{
}
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
- */
-extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type);
-
int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
- if (PKCS12_key_gen == NULL || en_de)
- /*
- * Default to UTF-8, but force it in encrypt case.
- */
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
- else
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
+ pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
if (cipher == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * |PKCS12_key_gen| is used to convey information about old-style broken
- * password being used to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen in decrypt cases. Workflow
- * is if PKCS12_verify_mac notes that password encoded with compliant
- * PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 conversion subroutine isn't right, while encoded
- * with legacy non-compliant one is, then it sets |PKCS12_key_gen| to
- * legacy PKCS12_key_gen_asc conversion subroutine, which is then picked
- * by PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. This applies to reading data. Written data
- * on the other hand is protected with standard-compliant encoding, i.e.
- * in backward-incompatible manner. Note that formally the approach is
- * not MT-safe. Rationale is that in order to access PKCS#12 files from
- * MT or even production application, you would be required to convert
- * data to correct interoperable format. In which case this variable
- * won't have to change. Conversion would have to be done with pkcs12
- * utility, which is not MT, and hence can tolerate it. In other words
- * goal is not to make this heuristic approach work in general case,
- * but in one specific one, apps/pkcs12.c.
- */
-int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type) = NULL;
-
-
/* Generate a MAC */
static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
- if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
- if (maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
return 0;
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) {
- if (pass == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * In order to facilitate accessing old data retry with
- * old-style broken password ...
- */
- if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
- PKCS12_key_gen_asc)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
- return 0;
- else
- PKCS12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_asc;
- /*
- * ... and if suceeded, pass it on to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen.
- */
- }
return 1;
}