1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
227 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
228 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
229 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
230 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
231 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
233 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
234 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
235 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
236 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
237 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
238 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
239 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
241 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
242 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
243 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
244 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
245 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
246 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
247 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
248 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
249 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
250 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
251 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
252 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
258 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 /* The default curves */
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
266 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
267 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
268 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
269 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
271 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
272 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
273 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
276 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
277 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
285 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
288 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
289 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
290 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
291 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
292 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
293 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
294 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
295 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
296 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
297 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
298 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
299 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
300 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
302 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
303 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
305 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
306 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
307 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
308 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
309 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
310 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
311 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
312 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
313 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
314 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
315 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
316 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
318 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
319 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
323 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
324 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
328 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
330 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
331 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
333 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
336 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
338 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
340 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
342 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
344 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
346 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
348 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
350 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
352 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
354 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
356 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
358 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
360 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
362 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
364 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
366 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
368 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
370 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
372 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
374 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
376 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
378 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
380 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
382 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
384 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
386 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
388 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
394 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
402 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
404 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
405 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
406 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
407 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
408 * lists in the first place.
409 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
410 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
411 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
413 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
414 const unsigned char **pcurves,
417 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
419 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
420 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
423 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
429 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
430 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
434 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
435 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
439 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
440 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
443 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
444 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
448 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
449 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
459 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
460 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
462 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
465 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
467 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
468 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
469 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
472 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
475 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
476 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
478 const unsigned char *curves;
479 size_t num_curves, i;
480 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
481 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
483 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
485 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
488 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
489 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
491 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
492 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 } else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
500 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
501 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
507 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
508 * if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
522 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
524 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
525 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
527 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
529 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
531 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
532 /* Should never happen */
535 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
539 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
540 * but s->options is a long...
542 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
543 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
545 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
546 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
553 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
556 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
558 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
559 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
560 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
562 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
566 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
567 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
568 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
569 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
570 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
573 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
574 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
582 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
586 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
587 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
589 unsigned char *clist, *p;
592 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
595 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
596 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
599 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
600 unsigned long idmask;
602 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
604 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
613 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
617 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
621 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
624 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
626 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
632 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
634 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
636 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
638 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
642 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
643 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
646 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
648 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
652 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
653 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
658 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
662 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
665 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
666 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
671 const EC_METHOD *meth;
674 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
675 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
678 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
681 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
685 /* Determine curve ID */
686 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
687 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
688 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
691 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
700 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
702 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
708 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
713 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
714 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
715 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
717 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
718 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
721 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
722 * supported (see RFC4492).
724 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
725 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
726 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
727 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
728 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
731 if (i == num_formats)
736 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
737 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
738 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
740 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
742 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
743 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
744 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
745 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
746 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
750 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
751 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
756 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
763 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
767 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
769 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
770 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
771 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
773 *pformats = ecformats_default;
774 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
778 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
783 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
784 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
786 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
788 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
791 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
794 /* If not EC nothing to do */
795 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
797 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
801 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
804 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
808 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
809 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
811 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
818 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
819 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
820 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
821 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
823 return 0; /* Should never happen */
824 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
825 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
827 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
829 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
830 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
831 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
833 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
841 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
843 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
845 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
846 * is compatible with the client extensions.
848 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
850 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
852 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
853 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
854 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
858 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
861 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
862 unsigned char curve_id[2];
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
876 /* Need a shared curve */
877 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
881 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
885 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
890 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
893 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
894 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
897 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
903 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
906 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
910 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
912 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
915 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
916 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
920 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
927 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
934 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
935 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
939 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
942 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
947 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
948 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
949 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
951 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
952 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
955 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
956 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
960 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
961 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
962 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
963 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
964 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
965 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
966 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
968 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
974 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
975 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
977 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
978 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
980 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
981 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
982 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
983 /* Should never happen */
986 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
987 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
992 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
993 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
994 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
995 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
997 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1001 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1002 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1005 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1006 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1008 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1012 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1014 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1020 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1025 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1027 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1030 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1031 if (i == sent_sigslen
1032 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1033 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1042 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1043 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1044 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1050 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1052 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1057 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1058 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1059 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1062 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1064 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1066 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1067 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1068 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1070 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1071 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1073 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1074 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1075 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1076 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1077 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1078 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1079 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1081 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1083 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1084 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1085 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1090 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1093 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1094 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1096 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1099 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1101 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1103 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1106 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1107 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1110 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1111 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1113 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1115 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1117 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1118 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1120 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1121 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1123 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1124 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1125 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1126 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1137 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1139 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1140 if (s->renegotiate) {
1143 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1151 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1154 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1162 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1165 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1166 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1167 unsigned long size_str;
1171 * check for enough space.
1172 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1173 * 2 for servernamelist length
1174 * 1 for the hostname type
1175 * 2 for hostname length
1179 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1181 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1184 /* extension type and length */
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1186 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1188 /* length of servername list */
1189 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1191 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1192 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1194 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1200 * Client Hello message */
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 * check for enough space.
1210 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 * 1 for the srp user identity
1212 * + srp user identity length
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1217 /* fill in the extension */
1218 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1219 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1220 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1221 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1229 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1232 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1233 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1235 unsigned char *etmp;
1237 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1239 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1241 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1243 if (num_formats > 255) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1249 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1250 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1251 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1252 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1256 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1258 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1259 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1264 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1266 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1275 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1277 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1281 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1283 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1284 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1285 ret += curves_list_len;
1287 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1289 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1291 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1292 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1293 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1294 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1295 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1296 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1297 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1299 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1300 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1301 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1304 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1308 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1311 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1313 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1316 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1324 const unsigned char *salg;
1325 unsigned char *etmp;
1326 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1327 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1329 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1331 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1333 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1334 /* Fill in lengths */
1335 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1340 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1342 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1346 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1347 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1348 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1354 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1355 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1361 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1363 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1364 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1366 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1367 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1369 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1370 /* save position of id len */
1371 unsigned char *q = ret;
1372 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1373 /* skip over id len */
1375 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1381 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1385 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1386 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1392 * 1: peer may send requests
1393 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1395 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1398 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1403 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1405 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1406 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1408 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1410 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1415 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1416 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1419 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1420 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1421 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1422 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1425 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1428 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1429 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1440 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1447 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1448 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1449 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1451 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1459 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1460 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1461 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1464 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1465 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1467 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1468 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1476 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1483 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1486 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1490 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1491 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1494 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1495 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1497 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1500 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1501 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1502 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1503 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1508 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1510 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1513 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1524 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1533 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1536 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1537 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 const unsigned char *plist;
1549 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1553 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1557 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1559 if (plistlen > 255) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1565 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1566 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1567 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1572 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1575 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1577 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1584 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1595 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1596 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1606 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1615 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1616 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1617 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1618 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1619 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1620 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1621 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1622 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1623 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1625 if (limit - ret < 36)
1627 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1632 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1634 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1640 * 1: peer may send requests
1641 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1643 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1644 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1646 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1652 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1654 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1655 const unsigned char *npa;
1656 unsigned int npalen;
1659 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1661 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1662 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1667 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1669 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1673 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1675 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1676 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1678 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1679 * for other cases too.
1681 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1682 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1683 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1684 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1685 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1692 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1693 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1697 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1698 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1699 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1707 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1713 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1716 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1721 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1722 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1723 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1724 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1727 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1729 unsigned int data_len;
1730 unsigned int proto_len;
1731 const unsigned char *selected;
1732 const unsigned char *data;
1733 unsigned char selected_len;
1736 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1740 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1741 * length-prefixed strings.
1743 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1744 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1745 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1749 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1751 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1753 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1755 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1756 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1757 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1758 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1759 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1760 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1761 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1764 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1765 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1776 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1777 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1778 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1783 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1784 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1785 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1786 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1788 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1790 unsigned int type, size;
1791 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1794 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1795 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1796 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1797 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1798 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1799 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1800 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1802 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1803 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1804 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1805 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1808 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1809 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1810 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1811 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1812 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1813 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1814 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1815 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1816 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1817 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1822 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1823 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1824 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1825 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1828 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1831 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1832 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1833 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1835 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1836 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1837 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1839 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1841 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1844 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1846 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1847 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1849 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1853 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1855 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1857 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1862 const unsigned char *data;
1863 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1865 s->servername_done = 0;
1866 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1868 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1871 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1872 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1874 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1875 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1880 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1881 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1883 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1884 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1885 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1886 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1887 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1891 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1892 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1895 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1897 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1900 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1903 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1906 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1909 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1912 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1913 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1915 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1918 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1919 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1921 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1922 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1925 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1927 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1928 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1929 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1930 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1931 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1932 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1933 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1934 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1935 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1936 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1937 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1938 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1939 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1940 * the value of the Host: field.
1941 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1942 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1943 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1945 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1949 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1950 const unsigned char *sdata;
1951 unsigned int servname_type;
1955 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1956 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1959 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1960 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1961 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1962 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1965 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1966 switch (servname_type) {
1967 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1969 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1972 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1973 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1976 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1977 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1982 (unsigned char *)s->session
1985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1989 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1990 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1991 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1992 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1995 s->servername_done = 1;
1998 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
1999 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2002 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2003 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2004 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2005 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2014 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2020 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2021 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2022 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2025 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2027 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2030 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2032 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2033 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2039 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2040 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2042 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2043 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2047 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2048 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2049 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2050 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2051 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2056 ecpointformatlist_length;
2057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2059 ecpointformatlist_length))
2061 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2064 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2065 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2070 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2072 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2073 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2074 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2075 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2079 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2082 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2083 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2084 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2085 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2088 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2089 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2090 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2091 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2092 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2094 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2097 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2098 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2102 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2103 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2104 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2105 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2106 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2107 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2111 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2114 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2115 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2118 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2119 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2120 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2123 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2126 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2127 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2130 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2131 const unsigned char *sdata;
2133 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2134 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2135 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2138 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2140 unsigned int idsize;
2142 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2143 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2144 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2149 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2152 if (data != sdata) {
2153 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2156 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2157 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2158 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2159 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2160 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2164 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2165 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 /* Read in request_extensions */
2171 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2172 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2173 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2178 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2179 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2180 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2181 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2182 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2187 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2190 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2193 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2194 unsigned int hbtype;
2196 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2197 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2198 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2203 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2205 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2206 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2207 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2210 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2217 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2218 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2220 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2223 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2224 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2225 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2226 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2227 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2228 * anything like that, but this might change).
2230 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2231 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2232 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2233 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2234 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2236 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2241 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2242 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2245 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2246 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2250 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2252 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2253 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2254 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2258 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2260 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2263 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2264 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2268 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2269 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2270 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2271 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2272 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2275 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2280 /* Spurious data on the end */
2281 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2286 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2288 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2289 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2290 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2292 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2305 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2306 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2311 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2320 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2321 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2322 * fill the length of the block.
2324 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2328 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2329 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2330 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2338 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2340 unsigned int length, type, size;
2341 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2342 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2345 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2347 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2350 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2352 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2353 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2356 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2357 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2360 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2362 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2365 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2371 const unsigned char *data;
2374 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2375 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2378 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2379 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2381 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2382 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2384 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2385 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2386 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2387 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2388 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2391 tlsext_servername = 1;
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2395 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2396 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2397 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2403 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2404 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2405 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2410 ecpointformatlist_length;
2411 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2412 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2413 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2423 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2424 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2425 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2434 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2438 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2441 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2445 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2446 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2450 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2451 unsigned char *selected;
2452 unsigned char selected_len;
2453 /* We must have requested it. */
2454 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2458 /* The data must be valid */
2459 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2464 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2466 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2467 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2468 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2471 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2472 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2476 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2477 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2478 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2484 /* We must have requested it. */
2485 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2490 * The extension data consists of:
2491 * uint16 list_length
2492 * uint8 proto_length;
2493 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2495 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2496 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2497 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2498 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2503 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2504 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2509 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2512 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2515 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2516 unsigned int hbtype;
2517 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2518 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2523 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2525 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2526 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2527 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2530 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2536 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2537 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2541 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2543 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2544 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2545 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2546 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2550 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2552 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2555 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2556 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2558 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2562 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2568 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2569 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2570 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2571 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2572 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2576 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2586 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2587 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2588 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2589 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2590 * initial connect only.
2592 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2593 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2594 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2596 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2602 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2605 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2606 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2607 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2616 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2622 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2627 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2629 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2630 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2634 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2635 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2638 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2639 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2643 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2645 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2646 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2647 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2648 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2650 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2652 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2655 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2656 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2659 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2663 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2664 s->servername_done = 0;
2669 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2670 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2672 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2674 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2677 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2678 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2681 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2684 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2687 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2688 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2693 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2697 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2698 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2699 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2700 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2701 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2702 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2703 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2704 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2707 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2708 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2709 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2711 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2715 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2717 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2718 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2722 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2726 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2730 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2732 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2733 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2736 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2737 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2738 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2739 * influence which certificate is sent
2741 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2743 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2744 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2745 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2746 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2747 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2751 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2752 * et al can pick it up.
2754 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2755 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2757 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2761 /* status request response should be sent */
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2763 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2764 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2768 /* something bad happened */
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2770 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2771 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2783 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2792 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2794 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2795 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2799 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2800 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2801 * must contain uncompressed.
2803 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2804 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2805 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2806 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2807 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2808 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2809 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2810 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2812 unsigned char *list;
2813 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2814 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2815 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2816 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2817 found_uncompressed = 1;
2821 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2823 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2827 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2828 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2830 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2832 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2833 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2834 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2835 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2837 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2839 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2842 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2843 * that we don't receive a status message
2845 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2846 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2847 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2850 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2851 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2854 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2855 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2858 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2859 s->servername_done = 0;
2865 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2868 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2870 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2875 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2883 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2884 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2885 * need to be handled at the same time.
2887 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2890 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2891 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2892 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2893 * point to the resulting session.
2895 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2896 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2897 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2900 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2901 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2902 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2903 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2904 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2905 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2906 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2909 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2910 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2911 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2912 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2913 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2914 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2916 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2919 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2920 const PACKET *session_id,
2924 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2927 int have_ticket = 0;
2928 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2931 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2932 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2935 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2938 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2941 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2945 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2946 unsigned int type, size;
2948 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2949 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2950 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2954 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2958 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2960 const unsigned char *etick;
2962 /* Duplicate extension */
2963 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2971 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2974 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2978 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2980 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2981 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2982 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2983 * calculate the master secret later.
2988 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2989 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2993 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2994 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2996 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2997 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3000 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3003 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3004 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3007 default: /* fatal error */
3013 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3014 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3015 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3021 if (have_ticket == 0)
3028 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3030 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3031 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3032 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3033 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3034 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3035 * point to the resulting session.
3038 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3039 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3040 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3041 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3042 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3044 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3045 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3046 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3049 unsigned char *sdec;
3050 const unsigned char *p;
3051 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3052 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3053 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3054 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3055 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3056 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3059 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3060 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3063 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3064 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3065 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3066 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3075 /* Check key name matches */
3076 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3078 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3079 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3080 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3081 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3087 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3090 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3095 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3096 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3097 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3100 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3101 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3102 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3105 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3106 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3107 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3108 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3109 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3111 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3112 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3115 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3116 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3121 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3125 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3129 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3130 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3131 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3135 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3136 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3145 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3149 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3150 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3154 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3161 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3162 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3163 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3164 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3165 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3166 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3167 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3170 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3173 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3174 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3175 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3176 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3177 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3179 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3182 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3185 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3186 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3192 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3195 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3196 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3197 return table[i].nid;
3202 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3208 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3211 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3214 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3215 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3219 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3221 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3228 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3231 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3232 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3233 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3234 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3235 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3236 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3237 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3238 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3239 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3240 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3243 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3249 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3251 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3252 return tls12_md_info + i;
3258 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3260 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3261 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3263 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3266 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3269 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3273 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3274 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3277 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3278 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3281 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3282 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3284 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3285 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3286 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3288 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3289 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3291 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3292 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3298 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3299 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3300 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3302 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3303 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3305 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3306 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3308 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3310 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3311 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3313 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3315 if (psignhash_nid) {
3316 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3317 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3319 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3323 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3324 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3326 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3327 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3328 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3330 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3331 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3333 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3334 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3338 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3339 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3343 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3345 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3346 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3347 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3349 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3350 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3351 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3353 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3354 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3355 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3357 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3358 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3363 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3364 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3369 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3370 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3377 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3379 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3381 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3384 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3385 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3387 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3389 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3390 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3391 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3392 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3395 return tmpout - out;
3398 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3399 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3400 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3401 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3403 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3404 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3405 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3406 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3407 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3409 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3410 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3413 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3414 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3415 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3417 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3427 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3428 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3430 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3431 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3433 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3435 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3437 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3438 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3439 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3440 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3441 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3442 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3443 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3444 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3445 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3446 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3448 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3449 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3452 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3453 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3457 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3458 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3460 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3462 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3465 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3469 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3470 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3474 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3476 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3479 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3480 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3482 /* Should never happen */
3486 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3487 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3488 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3490 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3491 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3495 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3500 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3501 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3503 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3504 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3507 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3508 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3510 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3511 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3513 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3515 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3517 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3519 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3520 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3522 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3523 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3524 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3525 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3531 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3532 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3533 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3534 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3535 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3537 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3538 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3539 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3540 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3546 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3547 * the certificate for signing.
3549 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3551 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3552 * supported it stays as NULL.
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3555 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3556 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3559 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3560 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3561 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3565 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3566 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3568 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3569 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3570 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3571 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3572 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3573 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3574 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3580 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3581 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3582 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3584 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3589 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3596 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3598 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3601 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3602 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3603 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3605 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3606 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3610 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3612 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3614 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3616 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3618 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3619 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3622 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3626 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3629 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3631 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3632 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3633 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3634 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3635 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3636 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3638 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3639 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3640 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3644 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3646 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3649 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3652 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3654 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3656 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3658 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3666 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3667 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3669 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3672 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3673 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3676 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3677 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3682 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3683 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3685 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3689 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3693 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3696 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3699 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3704 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3705 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3707 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3708 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3709 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3711 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3718 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3719 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3720 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3722 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3723 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3724 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3730 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3734 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3738 if (default_nid == -1)
3740 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3742 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3743 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3744 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3749 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3750 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3754 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3755 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3756 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3763 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3764 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3765 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3766 * attempting to use them.
3769 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3771 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3772 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3773 /* Strict mode flags */
3774 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3775 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3776 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3778 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3783 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3784 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3787 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3788 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3790 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3793 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3795 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3796 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3798 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3800 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3801 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3804 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3805 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3806 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3807 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3808 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3816 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3819 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3821 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3822 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3824 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3831 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3832 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3833 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3835 else if (!check_flags)
3840 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3841 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3843 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3845 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3846 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3848 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3851 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3852 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3853 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3854 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3857 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3858 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3859 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3863 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3864 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3867 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3868 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3869 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3872 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3873 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3874 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3877 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3878 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3879 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3888 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3889 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3891 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3893 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3894 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3895 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3898 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3905 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3906 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3910 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3912 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3913 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3915 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3922 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3923 else if (check_flags)
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3926 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3927 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3928 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3929 else if (!check_flags)
3932 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3933 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3934 else if (strict_mode) {
3935 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3936 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3937 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3938 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3940 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3947 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3948 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3950 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3952 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3955 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3958 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3962 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3966 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3968 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3969 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3971 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3972 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3973 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3977 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3980 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3982 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3984 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3985 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3987 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3988 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3989 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3991 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3992 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3993 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3994 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4000 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4005 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4006 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4010 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4011 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4013 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4014 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4019 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4023 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4026 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4027 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4034 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4035 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4037 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4038 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4039 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4040 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4041 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4042 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4043 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4046 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4047 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4049 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4054 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4056 int dh_secbits = 80;
4057 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4058 return DH_get_1024_160();
4059 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4060 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4065 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4066 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4069 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4075 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4076 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4077 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4079 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4080 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4086 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4087 return DH_get_2048_224();
4088 return DH_get_1024_160();
4092 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4095 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4098 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4099 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4100 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4101 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4103 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4106 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4108 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4111 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4113 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4114 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4115 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4116 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4118 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4119 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4121 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4122 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4125 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4127 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4130 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4133 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4135 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4136 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4138 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4139 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4141 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4142 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4147 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4148 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4149 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4152 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4154 int rv, start_idx, i;
4156 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4161 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4165 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4166 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4167 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);