2 * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/ktls.h"
13 #include "record/record_local.h"
14 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
21 /* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
22 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20";
25 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
26 * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
27 * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
28 * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
29 * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
30 * If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure.
32 int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
34 const unsigned char *secret,
35 const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
36 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
37 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error)
39 EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq);
41 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
42 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
43 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
47 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
52 if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
55 * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
56 * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
58 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
60 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
64 if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
65 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
67 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
70 hashlen = (size_t)ret;
72 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
73 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
75 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
76 (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
77 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
78 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
79 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
80 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
81 (unsigned char *)label, labellen);
83 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
84 (unsigned char *)data,
86 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
88 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
89 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
93 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
99 int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
100 const unsigned char *secret,
101 const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
102 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
103 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
106 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
108 ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md,
109 secret, label, labellen, data, datalen,
110 out, outlen, !fatal);
111 if (ret == 0 && fatal)
112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
118 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
119 * success 0 on failure.
121 int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
122 const unsigned char *secret,
123 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
125 /* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
126 static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79";
128 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
129 NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
133 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
134 * success 0 on failure.
136 int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
137 const unsigned char *secret,
138 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
140 /* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
141 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76";
143 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
144 NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
147 int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
148 const unsigned char *secret,
149 unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
151 /* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
152 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64";
154 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
155 sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
159 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
160 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
161 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
163 int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
164 const unsigned char *prevsecret,
165 const unsigned char *insecret,
167 unsigned char *outsecret)
174 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
175 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
176 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
177 /* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
178 static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64";
179 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
181 kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq);
182 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
189 mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
190 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
191 if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
193 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
196 mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
198 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
199 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
201 if (insecret != NULL)
202 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
203 (unsigned char *)insecret,
205 if (prevsecret != NULL)
206 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
207 (unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
208 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
209 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
210 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
211 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
212 (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
213 sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
214 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
216 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
221 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
226 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
227 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
228 * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
230 int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
231 const unsigned char *insecret,
234 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
235 return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
236 insecret, insecretlen,
237 (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
241 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
242 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
245 int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
246 unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
249 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
251 *secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
252 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
253 return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
257 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
260 size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
263 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
264 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
265 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
266 unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
267 unsigned char *key = NULL;
268 size_t len = 0, hashlen;
269 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
270 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
275 /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
276 if (sctx->propq != NULL)
277 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
280 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
282 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
287 if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
288 key = s->server_finished_secret;
289 } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
290 key = s->client_finished_secret;
292 if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
293 s->client_app_traffic_secret,
299 if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname,
300 params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
301 /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
302 out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
313 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
314 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
316 int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
321 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
322 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
323 NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
324 /* Error is already recorded */
325 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
329 ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
330 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
331 ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
332 s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
337 static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending,
339 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
340 const unsigned char *insecret,
341 const unsigned char *hash,
342 const unsigned char *label,
343 size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
344 unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen,
345 unsigned char *iv, size_t *ivlen,
348 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
352 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
353 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
359 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
360 secret, hashlen, 1)) {
361 /* SSLfatal() already called */
365 *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
367 mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
368 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
371 *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
372 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
373 algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
374 } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
375 /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
376 algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
377 } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
378 /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
379 algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
384 if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
385 *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
387 *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
391 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
392 *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
394 /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */
395 *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
397 iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
405 if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen)
406 || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, *ivlen)) {
407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
414 int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
416 /* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
417 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
418 /* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
419 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
420 /* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
421 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
422 /* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
423 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
424 /* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
425 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
426 /* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
427 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
428 /* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
429 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
430 /* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
431 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
432 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
433 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
434 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
435 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
436 unsigned char *hash = hashval;
437 unsigned char *insecret;
438 unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
439 const char *log_label = NULL;
440 size_t finsecretlen = 0;
441 const unsigned char *label;
442 size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
444 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
445 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
446 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
447 size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
449 int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
450 : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
452 if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
453 || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
454 if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
455 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
458 unsigned int hashlenui;
459 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
461 insecret = s->early_secret;
462 label = client_early_traffic;
463 labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
464 log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
466 handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
472 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
473 && s->max_early_data > 0
474 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
476 * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
477 * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
478 * must be using an external PSK.
480 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
481 && s->max_early_data ==
482 s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
488 if (sslcipher == NULL) {
489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
494 * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
495 * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
496 * use ssl_handshake_md().
498 mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
505 * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
508 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
509 /* Error is already recorded */
510 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
511 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
515 md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
516 if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
517 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
518 || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
520 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
524 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
526 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
527 early_exporter_master_secret,
528 sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
530 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
536 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
537 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
541 } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
542 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
543 finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
544 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
545 label = client_handshake_traffic;
546 labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
547 log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
549 * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
550 * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
551 * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
552 * processed early data then we delay changing the server
553 * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
554 * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
555 * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
557 hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
559 insecret = s->master_secret;
560 label = client_application_traffic;
561 labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
562 log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
564 * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
565 * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
566 * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
567 * previously saved value.
569 hash = s->server_finished_hash;
572 /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
573 if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
574 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
575 finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
576 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
577 label = server_handshake_traffic;
578 labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
579 log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
581 insecret = s->master_secret;
582 label = server_application_traffic;
583 labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
584 log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
588 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
589 md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
590 cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
591 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
592 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
593 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
599 * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
600 * client application traffic secret
602 if (label == server_application_traffic)
603 memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
605 if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
606 memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
608 if (label == client_application_traffic) {
610 * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
611 * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
613 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
614 resumption_master_secret,
615 sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
616 hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
618 /* SSLfatal() already called */
623 /* check whether cipher is known */
624 if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
627 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
628 insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
629 &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
634 if (label == server_application_traffic) {
635 memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
636 /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
637 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
638 exporter_master_secret,
639 sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
640 hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
646 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
651 } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
652 memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
654 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
659 if (finsecret != NULL
660 && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
661 finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
662 /* SSLfatal() already called */
666 if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) {
667 if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
668 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1);
670 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0);
673 level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0
674 ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
675 : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0
676 ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
677 : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION);
679 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
681 level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv,
682 ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen, NID_undef,
684 /* SSLfatal already called */
690 if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
691 /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
692 ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
694 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
695 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
699 int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending)
701 /* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
702 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64";
703 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
705 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
706 unsigned char *insecret;
707 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
709 size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
711 int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
712 : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
713 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
715 if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 if (s->server == sending)
722 insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
724 insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
726 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, md,
727 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
729 sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
730 &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
737 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
739 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
740 insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
741 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL,
743 /* SSLfatal already called */
747 /* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */
748 log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL;
749 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
755 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
756 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
760 int tls13_alert_code(int code)
762 /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
763 if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
766 return tls1_alert_code(code);
769 int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
770 unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
771 const char *label, size_t llen,
772 const unsigned char *context,
773 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
775 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
776 /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
777 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
778 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
779 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
780 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
781 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
784 if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
790 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
791 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
792 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
793 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
794 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
795 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
796 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
797 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
798 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
799 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
805 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
809 int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
810 unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
811 const char *label, size_t llen,
812 const unsigned char *context,
815 /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
816 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
817 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
818 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
820 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
821 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
823 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
825 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
828 if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
829 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
830 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
832 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
834 md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2);
837 * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
838 * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
841 * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
842 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
843 * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
845 * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
846 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
847 * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
849 * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
852 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
853 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
854 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
855 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
856 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
857 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
858 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
859 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
860 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
861 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
867 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);