/*
- * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
return ret;
}
-int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- /*
- * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider
- * side so we need to tell the ctx about our TLS version and mac size
- */
- OSSL_PARAM params[3], *pprm = params;
- size_t macsize = 0;
- int imacsize = -1;
-
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0
- /*
- * We look at s->ext.use_etm instead of SSL_READ_ETM() or
- * SSL_WRITE_ETM() because this test applies to both reading
- * and writing.
- */
- && !s->ext.use_etm)
- imacsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
- if (imacsize >= 0)
- macsize = (size_t)imacsize;
-
- *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_VERSION,
- &s->version);
- *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC_SIZE,
- &macsize);
- *pprm = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-
static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c)
{
/* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
{
unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
unsigned char *key, *iv;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
size_t mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
int iivlen;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
- ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
- void *rl_sequence;
- BIO *bio;
-#endif
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/*
* Taglen is only relevant for CCM ciphersuites. Other ciphersuites
* ignore this value so we can default it to 0.
*/
size_t taglen = 0;
+ int direction;
c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c)) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc
& (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) != 0)
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "CHACHA20-POLY1305")) {
+ taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* MAC secret size corresponds to the MAC output size */
+ taglen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ }
+ break;
}
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
- reuse_dd = 1;
- } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- } else {
- /*
- * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
- dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->expand == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- #endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
- */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- } else {
- if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
- OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
- OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
- key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret,
- mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type,
- m, comp)) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Temporary - remove me */
- goto skip_ktls;
- }
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
} else {
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
if (s->ext.use_etm)
s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
else
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- reuse_dd = 1;
- } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- } else {
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->compress == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
- */
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- if (mac_type == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
- sctx->propq, mac_secret,
- mac_secret_size);
- } else {
- /*
- * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
- * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
- * a MAC key.
- */
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
- (int)mac_secret_size);
- }
- if (mac_key == NULL
- || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mac_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(m),
- sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, mac_key,
- NULL) <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
}
- OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which);
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, mac_secret, i, 4);
- } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ dtls1_increment_epoch(s, which);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
- iv) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL) <= 0)
- || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL) <= 0)
- || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv) <= 0)
- || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
- && mac_secret_size != 0
- && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- (int)mac_secret_size, mac_secret) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(c) != NULL
- && !tls_provider_set_tls_params(s, dd, c, m)) {
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, direction,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+ NULL, 0, key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret,
+ mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type,
+ m, comp, NULL)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
- if (s->compress || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
- if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* check that cipher is supported */
- if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, c, m, taglen))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- bio = s->wbio;
- else
- bio = s->rbio;
-
- if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
- if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
- }
-
- /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */
- if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) ||
- (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- else
- rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-
- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(sctx->libctx, s->version, c, m, rl_sequence,
- &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv,
- (size_t)k, key, cl, mac_secret, mac_secret_size))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
- if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- SSL_set_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- }
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */
- skip_ktls:
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
-
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4);
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);
} OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
- && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
- /*
- * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
- * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
- }
- }
-
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
{
unsigned char *val = NULL;
size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
- int rv;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5705 embeds context length as uint16; reject longer context
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ if (contextlen > 0xffff) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
if (val == NULL)
- goto err2;
+ goto ret;
currentvalpos = 0;
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
currentvalpos += llen;
goto ret;
err1:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- rv = 0;
- goto ret;
- err2:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rv = 0;
ret:
OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
return rv;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff