openssl.git
7 years agoFix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 21 Jul 2016 14:24:16 +0000 (15:24 +0100)]
Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().

TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.

CVE-2016-2180

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ed26acce328ec16a3aa635f1ca37365e8c7403a)

7 years agoConvert memset calls to OPENSSL_cleanse
Matt Caswell [Fri, 24 Jun 2016 22:37:27 +0000 (23:37 +0100)]
Convert memset calls to OPENSSL_cleanse

Ensure things really do get cleared when we intend them to.

Addresses an OCAP Audit issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb5ebf961333896776fbce10ef88c2af7bec8aea)

7 years agoAllow proxy certs to be present when verifying a chain
Richard Levitte [Sun, 19 Jun 2016 08:55:43 +0000 (10:55 +0200)]
Allow proxy certs to be present when verifying a chain

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6ad8c48291622a6ccc51489b9a230c9a05ca5614)

7 years agoFix proxy certificate pathlength verification
Richard Levitte [Sun, 19 Jun 2016 08:55:29 +0000 (10:55 +0200)]
Fix proxy certificate pathlength verification

While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly.  This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30aeb3128199c15760a785d88a4eda9e156d5af6)

7 years agoCheck that the subject name in a proxy cert complies to RFC 3820
Richard Levitte [Sun, 19 Jun 2016 08:55:16 +0000 (10:55 +0200)]
Check that the subject name in a proxy cert complies to RFC 3820

The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.

RT#1852

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 338fb1688fbfb7efe0bdd475b01791a6de5ef94b)

7 years agoChange usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 16:06:56 +0000 (17:06 +0100)]
Change usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes

RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy
conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance
of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with
RAND_bytes().

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoMore fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Matt Caswell [Tue, 7 Jun 2016 08:12:51 +0000 (09:12 +0100)]
More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME

The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.

CVE-2016-2178

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b)

7 years agoFix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Cesar Pereida [Mon, 23 May 2016 09:45:25 +0000 (12:45 +0300)]
Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME

Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.

CVE-2016-2178

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534)

7 years agoUpdate CONTRIBUTING
Matt Caswell [Fri, 3 Jun 2016 16:12:08 +0000 (17:12 +0100)]
Update CONTRIBUTING

Fix typos and clarify a few things in the CONTRIBUTING file.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoAvoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
Matt Caswell [Thu, 5 May 2016 10:10:26 +0000 (11:10 +0100)]
Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic

A common idiom in the codebase is:

if (p + len > limit)
{
    return; /* Too long */
}

Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
limit == p + SIZE

"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
message).

The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
undefined behaviour.

For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2177

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoEnsure verify error is set when X509_verify_cert() fails
Viktor Dukhovni [Tue, 17 May 2016 22:25:40 +0000 (18:25 -0400)]
Ensure verify error is set when X509_verify_cert() fails

Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure.  Similarly for issuer lookup failures
and caller errors (bad parameters or invalid state).

Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the
verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set
it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns
an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error.

Add new and some missing error codes to X509 error -> SSL alert switch.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoClarify negative return from X509_verify_cert()
Viktor Dukhovni [Tue, 17 May 2016 01:38:03 +0000 (21:38 -0400)]
Clarify negative return from X509_verify_cert()

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoFix error return value in SRP functions
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 15:22:31 +0000 (16:22 +0100)]
Fix error return value in SRP functions

The functions SRP_Calc_client_key() and SRP_Calc_server_key() were
incorrectly returning a valid pointer in the event of error.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 308ff28673ae1a4a1b346761224b4a8851d41f58)

7 years agoCheck that the obtained public key is valid
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 15:50:59 +0000 (16:50 +0100)]
Check that the obtained public key is valid

In the X509 app check that the obtained public key is valid before we
attempt to use it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
7 years agoRecommend GH over RT, per team vote.
Rich Salz [Wed, 11 May 2016 20:46:44 +0000 (16:46 -0400)]
Recommend GH over RT, per team vote.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c393a5de99b5c565a124af8f69936dadde77184f)

7 years agoUpdate S/MIME certificates.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 11 May 2016 17:00:52 +0000 (18:00 +0100)]
Update S/MIME certificates.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
7 years agoOnly call FIPS_update, FIPS_final in FIPS mode.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sun, 8 May 2016 23:06:02 +0000 (00:06 +0100)]
Only call FIPS_update, FIPS_final in FIPS mode.

RT#3826

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b4825d0bb6057e44717007a54797df72babdb7e)

7 years agoConstify PKCS12_newpass()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 6 May 2016 02:46:09 +0000 (03:46 +0100)]
Constify PKCS12_newpass()

PR#4449

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1f8ba4dc7032a061d60b960c393178263e4a471)

7 years agoTidy up PKCS12_newpass() fix memory leaks.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 5 May 2016 14:37:23 +0000 (15:37 +0100)]
Tidy up PKCS12_newpass() fix memory leaks.

PR#4466

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06227924ad77fee9ead79189328aebf078c37add)

7 years agoOnly set CMS parameter when encrypting
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 6 May 2016 18:27:49 +0000 (19:27 +0100)]
Only set CMS parameter when encrypting

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 708cf5ded249f871fcd5e3de27d9281b1f37ae71)

7 years agoUse default ASN.1 for SEED.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 5 May 2016 21:17:05 +0000 (22:17 +0100)]
Use default ASN.1 for SEED.

The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes
CMS work with SEED.

PR#4504

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c0aa8c274843c5b8a70d70fc05d71fa3dfd510db)

7 years agoAlways try to set ASN.1 parameters for CMS.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 21 Mar 2016 15:48:51 +0000 (15:48 +0000)]
Always try to set ASN.1 parameters for CMS.

Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV
length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type.

This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use
an unsupported cipher type.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3fd60dc42288591737a35a90368d72dbd00fdef8)

Conflicts:
crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

7 years agoFix name length limit check.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 4 May 2016 15:09:06 +0000 (16:09 +0100)]
Fix name length limit check.

The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.

Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.

RT#4531

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4e0d184ac1dde845ba9574872e2ae5c903c81dff)

7 years agoFix double free in d2i_PrivateKey().
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 3 May 2016 14:05:31 +0000 (15:05 +0100)]
Fix double free in d2i_PrivateKey().

RT#4527

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3340e8bb186f689df5720352f65a9c0c42b6046b)

7 years agoadd documentation
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 3 May 2016 14:21:41 +0000 (15:21 +0100)]
add documentation

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1b3e14fbeb373a288ba20402600e071e6f402f8)

7 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1u-dev
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 May 2016 13:50:37 +0000 (14:50 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.0.1u-dev

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1t release OpenSSL_1_0_1t
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 May 2016 13:49:52 +0000 (14:49 +0100)]
Prepare for 1.0.1t release

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agomake update
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 May 2016 13:49:52 +0000 (14:49 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
7 years agoUpdate CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 May 2016 08:37:23 +0000 (09:37 +0100)]
Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
7 years agoFix ASN1_INTEGER handling.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 15 Apr 2016 01:37:09 +0000 (02:37 +0100)]
Fix ASN1_INTEGER handling.

Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER
tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used
for on the wire encoding.

Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.

This was found using libFuzzer.

RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
7 years agoCheck that we have enough padding characters.
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 16 Apr 2016 21:08:56 +0000 (23:08 +0200)]
Check that we have enough padding characters.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CVE-2016-2107

MR: #2572

7 years agoRemove some documentation for functions not in 1.0.x
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 May 2016 11:45:45 +0000 (12:45 +0100)]
Remove some documentation for functions not in 1.0.x

A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to
the 1.0.x branches.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
7 years agoAdd documentation for EVP_EncodeInit() and similar functions
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 10:54:30 +0000 (11:54 +0100)]
Add documentation for EVP_EncodeInit() and similar functions

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
7 years agoEnsure EVP_EncodeUpdate handles an output length that is too long
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 08:06:29 +0000 (09:06 +0100)]
Ensure EVP_EncodeUpdate handles an output length that is too long

With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
7 years agoAvoid overflow in EVP_EncodeUpdate
Matt Caswell [Fri, 4 Mar 2016 10:17:17 +0000 (10:17 +0000)]
Avoid overflow in EVP_EncodeUpdate

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.

Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.

User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2105

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
7 years agoPrevent EBCDIC overread for very long strings
Matt Caswell [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 09:46:55 +0000 (10:46 +0100)]
Prevent EBCDIC overread for very long strings

ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2176

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
7 years agoFix encrypt overflow
Matt Caswell [Thu, 3 Mar 2016 23:36:23 +0000 (23:36 +0000)]
Fix encrypt overflow

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)

7 years agoFix i2d_X509_AUX: pp can be NULL.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 2 May 2016 16:33:50 +0000 (17:33 +0100)]
Fix i2d_X509_AUX: pp can be NULL.

Reported by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 05aef4bbdbc18e7b9490512cdee41e8a608bcc0e)

7 years agoDon't free ret->data if malloc fails.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 27 Apr 2016 19:27:41 +0000 (20:27 +0100)]
Don't free ret->data if malloc fails.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64eaf6c928f4066d62aa86f805796ef05bd0b1cc)

7 years agoAdd checks to X509_NAME_oneline()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 18:45:44 +0000 (19:45 +0100)]
Add checks to X509_NAME_oneline()

Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537)

Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509.h
crypto/x509/x509_err.c

7 years agoSanity check buffer length.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 12:09:27 +0000 (13:09 +0100)]
Sanity check buffer length.

Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141b6dcce947708b984c5e9e91dad3d675d)

7 years agoAdd size limit to X509_NAME structure.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 11:55:29 +0000 (12:55 +0100)]
Add size limit to X509_NAME structure.

This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 295f3a24919157e2f9021d0b1709353710ad63db)

8 years agoReject inappropriate private key encryption ciphers.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 23 Apr 2016 12:33:05 +0000 (13:33 +0100)]
Reject inappropriate private key encryption ciphers.

The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function
properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers
(e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption
anyway.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d78df5dfd650e6de159a19a033513481064644f5)

8 years agoEnsure we check i2d_X509 return val
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 15:05:55 +0000 (16:05 +0100)]
Ensure we check i2d_X509 return val

The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 446ba8de9af9aa4fa3debc7c76a38f4efed47a62)

8 years agoFix a signed/unsigned warning
Matt Caswell [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 16:45:11 +0000 (17:45 +0100)]
Fix a signed/unsigned warning

This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2
and 1.0.1

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ca67644ddedfd656d43a6639d89a6236ff64652)

8 years agoFix NULL deref in apps/pkcs7
Rich Salz [Mon, 25 Apr 2016 12:56:54 +0000 (08:56 -0400)]
Fix NULL deref in apps/pkcs7

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79356a83b78a2d936dcd022847465d9ebf6c67b1)

8 years agoFix buffer overrun in ASN1_parse().
Viktor Dukhovni [Wed, 20 Apr 2016 02:23:24 +0000 (22:23 -0400)]
Fix buffer overrun in ASN1_parse().

Backport of commits:

        79c7f74d6cefd5d32fa20e69195ad3de834ce065
bdcd660e33710079b495cf5cc6a1aaa5d2dcd317

from master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
8 years agoHarden ASN.1 BIO handling of large amounts of data.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 11 Apr 2016 12:57:20 +0000 (13:57 +0100)]
Harden ASN.1 BIO handling of large amounts of data.

If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.

CVE-2016-2109

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c62981390d6cf9e3d612c489b8b77c2913b25807)

8 years agoFix memory leak on invalid CertificateRequest.
David Benjamin [Mon, 14 Mar 2016 19:03:07 +0000 (15:03 -0400)]
Fix memory leak on invalid CertificateRequest.

Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message
contains excess data.

The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side
only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would
be needed to have a significant impact.

This was found by libFuzzer.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec66c8c98881186abbb4a7ddd6617970f1ee27a7)

8 years agoFix FIPS SSLv2 test
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 26 Mar 2016 15:00:53 +0000 (15:00 +0000)]
Fix FIPS SSLv2 test

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 21211ade53f92629250bbea5e37d9179a31d3be2)

8 years agoFix the no-comp option for Windows
Matt Caswell [Thu, 17 Mar 2016 12:55:02 +0000 (12:55 +0000)]
Fix the no-comp option for Windows

no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code,
although it was suppressing its use.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a6406c95984a1009f5676bbcf60cc0d6db107af4)

8 years agoAdd a check for a failed malloc
Matt Caswell [Tue, 15 Mar 2016 11:51:48 +0000 (11:51 +0000)]
Add a check for a failed malloc

Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoEnsure that memory allocated for the ticket is freed
Matt Caswell [Tue, 15 Mar 2016 11:38:56 +0000 (11:38 +0000)]
Ensure that memory allocated for the ticket is freed

If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoFix a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex
Matt Caswell [Mon, 14 Mar 2016 17:06:19 +0000 (17:06 +0000)]
Fix a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex

There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b1508a0ffc9e724f975691f24eb045c05)

8 years agoAdd no-ssl2-method
Kurt Roeckx [Wed, 9 Mar 2016 17:10:52 +0000 (18:10 +0100)]
Add no-ssl2-method

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
MR: #2341
(cherry picked from commit 4256957570a233ed4e9840353e95e623dfd62086)

8 years agoexpose SSLv2 method prototypes
Viktor Dukhovni [Tue, 8 Mar 2016 20:30:27 +0000 (15:30 -0500)]
expose SSLv2 method prototypes

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
8 years agoRetain SSLv2 methods as functions that return NULL
Viktor Dukhovni [Mon, 7 Mar 2016 21:10:38 +0000 (21:10 +0000)]
Retain SSLv2 methods as functions that return NULL

This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agobn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: complement alloca with page-walking.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 4 Mar 2016 10:39:11 +0000 (11:39 +0100)]
bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: complement alloca with page-walking.

Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501)

Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoRemove LOW from the default
Kurt Roeckx [Sun, 10 Jan 2016 12:23:43 +0000 (13:23 +0100)]
Remove LOW from the default

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29cce508972f61511318bf8cf7011fae027cddb2)

8 years agoDon't shift serial number into sign bit
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:04:46 +0000 (18:04 +0000)]
Don't shift serial number into sign bit

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 01c32b5e448f6d42a23ff16bdc6bb0605287fa6f)

8 years agoSanity check PVK file fields.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 3 Mar 2016 23:37:36 +0000 (23:37 +0000)]
Sanity check PVK file fields.

PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an
integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption.
However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not
normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not
significant.

Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be
more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2b150139b8b057313d52b1fe8f126c952)

8 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1t-dev
Matt Caswell [Tue, 1 Mar 2016 13:42:02 +0000 (13:42 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.1t-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1s release OpenSSL_1_0_1s
Matt Caswell [Tue, 1 Mar 2016 13:40:46 +0000 (13:40 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.1s release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agomake update
Matt Caswell [Tue, 1 Mar 2016 13:40:45 +0000 (13:40 +0000)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoEnsure mk1mf.pl is aware of no-weak-ssl-ciphers option
Matt Caswell [Tue, 1 Mar 2016 12:08:33 +0000 (12:08 +0000)]
Ensure mk1mf.pl is aware of no-weak-ssl-ciphers option

Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoUpdate CHANGES and NEWS for new release
Matt Caswell [Tue, 1 Mar 2016 11:00:48 +0000 (11:00 +0000)]
Update CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoperlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl: handle inter-bank movd.
Andy Polyakov [Thu, 11 Sep 2014 22:06:00 +0000 (00:06 +0200)]
perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl: handle inter-bank movd.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 902b30df193afc3417a96ba72a81ed390bd50de3)

8 years agocrypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.pl: constant-time gather procedure.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 26 Jan 2016 15:25:02 +0000 (16:25 +0100)]
crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.pl: constant-time gather procedure.

[Backport from master]

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agobn/bn_exp.c: constant-time MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:34:41 +0000 (11:34 +0100)]
bn/bn_exp.c: constant-time MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF.

Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoDisable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3+ ciphers by default
Viktor Dukhovni [Fri, 19 Feb 2016 18:05:11 +0000 (13:05 -0500)]
Disable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3+ ciphers by default

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
8 years agoBring SSL method documentation up to date
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 18 Feb 2016 04:22:59 +0000 (23:22 -0500)]
Bring SSL method documentation up to date

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
8 years agoDisable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 18 Feb 2016 02:37:15 +0000 (21:37 -0500)]
Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.

SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not
configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if
"enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either
of:

    SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
    SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);

as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search
key recovery have been removed.  Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit
EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.

Mitigation for CVE-2016-0800

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
8 years agoFix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL ptr/heap corruption
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Feb 2016 10:27:18 +0000 (10:27 +0000)]
Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL ptr/heap corruption

In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.

This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.

All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-0797

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c175308407858afff3fc8c2e5e085d94d12edc7d)

8 years agoRevert "Don't check RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER."
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 27 Feb 2016 12:38:01 +0000 (13:38 +0100)]
Revert "Don't check RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER."

This reverts commit 23a58779f53a9060c823d00d76b3070cad61d9a3.

This broke existing engines that didn't properly implement the sign and verify
functions.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
MR: #2077

8 years agoFix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
Matt Caswell [Thu, 25 Feb 2016 13:09:46 +0000 (13:09 +0000)]
Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions

The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string
in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length
of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.

Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to
an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of
a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also
occur.

These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) >
sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second
issue dependent on compiler behaviour.

These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.

Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.

CVE-2016-0799

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 578b956fe741bf8e84055547b1e83c28dd902c73)

8 years agoCVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP
Emilia Kasper [Wed, 24 Feb 2016 11:59:59 +0000 (12:59 +0100)]
CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP

The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.

Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.

Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.

In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.

To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.

Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
8 years agoGH714: missing field initialisation
FdaSilvaYY [Fri, 19 Feb 2016 22:28:52 +0000 (23:28 +0100)]
GH714: missing field initialisation

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04f2a0b50d219aafcef2fa718d91462b587aa23d)

8 years agoFix double free in DSA private key parsing.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Feb 2016 12:47:23 +0000 (12:47 +0000)]
Fix double free in DSA private key parsing.

Fix double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.

Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.

CVE-2016-0705

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6c88c71b4e4825c7bc0489306d062d017634eb88)

8 years agomodes/ctr128.c: pay attention to ecount_buf alignment in CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 12 Feb 2016 13:07:27 +0000 (14:07 +0100)]
modes/ctr128.c: pay attention to ecount_buf alignment in CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt.

It's never problem if CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt is called from EVP, because
buffer in question is always aligned within EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure.

RT#4218

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e4bbeb49fb6522d858703201b5adee9611e7b7b)

8 years agoutil/mk1mf.pl: use LINK_CMD instead of LINK variable.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 3 Feb 2016 17:21:00 +0000 (18:21 +0100)]
util/mk1mf.pl: use LINK_CMD instead of LINK variable.

Trouble is that LINK variable assignment in make-file interferes with
LINK environment variable, which can be used to modify Microsoft's
LINK.EXE behaviour.

RT#4289

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d44bb1c31ca00f4359090daa15659c0dd1a08f0d)

Resolved conflicts:
util/pl/VC-32.pl

(cherry picked from commit 0fffd522426c7fc022894c8dd079dc2625c04096)

8 years agoms/uplink-x86.pl: make it work.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 9 Feb 2016 10:53:11 +0000 (11:53 +0100)]
ms/uplink-x86.pl: make it work.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 740b2b9a6cf31b02916a4d18f868e8a95934c083)

8 years agoFix CHANGES entry about DSA_generate_parameters_ex
Kurt Roeckx [Wed, 27 Jan 2016 19:31:57 +0000 (20:31 +0100)]
Fix CHANGES entry about DSA_generate_parameters_ex

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b0c11a620c3a3431410c5d56799286f60f60d8d)

8 years agoCorrect number of arguments in BIO_get_conn_int_port macro
Richard Levitte [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 16:55:11 +0000 (17:55 +0100)]
Correct number of arguments in BIO_get_conn_int_port macro

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41a28cb2944a4e1c9d13889757a3bd9f72abeca1)

8 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1s-dev
Matt Caswell [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 14:22:09 +0000 (14:22 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.1s-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoPrepare for 1.0.1r release OpenSSL_1_0_1r
Matt Caswell [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 14:21:21 +0000 (14:21 +0000)]
Prepare for 1.0.1r release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoTARFILE wasn't correctly set
Richard Levitte [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 14:18:50 +0000 (15:18 +0100)]
TARFILE wasn't correctly set

This solves an earlier cherry-pick mistake.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
8 years agoFurther updates to CHANGES and NEWS
Matt Caswell [Thu, 28 Jan 2016 12:28:53 +0000 (12:28 +0000)]
Further updates to CHANGES and NEWS

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoUpdate CHANGES and NEWS ready for release
Matt Caswell [Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:55:05 +0000 (13:55 +0000)]
Update CHANGES and NEWS ready for release

Update CHANGES and NEWS with details of the issues fixed in the forthcoming
release.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
8 years agoBetter SSLv2 cipher-suite enforcement
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 31 Dec 2015 03:44:51 +0000 (22:44 -0500)]
Better SSLv2 cipher-suite enforcement

Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>

CVE-2015-3197

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
8 years agoAlways generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites
Matt Caswell [Thu, 17 Dec 2015 02:57:20 +0000 (02:57 +0000)]
Always generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites

Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.

This is a follow on from CVE-2016-0701. This branch is not impacted by
that CVE because it does not support X9.42 style parameters. It is still
possible to generate parameters based on primes that are not "safe",
although by default OpenSSL does not do this. The documentation does
sign post that using such parameters is unsafe if the private DH key is
reused. However to avoid accidental problems or future attacks this commit
has been backported to this branch.

Issue reported by Antonio Sanso

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
8 years agoFix BSD -rpath parameter
Richard Levitte [Tue, 19 Jan 2016 19:35:41 +0000 (20:35 +0100)]
Fix BSD -rpath parameter

For BSD systems, Configure adds a shared_ldflags including a reference
to the Makefile variable LIBRPATH, but since it must be passed down to
Makefile.shared, care must be taken so the value of LIBRPATH doesn't
get expanded too early, or it ends up giving an empty string.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c64879d3f3cc4c7f1c436a9fe3bd109847a23629)

8 years agoValidate ClientHello session_id field length and send alert on failure
Alessandro Ghedini [Wed, 13 Jan 2016 12:49:24 +0000 (12:49 +0000)]
Validate ClientHello session_id field length and send alert on failure

RT#4080

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
8 years agoUpdate license year range to 2016
Prayag Verma [Mon, 18 Jan 2016 03:19:09 +0000 (08:49 +0530)]
Update license year range to 2016

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 02f70372470b4dd3b21443bb615292175f5d2c88)

8 years agoEmpty SNI names are not valid
Viktor Dukhovni [Sat, 16 Jan 2016 17:57:24 +0000 (12:57 -0500)]
Empty SNI names are not valid

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
8 years agoTo avoid possible time_t overflow use X509_time_adj_ex()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 14 Jan 2016 00:25:25 +0000 (00:25 +0000)]
To avoid possible time_t overflow use X509_time_adj_ex()

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9aa00b187a65b1f30789d6274ec31ea86efe7973)

Conflicts:
apps/x509.c

8 years agoChange minimum DH size from 768 to 1024
Kurt Roeckx [Sun, 10 Jan 2016 12:55:08 +0000 (13:55 +0100)]
Change minimum DH size from 768 to 1024

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
8 years agoFile is about s_time, not s_client
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 2 Jan 2016 19:42:27 +0000 (20:42 +0100)]
File is about s_time, not s_client

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1918e01c9f915e2eba31a5e2f86f0a5daa4fafb6)

8 years agoFix X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
Viktor Dukhovni [Fri, 1 Jan 2016 05:51:12 +0000 (00:51 -0500)]
Fix X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
8 years agoRT4202: Update rt URL's.
Rich Salz [Mon, 28 Dec 2015 19:58:23 +0000 (14:58 -0500)]
RT4202: Update rt URL's.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41977c53cd04f52b2b5e56d31ace782577620ac3)

8 years agoAdd some documentation for the OCSP callback functions
Matt Caswell [Mon, 30 Nov 2015 16:04:51 +0000 (16:04 +0000)]
Add some documentation for the OCSP callback functions

Describe the usage of the OCSP callback functions on both the client and
the server side.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c52c3b5e11253afabaa62739a8ee1c4c4bddcd53)