/*
- * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "quic/quic_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac_old,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac_old,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+ 0,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac_old,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
- tls13_enc,
- tls1_mac_old,
tls13_setup_key_block,
tls13_generate_master_secret,
tls13_change_cipher_state,
}
/* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
-static struct {
+static const struct {
int nid;
uint16_t group_id;
} nid_to_group[] = {
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
{EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
{EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
+ {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13},
+ {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13},
+ {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13},
{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
};
-struct provider_group_data_st {
+struct provider_ctx_data_st {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
};
static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
{
- struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
(ctx->group_list_max_len
+ TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
* sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
- }
ctx->group_list = tmp;
memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
0,
goto err;
}
ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
goto err;
}
ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->realname == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
goto err;
}
ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
- if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
goto err;
- }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
{
- struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
pgd.ctx = vctx;
pgd.provider = provider;
ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
- if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
return 0;
- }
memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
tmp_supp_groups,
return 1;
}
-static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+#define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
+static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs;
+static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
{
- size_t i;
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO *sinf = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
+ const char *keytype;
+ unsigned int code_point = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
- if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
- || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
- return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == 0)
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO)
+ * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->sigalg_list,
+ (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len
+ + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO));
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->sigalg_list = tmp;
+ memset(tmp + ctx->sigalg_list_max_len, 0,
+ sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctx->sigalg_list_max_len += TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
- return 0;
+ sinf = &ctx->sigalg_list[ctx->sigalg_list_len];
+
+ /* First, mandatory parameters */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
+ sinf->sigalg_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sigalg_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
+ sinf->name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT);
+ if (p == NULL
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &code_point)
+ || code_point > UINT16_MAX) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sinf->code_point = (uint16_t)code_point;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &sinf->secbits)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now, optional parameters */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sigalg_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sig_name = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
+ sinf->sig_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sig_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
+ sinf->sig_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->sig_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->hash_name = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
+ sinf->hash_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->hash_name == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
+ sinf->hash_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->hash_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->keytype = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
+ sinf->keytype = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->keytype == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
+ sinf->keytype_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
+ if (sinf->keytype_oid == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->mintls)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->mintls != 0) && (sinf->mintls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->mintls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->maxtls)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->maxtls < sinf->mintls))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
+ ((sinf->maxtls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
+ * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
+ * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
+ * use it.
+ */
+ ret = 1;
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ keytype = (sinf->keytype != NULL
+ ? sinf->keytype
+ : (sinf->sig_name != NULL
+ ? sinf->sig_name
+ : sinf->sigalg_name));
+ keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, keytype, ctx->propq);
+ if (keymgmt != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
+ * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
+ *
+ * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
+ * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
+ * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
+ * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
+ * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
+ * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
+ * behaviour)?
+ */
+ if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
+ /*
+ * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
+ * Check proper object registration first, though.
+ * Don't care about return value as this may have been
+ * done within providers or previous calls to
+ * add_provider_sigalgs.
+ */
+ OBJ_create(sinf->sigalg_oid, sinf->sigalg_name, NULL);
+ /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
+ if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name) == NID_undef) ||
+ (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name)) == NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (sinf->sig_name != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->sig_oid, sinf->sig_name, NULL);
+ if (sinf->keytype != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->keytype_oid, sinf->keytype, NULL);
+ if (sinf->hash_name != NULL)
+ OBJ_create(sinf->hash_oid, sinf->hash_name, NULL);
+ OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name),
+ (sinf->hash_name != NULL
+ ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->hash_name)
+ : NID_undef),
+ OBJ_txt2nid(keytype));
+ ctx->sigalg_list_len++;
+ sinf = NULL;
+ }
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ err:
+ if (sinf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
+ sinf->name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
+ sinf->sigalg_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
+ sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
+ sinf->sig_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
+ sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
+ sinf->hash_name = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
+ sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
+ sinf->keytype = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
+ sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
}
-uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id)
+static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
{
- switch(curve_id) {
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
+ struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
+
+ pgd.ctx = vctx;
+ pgd.provider = provider;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-SIGALG",
+ add_provider_sigalgs, &pgd);
+ /*
+ * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
+ * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ SSL_CERT_LOOKUP lu;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_sigalgs, ctx))
return 0;
- default:
- return curve_id;
+
+ /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
+ if (ctx->sigalg_list_len > 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->ssl_cert_info);
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu) * ctx->sigalg_list_len);
+ if (ctx->ssl_cert_info == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name);
+ ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].amask = SSL_aANY;
+ }
}
+
+ /*
+ * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
+ * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
+ */
+
+ return 1;
}
-uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id)
+static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
- switch(curve_id) {
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
- return 0;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1;
- case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
- return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1;
- default:
- return curve_id;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
+ || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
+ return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
}
+
+ return 0;
}
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
return NULL;
}
+const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
+{
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls_group_info = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, group_id);
+
+ if (tls_group_info == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return tls_group_info->tlsname;
+}
+
int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
{
size_t i;
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
group_id);
int ret;
+ int group_minversion, group_maxversion;
if (okfortls13 != NULL)
*okfortls13 = 0;
if (ginfo == NULL)
return 0;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
- return 0;
- if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
- ret = 1;
- else
- ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
- if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
- ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
- } else {
- if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
- return 0;
- if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
- ret = 1;
- else
- ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
- if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
- ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
+ group_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->mindtls : ginfo->mintls;
+ group_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? ginfo->maxdtls : ginfo->maxtls;
+
+ if (group_minversion < 0 || group_maxversion < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (group_maxversion == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ ret = (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, group_maxversion) <= 0);
+ if (group_minversion > 0)
+ ret &= (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, group_minversion) >= 0);
+
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
- *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
- || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
+ *okfortls13 = (group_maxversion == 0)
+ || (group_maxversion >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
}
ret &= !isec
|| strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
int k;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
uint16_t id = pref[i];
- uint16_t cid = id;
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
+ int minversion, maxversion;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
- cid = ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id);
- else
- cid = id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id);
- }
- if (!tls1_in_list(cid, supp, num_supp)
+ if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
|| !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
+ inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
+ if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ ? inf->mindtls : inf->mintls;
+ maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ ? inf->maxdtls : inf->maxtls;
+ if (maxversion == -1)
+ continue;
+ if ((minversion != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, minversion) < 0)
+ || (maxversion != 0
+ && ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, maxversion) > 0))
+ continue;
+
if (nmatch == k)
return id;
k++;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
- if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
uint16_t id;
size_t i;
uint16_t gid = 0;
char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
uint16_t *tmp =
- OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
+ OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
+ (garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT) * sizeof(*garg->gid_arr));
if (tmp == NULL)
return 0;
garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
if (gid == 0) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
- "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
- return 0;
+ /* Unknown group - ignore, if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
}
for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
- if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
- return 0;
+ if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid) {
+ /* Duplicate group - ignore */
+ return 1;
+ }
garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
return 1;
}
gcb.ctx = ctx;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
goto end;
+ if (gcb.gidcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid groups in '%s'", str);
+ goto end;
+ }
if (pext == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
if (tmparr == NULL)
goto end;
+ OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = tmparr;
*pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
ret = 1;
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
};
-int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- size_t i;
+ size_t i, cache_idx, sigalgs_len;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
- = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
+ SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache = NULL;
+ uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
int ret = 0;
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ sigalgs_len = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) + ctx->sigalg_list_len;
+
+ cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP) * sigalgs_len);
if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
goto err;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len);
+ if (tls12_sigalgs_list == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
ERR_set_mark();
+ /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
cache[i] = *lu;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list[i] = tls12_sigalgs[i];
/*
* Check hash is available.
cache[i].enabled = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
}
+
+ /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
+ cache_idx = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ TLS_SIGALG_INFO si = ctx->sigalg_list[i];
+ cache[cache_idx].name = si.name;
+ cache[cache_idx].sigalg = si.code_point;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list[cache_idx] = si.code_point;
+ cache[cache_idx].hash = si.hash_name?OBJ_txt2nid(si.hash_name):NID_undef;
+ cache[cache_idx].hash_idx = ssl_get_md_idx(cache[cache_idx].hash);
+ cache[cache_idx].sig = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
+ cache[cache_idx].sig_idx = i + SSL_PKEY_NUM;
+ cache[cache_idx].sigandhash = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
+ cache[cache_idx].curve = NID_undef;
+ /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
+ cache[cache_idx].enabled = 1;
+ cache_idx++;
+ }
ERR_pop_to_mark();
ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
+ ctx->tls12_sigalgs = tls12_sigalgs_list;
+ ctx->tls12_sigalgs_len = sigalgs_len;
cache = NULL;
+ tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list);
EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
return ret;
}
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
- /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
- i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i < SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
lu++, i++) {
if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
if (!lu->enabled)
return 0;
if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (EVP_MD_get_size(md) <= 0)
+ return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
return 0;
return 1;
size_t i;
/* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu
+ = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
if (clu == NULL)
continue;
}
if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
return NULL;
+
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
size_t idx;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
if (lu == NULL)
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
- *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ *psigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
+ return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
}
}
sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
- sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+ sigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
+ siglen = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
}
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
/* Security bits: half digest bits */
secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
+ if (secbits <= 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
* they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
secbits = 224;
}
+ /*
+ * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
+ * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
+ */
+ if ((secbits == 0) && (lu->sig_idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ && ((lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM) < (int)ctx->sigalg_list_len)) {
+ secbits = ctx->sigalg_list[lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM].secbits;
+ }
return secbits;
}
int secbits = 0;
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (pkeyid == -1)
- return -1;
+
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
}
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
+ /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
+ if ((pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT) && (lu != NULL))
+ pkeyid = lu->sig;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (pkeyid == -1)
+ return -1;
+
/*
* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
* is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
return 0;
}
/* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
- if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
+ if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
+ (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) : pkeyid,
+ &cidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))
|| lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
int op, int ecdhe)
{
+ int minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
+ int maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
+
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- int min_tls = c->min_tls;
- /*
- * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
- * in SSLv3 if we are a client
- */
- if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
- && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
- min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
-
- if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
+ if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
+ switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c)) {
+ case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ break;
+ default:
return 1;
- }
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
- && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
- || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
+ * in SSLv3 if we are a client
+ */
+ if (minversion == TLS1_VERSION
+ && ecdhe
+ && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
+ minversion = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+ if (ssl_version_cmp(s, minversion, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) > 0
+ || ssl_version_cmp(s, maxversion, s->s3.tmp.min_ver) < 0)
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags)
+ memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ else
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
+ return 0;
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
* the default algorithm for each certificate type
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
size_t j;
SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (eticklen == 0) {
/*
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
slen += declen;
p = sdec;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &p, slen, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
slen -= p - sdec;
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
- clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
+ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
if (clu == NULL)
continue;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
- if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
salgs = NULL;
size >>= 1;
- if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
buf[i] = stmp;
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++)
pvalid[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
size_t sigalgcnt;
/* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
} sig_cb_st;
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
- size_t i;
+ size_t i = 0;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
+ int ignore_unknown = 0;
+
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (elem[0] == '?') {
+ ignore_unknown = 1;
+ ++elem;
+ --len;
+ }
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
* in the table.
*/
if (p == NULL) {
- for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
- i++, s++) {
- if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
- sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
- break;
+ /* Load provider sigalgs */
+ if (sarg->ctx != NULL) {
+ /* Check if a provider supports the sigalg */
+ for (i = 0; i < sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ if (sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name != NULL
+ && strcmp(etmp,
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] =
+ sarg->ctx->sigalg_list[i].code_point;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check the built-in sigalgs */
+ if (sarg->ctx == NULL || i == sarg->ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+ i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); i++, s++) {
+ if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
+ sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
return 0;
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
- if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
- return 0;
+ if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
break;
}
}
- if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
- return 0;
+ if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) {
+ /* Ignore unknown algorithms if ignore_unknown */
+ return ignore_unknown;
+ }
}
- /* Reject duplicates */
+ /* Ignore duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
sarg->sigalgcnt--;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
}
return 1;
* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
-int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
{
sig_cb_st sig;
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+
+ if (ctx != NULL && ssl_load_sigalgs(ctx)) {
+ sig.ctx = ctx;
+ }
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
+ if (sig.sigalgcnt == 0) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+ "No valid signature algorithms in '%s'", str);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
{
uint16_t *sigalgs;
- if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
if (client) {
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
- if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
size_t j;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
uint32_t *pvalid;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
- /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+ /*
+ * Meaning of idx:
+ * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
+ * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
+ * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
+ *
+ * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
+ */
if (idx != -1) {
- /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+ if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, idx)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pk))
+ return 0;
+ *pvalid = rv = CERT_PKEY_RPK;
+ return rv;
+ }
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
- if (!x || !pk)
+ if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
goto end;
} else {
size_t certidx;
- if (!x || !pk)
+ if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
return 0;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
idx = certidx;
pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
- const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
/* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
if (clu == NULL
&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
return -1;
+ /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
+ if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, sig_idx))
+ return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_RPK ? sig_idx : -1;
+
return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
}
{
size_t idx;
- if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
+ if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
{
SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
- if (sc == NULL)
+ if (sc == NULL
+ || (IS_QUIC(ssl) && mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED))
return 0;
if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff