2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
902 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
903 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
907 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
908 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
915 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
916 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
917 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
921 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
924 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
927 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
928 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
929 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
930 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
931 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
933 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
934 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
937 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
938 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
942 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
943 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
944 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
945 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
946 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
947 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
948 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
956 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
957 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
959 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
960 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
962 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
963 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
964 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
965 /* Should never happen */
968 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
969 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
973 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
983 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
984 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
987 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
988 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
990 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
993 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
994 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
996 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1002 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1006 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1007 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1008 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1009 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1012 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1013 if (i == sent_sigslen
1014 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1015 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1019 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1024 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1025 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1026 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1032 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1034 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1035 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1040 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1041 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1042 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1045 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1050 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1051 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1052 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1055 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1057 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1060 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1061 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1062 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1063 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1064 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1066 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1067 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1072 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1073 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1074 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1078 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1080 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1088 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1091 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1092 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1094 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1097 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1099 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1101 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1104 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1105 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1108 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1109 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1110 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1111 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1113 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1119 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1121 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1122 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1123 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1124 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1135 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1137 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1138 if (s->renegotiate) {
1141 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1152 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1160 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1163 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1164 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1165 unsigned long size_str;
1169 * check for enough space.
1170 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1171 * 2 for servernamelist length
1172 * 1 for the hostname type
1173 * 2 for hostname length
1177 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1179 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1182 /* extension type and length */
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1184 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1186 /* length of servername list */
1187 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1189 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1192 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1195 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1196 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1197 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1198 * Client Hello message */
1200 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1201 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 * check for enough space.
1208 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1209 * 1 for the srp user identity
1210 * + srp user identity length
1212 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1215 /* fill in the extension */
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1217 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1218 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1219 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1224 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1230 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1231 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1233 unsigned char *etmp;
1235 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1237 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1239 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1241 if (num_formats > 255) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1247 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1248 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1249 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1250 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1254 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1256 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1257 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1260 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1262 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1264 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1271 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1272 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1273 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1274 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1279 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1281 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1282 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1283 ret += curves_list_len;
1285 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1287 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1289 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1291 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1292 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1293 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1294 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1295 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1299 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1302 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1306 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1309 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1311 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1314 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1320 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1322 const unsigned char *salg;
1323 unsigned char *etmp;
1324 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1325 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1329 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1331 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1332 /* Fill in lengths */
1333 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1338 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1340 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1345 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1346 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1352 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1353 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1362 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1364 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1365 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1389 * 1: peer may send requests
1390 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1392 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1395 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1398 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1399 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1401 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1402 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1404 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1411 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1412 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1415 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1416 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1418 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1420 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1424 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1440 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1441 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1443 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1451 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1452 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1453 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1457 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1459 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1460 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1463 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1465 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1466 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1474 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1481 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1484 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1488 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1489 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1492 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1493 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1494 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1495 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1499 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1500 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1501 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1502 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1507 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1509 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1512 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1517 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1532 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1535 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1536 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1537 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1545 const unsigned char *plist;
1548 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1552 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1554 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1556 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1558 if (plistlen > 255) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1564 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1565 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1566 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1571 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1574 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1576 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1583 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1584 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1590 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1591 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1594 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1596 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1602 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1611 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1612 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1613 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1614 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1615 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1616 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1617 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1618 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1619 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1621 if (limit - ret < 36)
1623 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1627 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1628 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1629 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1630 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1636 * 1: peer may send requests
1637 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1640 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1642 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1647 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1648 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1649 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1650 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1651 const unsigned char *npa;
1652 unsigned int npalen;
1655 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1657 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1659 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1669 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1671 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1672 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1674 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1675 * for other cases too.
1677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1678 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1679 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1686 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1691 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1692 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1693 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1701 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1707 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1710 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1715 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1716 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1717 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1718 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1721 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1722 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1726 const unsigned char *selected;
1727 unsigned char selected_len;
1730 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1737 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1738 * length-prefixed strings.
1740 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1749 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1750 proto_len = data[i];
1756 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1762 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1763 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1764 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1765 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1797 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1799 unsigned short type, size;
1800 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1801 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1802 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1803 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1804 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1805 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1806 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1808 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1809 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1810 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1811 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1814 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1815 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1816 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1817 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1818 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1819 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1820 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1821 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1823 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1826 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1830 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1835 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1838 if (data + size > d + n)
1842 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1843 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1844 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1846 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1848 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1850 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1853 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1855 if (data + len != d + n)
1857 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1863 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1866 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1868 unsigned short type;
1869 unsigned short size;
1871 unsigned char *data = *p;
1872 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1874 s->servername_done = 0;
1875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1876 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1880 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1884 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1889 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1891 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1892 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1894 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1895 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1897 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1899 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1900 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1903 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1905 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1906 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1910 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1912 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1916 if (data > (d + n - len))
1919 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1923 if (data + size > (d + n))
1925 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1926 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1927 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1928 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1930 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1931 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1934 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1936 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1937 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1938 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1939 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1940 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1941 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1942 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1943 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1944 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1945 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1946 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1947 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1948 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1949 * the value of the Host: field.
1950 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1951 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1952 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1954 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1959 unsigned char *sdata;
1964 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1985 switch (servname_type) {
1986 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1988 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1992 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1996 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1997 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2002 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2003 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2004 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2005 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2009 s->servername_done = 1;
2012 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2013 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2014 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2015 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2032 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2033 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2043 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2044 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2046 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2055 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2056 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2058 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2059 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2065 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2068 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2070 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2075 ecpointformatlist_length;
2076 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2077 ecpointformatlist_length);
2079 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2080 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2086 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2087 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2097 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2098 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2099 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2103 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2105 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2108 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2109 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2110 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2111 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2112 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2119 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2133 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2142 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2143 const unsigned char *sdata;
2145 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 if (data != sdata) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2179 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2180 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2181 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2182 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2185 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 /* Read in request_extensions */
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (dsize != size) {
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2206 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2207 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2210 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2211 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2212 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2222 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2224 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2227 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2228 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2230 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2231 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2235 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2240 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2242 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2243 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2245 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2248 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2249 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2250 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2251 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2252 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2253 * anything like that, but this might change).
2255 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2256 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2257 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2258 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2259 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2261 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2266 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2267 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2269 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2270 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2271 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2275 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2277 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2278 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2279 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2283 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2285 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2287 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2289 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2292 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2293 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2294 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2295 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2296 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2299 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2310 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2312 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2314 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2316 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2323 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2327 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2328 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2333 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2340 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2342 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2343 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2344 * fill the length of the block.
2346 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2348 unsigned int off = 0;
2361 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2362 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2364 unsigned short length;
2365 unsigned short type;
2366 unsigned short size;
2367 unsigned char *data = *p;
2368 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2369 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2371 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2372 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2374 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2376 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2380 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2385 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2389 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2393 if (data + length != d + n) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2402 if (data + size > (d + n))
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2420 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2423 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2425 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2431 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2433 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2434 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2439 ecpointformatlist_length;
2440 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2441 ecpointformatlist_length);
2444 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2447 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2448 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2449 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2454 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2462 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2469 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2470 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2472 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2475 unsigned char *selected;
2476 unsigned char selected_len;
2478 /* We must have requested it. */
2479 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2483 /* The data must be valid */
2484 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2485 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2489 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2491 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2492 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2497 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2502 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2510 /* We must have requested it. */
2511 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 * The extension data consists of:
2521 * uint16 list_length
2522 * uint8 proto_length;
2523 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2528 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2540 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2541 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2544 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2545 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2548 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2550 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2551 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2553 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2558 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2563 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2564 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2565 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2569 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2571 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2572 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2573 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2574 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2579 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2582 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2583 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2585 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2591 if (data != d + n) {
2592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2597 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2599 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2600 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2617 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2618 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2619 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2620 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2621 * initial connect only.
2623 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2624 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2627 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2634 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2640 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2645 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2647 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2648 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2650 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2652 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2653 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2656 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2657 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2661 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2663 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2664 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2665 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2666 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2668 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2670 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2678 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2682 s->servername_done = 0;
2688 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2692 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2693 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2694 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2695 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2697 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2698 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2699 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2700 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2703 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2704 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2705 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2707 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2711 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2713 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2714 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2718 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2721 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2725 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2727 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2731 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2732 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2733 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2734 * influence which certificate is sent
2736 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2738 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2739 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2740 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2741 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2742 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2746 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2747 * et al can pick it up.
2749 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2750 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2752 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2753 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2756 /* status request response should be sent */
2757 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2758 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2761 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2763 /* something bad happened */
2764 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2765 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2766 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2779 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2787 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2789 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2790 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2792 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2794 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2795 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2796 * must contain uncompressed.
2798 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2799 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2800 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2801 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2802 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2803 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2804 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2805 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2806 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2808 unsigned char *list;
2809 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2810 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2811 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2812 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2813 found_uncompressed = 1;
2817 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2819 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2823 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2824 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2826 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2828 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2829 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2830 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2831 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2833 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2835 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2838 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2841 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2842 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2845 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2848 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2849 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2850 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2852 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2853 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2855 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2856 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2860 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2865 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2870 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2873 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2874 s->servername_done = 0;
2880 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2884 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2886 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2891 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2899 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2900 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2901 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2903 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2904 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2905 * extension, if any.
2906 * len: the length of the session ID.
2907 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2908 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2909 * point to the resulting session.
2911 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2912 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2913 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2916 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2917 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2918 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2919 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2920 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2921 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2922 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2925 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2926 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2927 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2928 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2929 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2930 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2932 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2933 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2935 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2936 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2940 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2943 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2946 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2948 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2952 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2953 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2959 /* Skip past cipher list */
2964 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2969 /* Now at start of extensions */
2970 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2973 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2974 unsigned short type, size;
2977 if (p + size > limit)
2979 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2983 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2986 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2989 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2991 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2992 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2993 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2994 * calculate the master secret later.
2998 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3000 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3001 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3003 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3005 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3006 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3008 default: /* fatal error */
3018 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3020 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3021 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3022 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3023 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3024 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3025 * point to the resulting session.
3028 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3029 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3030 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3031 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3033 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3034 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3035 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3038 unsigned char *sdec;
3039 const unsigned char *p;
3040 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3041 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3044 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3045 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3048 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3049 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3051 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3052 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3053 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3062 /* Check key name matches */
3063 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3065 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3066 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3067 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3068 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3071 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3074 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3080 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3081 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3082 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3083 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3084 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3088 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3089 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3090 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3091 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3092 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3097 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3098 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3107 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3111 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3112 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3113 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3117 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3118 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3127 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3132 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3139 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3140 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3141 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3142 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3143 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3144 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3145 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3148 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3149 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3150 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3151 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3154 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3157 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3158 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3164 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3167 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3168 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3169 return table[i].nid;
3174 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3180 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3181 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3184 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3187 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3188 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3192 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3194 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3195 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3201 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3204 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3205 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3208 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3210 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3211 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3212 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3213 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3214 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3217 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3221 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3223 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3226 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3228 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3229 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3231 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3232 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3234 return inf->mfunc();
3237 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3240 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3244 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3245 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3246 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3248 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3249 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3250 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3256 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3257 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3258 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3260 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3261 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3263 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3264 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3265 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3267 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3269 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3270 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3271 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3273 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3275 if (psignhash_nid) {
3276 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3277 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3279 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3283 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3284 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3286 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3287 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3288 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3290 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3291 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3293 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3294 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3298 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3299 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3303 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3305 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3306 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3307 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3309 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3310 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3311 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3313 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3314 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3315 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3316 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3317 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3318 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3322 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3323 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3324 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3328 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3330 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3337 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3339 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3341 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3344 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3345 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3347 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3349 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3350 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3351 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3352 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3355 return tmpout - out;
3358 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3359 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3360 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3361 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3363 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3364 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3365 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3366 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3367 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3369 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3370 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3373 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3374 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3375 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3377 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3387 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3388 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3390 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3391 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3393 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3395 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3396 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3397 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3398 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3400 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3401 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3402 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3403 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3404 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3405 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3406 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3408 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3412 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3413 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3417 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3418 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3420 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3423 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3426 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3427 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3428 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3432 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3434 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3437 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3438 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3440 /* Should never happen */
3444 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3445 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3446 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3447 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3449 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3450 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3454 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3460 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3461 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3464 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3465 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3467 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3468 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3470 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3472 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3474 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3476 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3477 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3478 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3479 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3480 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3481 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3482 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3489 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3490 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3491 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3492 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3493 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3494 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3495 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3496 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3498 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3499 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3505 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3506 * the certificate for signing.
