/*
- * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
#include "x509_local.h"
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT)
-
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca);
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+ int non_leaf);
+static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf);
+static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf);
+static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf);
static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
"CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any",
+ {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check_purpose,
+ "Any Purpose", "any",
NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
+ {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_ocsp_helper,
"OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign",
NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_CODE_SIGN, X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0,
+ check_purpose_code_sign, "Code signing", "codesign",
+ NULL},
};
#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard)
}
/*
- * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
- * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things.
+ * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I really
+ * can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const things.
+ * If id == -1 it just calls x509v3_cache_extensions() for its side-effect.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 if x does not allow purpose, -1 on (internal) error.
*/
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int non_leaf)
{
int idx;
const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
return -1;
-
- /* Return if side-effect only call */
if (id == -1)
return 1;
+
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
if (idx == -1)
return -1;
pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+ return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, non_leaf);
}
int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
{
if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
return 0;
}
*p = purpose;
{
int i;
X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0)
return -1;
}
+/* Returns -1 on error, else an index => 0 in standard/extended purpose table */
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE tmp;
int idx;
- if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+ if (purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN && purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)
return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
if (xptable == NULL)
return -1;
{
int idx;
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- /*
- * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
- */
+
+ /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
/* Need a new entry */
if (idx == -1) {
- if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- } else
+ } else {
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ }
/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
- if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+ if ((ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) != 0) {
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
}
- /* dup supplied name */
+ /* Dup supplied name */
ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
- if (ptmp->name == NULL|| ptmp->sname == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ptmp->name == NULL || ptmp->sname == NULL)
goto err;
- }
/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
/* Set all other flags */
if (idx == -1) {
if (xptable == NULL
&& (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
{
if (p == NULL)
return;
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+ if ((p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) != 0) {
+ if ((p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) != 0) {
OPENSSL_free(p->name);
OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
}
* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
* order because it will be searched using bsearch.
*/
-
static const int supported_nids[] = {
NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
#endif
+ NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, /* 369 */
NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
return 0;
}
-/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
{
const X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
int i;
if (dp->distpoint == NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) <= 0) {
- X509err(0, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT);
return 0;
}
if (dp->reasons != NULL) {
if (dp->distpoint == NULL || dp->distpoint->type != 1)
return 1;
- /* handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */
+ /* Handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */
/*
* Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant
* with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13
return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname) ? 1 : -1;
}
-/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */
+/* Return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
{
int i;
}
/* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */
-static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject)
+static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *issuer_key, const X509 *subject)
{
- int pkey_nid;
+ int subj_sig_nid;
- if (pkey == NULL)
+ if (issuer_key == NULL)
return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm),
- NULL, &pkey_nid) == 0)
+ NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0)
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
- if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey))
- return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
- return X509_V_OK;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, OBJ_nid2sn(subj_sig_nid))
+ || (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, "RSA") && subj_sig_nid == NID_rsassaPss))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
}
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS)
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)) == 0)
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)) == 0)
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 && ((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)) == 0)
/*
* Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information,
* e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields.
+ * x->sha1_hash is filled in, or else EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT is set in x->flags.
* X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully.
* Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid.
*/
-int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+int ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
int res;
#ifdef tsan_ld_acq
- /* fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
+ /* Fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached))
return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
#endif
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { /* cert has already been processed */
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock))
+ return 0;
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) { /* Cert has already been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
+
ERR_set_mark();
/* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */
if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
- /*
- * Note that the cert is marked invalid also on internal malloc failure
- * or on failure of EVP_MD_fetch(), potentially called by X509_digest().
- */
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT;
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
- if (X509_get_version(x) == 0)
+ if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
/* Handle basic constraints */
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
if (bs->pathlen != NULL) {
/*
- * the error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain_extensions()
+ * The error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain()
* in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
*/
if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
- X509err(0, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
} else {
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
/* Handle proxy certificates */
if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
/* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
if (x->ex_kusage == 0) {
- X509err(0, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
} else if (i != -1) {
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
break;
default:
- /* ignore unknown extended key usage */
+ /* Ignore unknown extended key usage */
break;
}
}
/* Check if subject name matches issuer */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* cert is self-issued */
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* Cert is self-issued */
if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */
/* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */
&& check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */
- /* This is very related to x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */
+ /* This is very related to ossl_x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */
}
/* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */
res = setup_crldp(x);
if (res == 0)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- else if (res < 0)
- goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL);
}
/* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */
- (void)x509_init_sig_info(x);
+ (void)ossl_x509_init_sig_info(x);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* Indicate that cert has been processed */
#ifdef tsan_st_rel
tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1);
/*
*/
#endif
ERR_pop_to_mark();
+
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
return 1;
}
- X509err(0, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
-
- err:
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
- return 1;
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0) {
/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
- else
- return 0;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0;
} else {
- /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
+ /* We support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
return 3;
/*
* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
*/
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+ else if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0)
return 4;
/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
+ else if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0
+ && (x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) != 0)
return 5;
- /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
+ /* Can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it. */
return 0;
}
}
void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x)
{
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ }
}
void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l)
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
{
/* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */
- if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
return 0;
return check_ca(x);
}
-/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server. */
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
{
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
- return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
- return ca_ret;
- else
+ int ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+
+ if (ca_ret == 0)
return 0;
+ /* Check nsCertType if present */
+ return ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) != 0;
}
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
return 0;
- if (ca)
+ if (non_leaf)
return check_ssl_ca(x);
/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
* key types.
*/
#define KU_TLS \
- KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
+ KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
return 0;
- if (ca)
+ if (non_leaf)
return check_ssl_ca(x);
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
}
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
- int ret;
- ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ int ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, non_leaf);
+
+ if (!ret || non_leaf)
return ret;
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
- return 0;
- return ret;
+ return ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) ? 0 : ret;
}
/* common S/MIME checks */
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int non_leaf)
{
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
return 0;
- if (ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if (!ca_ret)
+ if (non_leaf) {
+ int ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+
+ if (ca_ret == 0)
return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
+ /* Check nsCertType if present */
+ if (ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) != 0)
return ca_ret;
else
return 0;
}
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
- if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0) {
+ if ((x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) != 0)
return 1;
/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
- if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
- return 2;
- return 0;
+ return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) != 0 ? 2 : 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ int ret = purpose_smime(x, non_leaf);
+
+ if (!ret || non_leaf)
return ret;
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
- return 0;
- return ret;
+ return ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION) ? 0 : ret;
}
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if (!ret || ca)
+ int ret = purpose_smime(x, non_leaf);
+
+ if (!ret || non_leaf)
return ret;
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
- return 0;
- return ret;
+ return ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) ? 0 : ret;
}
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
- if (ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
- return ca_ret;
- else
- return 0;
+ if (non_leaf) {
+ int ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+
+ return ca_ret == 2 ? 0 : ca_ret;
}
- if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return !ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN);
}
/*
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
*/
-
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf)
{
/*
* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value
* (2)?
*/
- if (ca)
+ if (non_leaf)
return check_ca(x);
- /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+ /* Leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
return 1;
}
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
- int ca)
+ int non_leaf)
{
int i_ext;
- /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
- if (ca)
+ /*
+ * If non_leaf is true we must check if this is a valid CA certificate.
+ * The extra requirements by the CA/Browser Forum are not checked.
+ */
+ if (non_leaf)
return check_ca(x);
+ /*
+ * Key Usage is checked according to RFC 5280 and
+ * Extended Key Usage attributes is checked according to RFC 3161.
+ * The extra (and somewhat conflicting) CA/Browser Forum
+ * Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
+ * Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates, Version 3.0.0,
+ * Section 7.1.2.3: Code signing and Timestamp Certificate are not checked.
+ */
/*
* Check the optional key usage field:
* if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
* and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
* be rejected).
*/
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0
&& ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
return 0;
- /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
+ /* Only timestamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) == 0 || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
return 0;
/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+ if (i_ext >= 0
+ && !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext)))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf)
+{
+ int i_ext;
+
+ /*
+ * If non_leaf is true we must check if this is a valid CA certificate.
+ * The extra requirements by the CA/Browser Forum are not checked.
+ */
+ if (non_leaf)
+ return check_ca(x);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the key usage and extended key usage fields:
+ *
+ * Reference: CA/Browser Forum,
+ * Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
+ * Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates, Version 3.0.0,
+ * Section 7.1.2.3: Code signing and Timestamp Certificate
+ *
+ * Checking covers Key Usage and Extended Key Usage attributes.
+ * The certificatePolicies, cRLDistributionPoints (CDP), and
+ * authorityInformationAccess (AIA) extensions are so far not checked.
+ */
+ /* Key Usage */
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((x->ex_kusage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((x->ex_kusage & (KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Key Usage MUST be critical */
+ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1);
+ if (i_ext < 0)
+ return 0;
if (i_ext >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
return 0;
}
+ /* Extended Key Usage */
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((x->ex_xkusage & XKU_CODE_SIGN) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((x->ex_xkusage & (XKU_ANYEKU | XKU_SSL_SERVER)) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
+
}
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+ int non_leaf)
{
return 1;
}
* This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which
* have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name.
* These are:
- * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
- * 2. If akid(subject) exists, check that it matches issuer
- * 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm
- * 4. Check that any key_usage(issuer) allows certificate signing
+ * 1. issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists, it matches the respective issuer fields.
+ * 3. subject signature algorithm == issuer public key algorithm
+ * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, it allows for signing subject.
* Note that this does not include actually checking the signature.
* Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch
* where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
{
int ret;
- if ((ret = x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK)
+ if ((ret = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK)
return ret;
- return x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject);
+ return ossl_x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject);
}
/* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */
-int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+int ossl_x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
{
int ret;
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
/* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */
- if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer)
- || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject))
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer)
+ || !ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(subject))
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
if (ret != X509_V_OK)
return ret;
- /* check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
+ /* Check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject);
}
* Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection
* where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
*/
-int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject)
+int ossl_x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject)
{
- if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ if ((subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) {
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
- } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+ } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+ }
return X509_V_OK;
}
* GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
* we only take any notice of the first.
*/
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
int i;
- gens = akid->issuer;
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
return x->ex_flags;
}
uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
- return x->ex_kusage;
- return UINT32_MAX;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 ? x->ex_kusage : UINT32_MAX;
}
uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
- return x->ex_xkusage;
- return UINT32_MAX;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 ? x->ex_xkusage : UINT32_MAX;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return NULL;
return x->skid;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL);
}
const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL);
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL);
}
long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x)
{
/* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1
|| (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0)
return -1;
return x->ex_pathlen;
long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x)
{
/* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1
|| (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0)
return -1;
return x->ex_pcpathlen;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff