/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */
-#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
-
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
-#include <internal/cryptlib.h>
-
-DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
-
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-
-static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
-static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
-static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt);
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt);
+
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
WPACKET *pkt);
+static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
+{
+ return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
*
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
-static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
-static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
+ && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
}
break;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
+ && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
- if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
-# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
+ /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
+# error Internal DTLS version error
#endif
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
/*
* In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
-int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
* Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
* we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
goto err;
return 1;
return 1;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
return 1;
}
} else {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
/*
* The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
* |ext.status_expected| is set
err:
/* No valid transition found */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
BIO *rbio;
/*
*/
s->init_num = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
return 0;
}
- SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
+static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
+{
+ /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
+ return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
+ && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+}
+
/*
* ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
* server.
*/
-static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
+static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ if (do_compressed_cert(s))
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/*
*/
if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
/* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
&& s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
else
- st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
- : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+
+ s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
- : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
/* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*/
-WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
* version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
* later
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
+ s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
+ s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
* If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
* convenient time.
*/
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the client to the server.
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
+ } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
+ /*
+ * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
+ * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
+ * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
+ * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
+ */
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
+ TLS_ANY_VERSION,
+ OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
/*
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
st->use_timer = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
}
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
s->init_num = 0;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
- case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
- /*
- * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
- * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
- s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
- break;
-
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
break;
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->max_early_data > 0) {
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
}
+#endif
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_B;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
-int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
else
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
+ *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
+ *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+#endif
+
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
-size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
- return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
+ : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
}
/*
- * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
+ * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
*/
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
+ return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
+#endif
+
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the server
*/
-WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
+ return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
+
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
}
-int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t sess_id_len;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
unsigned char *session_id;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- protverr);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (sess == NULL
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
&& !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/*-
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* Session ID */
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
- && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
- sess_id_len) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
+ sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
} else {
sess_id_len = 0;
|| (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
sess_id_len))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
/* Ciphers supported */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
+ if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
+ pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
- && s->ctx->comp_methods
- && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
- int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ && sctx->comp_methods
+ && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
}
#endif
/* Add the NULL method */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
size_t cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
-static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
+static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const unsigned char *cipherchars)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
/*
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
/* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
* ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
*/
- if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
- != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
+ if (md == NULL
+ || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
return 0;
}
* Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
* ciphersuite.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET session_id, extpkt;
size_t session_id_len;
unsigned int sversion;
unsigned int context;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
&& sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
&& PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
&& memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
+ if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
+ /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
+ if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
hrr = 1;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
}
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
} else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
}
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
if (compression != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
|| memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
session_id_len) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
goto err;
}
}
* Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
* are appropriate for this version.
*/
- context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
+ context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
s->hit = 0;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
* the message must be on a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
goto err;
}
* backwards compat reasons
*/
int master_key_length;
+
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
} else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto err;
}
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
- tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+ ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
* echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
* used for resumption.
*/
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
if (session_id_len > 0)
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto err;
} else {
- comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
+ comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
+ compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
} else {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
* In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
* we're done with this message
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
- && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
+ || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS
+ * (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys
+ * immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible
+ * early data is written. We could just always defer until the last
+ * moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys
+ * are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox
+ * compat this doesn't cause a problem.
+ */
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
+ && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
}
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *extpkt)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
/*
- * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
- * should not be used.
+ * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
+ * the old wrlmethod.
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
- s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
+ && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
+ TLS_ANY_VERSION,
+ OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
&extensions, NULL, 1)
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
extensions = NULL;
- if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
-#endif
- ) {
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
/*
* We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
* ClientHello will not change
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk;
+
+ if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
+ sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+}
+
+static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
+ WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ size_t certidx;
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+
+ if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+ sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
+ && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+
+ if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
+ * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
+ * type.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
+ if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
+ X509_free(sc->session->peer);
+ sc->session->peer = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
+ sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
+
+ /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
+ && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
+ sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
+ &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i;
- MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- size_t chainidx, certidx;
+ size_t chainidx;
unsigned int context = 0;
- const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
+ return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
+ if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
+ if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
|| context != 0
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
- x = X509_new_with_libctx(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
+ x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
cert_len) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
PACKET extensions;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+
+ err:
+ X509_free(x);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
+ s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
+ * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
+ * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
+ */
+WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
+ size_t certidx;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
+ return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
+ if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
*/
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto err;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
- if (i > 1) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
*/
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- sk = NULL;
+ x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
- x = NULL;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
- if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
- x = NULL;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto err;
+ if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
* skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
* type.
*/
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
- x = NULL;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
- s->session->peer_type = certidx;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- x = NULL;
+ /* Ensure there is no RPK */
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
+ s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
&s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
- goto err;
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ PACKET tmppkt;
+ BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
+ ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
- err:
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
return ret;
}
+#endif
-static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
- *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
return 1;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
-
- DH *dh = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
-
- int check_bits = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
- dh = DH_new();
-
- if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
NULL);
bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* test non-zero pubkey */
- if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+ if (tmpl == NULL
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
+ || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ bnpub_key)
+ || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- p = g = NULL;
- if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
+ if (pctx == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
- bnpub_key = NULL;
- if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
+ if (pctx == NULL
+ /*
+ * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
+ * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
+ * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
+ * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
+ */
+ || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
+ || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
- dh = NULL;
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
- 0, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(peer_tmp))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+ EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
+ 0, peer_tmp)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+ peer_tmp = NULL;
/*
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
- *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- return 1;
+ ret = 1;
err:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
- DH_free(dh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
- return 0;
-#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
+ return ret;
}
-static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
PACKET encoded_pt;
unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
/*
*/
if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
- PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
- PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
- SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
+ PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
- *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
- *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
+ s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
return 1;
-#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
long alg_k;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
-#endif
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
unsigned int sigalg;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
goto err;
}
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
- md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
+ md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx(md_ctx, &pctx,
- md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
- s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq,
- pkey) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
+ md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
+ sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
+ NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
if (rv <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
}
/* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
- size_t i;
-
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
+ memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ else
+ s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
+ if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context = NULL;
+ s->pha_context_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
!PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
} else {
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
PACKET sigalgs;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
*/
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
* SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
* client_cert_cb.
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned int ticklen;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
PACKET nonce;
EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
- || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
- : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
+ : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
* post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
* cache.
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* one
*/
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
- && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
* any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
s->session = new_sess;
}
- /*
- * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
- * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
- */
- s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
+ s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
+ ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
* ticket.
*/
- sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
+ sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
if (sha256 == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
+ /* Error is already recorded */
+ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
- * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
+ * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
* but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
*/
if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
sha256, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_free(sha256);
s->session->not_resumable = 0;
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
- int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
size_t hashlen;
static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
* parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
*/
-int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
size_t resplen;
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
- s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
return 1;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
* In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
* on failure.
*/
-int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
+int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
- && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
- int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
+ && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ sctx->ext.status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
return 0;
}
if (ret < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
- SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+ if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int ret = 0;
size_t psklen = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
- psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
goto err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
tmpidentity = NULL;
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return ret;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t enclen;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
- if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
-#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
int prime_len;
+ unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
+ size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
+ int ret = 0;
skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
-
- if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* send off the data */
- prime_len = BN_num_bytes(DH_get0_p(dh_clnt));
+
+ /* Generate encoding of server key */
+ encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
+ if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
/*
* For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
- * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here.
+ * as the prime.
*/
- if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, prime_len, &keybytes)
- || BN_bn2binpad(DH_get0_pub_key(dh_clnt), keybytes, prime_len) < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
+ pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
+ if (pad_len > 0) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- return 1;
+ ret = 1;
err:
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
- return 0;
-#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
+ return ret;
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* Generate encoding of client key */
- encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
+ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
-#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
-#endif
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
- X509 *peer_cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
/*
* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
- peer_cert = s->session->peer;
- if (peer_cert == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
return 0;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
- X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
- s->ctx->propq);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
+ pkey,
+ sctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
/*
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
/* Generate session key
- * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
*/
- || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
ukm_hash = NULL;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
*/
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
|| (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
return 0;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
-int gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
+int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
return NID_magma_ctr;
return NID_undef;
}
-int gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
+int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL;
unsigned int md_len;
- const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
+ sctx->propq);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
}
#endif
-static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
/* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
- unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
+ unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
+ unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
- X509 *peer_cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
size_t msglen;
- int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
+ int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
- peer_cert = s->session->peer;
- if (peer_cert == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
- return 0;
+ if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ goto err;
}
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), s->ctx->propq);
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
+ pkey,
+ sctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
- msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ pkey_ctx = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
return 0;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
&abytes)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
-int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
#endif
- return 0;
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
-int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
+int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
#endif
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
- if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
+ s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
return 0;
}
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
-static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
return 1;
}
-WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
- i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
- if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
+ || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+ || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
+ s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
+
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
-int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
/* no context available, add 0-length context */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
} else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
- (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
- : s->cert->key)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return 0;
+ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
+ cpk = s->cert->key;
+ switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
+ case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
+ if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ /*
+ * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
+ * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
+ * moment. We need to do it now.
+ */
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
- && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
+ || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
+ && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
/*
* This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
* state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
+ WPACKET tmppkt;
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ size_t length;
+ size_t max_length;
+ COMP_METHOD *method;
+ COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
+ int comp_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
+
+ /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
+
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
+ if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
+ /* no context available, add 0-length context */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* continue with the real |pkt| */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
+ goto err;
+
+ switch (alg) {
+ case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
+ method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
+ method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
+ break;
+ case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
+ method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto err;
+ }
+ max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
+
+ if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
+ (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
+ if (comp_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
+ * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
+ * moment. We need to do it now.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
+ && (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
+ || (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
+ && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
+ SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
+ /*
+ * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
+ * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+
+ err:
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ out:
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
+ }
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ COMP_CTX_free(comp);
+ return ret;
}
+#endif
-int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
size_t idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
return 1;
/* This is the passed certificate */
- clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
+ pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
+ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
/* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
return 0;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
- if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
- return 1;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
- SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
return 0;
}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Early out to skip the checks below */
+ if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
return 0;
}
-#endif
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
size_t len, padding_len;
unsigned char *padding = NULL;
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
-MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
* HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
* but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
*/
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- SSL_renegotiate(s);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
else
- SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
-static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
-int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
- i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
- SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
- px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
+ i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
- i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+ if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ WPACKET *pkt)
{
int i;
size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
- int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
+ && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL)
+ && s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
- SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
if (sk == NULL) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
else
#endif
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
continue;
- if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
if (!maxverok) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
- && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
- maxverok = 1;
- } else {
- if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
- && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
- maxverok = 1;
- }
+ int minproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
+ int maxproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
+
+ if (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) >= 0
+ && ssl_version_cmp(s, minproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) <= 0)
+ maxverok = 1;
}
totlen += len;
}
if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
- SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-
- if (!maxverok)
- ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
- "SSL/TLS version");
+ const char *maxvertext =
+ !maxverok
+ ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
+ : NULL;
+ SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
+ maxvertext);
return 0;
}
if (totlen != 0) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
- if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
- if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
- ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
- return 1;
+ return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff