/*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "quic/quic_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
-static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+ 0,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
- tls13_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls13_setup_key_block,
tls13_generate_master_secret,
tls13_change_cipher_state,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
-long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
{
/*
* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
* http, the cache would over fill
*/
- return (60 * 60 * 2);
+ return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
}
int tls1_new(SSL *s)
void tls1_free(SSL *s)
{
- OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
ssl3_free(s);
}
int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
if (!ssl3_clear(s))
return 0;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
- s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
+ sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
else
- s->version = s->method->version;
+ sc->version = s->method->version;
return 1;
}
/* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
-static struct {
+static const struct {
int nid;
uint16_t group_id;
} nid_to_group[] = {
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
{EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
{EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
- {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
+ {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13},
+ {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13},
+ {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
+ {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
{NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
{NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
{NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
/* The default curves */
static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
- 29, /* X25519 (29) */
- 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- 30, /* X448 (30) */
- 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 34, /* GC256A (34) */
- 35, /* GC256B (35) */
- 36, /* GC256C (36) */
- 37, /* GC256D (37) */
- 38, /* GC512A (38) */
- 39, /* GC512B (39) */
- 40, /* GC512C (40) */
- 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
- 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
- 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
- 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
- 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
};
static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
- TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
- TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
+ OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
};
-struct provider_group_data_st {
+struct provider_ctx_data_st {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
};
static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
{
- struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
(ctx->group_list_max_len
+ TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
* sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
- }
ctx->group_list = tmp;
memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
0,
goto err;
}
ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
goto err;
}
ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->realname == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
goto err;
}
ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
* it.
*/
ret = 1;
+ ERR_set_mark();
keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
if (keymgmt != NULL) {
/*
}
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
}
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
err:
if (ginf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
- ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
+ ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
{
- struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
pgd.ctx = vctx;
pgd.provider = provider;
ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
- if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
return 0;
- }
memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
tmp_supp_groups,
return 1;
}
+#define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
+static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs;
+static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
+{
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO *sinf = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
+ const char *keytype;
+ unsigned int code_point = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == 0)
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO)
+ * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->sigalg_list,
+ (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len
+ + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO));
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->sigalg_list = tmp;
+ memset(tmp + ctx->sigalg_list_max_len, 0,
+ sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctx->sigalg_list_max_len += TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ sinf = &ctx->sigalg_list[ctx->sigalg_list_len];
+
+ /* First, mandatory parameters */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
+ sinf->sigalg_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sigalg_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
+ sinf->name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT);
+ if (p == NULL
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &code_point)
+ || code_point > UINT16_MAX) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sinf->code_point = (uint16_t)code_point;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &sinf->secbits)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, optional parameters */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sigalg_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sig_name = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
+ sinf->sig_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sig_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
+ sinf->sig_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sig_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->hash_name = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
+ sinf->hash_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->hash_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
+ sinf->hash_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->hash_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->keytype = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
+ sinf->keytype = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->keytype == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
+ sinf->keytype_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->keytype_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->mintls)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->mintls != 0) && (sinf->mintls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->mintls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->maxtls)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->maxtls < sinf->mintls))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->maxtls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
+ * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
+ * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
+ * use it.
+ */
+ ret = 1;
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ keytype = (sinf->keytype != NULL
+ ? sinf->keytype
+ : (sinf->sig_name != NULL
+ ? sinf->sig_name
+ : sinf->sigalg_name));
+ keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, keytype, ctx->propq);
+ if (keymgmt != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
+ * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
+ *
+ * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
+ * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
+ * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
+ * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
+ * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
+ * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
+ * behaviour)?
+ */
+ if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
+ /*
+ * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
+ * Check proper object registration first, though.
+ * Don't care about return value as this may have been
+ * done within providers or previous calls to
+ * add_provider_sigalgs.
+ */
+ OBJ_create(sinf->sigalg_oid, sinf->sigalg_name, NULL);
+ /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
+ if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name) == NID_undef) ||
+ (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name)) == NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sinf->sig_name != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->sig_oid, sinf->sig_name, NULL);
+ if (sinf->keytype != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->keytype_oid, sinf->keytype, NULL);
+ if (sinf->hash_name != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->hash_oid, sinf->hash_name, NULL);
+ OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name),
+ (sinf->hash_name != NULL
+ ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->hash_name)
+ : NID_undef),
+ OBJ_txt2nid(keytype));
+ ctx->sigalg_list_len++;
+ sinf = NULL;
+ }
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ err:
+ if (sinf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
+ sinf->name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
+ sinf->sigalg_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
+ sinf->sig_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
+ sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
+ sinf->hash_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
+ sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
+ sinf->keytype = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
+ sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
+{
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
+
+ pgd.ctx = vctx;
+ pgd.provider = provider;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-SIGALG",
+ add_provider_sigalgs, &pgd);
+ /*
+ * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
+ * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ SSL_CERT_LOOKUP lu;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_sigalgs, ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_len > 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->ssl_cert_info);
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu) * ctx->sigalg_list_len);
+ if (ctx->ssl_cert_info == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name);
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].amask = SSL_aANY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
+ * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
+ */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
size_t i;
return NULL;
}
+const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
+{
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls_group_info = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, group_id);
+
+ if (tls_group_info == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return tls_group_info->tlsname;
+}
+
int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
{
size_t i;
* Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
* the number of groups supported.
*/
-void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
+void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
size_t *pgroupslen)
{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
default:
if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
- *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
- *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
+ *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
+ *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
} else {
*pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
*pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
}
-int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
+int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
+ int minversion, int maxversion,
int isec, int *okfortls13)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
+ group_id);
int ret;
+ int group_minversion, group_maxversion;
if (okfortls13 != NULL)
*okfortls13 = 0;
if (ginfo == NULL)
return 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
- return 0;
- if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
- ret = 1;
- else
- ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
- if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
- ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
- } else {
- if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
- return 0;
- if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
- ret = 1;
- else
- ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
- if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
- ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
+ group_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->mindtls : ginfo->mintls;
+ group_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->maxdtls : ginfo->maxtls;
+
+ if (group_minversion < 0 || group_maxversion < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (group_maxversion == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, group_maxversion) <= 0);
+ if (group_minversion > 0)
+ ret &= (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, group_minversion) >= 0);
+
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
- *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
- || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
+ *okfortls13 = (group_maxversion == 0)
+ || (group_maxversion >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
}
ret &= !isec
|| strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
}
/* See if group is allowed by security callback */
-int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
+int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
{
- const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
+ group);
unsigned char gtmp[2];
if (ginfo == NULL)
* For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
* a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
*/
-uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
{
const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
int k;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
- return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+ return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
- return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+ return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
/* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
uint16_t id = pref[i];
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
+ int minversion, maxversion;
if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
- || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
- continue;
+ || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+ continue;
+ inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
+ if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ ? inf->mindtls : inf->mintls;
+ maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ ? inf->maxdtls : inf->maxtls;
+ if (maxversion == -1)
+ continue;
+ if ((minversion != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, minversion) < 0)
+ || (maxversion != 0
+ && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, maxversion) > 0))
+ continue;
+
if (nmatch == k)
return id;
k++;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
- if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
uint16_t id;
size_t i;
uint16_t gid = 0;
char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
uint16_t *tmp =
- OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
+ OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
+ (garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT) * sizeof(*garg->gid_arr));
if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
etmp[len] = 0;
gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
- if (gid == 0)
- return 0;
+ if (gid == 0) {
+ /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
- if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
- return 0;
+ if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
+ /* Duplicate group - ignore */
+ return 1;
+ }
garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
return 1;
}
gcb.ctx = ctx;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
goto end;
+ if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid groups in '%s'", str);
+ goto end;
+ }
if (pext == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
if (tmparr == NULL)
goto end;
+ OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = tmparr;
*pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
ret = 1;
}
/* Check a group id matches preferences */
-int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
+int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
+ int check_own_groups)
{
const uint16_t *groups;
size_t groups_len;
unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
- if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
return 0;
} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
- if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
return 0;
} else {
/* Should never happen */
return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
}
-void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
}
/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
-static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
unsigned char comp_id;
size_t i;
return 0;
if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
* this check.
* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
-static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
{
uint16_t group_id;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
size_t i;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
- if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
- else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
- return 1;;
+ return 1;
}
return 0;
}
*
* Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
*/
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
{
/* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
* curves permitted.
*/
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
- return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
+ return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
- return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
+ return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
return 0;
}
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
+ {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
+ {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
+ {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
};
-int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- size_t i;
+ size_t i, cache_idx, sigalgs_len;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
- = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
+ SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache = NULL;
+ uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
int ret = 0;
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ sigalgs_len = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) + ctx->sigalg_list_len;
+
+ cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP) * sigalgs_len);
if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
goto err;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len);
+ if (tls12_sigalgs_list == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
ERR_set_mark();
+ /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
cache[i] = *lu;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list[i] = tls12_sigalgs[i];
/*
* Check hash is available.
cache[i].enabled = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
}
+
+ /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
+ cache_idx = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO si = ctx->sigalg_list[i];
+ cache[cache_idx].name = si.name;
+ cache[cache_idx].sigalg = si.code_point;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list[cache_idx] = si.code_point;
+ cache[cache_idx].hash = si.hash_name?OBJ_txt2nid(si.hash_name):NID_undef;
+ cache[cache_idx].hash_idx = ssl_get_md_idx(cache[cache_idx].hash);
+ cache[cache_idx].sig = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
+ cache[cache_idx].sig_idx = i + SSL_PKEY_NUM;
+ cache[cache_idx].sigandhash = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
+ cache[cache_idx].curve = NID_undef;
+ /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
+ cache[cache_idx].enabled = 1;
+ cache_idx++;
+ }
ERR_pop_to_mark();
ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
+ ctx->tls12_sigalgs = tls12_sigalgs_list;
+ ctx->tls12_sigalgs_len = sigalgs_len;
cache = NULL;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list);
EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
return ret;
}
/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
-static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ uint16_t sigalg)
{
size_t i;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
- /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
- i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
+ i < SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
lu++, i++) {
if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
if (!lu->enabled)
int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
+
if (lu == NULL)
return 0;
/* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
return 0;
if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (EVP_MD_get_size(md) <= 0)
+ return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
return 0;
return 1;
* certificate type from |s| will be used.
* Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
*/
-static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ int idx)
{
if (idx == -1) {
if (s->server) {
size_t i;
/* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu
+ = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
+ if (clu == NULL)
+ continue;
if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
idx = i;
break;
}
if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
return NULL;
+
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
if (lu == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
return NULL;
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
return NULL;
return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
}
/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
-int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
size_t idx;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
if (lu == NULL)
return 1;
}
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
- *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ *psigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
+ return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
}
}
* Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
* specified EC curve.
*/
-int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
+int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
{
const uint16_t *sigs;
size_t siglen, i;
sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
- sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ sigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
+ siglen = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
}
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
/* Security bits: half digest bits */
secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
+ if (secbits <= 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
* they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
* SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
* https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
* puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
- */
+ */
if (md_type == NID_sha1)
secbits = 64;
else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
secbits = 224;
}
+ /*
+ * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
+ * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
+ */
+ if ((secbits == 0) && (lu->sig_idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ && ((lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM) < (int)ctx->sigalg_list_len)) {
+ secbits = ctx->sigalg_list[lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM].secbits;
+ }
return secbits;
}
* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
* s.
*/
-int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
int secbits = 0;
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (pkeyid == -1)
- return -1;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
}
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
+ /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
+ if ((pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT) && (lu != NULL))
+ pkeyid = lu->sig;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (pkeyid == -1)
+ return -1;
+
/*
* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
* is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
*/
if (lu == NULL
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
+ || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
|| (pkeyid != lu->sig
&& (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
- if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
+ if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
+ (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) : pkeyid,
+ &cidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))
|| lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
return 0;
}
}
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Check curve matches extensions */
if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
*/
sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
if (secbits == 0 ||
!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
{
- if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
- *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
+ *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
{
- if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
return 0;
- *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
+
+ if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
return 1;
}
*
* Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
*/
-int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
*
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
*/
-int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
+ int op, int ecdhe)
{
+ int minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
+ int maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
+
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- int min_tls = c->min_tls;
- /*
- * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
- * in SSLv3 if we are a client
- */
- if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
- && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
- min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
-
- if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
+ if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
+ switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c)) {
+ case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ break;
+ default:
return 1;
- }
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
- || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
+ * in SSLv3 if we are a client
+ */
+ if (minversion == TLS1_VERSION
+ && ecdhe
+ && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
+ minversion = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+ if (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) > 0
+ || ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, s->s3.tmp.min_ver) < 0)
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
-int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
-int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
size_t i;
OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags)
+ memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ else
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
+ return 0;
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
* the default algorithm for each certificate type
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
size_t j;
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*/
-SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
size_t size;
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*/
-SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const unsigned char *etick,
+ size_t eticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
+ int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (eticklen == 0) {
/*
ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
goto end;
}
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
int rv = 0;
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
- rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
ctx,
ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
- rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
#endif
goto end;
}
- aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
- s->ctx->propq);
+ aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ sctx->propq);
if (aes256cbc == NULL
|| ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
goto end;
}
EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
renew_ticket = 1;
}
/*
goto end;
}
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
+ if (ivlen < 0) {
+ ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
- if (eticklen <=
- TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+ if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto end;
}
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
- eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
+ p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
+ eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
slen += declen;
p = sdec;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &p, slen, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
slen -= p - sdec;
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
- retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
+ retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ sess, etick, keyname_len,
ret,
s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
switch (retcb) {
}
}
- if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
int secbits;
if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
return 0;
/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
return 0;
/*
* At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
* spec
*/
- if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
+ if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
|| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
|| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
- if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
+ if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
return 0;
if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
|| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
/* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
- if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
return 0;
if (!s->server
- && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
+ && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
&& s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
int i, num;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
return 0;
- sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
}
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
- secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
* disabled.
*/
-void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
{
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
- clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
+ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
if (clu == NULL)
continue;
*pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
}
-int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
size_t i;
* If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
* signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
*/
- if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|| (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& lu->hash != NID_sha1
&& lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
+static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
}
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
-static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
- if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
salgs = NULL;
size >>= 1;
- if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
buf[i] = stmp;
return 1;
}
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
{
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
size_t i;
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++)
pvalid[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
/* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
/* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
- if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
+ if (pvalid[idx] == 0
+ && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
}
return 1;
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
- uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ uint16_t *psig;
+ size_t numsigalgs;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+
if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
*rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
if (rsig != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
- lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
if (psign != NULL)
*psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
if (phash != NULL)
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
- if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
|| idx < 0
- || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
- || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
+ || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
+ || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
- shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
+ shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
if (phash != NULL)
*phash = shsigalgs->hash;
if (psign != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
if (rhash != NULL)
*rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
- return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
+ return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
}
/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
size_t sigalgcnt;
/* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
} sig_cb_st;
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
- size_t i;
+ size_t i = 0;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
+
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
* in the table.
*/
if (p == NULL) {
- for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
- i++, s++) {
- if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
- sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
- break;
+ /* Load provider sigalgs */
+ if (sarg->ctx != NULL) {
+ /* Check if a provider supports the sigalg */
+ for (i = 0; i < sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ if (sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name != NULL
+ && strcmp(etmp,
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] =
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].code_point;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check the built-in sigalgs */
+ if (sarg->ctx == NULL || i == sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+ i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i++, s++) {
+ if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
return 0;
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
- if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
- return 0;
+ if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
break;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
}
- /* Reject duplicates */
+ /* Ignore duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
sarg->sigalgcnt--;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
}
return 1;
* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
-int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
{
sig_cb_st sig;
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+
+ if (ctx != NULL && ssl_load_sigalgs(ctx)) {
+ sig.ctx = ctx;
+ }
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
+ if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
{
uint16_t *sigalgs;
- if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
if (client) {
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
- if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
size_t j;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
return 0;
}
-static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
{
int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
size_t i;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
size_t sigalgslen;
+
if (default_nid == -1)
return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (default_nid)
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
/*
* If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
* chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
-int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
- int idx)
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
{
int i;
int rv = 0;
CERT *c = s->cert;
uint32_t *pvalid;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
- /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+
+ /*
+ * Meaning of idx:
+ * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
+ * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
+ * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
+ *
+ * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
+ */
if (idx != -1) {
- /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+ if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, idx)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pk))
+ return 0;
+ *pvalid = rv = CERT_PKEY_RPK;
+ return rv;
+ }
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
- if (!x || !pk)
+ if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
goto end;
} else {
size_t certidx;
- if (!x || !pk)
+ if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
return 0;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
idx = certidx;
pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
*/
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
+ if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
int rsign = 0;
+
if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
|| s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
default_nid = 0;
}
}
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
* so check_flags is always set.
ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+ if (ca_dn == NULL
+ || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
+ || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
-
- if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
- if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
- }
- if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
+ else
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
break;
}
}
- }
+
if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
goto end;
} else
end:
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
}
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
-void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
- return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
}
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
BIGNUM *p;
- int dh_secbits = 80;
+ int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
}
}
+ /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
+ sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
+ dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
+
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
goto err;
return dhp;
}
-static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
+ int op)
{
int secbits = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
if (pkey) {
/*
* If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
*/
secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
}
- if (s)
+ if (s != NULL)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
else
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
}
-static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
+ int op)
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits, nid, pknid;
+
/* Don't check signature if self signed */
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
return 1;
/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = pknid;
- if (s)
+ if (s != NULL)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
else
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
}
-int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
+int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
+ int is_ee)
{
if (vfy)
vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
*/
-int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
+int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
+ X509 *x, int vfy)
{
int rv, start_idx, i;
+
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
start_idx = 1;
} else
start_idx = 0;
* with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
*/
-static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
- const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
/* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
if (clu == NULL
&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
return -1;
+ /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
+ if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, sig_idx))
+ return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_RPK ? sig_idx : -1;
+
return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
}
* the key.
* Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
*/
-static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
- EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
+ X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
int mdnid, pknid, supported;
size_t i;
const char *mdname = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/*
* If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
*/
if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
- supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
+ supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
mdname,
- s->ctx->propq);
+ sctx->propq);
if (supported <= 0)
return 0;
continue;
/*
- * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+ * This does not differentiate between the
* rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
* have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
* signing certificate.
* the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
* Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
*/
-static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
+static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
{
/* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
if (idx == -1)
* Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
* specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
*/
-static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
+static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
size_t idx;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
* |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
* available certs/keys to find one that works.
*/
-static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
size_t i;
int curve = -1;
EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
/* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
continue;
if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
|| (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
continue;
} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
continue;
}
break;
* a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
* to the server. In this case no error is set.
*/
-int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
+int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
int sig_idx = -1;
s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
if (lu == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
size_t i;
if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
int curve = -1;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
continue;
}
if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
* in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
* we have to assume GOST support.
*/
- if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
+ && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
+ & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
if (i == sent_sigslen) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
+
+ if (sc == NULL
+ || (IS_QUIC(ssl) && mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED))
+ return 0;
+
if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
&& !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
- ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
+ sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
return 1;
}
return NID_undef;
}
+
+__owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char *enckey,
+ size_t enckeylen)
+{
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
+ int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
+
+ if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
+ /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
+ return 0;
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
+ if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
+ || enckey[0] != 0x04)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff