/*
- * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
-#else
-static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
-#endif
+/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20";
/*
* Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
* secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
* The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
* |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
+ * If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure.
*/
-int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
- const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
- const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
+int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error)
{
- EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF,
- s->ctx->propq);
+ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq);
EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
return 0;
if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
- if (fatal) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- } else {
+ if (raise_error)
/*
* Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
* or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
*/
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- }
+
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return 0;
}
if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
- if (fatal)
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- else
+ if (raise_error)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
if (ret != 0) {
- if (fatal)
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- else
+ if (raise_error)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
return ret == 0;
}
+int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
+{
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md,
+ secret, label, labellen, data, datalen,
+ out, outlen, !fatal);
+ if (ret == 0 && fatal)
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
-#else
- static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
* Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
* success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
-#else
- static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
}
-int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
-#else
- static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64";
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
* length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
* pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *prevsecret,
const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen,
OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
-#else
- static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64";
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, s->ctx->propq);
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq);
kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
if (kctx == NULL) {
* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
- size_t insecretlen)
+int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const unsigned char *insecret,
+ size_t insecretlen)
{
/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
* secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
* failure.
*/
-int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
size_t *secret_size)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ int md_size;
- *secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ if (md_size <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *secret_size = (size_t)md_size;
/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
}
* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
* 0 on error.
*/
-size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
+size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
- const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+ const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *key = NULL;
size_t len = 0, hashlen;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
- if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
+ if (sctx->propq != NULL)
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
- (char *)s->ctx->propq,
+ (char *)sctx->propq,
0);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
goto err;
}
- if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
+ if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
key = s->server_finished_secret;
} else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
key = s->client_finished_secret;
} else {
- if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
+ if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
s->client_app_traffic_secret,
finsecret, hashlen))
goto err;
key = finsecret;
}
- if (!EVP_Q_mac(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq, mdname,
+ if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname,
params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
/* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
-int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef;
+ size_t mac_secret_size = 0;
s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- 0)) {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
+ &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, NULL, 0)) {
/* Error is already recorded */
SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
return 1;
}
-static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
+static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ int mac_type,
+ const EVP_MD *mac_md,
const unsigned char *insecret,
const unsigned char *hash,
const unsigned char *label,
size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
- unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
+ unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen,
+ unsigned char **iv, size_t *ivlen,
+ size_t *taglen)
{
- size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
size_t hashlen;
+ int mode, mac_mdleni;
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
return 0;
}
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- uint32_t algenc;
-
- ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
- algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
- } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
- algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
- } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
- /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
- algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ /* if ciph is NULL cipher, then use new_hash to calculate keylen */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "NULL")
+ && mac_md != NULL
+ && mac_type == NID_hmac) {
+ mac_mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(mac_md);
+
+ if (mac_mdleni < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
- taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- else
- taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ *ivlen = *taglen = (size_t)mac_mdleni;
+ *keylen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
} else {
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
- taglen = 0;
+
+ *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
+
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ uint32_t algenc;
+
+ *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
+ algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
+ algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
+ /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
+ algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+ *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ else
+ *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ int iivlen;
+
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */
+ *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ }
+ iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
+ if (iivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *ivlen = iivlen;
+ }
}
- if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
- || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ if (*ivlen > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+ *iv = OPENSSL_malloc(*ivlen);
+ if (*iv == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
- || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
- taglen, NULL))
- || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen)
+ || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, *iv, *ivlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
- static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
-#else
- static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
- static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
- static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
- static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
- static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
- static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
- static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
- static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
-#endif
- unsigned char *iv;
+ /* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
+ /* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ /* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ /* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
+ unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *iv = iv_intern;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *insecret;
unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
const char *log_label = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
- size_t finsecretlen = 0;
+ int finsecretlen = 0;
const unsigned char *label;
size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
int ret = 0;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mac_md = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
- ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
- BIO *bio;
-#endif
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
- } else {
- s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
- iv = s->read_iv;
-
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- } else {
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
- } else {
- s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- iv = s->write_iv;
-
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- }
+ int mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ size_t keylen, ivlen = EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH, taglen;
+ int level;
+ int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
+ : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
- if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
long handlen;
void *hdata;
}
/*
- * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
- * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
- * use ssl_handshake_md().
+ * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
+ * it again
*/
- mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (mdctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0)
+ && (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(sctx, sslcipher, &mac_md,
+ &mac_pkey_type, NULL))) {
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
- * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
- * it again
+ * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
+ * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
+ * use ssl_handshake_md().
*/
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
- /* Error is already recorded */
- SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mdctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
+ md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
label = client_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
+ if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
label = server_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
}
}
- if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) == 0) {
md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ mac_md = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_pkey_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
|| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
}
/* check whether cipher is known */
- if(!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
+ if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
goto err;
- if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, cipher, mac_pkey_type, mac_md,
insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
- iv, ciph_ctx)) {
+ &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (finsecret != NULL
&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
- finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
+ finsecret, (size_t)finsecretlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
- if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
- else
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
-# if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
- if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- || !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
- || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
- if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls does not support record padding */
- if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* check that cipher is supported */
- if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- bio = s->wbio;
+ if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) {
+ if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1);
+ else
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0);
+ }
- if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0
+ ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
+ : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0
+ ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
+ : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION);
+
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
+ direction,
+ level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv,
+ ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen,
+ mac_pkey_type, mac_md, NULL, md)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
- /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
- if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* configure kernel crypto structure */
- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx,
- RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
- &crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
- if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-skip_ktls:
-# endif
-#endif
ret = 1;
err:
if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
/* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0)
+ ssl_evp_md_free(mac_md);
ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
+ if (iv != iv_intern)
+ OPENSSL_free(iv);
return ret;
}
-int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
+int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
-#else
- static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64";
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ size_t hashlen;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
+ unsigned char *insecret;
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
- int ret = 0;
+ char *log_label;
+ size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
+ int ret = 0, l;
+ int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
+ : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
+ unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *iv = iv_intern;
+
+ if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hashlen = (size_t)l;
if (s->server == sending)
insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
else
insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
- if (sending) {
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
- iv = s->write_iv;
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- } else {
- iv = s->read_iv;
- ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- }
-
- if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
- s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
+ if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md,
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc,
+ s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type, s->s3.tmp.new_hash,
+ insecret, NULL,
application_traffic,
sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
- iv, ciph_ctx)) {
+ &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
+ direction,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+ insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
+ s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL,
+ NULL, md)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */
+ log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL;
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
+ if (iv != iv_intern)
+ OPENSSL_free(iv);
return ret;
}
return tls1_alert_code(code);
}
-int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
-#else
- static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
int ret = 0;
- if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
+ if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
goto err;
if (!use_context)
return ret;
}
-int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen)
{
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
-#else
- static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
-#endif
+ /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
+ static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *md;
else
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
- md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
+ md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2);
/*
* Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
*
* Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
*/
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ if (md == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff