X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fx509_cmp.c;h=7094280d485e868590b0addd64bf66665e363151;hp=c7b0fe1e2955c1baf590077b6928a2ddc2104c23;hb=HEAD;hpb=c5ba2d990420e1778ca4a90bf882e0f806404af0 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c index c7b0fe1e29..7094280d48 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -1,169 +1,146 @@ -/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. +/* + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include -#include -#include "cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include -#include "internal/x509_int.h" +#include +#include "crypto/x509.h" int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int i; - X509_CINF *ai, *bi; - - ai = a->cert_info; - bi = b->cert_info; - i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); - if (i) - return (i); - return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); + const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; + + if (b == NULL) + return a != NULL; + if (a == NULL) + return -1; + ai = &a->cert_info; + bi = &b->cert_info; + i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); + if (i != 0) + return i < 0 ? -1 : 1; + return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) { unsigned long ret = 0; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char md[16]; - char *f; + char *f = NULL; + EVP_MD *digest = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) + if (ctx == NULL) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) + f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); + if (f == NULL) + goto err; + digest = EVP_MD_fetch(a->libctx, SN_md5, a->propq); + if (digest == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, digest, NULL)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) goto err; - OPENSSL_free(f); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate - (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, - (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) + (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, + (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) goto err; - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return (ret); + OPENSSL_free(f); + EVP_MD_free(digest); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; } #endif int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { - return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer); } int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { - return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); + int rv; + + if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 + && (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) + rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + else + return -2; + + return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0; } -X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) +X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->issuer); + return a->cert_info.issuer; } unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); + return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer); } #endif -X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) +X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->subject); + return a->cert_info.subject; } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { - return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; +} + +const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) +{ + return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; } unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { - return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); + return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject); } #endif @@ -177,67 +154,160 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - int rv; - /* ensure hash is valid */ - X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); - X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); + int rv = 0; + + if (a == b) /* for efficiency */ + return 0; + + /* attempt to compute cert hash */ + (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); + (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); + + if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 + && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) + rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (rv != 0) + return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1; - rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); - if (rv) - return rv; /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ - if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { - rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); - if (rv) - return rv; - return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, - a->cert_info->enc.len); + if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { + if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) + return -1; + if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) + return 1; + rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, + b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len); } - return rv; + return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0; +} + +int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, X509 *cert, int flags) +{ + if (*p_sk == NULL && (*p_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + return 0; + } + return X509_add_cert(*p_sk, cert, flags); +} + +int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags) +{ + if (sk == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) { + /* + * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find() + * because this re-orders the certs on the stack + */ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { + if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) + return 1; + } + } + if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0) { + int ret = X509_self_signed(cert, 0); + + if (ret != 0) + return ret > 0 ? 1 : 0; + } + if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert, + (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + return 0; + } + if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0) + (void)X509_up_ref(cert); + return 1; +} + +int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags) +/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */ +{ + if (sk == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk, certs, flags); +} + +int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + int flags) +/* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */ +{ + int n = sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i; + /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */ + + if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags)) + return 0; + } + return 1; } int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { int ret; - /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ + if (b == NULL) + return a != NULL; + if (a == NULL) + return -1; - if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { + /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ + if (a->canon_enc == NULL || a->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } - if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { + if (b->canon_enc == NULL || b->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; + if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen == 0) + return 0; - if (ret) - return ret; - - return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); + if (ret == 0) { + if (a->canon_enc == NULL || b->canon_enc == NULL) + return -2; + ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); + } + return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0; } -unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, + const char *propq, int *ok) { unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq); + int i2d_ret; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ - i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); - if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), - NULL)) - return 0; - - ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | - ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) - ) & 0xffffffffL; - return (ret); + i2d_ret = i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); + if (ok != NULL) + *ok = 0; + if (i2d_ret >= 0 && sha1 != NULL + && EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) { + ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | + ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) + ) & 0xffffffffL; + if (ok != NULL) + *ok = 1; + } + EVP_MD_free(sha1); + return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 @@ -245,53 +315,57 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, * this is reasonably efficient. */ - -unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x) { - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips"); + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[16]; + if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL) + goto end; + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ - i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) - && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) - && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) + if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) + goto end; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) + && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return (ret); + end: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + EVP_MD_free(md5); + + return ret; } #endif /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ -X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, - ASN1_INTEGER *serial) +X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name, + const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int i; - X509_CINF cinf; X509 x, *x509 = NULL; if (!sk) return NULL; - x.cert_info = &cinf; - cinf.serialNumber = serial; - cinf.issuer = name; + x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; + x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) - return (x509); + return x509; } - return (NULL); + return NULL; } -X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) +X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name) { X509 *x509; int i; @@ -299,53 +373,57 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) - return (x509); + return x509; } - return (NULL); + return NULL; } -EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) +EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { - if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) - return (NULL); - return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); + if (x == NULL) + return NULL; + return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); } -ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) +EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { - if (!x) + if (x == NULL) return NULL; - return x->cert_info->key->public_key; + return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); } -int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) +int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *cert, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - EVP_PKEY *xk; - int ret; - - xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); - if (xk) - ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); - else - ret = -2; + if (xk == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); + return 0; + } + return ossl_x509_check_private_key(xk, pkey); +} - switch (ret) { +int ossl_x509_check_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + if (x == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + switch (EVP_PKEY_eq(x, pkey)) { case 1: - break; + return 1; case 0: - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); - break; + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); + return 0; case -1: - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); - break; + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); + return 0; case -2: - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); + /* fall thru */ + default: + return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_free(xk); - if (ret > 0) - return 1; - return 0; } /* @@ -358,13 +436,18 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) { - const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; + char curve_name[80]; + size_t curve_name_len; int curve_nid; - if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); - if (!grp) + + if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; - curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, curve_name, sizeof(curve_name), + &curve_name_len)) + return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; + + curve_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name); /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ /* @@ -381,9 +464,9 @@ static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; - } else + } else { return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; - + } return X509_V_OK; } @@ -391,26 +474,37 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { int rv, i, sign_nid; - EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; - unsigned long tflags; + EVP_PKEY *pk; + unsigned long tflags = flags; + if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; - tflags = flags; + /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); i = 1; - } else + } else { i = 0; - - if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { + } + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + + /* + * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build + * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report + * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain + * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. + */ + if (chain == NULL) + return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); + + if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } - pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); /* Check EE key only */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { @@ -421,12 +515,11 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { + if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; goto end; } - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) goto end; @@ -435,7 +528,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* Final check: root CA signature */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); end: - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM @@ -443,7 +535,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, i--; /* * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 - * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. + * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. */ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; @@ -458,7 +550,7 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) int sign_nid; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; - sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); + sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); } @@ -475,6 +567,7 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) } #endif + /* * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of @@ -482,12 +575,22 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) */ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { - STACK_OF(X509) *ret; + STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); int i; - ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); + + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + + if (!X509_up_ref(x)) + goto err; } return ret; + + err: + while (i-- > 0) + X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); + sk_X509_free(ret); + return NULL; }