2 * Copyright 2002-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * EC_KEY low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
23 # include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
26 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
28 #include "crypto/bn.h"
30 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
34 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
36 return ossl_ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL, NULL);
40 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq)
42 return ossl_ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, propq, NULL);
45 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq,
48 EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx, propq);
51 ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx, propq, nid);
52 if (ret->group == NULL) {
56 if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
57 && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
65 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
67 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL, NULL, nid);
71 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
78 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i);
79 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
82 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
84 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
87 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
88 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
91 if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
92 r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
95 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
97 CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
98 EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
99 EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
100 BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
101 OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
103 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
106 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
108 if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
109 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
112 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
113 if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
114 dest->meth->finish(dest);
115 if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
116 dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
117 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
118 if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
123 dest->libctx = src->libctx;
124 /* copy the parameters */
125 if (src->group != NULL) {
126 /* clear the old group */
127 EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
128 dest->group = ossl_ec_group_new_ex(src->libctx, src->propq,
130 if (dest->group == NULL)
132 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
135 /* copy the public key */
136 if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
137 EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
138 dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
139 if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
141 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
144 /* copy the private key */
145 if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
146 if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
147 dest->priv_key = BN_new();
148 if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
151 if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
153 if (src->group->meth->keycopy
154 && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
161 dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
162 dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
163 dest->version = src->version;
164 dest->flags = src->flags;
166 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
167 &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
171 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
172 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
173 if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
175 dest->engine = src->engine;
177 dest->meth = src->meth;
180 if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
188 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
190 return ossl_ec_key_dup(ec_key, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL);
193 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
197 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i) <= 0)
200 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
201 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
202 return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
205 ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
207 return eckey->engine;
210 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
212 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
213 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
216 if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
219 ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
229 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
233 ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
241 * Refer: FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A Additional Comment 1
242 * Perform a KAT by duplicating the public key generation.
244 * NOTE: This issue requires a background understanding, provided in a separate
245 * document; the current IG 10.3.A AC1 is insufficient regarding the PCT for
246 * the key agreement scenario.
248 * Currently IG 10.3.A requires PCT in the mode of use prior to use of the
249 * key pair, citing the PCT defined in the associated standard. For key
250 * agreement, the only PCT defined in SP 800-56A is that of Section 5.6.2.4:
251 * the comparison of the original public key to a newly calculated public key.
253 static int ecdsa_keygen_knownanswer_test(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx,
254 OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
257 OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
258 unsigned char bytes[512] = {0};
259 EC_POINT *pub_key2 = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
261 if (pub_key2 == NULL)
264 st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
268 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT_KAT,
269 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
271 /* pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
272 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key2, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
275 if (BN_num_bytes(pub_key2->X) > (int)sizeof(bytes))
277 len = BN_bn2bin(pub_key2->X, bytes);
278 if (OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, bytes)
279 && BN_bin2bn(bytes, len, pub_key2->X) == NULL)
281 ret = !EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, pub_key2, ctx);
284 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
285 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
286 EC_POINT_free(pub_key2);
291 * ECC Key generation.
292 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
295 * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
296 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
297 * is stored in this object.
298 * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
299 * fails then the keypair is not generated,
300 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
302 static int ec_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
305 BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
306 const BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
307 BIGNUM *order = NULL;
308 EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
309 const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
310 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
311 int sm2 = EC_KEY_get_flags(eckey) & EC_FLAG_SM2_RANGE ? 1 : 0;
316 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
317 priv_key = BN_secure_new();
318 if (priv_key == NULL)
321 priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
324 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
325 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
326 * stated in the security policy.
329 tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
334 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
335 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
336 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
337 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
338 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
339 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
342 /* range of SM2 private key is [1, n-1) */
345 if (order == NULL || !BN_sub(order, tmp, BN_value_one()))
354 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, 0, ctx))
356 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
358 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
359 pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
363 pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
365 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
366 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
369 eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
370 eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
378 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
382 OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
385 OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(eckey->libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
386 ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg)
387 && ecdsa_keygen_knownanswer_test(eckey, ctx, cb, cbarg);
390 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
392 ossl_set_error_state(OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT);
393 BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
394 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
395 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
398 EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
399 BN_clear_free(priv_key);
407 * This is similar to ec_generate_key(), except it uses an ikm to
408 * derive the private key.
410 int ossl_ec_generate_key_dhkem(EC_KEY *eckey,
411 const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikmlen)
415 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
416 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
417 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
420 if (ossl_ec_dhkem_derive_private(eckey, eckey->priv_key, ikm, ikmlen) <= 0)
422 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
423 eckey->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
424 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
427 if (!ossl_ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(eckey))
433 BN_clear_free(eckey->priv_key);
434 eckey->priv_key = NULL;
435 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
436 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key);
442 int ossl_ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
444 return ec_generate_key(eckey, 0);
447 int ossl_ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
450 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
456 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
457 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
459 ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
469 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
471 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
472 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
476 if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
477 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
481 return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
485 * Check the range of the EC public key.
486 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
488 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
489 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
490 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
491 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
493 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
504 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
507 if (EC_GROUP_get_field_type(key->group) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
508 if (BN_is_negative(x)
509 || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
511 || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
515 int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
516 if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
527 * ECC Partial Public-Key Validation as specified in SP800-56A R3
528 * Section 5.6.2.3.4 ECC Partial Public-Key Validation Routine.
530 int ossl_ec_key_public_check_quick(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
532 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
533 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
537 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
538 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
539 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
543 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
544 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
545 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
549 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
550 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
551 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
558 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
559 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation Routine.
561 int ossl_ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
564 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
565 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
567 if (!ossl_ec_key_public_check_quick(eckey, ctx))
570 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
574 order = eckey->group->order;
575 if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
576 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
579 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
580 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
581 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
584 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
585 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
590 EC_POINT_free(point);
595 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
596 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
597 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
599 int ossl_ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
601 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
602 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
605 if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
606 || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
607 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
614 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
615 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
616 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
618 int ossl_ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
621 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
624 || eckey->group == NULL
625 || eckey->pub_key == NULL
626 || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
627 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
631 point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
636 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
637 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
640 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
641 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
646 EC_POINT_free(point);
652 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
653 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
654 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
655 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
657 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
658 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
659 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
661 int ossl_ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
667 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
670 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
673 if (!ossl_ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
676 if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
677 if (!ossl_ec_key_private_check(eckey)
678 || !ossl_ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
687 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
692 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
695 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
696 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
699 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
704 point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
709 tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
710 ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
714 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
716 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
720 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
721 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
723 if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
724 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
728 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
729 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
732 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
740 EC_POINT_free(point);
745 OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
750 const char *ossl_ec_key_get0_propq(const EC_KEY *key)
755 void ossl_ec_key_set0_libctx(EC_KEY *key, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
757 key->libctx = libctx;
758 /* Do we need to propagate this to the group? */
761 const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
766 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
768 if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
770 EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
771 key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
772 if (key->group != NULL && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(key->group) == NID_sm2)
773 EC_KEY_set_flags(key, EC_FLAG_SM2_RANGE);
776 return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
779 const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
781 return key->priv_key;
784 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
787 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
788 BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
790 if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
794 * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
795 * fully initialized state.
797 * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
798 * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
799 * as an EC private key.
801 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
802 if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
803 return 0; /* This should never happen */
805 if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
806 && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
808 if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
809 && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
813 * Return `0` to comply with legacy behavior for this function, see
814 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18744#issuecomment-1195175696
816 if (priv_key == NULL) {
817 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
818 key->priv_key = NULL;
819 return 0; /* intentional for legacy compatibility */
823 * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
824 * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
825 * holding the secret scalar.
827 * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
828 * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
829 * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
830 * the caller specifically set it.
832 * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
833 * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
834 * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
836 * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
837 * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
838 * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
839 * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
841 * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
842 * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
843 * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
844 * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
850 * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
851 * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
852 * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
855 * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
856 * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
857 * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
858 * might temporarily overflow the order length.
860 tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
864 BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
866 fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
867 if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
868 BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
872 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
873 key->priv_key = tmp_key;
879 const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
884 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
886 if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
887 && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
889 EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
890 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
892 return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
895 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
897 return key->enc_flag;
900 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
902 key->enc_flag = flags;
905 point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
907 return key->conv_form;
910 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
912 key->conv_form = cform;
913 if (key->group != NULL)
914 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
917 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
919 if (key->group != NULL)
920 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
924 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
926 if (key->group == NULL)
928 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
932 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
937 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
943 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
945 key->flags &= ~flags;
949 int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key)
951 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
953 return key->group->decoded_from_explicit_params;
956 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
957 unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
959 if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
961 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
964 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
967 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
969 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
970 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
971 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
973 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
977 * Save the point conversion form.
978 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
979 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
980 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
981 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
983 if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
984 key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
988 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
989 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
991 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
993 if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
994 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
998 return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
1001 size_t ossl_ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
1002 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
1006 buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
1007 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
1011 else if (len < buf_len)
1014 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
1016 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
1017 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
1024 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
1028 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
1030 if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
1031 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
1034 ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
1040 int ossl_ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf,
1043 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
1044 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
1045 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
1046 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1049 if (BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key) == NULL) {
1050 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1057 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
1062 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
1065 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
1067 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
1076 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
1078 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
1079 || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
1085 * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
1086 * Perform a sign/verify operation.
1088 * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
1089 * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
1090 * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
1093 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
1097 unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
1098 int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
1099 ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
1100 OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
1102 st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
1106 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
1107 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
1109 sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
1113 OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
1115 if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
1120 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
1121 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
1122 ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);