X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host,
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername,
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email,
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc
- X509 verification parameters
unsigned long flags);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
unsigned long flags);
- unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
uint32_t flags);
int auth_level);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int n);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
unsigned int flags);
- char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ unsigned int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *email, size_t emaillen);
+ char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc);
a certificate verification operation.
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B<param> by oring
-it with B<flags>. See the B<VERIFICATION FLAGS> section for a complete
+it with B<flags>. See L</VERIFICATION FLAGS> for a complete
description of values the B<flags> parameter can take.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B<param>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B<param>
to B<purpose>. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
-chain, for example SSL client or SSL server.
+chain, for example B<X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT>.
+The purpose requirement is cleared if B<purpose> is 0.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B<param> to
B<trust>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
+policy checking.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
limit.
Thus a B<depth> limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
-directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
-intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
+directly by the trust anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
+intermediate CA certificate between the trust anchor and the end-entity
certificate.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to
interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
shorter than 1024 bits.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host() returns the B<n>th expected DNS hostname that has
+been set using X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host().
+To obtain all names start with B<n> = 0 and increment B<n> as long as no NULL
+pointer is returned.
+
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to
-B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
+B<name> clearing any previously specified hostname. If
B<name> is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and
name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If B<name>
is NUL-terminated, B<namelen> may be zero, otherwise B<namelen>
-must be set to the length of B<name>. When a hostname is specified,
+must be set to the length of B<name>.
+
+When a hostname is specified,
certificate verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)>
with flags equal to the B<flags> argument given to
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags() (default zero). Applications
are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
-calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks are out of scope
+calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks may be out of scope
with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
-be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added to OpenSSL.
+be suppressed as appropriate when DANE verification is enabled.
+
+When the subject CommonName will not be ignored, whether as a result of the
+B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT> host flag, or because no DNS subject
+alternative names are present in the certificate, any DNS name constraints in
+issuer certificates apply to the subject CommonName as well as the subject
+alternative name extension.
+
+When the subject CommonName will be ignored, whether as a result of the
+B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT> host flag, or because some DNS subject
+alternative names are present in the certificate, DNS name constraints in
+issuer certificates will not be applied to the subject DN.
+As described in X509_check_host(3) the B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT>
+flag takes precedence over the B<X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT> flag.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() returns any host flags previously set via a
+call to X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags().
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference
identifier that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names
associated B<param> argument is freed. Applications must not free
the return value.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email() returns the expected RFC822 email address.
+
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to
B<email>. If B<email> is NUL-terminated, B<emaillen> may be zero, otherwise
B<emaillen> must be set to the length of B<email>. When an email address
is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
L<X509_check_email(3)>.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() returns the expected IP address as a string.
+The caller is responsible for freeing it.
+
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B<ip>.
The B<ip> argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
B<iplen> must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an IP
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
failure.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(), and
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc(), return the string pointers specified above
+or NULL if the respective value has not been set or on error.
+
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() returns any current host flags.
+
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the current inheritance flags.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return
B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL> enables CRL checking for the entire certificate
chain.
-B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disabled critical extension checking. By default
-any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
+B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disables critical extension checking. By default
+any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs result
in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
ignored. B<WARNING> setting this option for anything other than debugging
purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
If B<X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS> is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
-B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> enables checking of the root CA self signed
-certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
+B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> requests checking the signature of
+the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed.
+This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA
+certificate with key usage restrictions not including the I<keyCertSign> bit.
+By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
-check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA
-signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA
-are not treated as fatal errors.
-
-If B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when constructing the certificate chain,
-L<X509_verify_cert(3)> will search the trust store for issuer certificates before
-searching the provided untrusted certificates.
-As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
-
-The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
-chains.
+check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the self-signature
+of such a certificate is that disabled or unsupported message digests used for
+the signature are not treated as fatal errors.
+
+When B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, which is always the case since
+OpenSSL 1.1.0, construction of the certificate chain
+in L<X509_verify_cert(3)> searches the trust store for issuer certificates
+before searching the provided untrusted certificates.
+Local issuer certificates are often more likely to satisfy local security
+requirements and lead to a locally trusted root.
+This is especially important when some certificates in the trust store have
+explicit trust settings (see "TRUST SETTINGS" in L<openssl-x509(1)>).
+
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag could have been used before OpenSSL 1.1.0
+to suppress checking for alternative chains.
By default, unless B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> is set, when building a
certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then
OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST> always set, this option
has no effect.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag causes non-self-signed certificates in the
+trust store to be treated as trust anchors, in the same way as self-signed
+root CA certificates.
+This makes it possible to trust self-issued certificates as well as certificates
+issued by an intermediate CA without having to trust their ancestor root CA.
+With OpenSSL 1.1.0 and later and B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> set, chain
+construction stops as soon as the first certificate contained in the trust store
+is added to the chain, whether that certificate is a self-signed "root"
+certificate or a not self-signed "intermediate" or self-issued certificate.
+Thus, when an intermediate certificate is found in the trust store, the
+verified chain passed to callbacks may be shorter than it otherwise would
+be without the B<X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> flag.
+
The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME> flag suppresses checking the validity period
of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()
is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
corresponding B<X509_STORE> structure. No attempt is made to download
CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension.
-=head1 EXAMPLE
+=head1 EXAMPLES
Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL
connections associated with an B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>:
L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
L<X509_check_host(3)>,
L<X509_check_email(3)>,
-L<X509_check_ip(3)>
+L<X509_check_ip(3)>,
+L<openssl-x509(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
-The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
-The flag B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> was deprecated in
-OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The flag B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+and has no effect.
+
+The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+
+The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
+and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff