+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-# define _GNU_SOURCE
-#endif
-#include "e_os.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/dso.h"
-#if defined(__linux)
-# include <asm/unistd.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/sysctl.h>
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
- || defined(__DJGPP__)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-# if defined(__GLIBC__)
-# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-# else
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE"
-#endif
-
-#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
- || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
- || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-# error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
-# endif
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-# error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
-# endif
-
-/*
- * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
- * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the
- * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
- * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
- * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
- * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
- * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
- * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
- * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
- * platforms.
- *
- * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- short int code;
- int i, k;
- size_t bytes_needed;
- struct timespec ts;
- unsigned char v;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- long duration;
- extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
-# else
- long long duration;
- extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
-# endif
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
-
- for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
- /*
- * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
- * interference, etc.
- */
- for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
- ts.tv_nsec = random();
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep(&duration, &code);
-# else
- /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
-# endif
-
- /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
- v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
- rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
- }
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# else
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
- (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
-# error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-# error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-# if !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-# error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
-# endif
-# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
-# endif
-
-# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-/*
- * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
- * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
- int mib[2];
- size_t done = 0;
- size_t len;
-
- /*
- * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
- * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
- */
-
- /*
- * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
- * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
- * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
- * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
- */
- if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
- errno = EINVAL;
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
- * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0
- * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting
- * up to 256 bytes.
- * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
- */
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
- errno = ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-#endif
-
- mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
- mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
-
- do {
- len = buflen;
- if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
- return done > 0 ? done : -1;
- done += len;
- buf += len;
- buflen -= len;
- } while (buflen > 0);
-
- return done;
-}
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-
-# if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom)
-# if defined(__arm__) && defined(__NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
-# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
-# elif defined(__i386__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 355
-# elif defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(__ILP32__)
-# define __NR_getrandom 318
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/*
- * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
- * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
- */
-static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
- /*
- * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
- * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
- *
- * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
- *
- * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
- * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
- */
-
- /*
- * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
- *
- * Known OSs that should support this:
- * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
- * - Solaris since 11.3
- * - OpenBSD since 5.6
- * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
- * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
- */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
- extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
-
- if (getentropy != NULL)
- return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-# elif !defined(FIPS_MODE)
- union {
- void *p;
- int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
- } p_getentropy;
-
- /*
- * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
- * call this function often.
- */
- ERR_set_mark();
- p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
- return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-# endif
-
- /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
- return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
-# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
- return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
-# else
- errno = ENOSYS;
- return -1;
-# endif
-}
-# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM };
-static struct random_device {
- int fd;
- dev_t dev;
- ino_t ino;
- mode_t mode;
- dev_t rdev;
-} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
-static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
-
-/*
- * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
- * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
- * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing.
- * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening
- * another file.
- */
-static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- return rd->fd != -1
- && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1
- && rd->dev == st.st_dev
- && rd->ino == st.st_ino
- && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0
- && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev;
-}
-
-/*
- * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error
- */
-static int get_random_device(size_t n)
-{
- struct stat st;
- struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
- /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */
- if (check_random_device(rd))
- return rd->fd;
-
- /* open the random device ... */
- if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- return rd->fd;
-
- /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
- if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) {
- rd->dev = st.st_dev;
- rd->ino = st.st_ino;
- rd->mode = st.st_mode;
- rd->rdev = st.st_rdev;
- } else {
- close(rd->fd);
- rd->fd = -1;
- }
-
- return rd->fd;
-}
-
-/*
- * Close a random device making sure it is a random device
- */
-static void close_random_device(size_t n)
-{
- struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
- if (check_random_device(rd))
- close(rd->fd);
- rd->fd = -1;
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
- random_devices[i].fd = -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
- size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
- close_random_device(i);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
- if (!keep)
- rand_pool_cleanup();
-
- keep_random_devices_open = keep;
-}
-
-# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-/*
- * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
- *
- * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
- * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
- * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
- * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
- *
- * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
- * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
- * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
- * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
- * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
- * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
- * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
- * possibility of blocking).
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-# else
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
- {
- ssize_t bytes;
- /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
- int attempts = 3;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
- if (bytes > 0) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- bytes_needed -= bytes;
- attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
- } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
- {
- /* Not yet implemented. */
- }
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- {
- size_t i;
-
- for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
- /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
- int attempts = 3;
- const int fd = get_random_device(i);
-
- if (fd == -1)
- continue;
-
- while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
-
- if (bytes > 0) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- bytes_needed -= bytes;
- attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
- } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
- break;
- }
- }
- if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
- close_random_device(i);
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- }
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
- }
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
- entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD)
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- if (bytes_needed > 0) {
- static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
- int num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
- buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
- if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
- if (entropy_available > 0)
- return entropy_available;
- }
- }
-# endif
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-# endif
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
- || defined(__DJGPP__)
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- pid_t pid;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
- * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
- * different process instances.
- */
- data.pid = getpid();
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- struct {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
- uint64_t time;
- } data;
-
- /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
- memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
- /*
- * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
- * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
- * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
- */
- data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
- * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
- * is synchronized.
- */
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
-# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
-# endif
- return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
- * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
- * is acceptable.
- */
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
- uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-
- if (res != 0)
- return res;
-
-# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
- return gethrtime();
-# elif defined(_AIX)
- {
- timebasestruct_t t;
-
- read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
- return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
- }
-# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
-
-# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
-# else
-# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
-# endif
-
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
-# endif
- return time(NULL);
-}
-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */
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