-/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "internal/x509_int.h"
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
- X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
-
- ai = a->cert_info;
- bi = b->cert_info;
- i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
- if (i)
- return (i);
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
+ const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+
+ if (b == NULL)
+ return a != NULL;
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ ai = &a->cert_info;
+ bi = &b->cert_info;
+ i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i < 0 ? -1 : 1;
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char md[16];
- char *f;
+ char *f = NULL;
+ EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
+ if (f == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ digest = EVP_MD_fetch(a->libctx, SN_md5, a->propq);
+ if (digest == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, digest, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
goto err;
- OPENSSL_free(f);
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
- (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+ (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
goto err;
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return (ret);
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ EVP_MD_free(digest);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
}
#endif
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
}
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
- return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+ int rv;
+
+ if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
+ && (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ else
+ return -2;
+
+ return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
}
-X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
{
- return (a->cert_info->issuer);
+ return a->cert_info.issuer;
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
+ return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+ return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
}
#endif
-X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
{
- return (a->cert_info->subject);
+ return a->cert_info.subject;
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
{
- return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
+ return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
+{
+ return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
+ return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+ return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
}
#endif
*/
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- int rv;
- /* ensure hash is valid */
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* attempt to compute cert hash */
+ (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+ if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
+ && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != 0)
+ return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1;
- rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if (rv)
- return rv;
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
- if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
- rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
- if (rv)
- return rv;
- return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
- a->cert_info->enc.len);
+ if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
+ if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
+ return 1;
+ rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc,
+ b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len);
}
- return rv;
+ return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
+}
+
+int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
+{
+ if (*p_sk == NULL && (*p_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return X509_add_cert(*p_sk, cert, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
+{
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
+ * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
+ */
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0) {
+ int ret = X509_self_signed(cert, 0);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
+ (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
+ (void)X509_up_ref(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
+/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
+{
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk, certs, flags);
+}
+
+int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ int flags)
+/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
+{
+ int n = sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
+ /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
+
+ if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
int ret;
- /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+ if (b == NULL)
+ return a != NULL;
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return -1;
- if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+ if (a->canon_enc == NULL || a->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
- if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+ if (b->canon_enc == NULL || b->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+ if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen == 0)
+ return 0;
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if (a->canon_enc == NULL || b->canon_enc == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+ }
+ return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0;
}
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq, int *ok)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq);
+ int i2d_ret;
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
- if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
- NULL))
- return 0;
-
- ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
- ) & 0xffffffffL;
- return (ret);
+ i2d_ret = i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ if (ok != NULL)
+ *ok = 0;
+ if (i2d_ret >= 0 && sha1 != NULL
+ && EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) {
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ if (ok != NULL)
+ *ok = 1;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(sha1);
+ return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
* this is reasonably efficient.
*/
-
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
+ if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
- && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
- && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
+ if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (ret);
+ end:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(md5);
+
+ return ret;
}
#endif
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
-X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
+ const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
int i;
- X509_CINF cinf;
X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
if (!sk)
return NULL;
- x.cert_info = &cinf;
- cinf.serialNumber = serial;
- cinf.issuer = name;
+ x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
+ x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
- return (x509);
+ return x509;
}
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
-X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
{
X509 *x509;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
- return (x509);
+ return x509;
}
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
{
- if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
- return (NULL);
- return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
}
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
- if (!x)
+ if (x == NULL)
return NULL;
- return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
}
-int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *cert, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- EVP_PKEY *xk;
- int ret;
-
- xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
- if (xk)
- ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
- else
- ret = -2;
+ if (xk == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ossl_x509_check_private_key(xk, pkey);
+}
- switch (ret) {
+int ossl_x509_check_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_eq(x, pkey)) {
case 1:
- break;
+ return 1;
case 0:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
- break;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
case -1:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
- break;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
case -2:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ /* fall thru */
+ default:
+ return 0;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
- if (ret > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
}
/*
static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
{
- const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+ char curve_name[80];
+ size_t curve_name_len;
int curve_nid;
- if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
- if (!grp)
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
- curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, curve_name, sizeof(curve_name),
+ &curve_name_len))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+ curve_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name);
/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
/*
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
- } else
+ } else {
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
-
+ }
return X509_V_OK;
}
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- unsigned long tflags;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ unsigned long tflags = flags;
+
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
- tflags = flags;
+
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
i = 1;
- } else
+ } else {
i = 0;
-
- if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ }
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
+ * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
+ * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
+ * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
+ */
+ if (chain == NULL)
+ return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
i = 0;
goto end;
}
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
goto end;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
goto end;
/* Final check: root CA signature */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
end:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
i--;
/*
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
- * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+ * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
*/
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
int sign_nid;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
- sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
}
#endif
+
/*
* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
*/
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
- STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
int i;
- ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+ if (!X509_up_ref(x))
+ goto err;
}
return ret;
+
+ err:
+ while (i-- > 0)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
+ sk_X509_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff