/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
#include <openssl/trace.h>
/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
if (md == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
if (fatal)
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, s->ctx->propq);
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
+ OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->propq);
if (kdf == NULL)
goto err;
kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
if (kctx == NULL)
goto err;
- mdname = EVP_MD_name(md);
+ mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
(char *)mdname, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET,
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED,
(void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(kctx, params)
- && EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen)) {
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen, params)) {
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return 1;
}
err:
if (fatal)
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
else
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return 0;
}
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *km,
+ size_t num)
{
int ret;
return ret;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
- /*
- * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
- *
- * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
- * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
- * function will fail.
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
-static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
+static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c)
{
- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
- PACKET pkt, subpkt;
- int count = 0;
-
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
- return -1;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
- /* Skip record type and version */
- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
- return -1;
-
- /* Read until next record */
- if (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
- return -1;
-
- count += 1;
- }
-
- return count;
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-
-int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- /*
- * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider
- * side so we need to tell the ctx about our TLS version and mac size
- */
- OSSL_PARAM params[3], *pprm = params;
- size_t macsize = 0;
- int imacsize = -1;
-
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0
- /*
- * We look at s->ext.use_etm instead of SSL_READ_ETM() or
- * SSL_WRITE_ETM() because this test applies to both reading
- * and writing.
- */
- && !s->ext.use_etm)
- imacsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (imacsize >= 0)
- macsize = (size_t)imacsize;
-
- *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_VERSION,
- &s->version);
- *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC_SIZE,
- &macsize);
- *pprm = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
+ /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ return EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+ return EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ return EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c);
}
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
{
unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
- unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ unsigned char *key, *iv;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
+ const SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
const EVP_MD *m;
int mac_type;
- size_t *mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ size_t mac_secret_size;
size_t n, i, j, k, cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
-# ifdef __FreeBSD__
- struct tls_enable crypto_info;
-# else
- struct tls_crypto_info_all crypto_info;
- unsigned char *rec_seq;
- void *rl_sequence;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- int count_unprocessed;
- int bit;
-# endif
-# endif
- BIO *bio;
-#endif
+ int iivlen;
+ /*
+ * Taglen is only relevant for CCM ciphersuites. Other ciphersuites
+ * ignore this value so we can default it to 0.
+ */
+ size_t taglen = 0;
+ int direction;
c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression;
#endif
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- if (s->ext.use_etm)
- s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
- else
- s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
-
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
- reuse_dd = 1;
- } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- } else {
- /*
- * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
- dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->expand == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret_size);
- } else {
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
- if (s->ext.use_etm)
- s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
- else
- s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- reuse_dd = 1;
- } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- } else {
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
- if (mac_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->compress == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret_size);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd);
-
p = s->s3.tmp.key_block;
- i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+ i = mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
- /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
- cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c);
j = cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
- else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
- k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
- else
- k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ iivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);
+ if (iivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ k = iivlen;
if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- ms = &(p[0]);
+ mac_secret = &(p[0]);
n = i + i;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + j;
n += k + k;
} else {
n = i;
- ms = &(p[n]);
+ mac_secret = &(p[n]);
n += i + j;
key = &(p[n]);
n += j + k;
}
if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
-
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
- (int)*mac_secret_size);
- if (mac_key == NULL
- || EVP_DigestSignInit_with_libctx(mac_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_name(m),
- s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq,
- mac_key) <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- }
-
- OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which);
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, ms, i, 4);
- } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k,
- iv)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- int taglen;
- if (s->s3.tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c)) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ break;
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc
+ & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) != 0)
taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
else
taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv)
- || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
- && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_provider(c) != NULL
- && !tls_provider_set_tls_params(s, dd, c, m)) {
- /* SSLfatal already called */
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
- if (s->compress)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- if (((which & SSL3_CC_READ) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX))
- || ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX)))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
- if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
-# ifdef __FreeBSD__
- memset(&crypto_info, 0, sizeof(crypto_info));
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc) {
- case SSL_AES128GCM:
- case SSL_AES256GCM:
- crypto_info.cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16;
- crypto_info.iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
break;
- case SSL_AES128:
- case SSL_AES256:
- if (s->ext.use_etm)
- goto skip_ktls;
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
- case SSL_SHA1:
- crypto_info.auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA256:
- crypto_info.auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA384:
- crypto_info.auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC;
- break;
- default:
- goto skip_ktls;
+ default:
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "CHACHA20-POLY1305")) {
+ taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* MAC secret size corresponds to the MAC output size */
+ taglen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
}
- crypto_info.cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
- crypto_info.iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- crypto_info.auth_key = ms;
- crypto_info.auth_key_len = *mac_secret_size;
break;
- default:
- goto skip_ktls;
}
- crypto_info.cipher_key = key;
- crypto_info.cipher_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- crypto_info.iv = iv;
- crypto_info.tls_vmajor = (s->version >> 8) & 0x000000ff;
- crypto_info.tls_vminor = (s->version & 0x000000ff);
-# else /* !defined(__FreeBSD__) */
- /* check that cipher is supported */
- if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(c, dd))
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* check version */
- if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION)
- goto skip_ktls;
-# endif
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- bio = s->wbio;
- else
- bio = s->rbio;
- if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+ else
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
- /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
- if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
- }
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */
- if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) ||
- (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
-# ifndef __FreeBSD__
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- else
- rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
+ } else {
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
+ else
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE;
- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(c, s->version, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
- &rec_seq, iv, key))
- goto skip_ktls;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
- if (count_unprocessed < 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
- while (count_unprocessed) {
- for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
- ++rec_seq[bit];
- if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
- break;
- }
- count_unprocessed--;
- }
-# else
- goto skip_ktls;
-# endif
- }
-# endif /* !__FreeBSD__ */
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE;
- /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
- if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
- if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
}
- skip_ktls:
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */
- s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ dtls1_increment_epoch(s, which);
+
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, direction,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
+ NULL, 0, key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret,
+ mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type,
+ m, comp, NULL)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which);
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c), 4);
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4);
BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4);
} OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
return 0;
}
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
int mac_type = NID_undef;
size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ int ivlen;
if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return 1;
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type,
- &mac_secret_size, &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
- SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
+ &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
+ s->ext.use_etm)) {
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ ivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c);
+ if (ivlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c) + ivlen;
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3.tmp.key_block = p;
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block length: %zu\n", num);
BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4);
BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4);
} OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
- && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
- /*
- * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
- * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
- }
- }
-
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
}
-size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
- unsigned char *out)
+size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str,
+ size_t slen, unsigned char *out)
{
size_t hashlen;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
return finished_size;
}
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- size_t len, size_t *secret_size)
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, size_t len,
+ size_t *secret_size)
{
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
return 1;
}
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
{
unsigned char *val = NULL;
size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos;
- int rv;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5705 embeds context length as uint16; reject longer context
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ if (contextlen > 0xffff) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
if (val == NULL)
- goto err2;
+ goto ret;
currentvalpos = 0;
memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
currentvalpos += llen;
goto ret;
err1:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- rv = 0;
- goto ret;
- err2:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rv = 0;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
ret:
OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen);
return rv;
return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED:
return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ case TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION:
+ return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
default:
return -1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff