X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fv3_purp.c;h=40f976bdda505321b6f9aa69e111836589f9eee1;hp=2d4098b6292af90bde5fe50ebc7f9889513c95a2;hb=HEAD;hpb=da6c691d6d417ad413fdc1e7a7a183d005e7fefd diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509/v3_purp.c index 2d4098b629..e917c455de 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/v3_purp.c +++ b/crypto/x509/v3_purp.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -16,29 +16,28 @@ #include "internal/tsan_assist.h" #include "x509_local.h" -DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) -DEFINE_STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) -DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) -DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) - static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); + int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); + int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); + int non_leaf); +static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); + int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); + int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); + int non_leaf); static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca); -static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); -static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); + int non_leaf); +static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf); +static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf); +static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf); static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); @@ -56,13 +55,17 @@ static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", + {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check_purpose, + "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, - {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, + {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, + {X509_PURPOSE_CODE_SIGN, X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, + check_purpose_code_sign, "Code signing", "codesign", + NULL}, }; #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard) @@ -75,32 +78,32 @@ static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) } /* - * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I - * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const - * things. + * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I really + * can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const things. + * If id == -1 it just calls x509v3_cache_extensions() for its side-effect. + * Returns 1 on success, 0 if x does not allow purpose, -1 on (internal) error. */ -int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) +int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int non_leaf) { int idx; const X509_PURPOSE *pt; - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) + if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) return -1; - - /* Return if side-effect only call */ if (id == -1) return 1; + idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); if (idx == -1) return -1; pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); - return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); + return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, non_leaf); } int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) { if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); return 0; } *p = purpose; @@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) { int i; X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; + for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0) @@ -135,12 +139,13 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) return -1; } +/* Returns -1 on error, else an index => 0 in standard/extended purpose table */ int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) { X509_PURPOSE tmp; int idx; - if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) + if (purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN && purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX) return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; if (xptable == NULL) return -1; @@ -157,9 +162,8 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, { int idx; X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; - /* - * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it - */ + + /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; @@ -167,26 +171,23 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); /* Need a new entry */ if (idx == -1) { - if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) return 0; - } ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; - } else + } else { ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); + } /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ - if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { + if ((ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) != 0) { OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); } - /* dup supplied name */ + /* Dup supplied name */ ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname); - if (ptmp->name == NULL|| ptmp->sname == NULL) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (ptmp->name == NULL || ptmp->sname == NULL) goto err; - } /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* Set all other flags */ @@ -201,11 +202,11 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, if (idx == -1) { if (xptable == NULL && (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { - X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } } @@ -223,8 +224,8 @@ static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) { if (p == NULL) return; - if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { - if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { + if ((p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) != 0) { + if ((p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) != 0) { OPENSSL_free(p->name); OPENSSL_free(p->sname); } @@ -275,7 +276,6 @@ int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical * order because it will be searched using bsearch. */ - static const int supported_nids[] = { NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ @@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ #endif + NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, /* 369 */ NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ @@ -305,14 +306,14 @@ int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) return 0; } -/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */ +/* Returns 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */ static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) { const X509_NAME *iname = NULL; int i; if (dp->distpoint == NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) <= 0) { - X509err(0, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT); return 0; } if (dp->reasons != NULL) { @@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) if (dp->distpoint == NULL || dp->distpoint->type != 1) return 1; - /* handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */ + /* Handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */ /* * Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant * with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13 @@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname) ? 1 : -1; } -/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */ +/* Return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */ static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) { int i; @@ -366,35 +367,37 @@ static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) } /* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */ -static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject) +static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *issuer_key, const X509 *subject) { - int pkey_nid; + int subj_sig_nid; - if (pkey == NULL) + if (issuer_key == NULL) return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm), - NULL, &pkey_nid) == 0) + NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; - if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) - return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH; - return X509_V_OK; + if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, OBJ_nid2sn(subj_sig_nid)) + || (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, "RSA") && subj_sig_nid == NID_rsassaPss)) + return X509_V_OK; + return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH; } -#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) +#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS) #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)) == 0) #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)) == 0) #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) + (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 && ((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)) == 0) /* * Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information, * e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields. + * x->sha1_hash is filled in, or else EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT is set in x->flags. * X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully. * Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid. */ -int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) +int ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) { BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; @@ -405,28 +408,26 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) int res; #ifdef tsan_ld_acq - /* fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */ + /* Fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */ if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached)) return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; #endif - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock); - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { /* cert has already been processed */ + if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) + return 0; + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) { /* Cert has already been processed */ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; } + ERR_set_mark(); /* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */ if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL)) - /* - * Note that the cert is marked invalid also on internal malloc failure - * or on failure of EVP_MD_fetch(), potentially called by X509_digest(). - */ - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT; /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ - if (X509_get_version(x) == 0) + if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; /* Handle basic constraints */ @@ -436,11 +437,11 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; if (bs->pathlen != NULL) { /* - * the error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain_extensions() + * The error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain() * in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT */ if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { - X509err(0, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } else { x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); @@ -454,7 +455,7 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) /* Handle proxy certificates */ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; @@ -481,7 +482,7 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); /* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ if (x->ex_kusage == 0) { - X509err(0, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } } else if (i != -1) { @@ -523,7 +524,7 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; break; default: - /* ignore unknown extended key usage */ + /* Ignore unknown extended key usage */ break; } } @@ -555,12 +556,12 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) /* Check if subject name matches issuer */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* cert is self-issued */ + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* Cert is self-issued */ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */ /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */ && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */ - /* This is very related to x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */ + /* This is very related to ossl_x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */ } /* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */ @@ -575,8 +576,6 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) res = setup_crldp(x); if (res == 0) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; - else if (res < 0) - goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL); @@ -617,9 +616,9 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) } /* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */ - (void)x509_init_sig_info(x); + (void)ossl_x509_init_sig_info(x); - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */ + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* Indicate that cert has been processed */ #ifdef tsan_st_rel tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1); /* @@ -629,15 +628,13 @@ int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) */ #endif ERR_pop_to_mark(); + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); return 1; } - X509err(0, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); - - err: - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } @@ -658,32 +655,33 @@ static int check_ca(const X509 *x) /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) - return 1; + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0) { /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ - else - return 0; + return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0; } else { - /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ + /* We support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; /* * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) + else if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0) return 4; /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ - else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) + else if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 + && (x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) != 0) return 5; - /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ + /* Can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it. */ return 0; } } void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; + if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) { + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); + } } void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l) @@ -694,32 +692,29 @@ void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l) int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) { /* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */ - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) + if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) return 0; return check_ca(x); } -/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ +/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server. */ static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) { - int ca_ret; - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) - return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) - return ca_ret; - else + int ca_ret = check_ca(x); + + if (ca_ret == 0) return 0; + /* Check nsCertType if present */ + return ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) != 0; } static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; - if (ca) + if (non_leaf) return check_ssl_ca(x); /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) @@ -736,14 +731,14 @@ static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, * key types. */ #define KU_TLS \ - KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT + KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) return 0; - if (ca) + if (non_leaf) return check_ssl_ca(x); if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) @@ -756,137 +751,188 @@ static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, } static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { - int ret; - ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) + int ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, non_leaf); + + if (!ret || non_leaf) return ret; /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; + return ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) ? 0 : ret; } /* common S/MIME checks */ -static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) +static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int non_leaf) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) return 0; - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - ca_ret = check_ca(x); - if (!ca_ret) + if (non_leaf) { + int ca_ret = check_ca(x); + + if (ca_ret == 0) return 0; - /* check nsCertType if present */ - if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) + /* Check nsCertType if present */ + if (ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) != 0) return ca_ret; else return 0; } - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0) { + if ((x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) != 0) return 1; /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ - if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) - return 2; - return 0; + return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) != 0 ? 2 : 0; } return 1; } static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { - int ret; - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) + int ret = purpose_smime(x, non_leaf); + + if (!ret || non_leaf) return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) - return 0; - return ret; + return ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION) ? 0 : ret; } static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { - int ret; - ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); - if (!ret || ca) + int ret = purpose_smime(x, non_leaf); + + if (!ret || non_leaf) return ret; - if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) - return 0; - return ret; + return ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) ? 0 : ret; } static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { - if (ca) { - int ca_ret; - if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) - return ca_ret; - else - return 0; + if (non_leaf) { + int ca_ret = check_ca(x); + + return ca_ret == 2 ? 0 : ca_ret; } - if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) - return 0; - return 1; + return !ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN); } /* * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. */ - -static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) +static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf) { /* * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value * (2)? */ - if (ca) + if (non_leaf) return check_ca(x); - /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ + /* Leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ return 1; } static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, - int ca) + int non_leaf) { int i_ext; - /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ - if (ca) + /* + * If non_leaf is true we must check if this is a valid CA certificate. + * The extra requirements by the CA/Browser Forum are not checked. + */ + if (non_leaf) return check_ca(x); + /* + * Key Usage is checked according to RFC 5280 and + * Extended Key Usage attributes is checked according to RFC 3161. + * The extra (and somewhat conflicting) CA/Browser Forum + * Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of + * Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates, Version 3.0.0, + * Section 7.1.2.3: Code signing and Timestamp Certificate are not checked. + */ /* * Check the optional key usage field: * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall * be rejected). */ - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) return 0; - /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) + /* Only timestamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) == 0 || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) return 0; /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); + if (i_ext >= 0 + && !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext))) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf) +{ + int i_ext; + + /* + * If non_leaf is true we must check if this is a valid CA certificate. + * The extra requirements by the CA/Browser Forum are not checked. + */ + if (non_leaf) + return check_ca(x); + + /* + * Check the key usage and extended key usage fields: + * + * Reference: CA/Browser Forum, + * Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of + * Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates, Version 3.0.0, + * Section 7.1.2.3: Code signing and Timestamp Certificate + * + * Checking covers Key Usage and Extended Key Usage attributes. + * The certificatePolicies, cRLDistributionPoints (CDP), and + * authorityInformationAccess (AIA) extensions are so far not checked. + */ + /* Key Usage */ + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0) + return 0; + if ((x->ex_kusage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) + return 0; + if ((x->ex_kusage & (KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | KU_CRL_SIGN)) != 0) + return 0; + + /* Key Usage MUST be critical */ + i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_key_usage, -1); + if (i_ext < 0) + return 0; if (i_ext >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) return 0; } + /* Extended Key Usage */ + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) == 0) + return 0; + if ((x->ex_xkusage & XKU_CODE_SIGN) == 0) + return 0; + if ((x->ex_xkusage & (XKU_ANYEKU | XKU_SSL_SERVER)) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; + } -static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) +static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, + int non_leaf) { return 1; } @@ -896,10 +942,10 @@ static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which * have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name. * These are: - * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) - * 2. If akid(subject) exists, check that it matches issuer - * 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm - * 4. Check that any key_usage(issuer) allows certificate signing + * 1. issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) + * 2. If akid(subject) exists, it matches the respective issuer fields. + * 3. subject signature algorithm == issuer public key algorithm + * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, it allows for signing subject. * Note that this does not include actually checking the signature. * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert(). @@ -908,13 +954,13 @@ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { int ret; - if ((ret = x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK) + if ((ret = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK) return ret; - return x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject); + return ossl_x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject); } /* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */ -int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) +int ossl_x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { int ret; @@ -923,15 +969,15 @@ int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; /* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */ - if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) - || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) + if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) + || !ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); if (ret != X509_V_OK) return ret; - /* check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */ + /* Check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */ return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject); } @@ -942,13 +988,14 @@ int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert(). */ -int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject) +int ossl_x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject) { - if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { + if ((subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) { if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) + } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) { return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; + } return X509_V_OK; } @@ -972,11 +1019,11 @@ int X509_check_akid(const X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but * we only take any notice of the first. */ - GENERAL_NAMES *gens; + GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; GENERAL_NAME *gen; X509_NAME *nm = NULL; int i; - gens = akid->issuer; + for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { @@ -993,34 +1040,30 @@ int X509_check_akid(const X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); + X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); return x->ex_flags; } uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return 0; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) - return x->ex_kusage; - return UINT32_MAX; + return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 ? x->ex_kusage : UINT32_MAX; } uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return 0; - if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) - return x->ex_xkusage; - return UINT32_MAX; + return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 ? x->ex_xkusage : UINT32_MAX; } const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return NULL; return x->skid; } @@ -1028,7 +1071,7 @@ const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x) const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return NULL; return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL); } @@ -1036,7 +1079,7 @@ const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x) const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return NULL; return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL); } @@ -1044,7 +1087,7 @@ const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x) const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1) + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return NULL; return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL); } @@ -1052,7 +1095,7 @@ const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x) long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x) { /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1 + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1 || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) return -1; return x->ex_pathlen; @@ -1061,7 +1104,7 @@ long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x) long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x) { /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ - if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1 + if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1 || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0) return -1; return x->ex_pcpathlen;