/*
- * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/self_test.h>
#include "crypto/bn.h"
+static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
+ void *cbarg);
+
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
{
* See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
*
* Params:
+ * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
* eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
* is stored in this object.
+ * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
+ * fails then the keypair is not generated,
* Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
*/
-int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ pairwise_test = 1;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
ok = 1;
+ if (pairwise_test) {
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
+ void *cbarg = NULL;
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
+ ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
+ }
err:
/* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
if (!ok) {
return ok;
}
+int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
+}
+
int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ret;
/*
* ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
- * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
- * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
- * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
- * NOTES:
- * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
- * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
- * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
*/
-int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
- goto err;
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ return 0;
}
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
order = eckey->group->order;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
+ */
+int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
+ || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
+ * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
+ */
+int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL
+ || eckey->group == NULL
+ || eckey->pub_key == NULL
+ || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
goto err;
}
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
+ * NOTES:
+ * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
+ * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
+ * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
- /*
- * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
- * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
- */
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
- || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey)
+ || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
- * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
- */
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
- NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
}
ok = 1;
- err:
+err:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
return ok;
}
}
+OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->libctx;
+}
+
const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
{
return key->group;
* This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
* propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
* this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
- * the called specifically set it.
+ * the caller specifically set it.
*
* The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
* years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
return 0;
return 1;
}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
+ * Perform a sign/verify operation.
+ *
+ * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
+ * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
+ * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
+ * omitted here.
+ */
+static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
+ void *cbarg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
+ int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
+
+ st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
+ if (st == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
+
+ sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
+
+ if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff