2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
34 tls1_generate_master_secret,
35 tls1_change_cipher_state,
36 tls1_final_finish_mac,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
43 tls_close_construct_packet,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
49 tls1_generate_master_secret,
50 tls1_change_cipher_state,
51 tls1_final_finish_mac,
52 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
53 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_export_keying_material,
56 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
57 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
58 tls_close_construct_packet,
62 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_generate_master_secret,
65 tls1_change_cipher_state,
66 tls1_final_finish_mac,
67 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
70 tls1_export_keying_material,
71 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
72 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
73 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
74 tls_close_construct_packet,
78 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
99 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
119 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
123 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
133 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
134 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
136 sc->version = s->method->version;
141 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
146 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
147 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
148 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
149 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
150 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
151 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
152 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
153 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
154 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
155 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
156 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
157 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
158 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
159 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
160 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
161 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
162 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
163 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
164 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
165 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
166 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
167 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
169 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
170 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
172 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
173 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
174 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
176 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13},
177 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13},
178 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
186 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
187 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
188 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
189 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
190 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
193 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
194 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
199 /* The default curves */
200 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
220 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
225 struct provider_ctx_data_st {
227 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
230 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
231 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
232 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
234 struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
235 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
236 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
238 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
239 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
241 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
244 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
245 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
247 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
248 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
249 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
251 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
252 (ctx->group_list_max_len
253 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
254 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
257 ctx->group_list = tmp;
258 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
260 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
261 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
264 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
266 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
267 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
268 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
271 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
272 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
275 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
276 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
280 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
281 if (ginf->realname == NULL)
284 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
285 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
286 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
289 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
291 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
292 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
296 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
297 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
300 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
301 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
302 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
306 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
307 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
308 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
311 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
313 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
314 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
319 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
320 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
325 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
326 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
327 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
331 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
332 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
337 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
338 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
339 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
344 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
345 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
347 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
348 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
350 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
351 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
352 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
353 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
354 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
355 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
358 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
359 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
360 ctx->group_list_len++;
363 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
368 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
371 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
376 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
378 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
381 pgd.provider = provider;
382 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
383 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
386 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
388 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
389 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
391 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
394 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
395 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
396 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
397 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
403 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
406 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
407 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
409 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
412 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
414 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
415 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
420 #define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
421 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs;
422 static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
424 struct provider_ctx_data_st *pgd = data;
425 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
426 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
428 TLS_SIGALG_INFO *sinf = NULL;
429 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
431 unsigned int code_point = 0;
434 if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == ctx->sigalg_list_len) {
435 TLS_SIGALG_INFO *tmp = NULL;
437 if (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len == 0)
438 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO)
439 * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
441 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->sigalg_list,
442 (ctx->sigalg_list_max_len
443 + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
444 * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO));
447 ctx->sigalg_list = tmp;
448 memset(tmp + ctx->sigalg_list_max_len, 0,
449 sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
450 ctx->sigalg_list_max_len += TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
453 sinf = &ctx->sigalg_list[ctx->sigalg_list_len];
455 /* First, mandatory parameters */
456 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME);
457 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
458 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
461 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
462 sinf->sigalg_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
463 if (sinf->sigalg_name == NULL)
466 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME);
467 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
471 OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
472 sinf->name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
473 if (sinf->name == NULL)
476 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
477 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT);
479 || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &code_point)
480 || code_point > UINT16_MAX) {
481 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
484 sinf->code_point = (uint16_t)code_point;
486 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
487 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS);
488 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &sinf->secbits)) {
489 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
493 /* Now, optional parameters */
494 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID);
496 sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
497 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
500 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
501 sinf->sigalg_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
502 if (sinf->sigalg_oid == NULL)
506 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME);
508 sinf->sig_name = NULL;
509 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
512 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
513 sinf->sig_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
514 if (sinf->sig_name == NULL)
518 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID);
520 sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
521 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
524 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
525 sinf->sig_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
526 if (sinf->sig_oid == NULL)
530 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME);
532 sinf->hash_name = NULL;
533 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
536 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
537 sinf->hash_name = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
538 if (sinf->hash_name == NULL)
542 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID);
544 sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
545 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
548 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
549 sinf->hash_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
550 if (sinf->hash_oid == NULL)
554 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE);
556 sinf->keytype = NULL;
557 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
560 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
561 sinf->keytype = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
562 if (sinf->keytype == NULL)
566 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID);
568 sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
569 } else if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
572 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
573 sinf->keytype_oid = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
574 if (sinf->keytype_oid == NULL)
578 /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
579 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS);
580 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->mintls)) {
581 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
584 if ((sinf->mintls != 0) && (sinf->mintls != -1) &&
585 ((sinf->mintls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
586 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
591 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS);
592 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &sinf->maxtls)) {
593 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
596 if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
597 ((sinf->maxtls < sinf->mintls))) {
598 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
601 if ((sinf->maxtls != 0) && (sinf->maxtls != -1) &&
602 ((sinf->maxtls < TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
603 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
609 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
610 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
611 * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
616 keytype = (sinf->keytype != NULL
618 : (sinf->sig_name != NULL
620 : sinf->sigalg_name));
621 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, keytype, ctx->propq);
622 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
624 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
625 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
627 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
628 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
629 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
630 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
631 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
632 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
635 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
637 * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
638 * Check proper object registration first, though.
639 * Don't care about return value as this may have been
640 * done within providers or previous calls to
641 * add_provider_sigalgs.
643 OBJ_create(sinf->sigalg_oid, sinf->sigalg_name, NULL);
644 /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
645 if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name) == NID_undef) ||
646 (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name)) == NULL)) {
647 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
650 if (sinf->sig_name != NULL)
651 OBJ_create(sinf->sig_oid, sinf->sig_name, NULL);
652 if (sinf->keytype != NULL)
653 OBJ_create(sinf->keytype_oid, sinf->keytype, NULL);
654 if (sinf->hash_name != NULL)
655 OBJ_create(sinf->hash_oid, sinf->hash_name, NULL);
656 OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->sigalg_name),
657 (sinf->hash_name != NULL
658 ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf->hash_name)
660 OBJ_txt2nid(keytype));
661 ctx->sigalg_list_len++;
664 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
669 OPENSSL_free(sinf->name);
671 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_name);
672 sinf->sigalg_name = NULL;
673 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sigalg_oid);
674 sinf->sigalg_oid = NULL;
675 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_name);
676 sinf->sig_name = NULL;
677 OPENSSL_free(sinf->sig_oid);
678 sinf->sig_oid = NULL;
679 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_name);
680 sinf->hash_name = NULL;
681 OPENSSL_free(sinf->hash_oid);
682 sinf->hash_oid = NULL;
683 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype);
684 sinf->keytype = NULL;
685 OPENSSL_free(sinf->keytype_oid);
686 sinf->keytype_oid = NULL;
691 static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
693 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd;
696 pgd.provider = provider;
697 OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-SIGALG",
698 add_provider_sigalgs, &pgd);
700 * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
701 * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
706 int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
711 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_sigalgs, ctx))
714 /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
715 if (ctx->sigalg_list_len > 0) {
716 ctx->ssl_cert_info = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu) * ctx->sigalg_list_len);
717 if (ctx->ssl_cert_info == NULL)
719 for(i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
720 ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ctx->sigalg_list[i].sigalg_name);
721 ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].amask = SSL_aANY;
726 * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
727 * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
733 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
737 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
738 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
739 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
740 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
746 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
750 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
751 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
752 return &ctx->group_list[i];
758 const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
760 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls_group_info = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, group_id);
762 if (tls_group_info == NULL)
765 return tls_group_info->tlsname;
768 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
776 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
777 * work for groups we don't know about.
779 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
781 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
782 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
784 if (!include_unknown)
786 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
789 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
794 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
795 * work for groups we don't know about.
797 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
799 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
800 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
807 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
808 * the number of groups supported.
810 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
813 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
815 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
816 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
818 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
819 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
822 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
823 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
827 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
828 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
833 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
834 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
835 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
837 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
838 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
844 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
845 int minversion, int maxversion,
846 int isec, int *okfortls13)
848 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
852 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
858 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
859 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
861 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
864 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
865 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
866 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
868 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
870 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
873 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
874 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
875 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
876 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
877 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
878 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
881 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
882 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
883 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
888 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
889 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
891 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
893 unsigned char gtmp[2];
898 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
899 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
900 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
901 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
904 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
905 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
908 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
915 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
916 * if there is no match.
917 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
918 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
919 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
921 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
923 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
924 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
926 SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
928 /* Can't do anything on client side */
932 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
935 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
937 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
939 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
940 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
941 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
942 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
943 /* Should never happen */
946 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
950 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
951 * otherwise peer decides.
953 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
954 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
955 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
957 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
958 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
961 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
962 uint16_t id = pref[i];
963 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
965 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
966 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
968 inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
969 if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
971 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
972 if (inf->maxdtls == -1)
974 if ((inf->mindtls != 0 && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, inf->mindtls))
975 || (inf->maxdtls != 0
976 && DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, inf->maxdtls)))
979 if (inf->maxtls == -1)
981 if ((inf->mintls != 0 && s->version < inf->mintls)
982 || (inf->maxtls != 0 && s->version > inf->maxtls))
992 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
996 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
997 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
1002 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
1003 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
1005 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
1006 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
1007 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
1010 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1013 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
1015 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
1016 unsigned long idmask;
1018 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
1019 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
1021 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
1022 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
1023 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
1025 *dup_list |= idmask;
1028 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
1033 OPENSSL_free(glist);
1037 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
1038 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
1046 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1048 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
1051 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
1055 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
1057 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
1060 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1061 garg->gid_arr = tmp;
1063 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1065 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1068 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
1070 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
1071 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
1074 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
1075 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
1077 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
1081 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
1082 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
1090 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
1091 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
1092 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
1095 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
1103 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
1106 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
1109 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
1111 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
1114 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
1118 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
1119 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
1120 int check_own_groups)
1122 const uint16_t *groups;
1128 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
1129 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
1130 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
1132 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
1133 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
1135 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
1136 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
1139 /* Should never happen */
1144 if (check_own_groups) {
1145 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
1146 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
1147 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
1151 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
1154 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
1158 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
1159 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
1162 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
1163 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
1164 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
1165 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
1167 if (groups_len == 0)
1169 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
1172 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
1173 size_t *num_formats)
1176 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
1178 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
1179 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
1180 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
1182 *pformats = ecformats_default;
1183 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
1185 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
1187 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1191 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
1192 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1194 unsigned char comp_id;
1198 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
1199 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
1203 /* Get required compression id */
1204 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
1205 if (point_conv == 0)
1207 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
1208 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1209 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1211 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
1216 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
1218 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
1219 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1220 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
1221 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1226 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
1227 * supported (see RFC4492).
1229 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
1232 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
1233 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
1239 /* Return group id of a key */
1240 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1242 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1244 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
1246 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
1250 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
1251 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
1253 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
1257 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1260 /* If not EC nothing to do */
1261 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
1263 /* Check compression */
1264 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
1266 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
1268 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
1271 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
1274 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
1277 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1281 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
1282 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
1283 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
1284 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
1285 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
1287 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1288 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1289 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1298 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1299 * @s: SSL connection
1300 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1302 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1303 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1305 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1307 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
1309 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1310 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
1311 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
1313 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1316 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1317 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
1318 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1319 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
1324 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1325 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1326 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1327 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1328 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1329 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1330 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1331 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1332 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1333 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1335 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1336 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1337 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1338 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1339 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1340 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1342 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1343 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1344 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1346 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1347 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1349 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1350 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1352 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1353 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1355 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1356 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1357 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1360 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1361 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1362 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1363 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1364 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1369 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1370 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1371 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1374 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1375 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1376 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1377 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1378 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1379 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1380 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1381 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1382 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1383 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1384 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1385 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1386 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1387 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1388 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1389 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1390 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1391 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1392 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1393 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1394 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1395 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1396 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1397 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1398 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1399 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1400 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1401 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1402 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1403 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1404 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1405 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1406 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1407 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1408 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1409 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1410 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1411 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1412 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1413 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1414 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1415 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1416 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1417 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1418 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1419 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1420 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1421 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1422 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1423 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1424 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1425 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1426 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1427 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1428 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1429 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1430 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1431 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1432 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1433 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1434 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1435 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1436 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1437 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1438 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1439 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1440 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1441 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1442 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1443 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1444 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1445 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1446 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1447 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1448 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1449 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1450 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1451 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1452 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1454 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1455 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1456 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1457 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1458 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1459 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1460 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1461 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1462 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1463 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1464 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1465 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1466 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1467 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1468 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1469 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1470 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1471 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1472 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1473 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1476 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1477 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1478 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1479 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1480 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1481 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1485 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1486 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1488 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1489 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1490 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1491 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1492 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1493 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1494 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1495 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1496 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1497 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1500 int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1502 size_t i, cache_idx, sigalgs_len;
1503 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1504 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache = NULL;
1505 uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
1506 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1512 sigalgs_len = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) + ctx->sigalg_list_len;
1514 cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP) * sigalgs_len);
1515 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1518 tls12_sigalgs_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len);
1519 if (tls12_sigalgs_list == NULL)
1523 /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
1524 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1525 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1529 tls12_sigalgs_list[i] = tls12_sigalgs[i];
1532 * Check hash is available.
1533 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1534 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1535 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1536 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1537 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1539 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1540 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1541 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1545 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1546 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1549 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1550 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1552 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1553 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1556 /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
1557 cache_idx = OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1558 for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
1559 TLS_SIGALG_INFO si = ctx->sigalg_list[i];
1560 cache[cache_idx].name = si.name;
1561 cache[cache_idx].sigalg = si.code_point;
1562 tls12_sigalgs_list[cache_idx] = si.code_point;
1563 cache[cache_idx].hash = si.hash_name?OBJ_txt2nid(si.hash_name):NID_undef;
1564 cache[cache_idx].hash_idx = ssl_get_md_idx(cache[cache_idx].hash);
1565 cache[cache_idx].sig = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
1566 cache[cache_idx].sig_idx = i + SSL_PKEY_NUM;
1567 cache[cache_idx].sigandhash = OBJ_txt2nid(si.sigalg_name);
1568 cache[cache_idx].curve = NID_undef;
1569 /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
1570 cache[cache_idx].enabled = 1;
1574 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1575 ctx->tls12_sigalgs = tls12_sigalgs_list;
1576 ctx->tls12_sigalgs_len = sigalgs_len;
1578 tls12_sigalgs_list = NULL;
1582 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1583 OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list);
1584 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1588 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1589 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1593 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1595 for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1596 i < SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
1598 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1606 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1607 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1613 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1614 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1617 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1627 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1629 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1630 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1631 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1633 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1634 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1635 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1641 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1643 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1649 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1650 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1651 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1652 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1653 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1655 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1662 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1663 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
1664 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu
1665 = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
1669 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1676 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1678 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1681 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1683 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1690 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1691 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1693 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1696 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1698 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1705 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1708 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1711 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1712 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1716 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
1718 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1722 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1724 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1726 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1727 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1730 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1732 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
1734 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1737 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1741 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1744 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1747 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1748 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1749 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1750 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1752 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1753 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1756 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1757 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1761 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1762 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1763 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1765 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1766 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1767 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1768 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1769 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1770 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1772 *psigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
1773 return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
1778 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1779 * specified EC curve.
1781 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
1783 const uint16_t *sigs;
1786 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1787 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1788 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1790 sigs = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs;
1791 siglen = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->tls12_sigalgs_len;
1794 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1795 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1799 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1800 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1801 && curve == lu->curve)
1809 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1812 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1814 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1817 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1821 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1823 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1824 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1826 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1827 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1828 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1830 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1831 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1832 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1833 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1835 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1837 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1839 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1842 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1843 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1845 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1849 * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
1850 * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
1852 if ((secbits == 0) && (lu->sig_idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
1853 && ((lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM) < (int)ctx->sigalg_list_len)) {
1854 secbits = ctx->sigalg_list[lu->sig_idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM].secbits;
1860 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1861 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1864 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1866 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1867 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1869 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1871 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1874 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1876 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1877 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1878 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1882 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1883 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1884 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1886 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1887 /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
1888 if ((pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT) && (lu != NULL))
1891 /* Should never happen */
1896 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1897 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1900 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1901 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1902 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1903 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1907 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1908 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
1909 (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) : pkeyid,
1910 &cidx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))
1911 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1916 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1918 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1919 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1921 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1925 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1926 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1927 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1929 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1934 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1935 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1936 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1940 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1941 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1942 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1943 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1945 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1950 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1955 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1956 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1957 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1958 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1961 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1962 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1963 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1967 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
1968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1972 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1973 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1975 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1976 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1977 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
1979 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1980 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1981 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1985 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1986 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1990 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1992 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1997 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1999 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
2003 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
2005 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
2010 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
2012 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
2017 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
2018 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
2019 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
2021 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
2024 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
2026 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2028 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
2029 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
2030 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
2031 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
2032 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2035 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
2036 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
2037 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
2038 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
2040 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2042 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
2043 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
2044 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
2051 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
2052 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
2053 * @c: cipher to check
2054 * @op: Security check that you want to do
2055 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
2057 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
2059 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
2062 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
2063 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
2065 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
2068 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s))
2069 /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
2070 switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c)) {
2071 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
2072 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
2073 case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
2079 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2080 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
2083 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
2084 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
2086 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
2087 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
2088 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
2090 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
2093 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2094 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
2095 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
2098 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
2101 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2103 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
2105 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
2108 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2112 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2113 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2114 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2115 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2117 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2118 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags)
2119 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2121 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2122 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2125 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
2126 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
2128 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
2129 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
2130 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2131 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2133 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
2134 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
2139 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
2140 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
2141 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
2142 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2150 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2154 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
2157 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2159 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2164 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2166 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2167 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2168 * point to the resulting session.
2170 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2171 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2175 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2178 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2181 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
2182 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2185 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2186 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2188 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
2189 if (!ticketext->present)
2190 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2192 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2194 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
2195 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
2199 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2201 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
2202 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
2203 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
2204 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
2207 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2208 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2209 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2210 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2211 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2212 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
2214 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2215 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2216 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2217 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2218 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2219 * point to the resulting session.
2221 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2222 const unsigned char *etick,
2224 const unsigned char *sess_id,
2225 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2227 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
2228 unsigned char *sdec;
2229 const unsigned char *p;
2230 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
2231 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2233 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2234 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
2235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2236 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
2237 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2239 if (eticklen == 0) {
2241 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2242 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
2244 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
2247 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
2249 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2250 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2251 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2252 * calculate the master secret later.
2254 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2258 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
2259 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
2260 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2264 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2265 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
2267 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
2270 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2272 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2276 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
2278 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
2281 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2284 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
2285 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
2286 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
2288 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2291 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
2292 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2293 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
2294 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
2295 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
2298 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2302 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2308 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
2310 /* Check key name matches */
2311 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
2312 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
2313 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2317 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
2319 if (aes256cbc == NULL
2320 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
2321 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
2323 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
2324 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
2325 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
2326 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
2327 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2330 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
2331 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2335 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2338 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
2340 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2344 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
2346 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2350 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2351 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
2352 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2356 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2357 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
2358 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
2359 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2363 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2364 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2367 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2368 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2369 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
2370 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
2371 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2372 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
2373 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
2375 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2378 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
2380 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2386 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &p, slen, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
2390 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2392 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2394 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2398 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2399 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2400 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2404 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2405 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2408 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2410 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2415 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2417 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2420 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2421 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2424 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2425 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2426 * performs any action
2428 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2429 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2430 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2431 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2432 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2433 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2436 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2437 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2438 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2439 sess, etick, keyname_len,
2441 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2443 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2444 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2447 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2448 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2449 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2453 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2454 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2455 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2456 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2457 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2461 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2462 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2463 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2464 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2465 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2466 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2467 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2469 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2473 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2477 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2479 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2480 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2481 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2482 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2491 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2492 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
2493 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2495 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2498 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2500 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2501 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2504 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2507 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2508 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2509 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2510 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2511 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2514 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2515 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
2518 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2519 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2520 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2521 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2522 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2525 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2526 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2528 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2531 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2532 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2533 * ciphersuites enabled.
2536 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2539 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
2540 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2541 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2542 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2544 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2545 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2546 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2549 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2557 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2558 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2559 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2560 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2561 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2565 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2566 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2570 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
2572 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2573 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2574 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2576 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2579 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2580 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2581 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2582 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2587 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx,
2588 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
2592 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2593 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2594 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2595 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2597 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2600 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2601 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2606 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2607 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2610 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2612 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2615 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2616 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2618 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2619 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2620 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2621 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2625 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2629 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2630 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2631 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2632 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2633 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2635 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2636 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2637 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2638 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2640 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2642 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2644 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2645 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2656 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2657 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2659 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2660 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2662 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2664 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2666 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2667 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2668 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2669 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2670 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2671 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2672 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2673 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2674 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2675 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2677 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2681 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2682 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2686 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2687 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2689 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2691 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
2693 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2697 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2698 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2702 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2708 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2710 /* Invalid data length */
2711 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2716 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
2718 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2726 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2733 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2735 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2736 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2738 /* Should never happen */
2739 if (s->cert == NULL)
2743 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2744 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2746 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2747 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2751 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2753 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2756 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2758 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2761 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++)
2764 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2765 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2766 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2768 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2769 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2771 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2772 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
2773 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
2774 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2779 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2780 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2781 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2785 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2790 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2791 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2793 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2796 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2798 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2802 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2804 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2805 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
2807 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2809 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2810 if (psignhash != NULL)
2811 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2813 return (int)numsigalgs;
2816 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2817 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2818 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2820 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2821 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2826 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2828 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
2829 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2831 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2833 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2835 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2836 if (psignhash != NULL)
2837 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2839 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2841 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2842 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
2845 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2846 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2850 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2851 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2854 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2856 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2857 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2858 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2859 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2860 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2861 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2862 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2863 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2865 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2866 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2867 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2870 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2871 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2873 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2875 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2877 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2878 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2879 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2882 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2884 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2886 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2888 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2890 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2891 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2892 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2893 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2894 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2895 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2899 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2901 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2902 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2906 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2913 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2914 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2915 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2917 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2919 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2920 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2924 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2928 /* Reject duplicates */
2929 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2930 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2939 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2940 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2942 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2946 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2950 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2953 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2958 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2960 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2963 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2964 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2965 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2967 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2968 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2969 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2975 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2977 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2982 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2984 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2986 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2987 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2988 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2990 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2992 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2993 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2998 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
3003 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3004 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3005 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
3007 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3008 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3009 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
3015 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3019 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3021 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
3023 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
3026 if (default_nid == -1)
3028 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3030 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3032 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3034 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
3035 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
3036 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
3038 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
3041 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
3043 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
3044 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
3045 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
3046 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3047 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
3053 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3054 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3056 const X509_NAME *nm;
3058 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3059 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3060 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3067 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3068 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3069 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3070 * attempting to use them.
3073 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3075 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3076 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3077 /* Strict mode flags */
3078 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3079 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3080 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3082 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
3083 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
3087 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3088 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3091 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3095 * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
3096 * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
3097 * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
3099 * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
3104 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3106 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3107 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3109 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3111 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3112 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, idx)) {
3113 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pk))
3115 *pvalid = rv = CERT_PKEY_RPK;
3118 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3119 if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
3124 if (x == NULL || pk == NULL)
3127 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx,
3128 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
3131 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3133 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3134 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3136 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3143 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3144 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3145 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3146 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3147 else if (!check_flags)
3152 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3153 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3155 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
3160 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
3161 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3163 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3167 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3168 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3171 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3172 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3173 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3177 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3178 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3181 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3182 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
3183 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3186 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3187 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
3188 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3191 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3192 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
3193 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3202 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3203 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3205 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3207 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3208 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
3209 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
3211 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
3214 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3221 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3222 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3224 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
3225 * so check_flags is always set.
3227 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
3228 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3229 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
3233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3235 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3236 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3238 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3245 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3246 else if (check_flags)
3247 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3249 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3250 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
3251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3252 else if (!check_flags)
3255 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3256 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3257 else if (strict_mode) {
3258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3259 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3260 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3261 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3263 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3270 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3271 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3274 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
3275 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3276 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
3277 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3278 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
3279 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3282 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
3285 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
3286 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
3287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3291 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3297 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
3300 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
3301 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3302 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3304 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3305 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3307 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3308 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3313 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3318 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3319 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3323 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3324 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
3326 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3329 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3333 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
3336 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3337 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3344 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3345 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3347 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
3348 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
3349 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3350 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3351 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3352 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3353 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3354 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
3355 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
3358 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
3359 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3361 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
3366 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
3369 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3371 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
3373 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
3374 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3375 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
3376 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
3377 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3379 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
3380 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3381 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3386 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
3388 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
3392 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3393 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3395 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
3396 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
3398 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3399 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3400 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
3401 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
3402 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
3403 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3404 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3405 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
3407 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
3411 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
3413 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
3416 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3418 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
3419 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
3422 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
3424 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3428 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3429 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3430 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3435 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3439 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3443 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3444 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3445 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3446 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3448 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3451 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3453 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3456 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3459 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3460 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3462 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3463 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3465 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3467 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3468 if (nid == NID_undef)
3471 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3473 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3476 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
3480 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3482 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3483 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3485 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3486 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3488 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3489 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3494 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3495 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3496 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3499 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
3502 int rv, start_idx, i;
3505 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3507 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3512 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3516 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3517 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3518 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3526 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3527 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3530 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3531 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3533 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3534 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx,
3535 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3537 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3539 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3540 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3541 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3544 /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
3545 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s, sig_idx))
3546 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_RPK ? sig_idx : -1;
3548 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3552 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3553 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3555 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3557 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
3558 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3560 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3561 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3563 const char *mdname = NULL;
3564 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3567 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3568 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3570 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3571 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3572 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
3579 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3580 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3582 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3583 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3585 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3586 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3591 * This does not differentiate between the
3592 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3593 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3594 * signing certificate.
3596 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3603 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3604 * a viable public key is permitted.
3610 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3611 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3612 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3613 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3614 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3616 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3618 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3621 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3624 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3625 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3629 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3630 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3632 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3637 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)) == NULL)
3640 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3641 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3644 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3648 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3649 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3650 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3652 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
3655 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3659 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3661 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3662 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3663 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3665 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3666 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3667 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3668 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3669 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3671 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3672 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
3674 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3675 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3678 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3679 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3681 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3683 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3684 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3686 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3687 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3688 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
3694 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3701 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3702 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3704 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3705 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3707 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3708 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3709 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3711 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
3713 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3716 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3717 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3719 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3720 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3725 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3729 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3730 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3732 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3735 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3737 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3739 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3741 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3743 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3747 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3750 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3751 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3754 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3757 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3759 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3760 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3763 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3764 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3766 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3767 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3768 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3770 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
3773 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3778 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3779 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3780 * we have to assume GOST support.
3782 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
3783 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
3784 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
3785 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3789 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3793 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3797 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3801 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3806 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3808 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3809 size_t sent_sigslen;
3811 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3815 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3819 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3820 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3821 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3822 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3823 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3826 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3830 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3835 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3839 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3845 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3846 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3847 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3848 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3852 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3854 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3855 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3856 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3860 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3864 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3866 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
3871 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3872 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3873 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3877 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3881 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3883 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3887 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3889 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3891 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3892 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3897 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3898 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3899 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3904 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3905 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3910 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3916 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3919 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3921 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3927 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3932 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3934 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3936 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3937 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3938 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3939 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3943 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3944 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3949 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3951 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3952 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3954 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3955 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3960 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3963 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3964 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3966 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3967 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3972 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3974 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3975 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3977 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3978 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3983 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3985 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3987 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3988 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3993 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3994 const unsigned char *enckey,
3997 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3998 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
4000 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
4001 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
4003 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
4004 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
4005 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
4009 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);