3508 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3510 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3511 * supported it stays as NULL.
3513 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3514 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3518 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3519 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3524 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3531 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3532 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3533 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3535 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3540 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3547 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3549 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3552 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3553 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3554 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3556 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3557 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3561 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3563 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3565 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3567 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3569 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3570 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3573 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3574 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3576 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3577 unsigned short hbtype;
3578 unsigned int payload;
3579 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3581 if (s->msg_callback)
3582 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3583 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3584 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3586 /* Read type and payload length first */
3587 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3588 return 0; /* silently discard */
3591 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3592 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3595 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3596 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3600 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3601 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3603 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3604 if (buffer == NULL) {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3610 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3611 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3613 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3615 /* Random padding */
3616 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3618 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3619 3 + payload + padding);
3621 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3622 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3623 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3624 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3626 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3630 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3634 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3635 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3639 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3641 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3648 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3650 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3652 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3653 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3655 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3656 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3657 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3662 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3663 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3668 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3669 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3675 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3676 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3678 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3681 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3682 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3683 * some random stuff.
3684 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3685 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3686 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3687 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3690 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3697 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3698 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3700 /* Sequence number */
3701 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3702 /* 16 random bytes */
3703 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3705 /* Random padding */
3706 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3708 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3710 if (s->msg_callback)
3711 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3712 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3713 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3715 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3724 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3728 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3731 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3733 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3736 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3739 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3741 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3743 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3745 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3753 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3754 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3755 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3756 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3757 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3758 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3762 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3763 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3764 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3765 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3768 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3769 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3772 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3778 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3779 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3781 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3785 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3789 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3792 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3795 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3800 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3801 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3803 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3804 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3805 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3806 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3807 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3809 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3816 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3817 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3818 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3819 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3821 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3822 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3823 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3824 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3830 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3834 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3838 if (default_nid == -1)
3840 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3842 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3843 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3844 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3849 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3850 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3854 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3855 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3856 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3863 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3864 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3865 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3866 * attempting to use them.
3869 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3871 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3872 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3873 /* Strict mode flags */
3874 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3875 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3876 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3878 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3883 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3884 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3886 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3887 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3889 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3892 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3894 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3896 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3898 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3899 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3902 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3903 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3904 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3905 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3906 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3907 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3914 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3917 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3918 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3919 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3921 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3928 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3929 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3930 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3932 else if (!check_flags)
3937 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3938 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3940 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3942 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3943 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3945 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3948 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3950 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3951 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3952 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3955 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3956 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3957 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3958 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3962 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3963 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3972 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3973 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3975 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3977 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3978 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3979 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3982 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3989 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3990 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3996 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3997 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3999 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4006 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4007 else if (check_flags)
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4010 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4011 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4013 else if (!check_flags)
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4017 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4018 else if (strict_mode) {
4019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4021 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4022 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4024 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4031 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4032 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4047 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4048 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4049 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4050 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4051 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4055 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4059 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4061 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4062 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4064 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4065 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4075 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4077 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4080 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4086 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4093 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4098 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4104 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4106 else if (cpk->digest)
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4117 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4119 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4120 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4127 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4128 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4138 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4139 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4141 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4147 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4149 int dh_secbits = 80;
4150 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4151 return DH_get_1024_160();
4152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4158 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4159 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4162 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4168 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4169 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4170 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4172 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4173 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4179 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4180 return DH_get_2048_224();
4181 return DH_get_1024_160();
4185 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4188 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4190 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4191 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4195 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4197 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4200 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4202 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4203 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4204 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4205 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4207 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4208 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4211 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4213 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4216 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4219 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4221 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4222 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4224 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4225 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4227 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4228 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4233 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4234 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4235 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4238 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4240 int rv, start_idx, i;
4242 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4247 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4251 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4252 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4253 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);