2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
272 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
273 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
274 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
275 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
281 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
282 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
283 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
284 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
287 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
288 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
291 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
292 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
293 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
295 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
296 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
297 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
298 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
299 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
300 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
309 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
310 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
312 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
313 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
314 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
315 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
316 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
317 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
318 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
319 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
320 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
321 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
322 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
323 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
324 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
325 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
330 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
332 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
337 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
340 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
343 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
345 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
347 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
351 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
353 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
355 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
357 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
359 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
361 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
363 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
365 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
367 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
369 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
371 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
373 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
375 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
377 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
379 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
381 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
383 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
385 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
387 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
389 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
391 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
393 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
395 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
399 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
401 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
409 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
411 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
412 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
413 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
414 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
415 * lists in the first place.
416 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
417 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
418 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
420 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
421 const unsigned char **pcurves,
424 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
426 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
427 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
429 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
430 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
431 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
432 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
433 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
436 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
437 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
441 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
442 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
446 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
447 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
450 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
451 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
452 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
454 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
455 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
460 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
461 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
471 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
472 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
474 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
477 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
479 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
480 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
481 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
484 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
487 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
488 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
490 const unsigned char *curves;
491 size_t num_curves, i;
492 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
493 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
495 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
497 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
500 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
501 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
503 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
504 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
506 } else /* Should never happen */
509 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
511 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
512 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
513 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
519 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
520 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
521 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
522 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
524 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
526 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
527 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
529 /* Can't do anything on client side */
533 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
535 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
536 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
538 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
539 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
540 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
541 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
542 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
543 /* Should never happen */
546 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
550 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
551 * but s->options is a long...
553 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
554 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
556 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
557 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
558 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
559 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
561 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
563 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
564 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
565 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
566 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
567 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
570 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
571 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
579 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
583 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
584 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
586 unsigned char *clist, *p;
589 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
592 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
593 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
596 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
597 unsigned long idmask;
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
601 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
610 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
614 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
618 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
621 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
623 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
629 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
631 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
633 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
635 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
636 if (nid == NID_undef)
637 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
638 if (nid == NID_undef)
639 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
640 if (nid == NID_undef)
642 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
643 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
645 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
649 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
650 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
655 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
659 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
662 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
663 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
668 const EC_METHOD *meth;
671 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
672 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
675 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
678 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
682 /* Determine curve ID */
683 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
684 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
685 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
688 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
697 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
699 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
701 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
705 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
710 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
711 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
712 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
714 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
715 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
718 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
719 * supported (see RFC4492).
721 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
722 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
723 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
725 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
728 if (i == num_formats)
733 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
734 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
735 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
737 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
739 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
740 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
741 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
742 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
743 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
747 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
748 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
753 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
760 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
764 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
766 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
767 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
768 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
770 *pformats = ecformats_default;
771 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
773 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
775 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
780 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
781 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
783 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
785 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
788 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
791 /* If not EC nothing to do */
792 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
796 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
801 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
804 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
808 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
809 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
811 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
818 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
819 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
820 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
821 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
823 return 0; /* Should never happen */
824 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
825 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
827 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
829 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
830 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
831 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
833 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
840 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
841 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
843 unsigned char curve_id[2];
844 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
845 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
846 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
847 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
851 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
854 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
855 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
856 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
857 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
858 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
859 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
863 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
864 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
866 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
867 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
869 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
871 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
874 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
876 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
882 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
883 /* Need a shared curve */
884 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
890 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
895 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
897 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
901 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
904 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
908 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
913 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
918 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
919 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
922 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
923 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
925 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
928 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
934 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
940 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
941 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
942 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
943 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
945 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
946 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
947 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
949 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
950 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
953 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
954 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
955 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
956 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
959 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
962 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
965 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
966 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
967 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
968 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
971 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
972 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
975 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
976 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
980 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
981 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
982 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
983 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
985 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
986 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
988 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
989 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
994 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
995 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
997 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
998 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1000 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1001 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1002 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1003 /* Should never happen */
1006 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1007 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1011 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1012 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1013 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1014 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1015 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1017 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1021 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1022 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1025 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1026 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1028 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1031 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1034 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1040 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1044 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1045 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1046 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1047 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1050 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1051 if (i == sent_sigslen
1052 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1053 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1057 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1062 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1063 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1064 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1070 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1072 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1077 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1078 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1079 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1082 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1084 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1085 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1086 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1087 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1088 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1090 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1091 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1093 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1096 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1097 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1098 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1099 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1100 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1101 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1102 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1103 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1104 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1106 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1108 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1109 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1110 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1111 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1112 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1117 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1119 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1120 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1121 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1123 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1126 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1128 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1130 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1133 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1134 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1137 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1138 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1139 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1140 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1142 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1144 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1145 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1147 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1148 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1150 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1151 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1152 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1153 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1164 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1166 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if (s->renegotiate) {
1170 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1178 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1181 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1189 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1192 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1193 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1194 unsigned long size_str;
1198 * check for enough space.
1199 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1200 * 2 for servernamelist length
1201 * 1 for the hostname type
1202 * 2 for hostname length
1206 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1208 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1211 /* extension type and length */
1212 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1213 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1215 /* length of servername list */
1216 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1218 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1219 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1221 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1224 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1225 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1226 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1227 * Client Hello message */
1229 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1230 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 * check for enough space.
1237 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1238 * 1 for the srp user identity
1239 * + srp user identity length
1241 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1244 /* fill in the extension */
1245 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1246 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1247 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1248 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1253 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1256 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1259 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1260 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1262 unsigned char *etmp;
1264 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1266 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1268 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1270 if (num_formats > 255) {
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1276 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1277 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1278 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1279 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1283 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1285 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1286 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1289 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1291 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1293 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1300 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1301 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1302 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1303 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1304 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1308 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1310 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1311 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1312 ret += curves_list_len;
1314 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1316 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1318 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1319 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1320 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1321 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1322 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1323 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1324 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1326 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1327 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1328 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1331 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1332 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1335 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1338 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1343 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1349 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1351 const unsigned char *salg;
1352 unsigned char *etmp;
1353 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1354 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1356 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1358 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1360 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1361 /* Fill in lengths */
1362 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1367 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1369 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1373 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1374 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1375 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1381 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1382 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1388 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1390 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1391 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1393 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1394 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1397 /* save position of id len */
1398 unsigned char *q = ret;
1399 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1400 /* skip over id len */
1402 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1408 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1410 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1411 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1412 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1418 * 1: peer may send requests
1419 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1421 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1422 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1424 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1427 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1428 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1430 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1431 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1433 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1435 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1440 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1441 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1444 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1445 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1446 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1447 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1449 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1450 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1453 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1454 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1462 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1465 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1472 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1473 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1474 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1476 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1484 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1485 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1486 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1489 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1490 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1492 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1493 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1499 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1501 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1508 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1511 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1515 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1516 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1519 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1520 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1528 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1529 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1534 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1536 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1539 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1550 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1559 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1562 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1563 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1570 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1572 const unsigned char *plist;
1575 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1579 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1581 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1583 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1585 if (plistlen > 255) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1591 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1592 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1593 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1598 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1601 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1603 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1610 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1611 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1617 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1618 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1621 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1622 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1632 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1641 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1642 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1643 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1644 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1645 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1646 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1647 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1648 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1649 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1651 if (limit - ret < 36)
1653 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1657 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1658 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1659 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1660 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1681 const unsigned char *npa;
1682 unsigned int npalen;
1685 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1687 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1688 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1693 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1701 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1702 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1704 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1705 * for other cases too.
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1708 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1709 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1716 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1721 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1722 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1723 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1725 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1727 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1731 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1737 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1740 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1745 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1746 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1747 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1748 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1751 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1752 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1756 const unsigned char *selected;
1757 unsigned char selected_len;
1760 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1767 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1768 * length-prefixed strings.
1770 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1779 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1780 proto_len = data[i];
1786 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1792 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1793 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1794 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1795 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1796 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1797 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1801 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1802 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1807 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1811 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1813 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1814 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1815 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1820 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1821 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1822 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1823 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1825 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1826 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1828 unsigned short type, size;
1829 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1830 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1831 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1832 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1833 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1834 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1835 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1837 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1838 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1839 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1840 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1843 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1844 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1845 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1846 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1847 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1848 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1849 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1850 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1851 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1852 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1855 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1859 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1864 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1867 if (data + size > d + n)
1871 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1872 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1873 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1875 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1877 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1879 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1882 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1884 if (data + len != d + n)
1886 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1890 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1892 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1894 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1895 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1897 unsigned short type;
1898 unsigned short size;
1900 unsigned char *data = *p;
1901 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1903 s->servername_done = 0;
1904 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1905 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1906 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1910 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1911 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1912 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1913 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1917 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1918 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1919 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1922 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1923 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1924 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1925 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1928 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1930 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1933 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1935 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1939 if (data > (d + n - len))
1942 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1946 if (data + size > (d + n))
1948 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1949 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1950 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1951 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1953 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1954 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1957 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1959 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1960 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1961 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1962 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1963 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1964 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1965 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1966 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1967 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1968 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1969 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1970 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1971 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1972 * the value of the Host: field.
1973 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1974 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1975 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1977 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1981 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1982 unsigned char *sdata;
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2004 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2008 switch (servname_type) {
2009 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2011 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2012 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2019 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2020 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2021 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2024 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2025 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2026 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2027 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2028 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2032 s->servername_done = 1;
2035 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2036 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2037 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2038 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2055 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2056 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2066 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2067 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2069 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2078 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2079 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2081 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2082 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2088 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2089 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2090 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2091 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2096 ecpointformatlist_length;
2097 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2098 ecpointformatlist_length);
2100 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2101 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2102 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2103 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2105 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2106 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2107 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2108 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2109 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2118 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2119 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2120 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2124 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2125 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2126 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2129 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2131 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2132 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2133 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2135 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2163 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2164 const unsigned char *sdata;
2166 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if (data != sdata) {
2195 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2196 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2200 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2201 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2202 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2203 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2206 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2207 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2208 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2213 /* Read in request_extensions */
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 if (dsize != size) {
2221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2227 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2228 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2229 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2230 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2240 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2242 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2245 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2246 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2248 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2249 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2250 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2253 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2258 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2260 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2261 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2263 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2266 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2267 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2268 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2269 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2270 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2271 * anything like that, but this might change).
2273 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2274 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2275 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2276 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2277 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2279 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2284 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2285 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2287 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2288 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2289 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2293 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2294 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2295 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2296 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2297 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2301 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2302 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2303 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2305 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2307 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2310 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2311 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2312 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2313 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2314 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2317 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2328 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2330 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2331 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2332 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2334 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2341 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2345 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2346 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2347 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2351 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2358 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2360 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2361 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2362 * fill the length of the block.
2364 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2366 unsigned int off = 0;
2379 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2380 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2382 unsigned short length;
2383 unsigned short type;
2384 unsigned short size;
2385 unsigned char *data = *p;
2386 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2387 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2389 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2390 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2394 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2395 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2396 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2397 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2398 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2401 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2402 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2405 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2409 if (data + length != d + n) {
2410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2414 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2418 if (data + size > (d + n))
2421 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2422 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2424 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2425 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2427 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2428 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2429 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2430 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2434 tlsext_servername = 1;
2436 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2437 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2438 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2439 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2441 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2446 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2447 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2448 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2449 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2453 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2454 ecpointformatlist_length;
2455 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2456 ecpointformatlist_length);
2459 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2461 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2462 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2463 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2464 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2469 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2470 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2473 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2475 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2477 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2480 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2484 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2485 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2487 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2489 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2490 unsigned char *selected;
2491 unsigned char selected_len;
2493 /* We must have requested it. */
2494 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2498 /* The data must be valid */
2499 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2504 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2506 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2507 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2512 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2517 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2518 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2522 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2525 /* We must have requested it. */
2526 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2527 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2531 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 * The extension data consists of:
2536 * uint16 list_length
2537 * uint8 proto_length;
2538 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2543 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2549 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2552 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2553 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2554 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2555 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2558 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2559 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2562 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2564 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2565 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2567 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2568 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2572 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2578 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2579 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2583 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2584 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2585 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2586 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2587 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2588 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2591 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2593 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2596 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2597 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2599 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2605 if (data != d + n) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2611 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2612 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2613 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2614 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2619 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2630 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2631 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2632 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2633 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2634 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2635 * initial connect only.
2637 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2638 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2639 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2641 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2648 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2654 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2659 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2661 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2662 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2664 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2666 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2667 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2670 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2671 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2675 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2677 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2678 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2679 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2680 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2682 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2684 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2687 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2688 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2691 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2692 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2695 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2696 s->servername_done = 0;
2701 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2702 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2704 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2706 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2709 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2710 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2713 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2717 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2721 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2722 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2723 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2724 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2725 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2726 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2727 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2728 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2731 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2732 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2733 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2735 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2738 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2739 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2741 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2742 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2746 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2750 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2754 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2756 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2757 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2760 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2761 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2762 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2763 * influence which certificate is sent
2765 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2767 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2768 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2769 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2770 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2776 * et al can pick it up.
2778 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2779 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2781 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2782 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2783 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2785 /* status request response should be sent */
2786 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2787 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2788 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2790 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2792 /* something bad happened */
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2794 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2795 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2799 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2803 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2804 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2808 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2816 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2818 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2819 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2821 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2823 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2824 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2825 * must contain uncompressed.
2827 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2828 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2829 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2830 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2831 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2832 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2833 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2834 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2835 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2837 unsigned char *list;
2838 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2839 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2840 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2841 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2842 found_uncompressed = 1;
2846 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2848 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2852 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2853 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2855 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2857 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2858 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2859 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2860 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2862 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2864 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2867 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2870 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2871 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2874 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2877 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2878 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2879 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2880 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2882 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2883 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2886 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2887 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2892 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2893 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2896 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2901 s->servername_done = 0;
2907 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2911 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2913 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2914 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2918 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2926 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2927 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2928 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2930 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2931 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2932 * extension, if any.
2933 * len: the length of the session ID.
2934 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2935 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2936 * point to the resulting session.
2938 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2939 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2940 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2943 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2944 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2945 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2946 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2947 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2948 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2949 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2952 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2953 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2954 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2955 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2956 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2957 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2959 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2960 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2962 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2963 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2967 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2970 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2973 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2975 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2979 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2980 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2986 /* Skip past cipher list */
2991 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2996 /* Now at start of extensions */
2997 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3000 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3001 unsigned short type, size;
3004 if (p + size > limit)
3006 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3010 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3013 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3016 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3018 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3019 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3020 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3021 * calculate the master secret later.
3025 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3027 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3028 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3030 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3032 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3033 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3035 default: /* fatal error */
3045 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3047 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3048 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3049 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3050 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3051 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3052 * point to the resulting session.
3055 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3056 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3057 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3058 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3060 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3061 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3062 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3065 unsigned char *sdec;
3066 const unsigned char *p;
3067 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3068 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3071 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3072 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3075 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3076 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3078 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3079 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3080 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3089 /* Check key name matches */
3090 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3092 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3093 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3094 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3095 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3098 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3101 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3103 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3107 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3108 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3109 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3110 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3111 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3112 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3115 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3116 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3117 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3118 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3119 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3121 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3124 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3125 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3126 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3131 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3134 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3138 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3139 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3140 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3144 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3145 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3154 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3159 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3166 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3167 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3168 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3169 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3170 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3171 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3172 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3175 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3176 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3177 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3178 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3181 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3184 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3185 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3191 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3194 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3195 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3196 return table[i].nid;
3201 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3207 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3210 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3213 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3214 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3218 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3220 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3226 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3229 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3230 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3233 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3235 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3236 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3237 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3238 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3239 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3242 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3246 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3248 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3251 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3253 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3254 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3256 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3257 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3259 return inf->mfunc();
3262 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3265 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3266 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3267 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3269 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3270 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3271 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3273 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3275 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3281 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3282 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3283 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3285 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3286 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3288 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3289 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3291 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3293 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3294 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3296 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3298 if (psignhash_nid) {
3299 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3300 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3302 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3306 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3307 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3309 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3310 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3311 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3313 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3314 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3316 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3317 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3321 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3322 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3326 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3328 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3329 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3330 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3332 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3333 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3334 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3336 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3337 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3338 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3339 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3341 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3346 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3347 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3351 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3352 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3353 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3360 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3362 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3364 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3367 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3368 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3370 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3372 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3373 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3374 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3375 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3378 return tmpout - out;
3381 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3382 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3383 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3384 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3386 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3387 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3388 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3389 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3390 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3392 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3393 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3396 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3397 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3398 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3400 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3410 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3411 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3413 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3414 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3416 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3418 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3420 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3421 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3422 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3423 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3424 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3425 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3426 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3427 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3428 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3429 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3431 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3432 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3435 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3436 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3440 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3441 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3443 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3445 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3448 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3452 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3453 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3457 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3459 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3462 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3463 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3465 /* Should never happen */
3469 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3470 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3471 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3473 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3474 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3478 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3483 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3484 int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3486 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3487 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3490 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3491 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3493 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3494 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3496 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3498 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3500 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3502 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3503 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3505 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3506 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3507 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3508 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3514 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3515 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3516 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3517 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3518 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3520 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3521 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3522 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3523 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3529 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3530 * the certificate for signing.
3532 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3534 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3535 * supported it stays as NULL.
3537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3538 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3539 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3541 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3542 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3543 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3544 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3548 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3549 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3555 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3556 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3557 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3559 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3564 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3571 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3573 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3576 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3577 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3578 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3580 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3581 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3585 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3587 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3589 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3591 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3593 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3594 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3598 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3601 unsigned short hbtype;
3602 unsigned int payload;
3603 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3605 if (s->msg_callback)
3606 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3608 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3610 /* Read type and payload length first */
3611 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3612 return 0; /* silently discard */
3615 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3616 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3619 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3620 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3624 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3625 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3627 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3628 if (buffer == NULL) {
3629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3634 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3635 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3637 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3639 /* Random padding */
3640 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3641 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3645 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3646 3 + payload + padding);
3648 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3649 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3650 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3651 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3653 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3657 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3661 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3662 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3666 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3668 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3675 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3677 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3679 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3680 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3682 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3683 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3684 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3689 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3690 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3695 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3696 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3702 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3703 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3705 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3708 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3709 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3710 * some random stuff.
3711 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3712 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3713 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3714 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3717 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3724 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3725 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3727 /* Sequence number */
3728 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3729 /* 16 random bytes */
3730 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3735 /* Random padding */
3736 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3741 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3743 if (s->msg_callback)
3744 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3745 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3746 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3748 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3757 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3761 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3764 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3766 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3769 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3772 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3774 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3776 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3778 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3786 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3787 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3788 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3789 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3790 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3791 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3795 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3796 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3797 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3798 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3801 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3802 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3805 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3806 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3811 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3812 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3814 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3818 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3822 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3825 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3828 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3833 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3834 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3836 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3837 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3838 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3840 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3847 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3848 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3849 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3851 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3852 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3853 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3859 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3863 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3867 if (default_nid == -1)
3869 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3871 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3872 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3873 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3878 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3879 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3883 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3884 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3885 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3892 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3893 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3894 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3895 * attempting to use them.
3898 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3900 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3901 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3902 /* Strict mode flags */
3903 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3904 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3905 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3907 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3912 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3913 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3916 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3917 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3919 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3922 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3924 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3925 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3927 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3929 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3930 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3933 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3934 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3935 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3936 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3937 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3945 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3948 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3949 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3951 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3952 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3954 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3961 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3962 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3963 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3964 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3965 else if (!check_flags)
3970 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3971 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3973 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3975 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3976 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3978 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3981 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3982 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3983 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3984 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3985 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3988 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3989 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3990 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3991 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3995 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3996 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4005 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4006 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4008 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4010 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4011 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4012 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4015 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4022 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4023 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4027 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4029 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4030 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4032 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4039 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4040 else if (check_flags)
4041 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4043 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4044 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4046 else if (!check_flags)
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4050 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4051 else if (strict_mode) {
4052 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4053 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4054 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4055 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4057 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4064 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4065 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4069 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4072 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4075 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4080 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4081 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4082 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4083 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4084 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4088 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4092 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4094 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4095 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4097 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4098 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4103 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4108 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4110 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4113 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4114 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4117 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4118 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4119 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4120 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4126 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4131 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4136 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4137 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4138 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4139 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4145 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4149 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4152 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4153 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4160 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4161 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4163 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4164 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4165 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4166 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4167 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4168 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4171 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4172 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4174 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4180 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4182 int dh_secbits = 80;
4183 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4184 return DH_get_1024_160();
4185 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4186 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4191 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4192 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4195 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4201 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4202 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4203 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4205 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4206 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4212 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4213 return DH_get_2048_224();
4214 return DH_get_1024_160();
4218 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4221 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4223 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4224 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4228 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4230 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4233 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4235 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4236 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4237 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4238 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4240 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4241 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4244 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4246 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4249 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4252 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4254 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4255 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4257 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4258 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4260 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4261 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4266 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4267 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4268 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4271 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4273 int rv, start_idx, i;
4275 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4280 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4284 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4285 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4286 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);