2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
312 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
315 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
317 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
319 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
323 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
327 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
329 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
331 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
333 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
335 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
337 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
339 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
341 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
343 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
345 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
347 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
349 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
351 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
353 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
355 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
357 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
361 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
365 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
367 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
373 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
381 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
383 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
384 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
385 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
386 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
387 * lists in the first place.
388 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
389 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
390 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
392 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
393 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
398 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
399 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
401 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
402 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
423 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
428 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
438 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
439 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
441 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
444 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
446 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
447 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
448 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
451 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
454 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
455 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
457 const unsigned char *curves;
458 size_t num_curves, i;
459 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
460 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
462 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
468 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
470 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
471 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
473 } else /* Should never happen */
476 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
478 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
479 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
480 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
486 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
487 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
488 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
489 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
493 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
494 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
496 /* Can't do anything on client side */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
502 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
503 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
506 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
507 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
509 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
510 /* Should never happen */
513 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
517 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
518 * but s->options is a long...
520 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
521 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
523 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
524 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
526 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
530 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
531 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
532 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
534 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
546 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
550 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
551 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
553 unsigned char *clist, *p;
556 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
559 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
560 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
563 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
564 unsigned long idmask;
566 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
568 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
577 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
581 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
585 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
588 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
590 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
598 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
600 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
602 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
603 if (nid == NID_undef)
604 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
610 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
612 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
616 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
617 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
622 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
626 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
629 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
630 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
635 const EC_METHOD *meth;
638 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
639 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
642 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
645 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
649 /* Determine curve ID */
650 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
651 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
652 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
655 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
664 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
666 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
668 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
677 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
678 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
679 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
681 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
682 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
685 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
686 * supported (see RFC4492).
688 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
689 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
691 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
692 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
695 if (i == num_formats)
700 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
701 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
702 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
704 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
706 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
707 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
708 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
709 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
710 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
714 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
715 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
720 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
727 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
731 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
734 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
735 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
737 *pformats = ecformats_default;
738 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
740 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
747 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
748 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
750 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
752 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
755 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
758 /* If not EC nothing to do */
759 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
763 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
768 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
771 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
775 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
776 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
778 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
784 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
785 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
786 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
787 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
790 return 0; /* Should never happen */
791 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
792 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
794 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
796 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
797 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
798 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
800 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
807 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
808 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
810 unsigned char curve_id[2];
811 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
812 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
813 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
814 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
818 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
821 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
823 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
824 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
825 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
830 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
831 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
833 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
834 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
836 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
838 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
841 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
843 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
849 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
850 /* Need a shared curve */
851 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
857 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
862 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
864 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
868 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
871 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
875 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
880 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
885 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
886 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
889 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
890 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
892 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
895 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
896 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
901 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
902 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
907 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
908 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
909 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
912 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
914 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
920 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
921 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
923 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
929 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
932 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
933 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
936 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
947 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
948 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
949 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
950 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
951 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
952 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
953 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
955 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
956 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
961 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
962 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
964 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
965 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
967 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
968 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
969 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
970 /* Should never happen */
973 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
974 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
979 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
980 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
981 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
982 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
984 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
988 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
993 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
995 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
999 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1001 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1007 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1011 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1012 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1013 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1014 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1017 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1018 if (i == sent_sigslen
1019 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1020 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1030 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1031 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1039 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1044 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1045 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1046 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1049 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1054 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1055 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1056 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1059 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1061 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1064 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1066 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1070 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1071 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1072 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1073 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1074 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1076 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1077 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1078 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1086 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1089 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1090 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1092 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1095 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1097 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1099 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1103 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1106 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1107 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1108 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1109 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1111 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1113 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1114 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1116 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1133 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1135 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1136 if (s->renegotiate) {
1139 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1147 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1150 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1158 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1161 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1162 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1163 unsigned long size_str;
1167 * check for enough space.
1168 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1169 * 2 for servernamelist length
1170 * 1 for the hostname type
1171 * 2 for hostname length
1175 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1177 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1180 /* extension type and length */
1181 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1182 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1184 /* length of servername list */
1185 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1187 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1188 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1190 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1193 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1194 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1195 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1196 * Client Hello message */
1198 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1199 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 * check for enough space.
1206 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1207 * 1 for the srp user identity
1208 * + srp user identity length
1210 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1213 /* fill in the extension */
1214 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1215 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1216 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1217 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1222 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1225 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1228 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1229 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1231 unsigned char *etmp;
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1237 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1239 if (num_formats > 255) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1245 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1246 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1247 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1248 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1252 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1254 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1255 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1258 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1260 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1262 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1269 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1270 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1271 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1272 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1273 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1277 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1279 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1280 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1281 ret += curves_list_len;
1283 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1285 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1287 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1288 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1289 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1290 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1291 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1292 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1293 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1295 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1296 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1297 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1300 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1301 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1304 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1307 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1312 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1318 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1320 const unsigned char *salg;
1321 unsigned char *etmp;
1322 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1323 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1327 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1329 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1330 /* Fill in lengths */
1331 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1336 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1338 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1342 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1343 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1344 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1350 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1357 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1366 /* save position of id len */
1367 unsigned char *q = ret;
1368 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1369 /* skip over id len */
1371 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1377 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1379 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1380 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1381 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1387 * 1: peer may send requests
1388 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1390 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1391 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1396 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1397 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1399 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1400 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1402 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1409 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1410 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1413 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1414 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1415 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1418 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1419 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1422 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1423 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1428 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1434 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1442 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1443 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1445 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1453 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1454 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1455 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1458 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1459 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1461 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1462 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1470 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1477 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1480 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1484 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1485 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1488 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1489 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1491 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1493 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1494 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1495 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1496 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1497 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1498 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1503 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1505 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1508 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1513 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1516 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1519 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1528 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1532 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1539 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1541 const unsigned char *plist;
1544 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1548 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1550 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1552 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1554 if (plistlen > 255) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1560 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1561 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1562 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1567 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1570 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1572 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1579 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1580 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1586 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1587 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1590 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1591 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1601 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1610 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1611 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1612 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1613 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1614 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1615 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1616 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1617 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1618 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1620 if (limit - ret < 36)
1622 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1626 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1627 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1628 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1629 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1631 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1635 * 1: peer may send requests
1636 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1638 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1639 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1646 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1647 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1648 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1649 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1650 const unsigned char *npa;
1651 unsigned int npalen;
1654 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1656 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1657 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1658 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1662 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1664 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1668 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1670 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1671 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1673 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1674 * for other cases too.
1676 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1677 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1678 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1685 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1686 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1690 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1691 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1692 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1694 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1700 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1706 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1709 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1714 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1715 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1716 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1717 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1720 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1721 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1725 const unsigned char *selected;
1726 unsigned char selected_len;
1729 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1736 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1737 * length-prefixed strings.
1739 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1748 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1749 proto_len = data[i];
1755 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1761 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1762 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1763 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1764 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1765 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1766 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1767 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1770 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1771 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1780 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1782 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1783 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1784 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1789 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1790 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1791 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1792 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1794 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1795 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1797 unsigned short type, size;
1798 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1799 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1800 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1801 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1802 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1803 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1804 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1806 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1807 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1808 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1809 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1812 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1813 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1814 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1815 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1816 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1817 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1818 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1819 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1820 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1821 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1824 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1828 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1833 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1836 if (data + size > d + n)
1840 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1841 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1842 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1844 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1846 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1848 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1851 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1853 if (data + len != d + n)
1855 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1859 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1861 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1863 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1864 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1866 unsigned short type;
1867 unsigned short size;
1869 unsigned char *data = *p;
1870 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1872 s->servername_done = 0;
1873 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1874 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1878 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1879 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1880 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1885 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1886 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1887 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1888 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1891 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1892 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1893 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1894 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1897 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1899 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1902 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1904 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1908 if (data > (d + n - len))
1911 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1915 if (data + size > (d + n))
1917 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1918 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1919 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1920 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1922 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1923 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1926 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1928 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1929 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1930 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1931 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1932 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1933 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1934 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1935 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1936 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1937 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1938 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1939 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1940 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1941 * the value of the Host: field.
1942 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1943 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1944 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1946 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1950 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1951 unsigned char *sdata;
1956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1977 switch (servname_type) {
1978 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1980 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1988 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1989 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1990 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1993 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1994 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1995 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1996 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1997 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2001 s->servername_done = 1;
2004 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2005 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2006 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2007 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2018 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2023 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2024 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2025 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2033 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2035 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2036 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2038 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2046 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2047 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2048 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2050 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2051 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2057 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2059 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2060 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2061 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2064 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2065 ecpointformatlist_length;
2066 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2067 ecpointformatlist_length);
2069 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2070 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2071 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2072 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2074 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2075 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2076 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2077 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2078 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2087 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2088 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2093 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2094 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2095 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2098 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2099 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2100 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2101 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2102 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2109 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2115 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2132 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2133 const unsigned char *sdata;
2135 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2153 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 if (data != sdata) {
2164 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2169 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2170 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2171 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2172 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2176 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2177 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 /* Read in request_extensions */
2184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if (dsize != size) {
2190 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2196 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2197 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2198 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2199 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2209 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2214 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2217 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2218 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2219 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2222 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2227 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2229 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2230 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2232 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2235 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2236 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2237 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2238 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2239 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2240 * anything like that, but this might change).
2242 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2243 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2244 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2245 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2246 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2248 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2253 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2254 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2256 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2257 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2258 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2262 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2263 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2264 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2265 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2266 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2270 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2272 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2276 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2279 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2280 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2281 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2282 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2283 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2286 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2297 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2299 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2300 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2303 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2310 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2314 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2315 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2316 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2320 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2327 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2329 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2330 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2331 * fill the length of the block.
2333 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2335 unsigned int off = 0;
2348 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2349 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2351 unsigned short length;
2352 unsigned short type;
2353 unsigned short size;
2354 unsigned char *data = *p;
2355 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2356 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2358 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2359 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2363 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2364 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2365 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2366 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2367 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2370 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2371 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2374 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2378 if (data + length != d + n) {
2379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2383 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2387 if (data + size > (d + n))
2390 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2391 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2393 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2394 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2396 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2397 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2398 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2399 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2400 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2403 tlsext_servername = 1;
2405 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2407 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2408 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2410 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2411 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2416 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2417 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2418 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2422 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2423 ecpointformatlist_length;
2424 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2425 ecpointformatlist_length);
2428 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2431 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2432 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2433 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2442 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2446 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2449 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2454 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2456 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2458 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2459 unsigned char *selected;
2460 unsigned char selected_len;
2462 /* We must have requested it. */
2463 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2464 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2467 /* The data must be valid */
2468 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2469 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2473 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2475 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2476 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2477 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2480 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2481 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2485 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2486 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2487 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2494 /* We must have requested it. */
2495 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2504 * The extension data consists of:
2505 * uint16 list_length
2506 * uint8 proto_length;
2507 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2512 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2517 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2518 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2522 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2523 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2524 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2527 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2528 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2530 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2531 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2533 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2536 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2537 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2538 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2541 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2546 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2547 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2548 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2552 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2553 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2554 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2555 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2556 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2557 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2560 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2562 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2565 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2566 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2568 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2574 if (data != d + n) {
2575 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2579 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2580 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2581 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2582 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2583 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2584 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2588 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2599 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2600 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2601 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2602 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2603 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2604 * initial connect only.
2606 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2607 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2610 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2617 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2623 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2628 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2630 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2631 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2633 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2635 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2636 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2639 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2640 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2644 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2646 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2647 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2648 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2649 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2651 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2653 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2656 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2660 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2665 s->servername_done = 0;
2670 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2671 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2673 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2675 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2678 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2679 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2682 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2686 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2690 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2692 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2693 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2694 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2695 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2696 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2697 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2700 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2701 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2702 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2708 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2710 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2711 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2715 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2723 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2725 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2726 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2730 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2731 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2732 * influence which certificate is sent
2734 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2736 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2737 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2738 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2739 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2740 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2744 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2745 * et al can pick it up.
2747 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2748 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2750 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2752 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2754 /* status request response should be sent */
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2756 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2761 /* something bad happened */
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2763 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2764 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2773 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2777 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2785 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2787 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2788 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2790 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2792 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2793 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2794 * must contain uncompressed.
2796 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2797 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2798 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2799 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2800 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2801 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2802 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2803 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2804 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2806 unsigned char *list;
2807 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2808 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2809 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2810 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2811 found_uncompressed = 1;
2815 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2817 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2821 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2822 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2824 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2826 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2827 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2828 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2829 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2831 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2833 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2836 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2839 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2840 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2843 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2846 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2847 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2848 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2849 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2851 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2852 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2855 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2856 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2861 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2862 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2865 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2870 s->servername_done = 0;
2876 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2880 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2882 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2887 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2895 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2896 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2897 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2899 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2900 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2901 * extension, if any.
2902 * len: the length of the session ID.
2903 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2904 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2905 * point to the resulting session.
2907 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2908 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2909 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2912 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2913 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2914 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2915 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2916 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2917 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2918 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2921 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2922 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2923 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2924 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2925 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2926 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2928 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2929 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2931 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2932 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2936 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2939 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2942 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2944 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2948 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2949 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2955 /* Skip past cipher list */
2960 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2965 /* Now at start of extensions */
2966 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2969 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2970 unsigned short type, size;
2973 if (p + size > limit)
2975 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2979 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2982 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2985 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2987 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2988 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2989 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2990 * calculate the master secret later.
2994 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2996 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2997 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2999 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3001 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3004 default: /* fatal error */
3014 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3016 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3017 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3018 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3019 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3020 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3021 * point to the resulting session.
3024 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3025 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3026 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3027 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3029 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3030 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3031 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3034 unsigned char *sdec;
3035 const unsigned char *p;
3036 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3037 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3040 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3041 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3044 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3045 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3046 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3047 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3048 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3049 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3058 /* Check key name matches */
3059 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3061 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3062 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3063 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3064 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3067 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3070 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3076 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3077 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3078 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3079 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3080 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3081 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3084 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3085 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3086 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3087 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3088 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3090 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3093 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3094 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3095 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3103 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3107 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3108 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3109 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3113 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3114 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3123 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3128 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3135 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3136 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3137 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3138 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3139 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3140 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3141 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3144 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3145 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3146 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3147 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3150 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3153 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3154 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3160 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3163 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3164 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3165 return table[i].nid;
3170 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3176 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3179 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3182 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3183 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3187 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3189 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3195 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3198 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3199 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3202 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3204 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3205 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3206 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3207 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3208 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3211 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3215 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3217 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3220 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3222 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3223 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3225 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3226 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3228 return inf->mfunc();
3231 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3234 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3235 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3236 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3238 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3239 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3240 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3242 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3243 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3244 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3250 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3251 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3252 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3254 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3255 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3257 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3258 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3260 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3262 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3263 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3265 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3267 if (psignhash_nid) {
3268 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3269 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3271 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3275 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3276 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3278 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3279 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3280 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3282 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3283 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3285 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3286 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3290 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3291 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3295 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3297 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3298 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3299 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3301 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3302 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3303 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3305 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3306 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3307 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3308 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3309 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3310 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3314 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3315 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3316 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3320 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3321 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3322 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3329 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3331 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3333 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3336 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3337 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3339 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3341 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3342 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3343 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3344 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3347 return tmpout - out;
3350 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3351 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3352 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3353 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3355 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3356 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3357 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3358 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3359 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3361 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3362 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3365 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3366 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3367 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3369 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3379 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3380 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3382 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3383 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3385 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3387 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3389 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3390 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3391 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3392 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3393 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3394 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3395 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3396 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3397 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3398 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3400 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3401 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3404 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3405 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3409 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3410 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3412 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3414 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3417 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3421 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3422 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3426 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3428 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3431 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3432 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3434 /* Should never happen */
3438 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3439 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3440 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3442 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3443 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3447 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3452 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3454 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3455 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3458 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3459 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3461 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3462 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3464 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3466 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3468 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3470 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3471 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3473 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3474 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3475 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3476 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3477 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3483 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3484 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3485 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3486 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3487 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3489 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3490 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3491 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3492 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3493 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3499 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3500 * the certificate for signing.
3502 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3504 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3505 * supported it stays as NULL.
3507 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3508 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3509 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3511 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3512 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3513 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3514 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3518 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3519 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3525 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3526 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3527 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3529 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3534 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3541 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3543 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3546 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3547 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3548 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3550 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3551 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3555 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3557 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3559 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3561 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3563 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3564 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3568 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3571 unsigned short hbtype;
3572 unsigned int payload;
3573 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3575 if (s->msg_callback)
3576 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3578 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3580 /* Read type and payload length first */
3581 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3582 return 0; /* silently discard */
3585 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3586 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3589 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3590 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3594 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3595 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3597 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3598 if (buffer == NULL) {
3599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3604 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3605 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3607 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3609 /* Random padding */
3610 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3611 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3615 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3616 3 + payload + padding);
3618 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3619 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3620 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3621 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3623 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3627 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3631 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3632 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3636 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3638 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3645 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3647 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3649 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3650 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3652 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3653 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3654 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3659 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3660 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3665 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3666 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3672 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3673 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3675 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3678 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3679 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3680 * some random stuff.
3681 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3682 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3683 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3684 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3687 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3694 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3695 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3697 /* Sequence number */
3698 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3699 /* 16 random bytes */
3700 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3705 /* Random padding */
3706 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3711 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3713 if (s->msg_callback)
3714 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3715 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3716 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3718 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3727 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3731 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3734 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3736 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3739 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3742 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3744 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3746 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3748 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3756 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3757 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3758 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3760 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3761 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3765 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3766 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3767 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3768 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3771 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3772 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3775 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3776 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3781 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3782 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3784 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3788 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3792 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3795 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3798 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3803 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3804 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3806 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3807 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3808 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3810 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3817 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3818 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3819 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3821 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3822 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3823 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3829 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3833 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3837 if (default_nid == -1)
3839 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3841 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3842 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3843 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3848 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3849 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3853 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3854 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3855 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3862 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3863 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3864 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3865 * attempting to use them.
3868 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3870 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3871 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3872 /* Strict mode flags */
3873 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3874 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3875 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3877 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3882 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3883 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3885 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3886 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3888 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3891 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3893 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3895 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3897 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3898 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3901 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3902 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3903 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3904 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3905 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3906 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3913 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3916 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3917 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3918 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3920 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3927 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3928 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3929 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3931 else if (!check_flags)
3936 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3937 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3939 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3941 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3942 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3944 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3947 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3948 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3949 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3950 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3951 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3954 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3955 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3956 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3957 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3961 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3962 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3971 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3972 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3974 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3976 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3977 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3978 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3981 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3988 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3989 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3993 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3995 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3996 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3998 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4005 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4006 else if (check_flags)
4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4009 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4010 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4012 else if (!check_flags)
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4016 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4017 else if (strict_mode) {
4018 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4019 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4020 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4021 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4023 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4030 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4035 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4038 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4041 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4046 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4047 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4048 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4049 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4050 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4054 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4058 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4060 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4061 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4063 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4064 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4069 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4074 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4076 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4079 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4080 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4084 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4085 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4086 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4092 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4095 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4097 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4098 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4102 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4103 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4105 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4111 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4115 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4116 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4118 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4119 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4126 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4127 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4129 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4137 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4138 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4140 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4146 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4148 int dh_secbits = 80;
4149 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4150 return DH_get_1024_160();
4151 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4157 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4158 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4161 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4167 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4168 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4169 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4171 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4172 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4178 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4179 return DH_get_2048_224();
4180 return DH_get_1024_160();
4184 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4187 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4189 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4190 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4194 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4196 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4199 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4201 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4202 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4203 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4204 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4206 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4207 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4210 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4212 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4215 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4218 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4220 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4221 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4223 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4224 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4226 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4227 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4232 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4233 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4234 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4237 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4239 int rv, start_idx, i;
4241 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4246 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4250 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4251 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4252 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);