/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2005-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include "internal/e_os.h"
#include <stdio.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-# include <sys/timeb.h>
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
-# include <sys/timeval.h>
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# include <sys/times.h>
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "internal/time.h"
-static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
-static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
-static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
-static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
-static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
+static const size_t g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+ dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+ dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
-long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
+OSSL_TIME dtls1_default_timeout(void)
{
/*
* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
* http, the cache would over fill
*/
- return (60 * 60 * 2);
+ return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
}
-int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_new(SSL *ssl)
{
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
return 0;
}
-
- if (!ssl3_new(s))
- return (0);
+
+ if (!ssl3_new(ssl))
+ return 0;
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
- ssl3_free(s);
- return (0);
+ ssl3_free(ssl);
+ return 0;
}
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
OPENSSL_free(d1);
- ssl3_free(s);
- return (0);
+ ssl3_free(ssl);
+ return 0;
}
s->d1 = d1;
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return (1);
+
+ if (!ssl->method->ssl_clear(ssl))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+ dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
}
-static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
pitem *item = NULL;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
+}
+
+void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs
+ && frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod != NULL
+ && s->rlayer.wrl != frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrl) {
+ /*
+ * If we're freeing the CCS then we're done with the old wrl and it
+ * can bee freed
+ */
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrlmethod->free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.wrl);
+ }
+
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
-void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
+
+void dtls1_free(SSL *ssl)
{
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
- ssl3_free(s);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
- dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+ if (s->d1 != NULL) {
+ dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ }
- pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
+
+ ssl3_free(ssl);
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
s->d1 = NULL;
}
-void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_clear(SSL *ssl)
{
pqueue *buffered_messages;
pqueue *sent_messages;
- unsigned int mtu;
- unsigned int link_mtu;
+ size_t mtu;
+ size_t link_mtu;
+
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
if (s->d1) {
+ DTLS_timer_cb timer_cb = s->d1->timer_cb;
+
buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
mtu = s->d1->mtu;
memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
+ /* Restore the timer callback from previous state */
+ s->d1->timer_cb = timer_cb;
+
if (s->server) {
s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
+ if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
}
s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
}
- ssl3_clear(s);
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
+ if (!ssl3_clear(ssl))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
+ else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
- else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
- s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+#endif
else
- s->version = s->method->version;
+ s->version = ssl->method->version;
+
+ return 1;
}
-long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
+ OSSL_TIME t;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
switch (cmd) {
case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
- if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
+ if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &t)) {
+ *(struct timeval *)parg = ossl_time_to_timeval(t);
ret = 1;
}
break;
s->d1->mtu = larg;
return larg;
default:
- ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(ssl, cmd, larg, parg);
break;
}
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void dtls1_bio_set_next_timeout(BIO *bio, const DTLS1_STATE *d1)
+{
+ struct timeval tv = ossl_time_to_timeval(d1->next_timeout);
+
+ BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &tv);
}
-void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
+ OSSL_TIME duration;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable timer for SCTP */
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
+ s->d1->next_timeout = ossl_time_zero();
return;
}
#endif
- /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
- if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
- s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+ /*
+ * If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second or
+ * a user-specified value if the timer callback is installed.
+ */
+ if (ossl_time_is_zero(s->d1->next_timeout)) {
+ if (s->d1->timer_cb != NULL)
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us = s->d1->timer_cb(ssl, 0);
+ else
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 1000000;
}
- /* Set timeout to current time */
- get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ /* Set timeout to current time plus duration */
+ duration = ossl_us2time(s->d1->timeout_duration_us);
+ s->d1->next_timeout = ossl_time_add(ossl_time_now(), duration);
- /* Add duration to current time */
- s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
- &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ /* set s->d1->next_timeout into ssl->rbio interface */
+ dtls1_bio_set_next_timeout(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), s->d1);
}
-struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
+int dtls1_get_timeout(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, OSSL_TIME *timeleft)
{
- struct timeval timenow;
+ OSSL_TIME timenow;
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
- if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (ossl_time_is_zero(s->d1->next_timeout))
+ return 0;
/* Get current time */
- get_current_time(&timenow);
-
- /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
- if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
- (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
- s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
- memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
- return timeleft;
- }
-
- /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
- memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
- timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
- timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
- if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
- timeleft->tv_sec--;
- timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
- }
+ timenow = ossl_time_now();
/*
- * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
- * because of small devergences with socket timeouts.
+ * If timer already expired or if remaining time is less than 15 ms,
+ * set it to 0 to prevent issues because of small divergences with
+ * socket timeouts.
*/
- if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
- memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
- }
-
- return timeleft;
+ *timeleft = ossl_time_subtract(s->d1->next_timeout, timenow);
+ if (ossl_time_compare(*timeleft, ossl_ms2time(15)) <= 0)
+ *timeleft = ossl_time_zero();
+ return 1;
}
-int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- struct timeval timeleft;
+ OSSL_TIME timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
- if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
+ if (!dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft))
return 0;
- }
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
- if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
+ if (!ossl_time_is_zero(timeleft))
return 0;
- }
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
-void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
+static void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
- if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
- s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us *= 2;
+ if (s->d1->timeout_duration_us > 60000000)
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 60000000;
}
-void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* Reset everything */
- memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
- memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
- s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
- &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ s->d1->timeout_num_alerts = 0;
+ s->d1->next_timeout = ossl_time_zero();
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us = 1000000;
+ dtls1_bio_set_next_timeout(s->rbio, s->d1);
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
- dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
}
-int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- unsigned int mtu;
+ size_t mtu;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
+ s->d1->timeout_num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
- if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
- && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ if (s->d1->timeout_num_alerts > 2
+ && !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
mtu =
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
- NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
}
- if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
+ if (s->d1->timeout_num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
return 0;
}
- dtls1_double_timeout(s);
+ if (s->d1->timer_cb != NULL)
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us = s->d1->timer_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ s->d1->timeout_duration_us);
+ else
+ dtls1_double_timeout(s);
- if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+ if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
-
- s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
- if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
- s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
}
-#endif
dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
}
-static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
-{
-#if defined(_WIN32)
- SYSTEMTIME st;
- union {
- unsigned __int64 ul;
- FILETIME ft;
- } now;
-
- GetSystemTime(&st);
- SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
-# ifdef __MINGW32__
- now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
-# else
- now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
-# endif
- t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
- t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
- struct timeb tb;
- ftime(&tb);
- t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
- t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
-#else
- gettimeofday(t, NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-
#define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
-
-int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *client)
{
- int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
+ int next, n, ret = 0;
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
const unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char *p, *buf;
- unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
- unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL, *wbuf;
+ size_t fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
+ unsigned int rectype, versmajor, versminor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
BIO *rbio, *wbio;
- BUF_MEM *bufm;
BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+ }
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
- if (!SSL_clear(s))
+ if (!SSL_clear(ssl))
return -1;
ERR_clear_error();
- rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
- if(!rbio || !wbio) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ if (!rbio || !wbio) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
- /*
- * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
- * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
- * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
-
/*
* Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
* requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
* SSL_accept)
*/
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- BUF_MEM_free(bufm);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->init_buf = bufm;
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ wbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (wbuf == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return -1;
}
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
do {
/* Get a packet */
clear_sys_error();
- /*
- * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
- * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
- * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
- * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
- * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
- * in the record length check below.
- */
- n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
-
+ n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (n <= 0) {
- if(BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
/* Non-blocking IO */
goto end;
}
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
- clearpkt = 1;
-
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
/*
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto end;
}
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
/* Get the record header */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
- || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versminor)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
- if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, (versmajor << 8) | versminor, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
* the same.
*/
if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
- /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
- || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
+ /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
/* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &msglen)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
- if(msgseq > 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
+ if (msgseq > 2) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
*/
if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
/* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
- fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* Verify client version is supported
*/
- if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
- s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)ssl->method->version) &&
+ ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
* Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
* ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
/*
* We have a cookie, so lets check it.
*/
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
+ if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
/* This is fatal */
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
- PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
- 0) {
+ if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
+ (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == 0) {
/*
* We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
* per RFC6347
}
if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ WPACKET wpkt;
+ unsigned int version;
+ size_t wreclen;
+
/*
* There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
* to resend, we just drop it.
*/
- /*
- * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
- * value
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
- BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
-
/* Generate the cookie */
- if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
- s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
+ if (ssl->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+ ssl->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(ssl, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
cookielen > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
/* This is fatal */
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
- msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- cookie, cookielen);
-
- *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
-
- /* Message length */
- l2n3(msglen, p);
-
- /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
- s2n(0, p);
-
- /*
- * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
- * and fragment length is message length
- */
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msglen, p);
-
- /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
- reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /* Add the record header */
- p = buf;
-
- *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
* 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
- } else {
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ version = (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ? DTLS1_VERSION
+ : s->version;
+
+ /* Construct the record and message headers */
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt,
+ wbuf,
+ ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
+ + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ 0)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, version)
+ /*
+ * Record sequence number is always the same as in the
+ * received ClientHello
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&wpkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
+ /* End of record, start sub packet for message */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&wpkt)
+ /* Message type */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ /*
+ * Message length - doesn't follow normal TLS convention:
+ * the length isn't the last thing in the message header.
+ * We'll need to fill this in later when we know the
+ * length. Set it to zero for now
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * Message sequence number is always 0 for a
+ * HelloVerifyRequest
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment
+ * offset is 0
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * Fragment length is the same as message length, but
+ * this *is* the last thing in the message header so we
+ * can just start a sub-packet. No need to come back
+ * later for this one.
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&wpkt)
+ /* Create the actual HelloVerifyRequest body */
+ || !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&wpkt, cookie, cookielen)
+ /* Close message body */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
+ /* Close record body */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &wreclen)
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
+ /* This is fatal */
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
/*
- * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
- * ClientHello
+ * Fix up the message len in the message header. Its the same as the
+ * fragment len which has been filled in by WPACKET, so just copy
+ * that. Destination for the message len is after the record header
+ * plus one byte for the message content type. The source is the
+ * last 3 bytes of the message header
*/
- memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
- p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
-
- /* Length */
- s2n(reclen, p);
-
- /*
- * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
- * header
- */
- reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&wbuf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1],
+ &wbuf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3],
+ 3);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto end;
}
/*
- * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
+ * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
* maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
* support this.
*/
- if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
+ if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
(void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
}
BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
tmpclient = NULL;
- if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
- if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
+ if (BIO_write(wbio, wbuf, wreclen) < (int)wreclen) {
+ if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
- if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
* going to drop this packet.
*/
goto end;
}
- return -1;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
}
} while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->increment_sequence_ctr(s->rlayer.wrl);
/*
* We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
* SSL object
*/
- SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
/*
* Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
*/
ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
- /* Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address */
+ /*
+ * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address
+ */
if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
- ret = 1;
- clearpkt = 0;
-end:
- BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
- if (clearpkt) {
- /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
- BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
-{
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
- s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
- /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-
- if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
-{
- return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
-{
- unsigned char *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
-
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
-
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
- 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
- payload + padding;
- int r;
-
- if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
- if (buffer == NULL)
- return -1;
- bp = buffer;
-
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return -1;
- }
-
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
-
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
- unsigned int seq;
-
- /*
- * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
- * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
- */
- n2s(pl, seq);
-
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
+ /* Buffer the record for use by the record layer */
+ if (BIO_write(s->rlayer.rrlnext, buf, n) != n) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- return 0;
-}
-
-int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*-
- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
+ /*
+ * Reset the record layer - but this time we can use the record we just
+ * buffered in s->rlayer.rrlnext
*/
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
+ DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+ OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
+ OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- err:
+ ret = 1;
+ end:
+ BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
+ OPENSSL_free(wbuf);
return ret;
}
#endif
+static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+
int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
BIO *wbio;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return -1;
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ !(sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
return ret;
}
-int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
s->d1->mtu =
- s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
}
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
s->d1->mtu =
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/*
* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
/* Set to min mtu */
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
- s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+ (long)s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
} else
return 0;
return 1;
}
-static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
+static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
{
return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
}
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
+size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
+}
+
+size_t DTLS_get_data_mtu(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ size_t mac_overhead, int_overhead, blocksize, ext_overhead;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
+ size_t mtu;
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+ if (ciph == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_overhead(ciph, &mac_overhead, &int_overhead,
+ &blocksize, &ext_overhead))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (SSL_READ_ETM(s))
+ ext_overhead += mac_overhead;
+ else
+ int_overhead += mac_overhead;
+
+ /* Subtract external overhead (e.g. IV/nonce, separate MAC) */
+ if (ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH >= mtu)
+ return 0;
+ mtu -= ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Round encrypted payload down to cipher block size (for CBC etc.)
+ * No check for overflow since 'mtu % blocksize' cannot exceed mtu. */
+ if (blocksize)
+ mtu -= (mtu % blocksize);
+
+ /* Subtract internal overhead (e.g. CBC padding len byte) */
+ if (int_overhead >= mtu)
+ return 0;
+ mtu -= int_overhead;
+
+ return mtu;
+}
+
+void DTLS_set_timer_cb(SSL *ssl, DTLS_timer_cb cb)
{
- return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ s->d1->timer_cb = cb;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff