2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
111 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
113 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
117 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
133 int nid; /* Curve NID */
134 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
135 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
139 * Table of curve information.
140 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
141 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
144 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
145 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
146 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
147 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
148 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
149 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
150 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
151 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
152 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
153 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
154 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
155 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
156 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
157 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
158 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
159 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
160 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
161 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
163 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
164 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
165 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
167 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
168 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
172 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
175 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
181 /* The default curves */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
189 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
190 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
191 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
194 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
196 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
197 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
198 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
200 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
202 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
206 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
209 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
210 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
217 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
219 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
220 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
221 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
222 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
223 * lists in the first place.
224 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
225 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
226 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
228 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
231 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
234 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
235 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
237 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
238 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
241 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
244 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
245 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
249 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
250 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
254 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
255 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
258 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
259 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
263 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
264 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
273 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
274 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
276 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
279 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
281 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
282 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
283 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
286 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
289 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
290 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
292 const unsigned char *curves;
293 size_t num_curves, i;
294 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
295 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
297 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
299 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
302 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
303 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
305 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
306 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
308 } else /* Should never happen */
311 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
313 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
314 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
315 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
321 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
322 * if there is no match.
323 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
324 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
325 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
327 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
329 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
330 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
333 /* Can't do anything on client side */
337 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
339 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
340 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
342 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
344 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
345 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
346 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
347 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
348 /* Should never happen */
351 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
355 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
356 * but s->options is a long...
358 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
359 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
361 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
362 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
363 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
364 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
366 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
368 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
369 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
371 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
372 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
373 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
376 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
378 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
386 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
390 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
391 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
393 unsigned char *glist, *p;
396 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
399 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
400 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
403 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
404 unsigned long idmask;
406 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
407 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
409 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
418 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
422 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
426 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
429 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
431 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
437 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
439 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
441 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
443 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
444 if (nid == NID_undef)
445 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
446 if (nid == NID_undef)
447 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
448 if (nid == NID_undef)
450 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
451 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
453 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
457 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
458 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
462 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
466 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
469 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
470 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
477 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
478 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
481 /* Determine curve ID */
482 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
483 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
484 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
488 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
490 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
492 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
493 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
495 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
496 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
498 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
504 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
505 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
506 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
508 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
509 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
512 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
513 * supported (see RFC4492).
515 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
516 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
517 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
518 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
519 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
522 if (i == num_formats)
527 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
528 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
531 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
533 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
534 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
535 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
536 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
537 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
541 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
542 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
547 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
554 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
558 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
560 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
561 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
562 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
564 *pformats = ecformats_default;
565 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
567 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
569 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
574 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
575 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
577 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
579 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
582 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
585 /* If not EC nothing to do */
586 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
588 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
592 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
595 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
599 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
602 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
608 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
609 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
610 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
611 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
612 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
614 return 0; /* Should never happen */
615 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
616 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
618 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
625 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
627 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
629 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
630 * is compatible with the client extensions.
632 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
634 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
637 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
640 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
641 unsigned char curve_id[2];
642 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
643 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
644 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
645 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
646 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
650 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
651 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
655 /* Need a shared curve */
656 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
663 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
668 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
670 /* Default sigalg schemes */
671 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
678 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
683 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
687 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
688 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
690 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
694 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
698 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
703 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
705 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
709 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
711 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
712 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
713 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
714 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
715 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
716 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
717 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
718 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
719 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
720 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
721 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
722 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
723 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
724 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
725 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
727 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
728 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
729 NID_undef, NID_undef},
730 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
731 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
732 NID_undef, NID_undef},
733 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
734 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
735 NID_undef, NID_undef},
736 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
737 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
738 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
739 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
740 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
741 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
742 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
743 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
744 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
745 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
746 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
747 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
748 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
749 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
750 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
752 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
753 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
754 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
755 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
756 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
757 NID_undef, NID_undef},
758 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
759 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
760 NID_undef, NID_undef},
761 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
762 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
763 NID_undef, NID_undef},
764 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
765 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
766 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
769 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
770 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
771 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
772 NID_undef, NID_undef},
773 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
774 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
775 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
776 NID_undef, NID_undef},
777 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
778 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
779 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
780 NID_undef, NID_undef}
783 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
784 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
785 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
786 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
787 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
792 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
793 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
795 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
796 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
797 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
798 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
799 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
800 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
801 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
802 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
805 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
806 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
809 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
811 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
813 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
819 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
820 * is fixed by the certificate type.
822 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
824 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
826 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
827 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
829 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL) {
834 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
836 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
837 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
839 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
841 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
844 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
848 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
851 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
855 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
856 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
857 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
858 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
860 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
861 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
864 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
865 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
870 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
871 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
872 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
874 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
875 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
876 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
877 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
878 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
879 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
881 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
882 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
887 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
888 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
891 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
893 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
894 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
896 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
897 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
898 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
900 /* Should never happen */
903 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
904 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
905 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
909 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
910 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
911 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
913 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
915 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
916 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
919 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
920 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
921 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
926 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
927 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
928 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
931 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
933 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
936 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
937 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
944 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
945 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
947 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
951 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
952 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
953 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
954 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
956 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
960 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
961 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
962 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
963 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
965 if (curve != lu->curve) {
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
967 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
972 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
977 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
978 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
979 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
980 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
983 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
984 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
985 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
989 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
995 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
996 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
998 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
999 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1000 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1001 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1002 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1006 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1007 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1011 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1013 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1015 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1020 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1021 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1022 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1024 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1027 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1029 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1031 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1032 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1033 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1034 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1036 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1037 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1038 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1039 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1041 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1043 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1044 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1045 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1051 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1052 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1053 * @c: cipher to check
1054 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1055 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1057 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1059 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1061 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1062 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1064 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1066 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1067 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1070 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1071 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1073 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1074 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1075 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1077 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1080 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1081 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1084 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1087 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1089 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1091 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1094 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1099 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1100 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1101 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1102 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1103 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1104 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1105 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1107 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1108 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1110 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1111 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1112 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1114 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1115 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1120 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1121 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1122 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1123 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1131 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1136 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1138 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1140 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1147 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1149 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1150 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1151 * point to the resulting session.
1153 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1154 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1155 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1158 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1159 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1160 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1161 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1162 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1163 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1164 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1167 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1168 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1169 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1170 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1171 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1172 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1174 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1179 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1182 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1185 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1186 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1189 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1192 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1193 if (!ticketext->present)
1196 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1199 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1202 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1203 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1205 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1207 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1208 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1209 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1210 * calculate the master secret later.
1212 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1215 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1216 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1218 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1219 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1220 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1222 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1223 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1225 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1226 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1227 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1230 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1235 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1237 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1238 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1239 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1240 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1241 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1242 * point to the resulting session.
1244 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1245 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1246 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1249 unsigned char *sdec;
1250 const unsigned char *p;
1251 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1252 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1254 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1255 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1256 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1257 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1259 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1260 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1262 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1263 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1265 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1268 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1269 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1270 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1275 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1281 /* Check key name matches */
1282 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1283 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1284 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1287 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1288 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1289 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1290 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1291 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1293 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1298 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1301 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1305 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1307 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1308 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1312 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1313 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1314 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1317 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1318 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1319 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1320 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1322 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1323 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1324 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1325 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1326 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1327 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1328 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1329 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1331 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1333 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1336 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1343 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1347 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1348 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1349 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1350 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1353 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1354 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1355 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1359 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1360 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1363 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1365 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1369 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1371 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1374 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1378 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1383 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1385 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1386 * this will need to be updated.
1388 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1389 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1393 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1397 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1399 return SSL_PKEY_ED25519;
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1402 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1403 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1405 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1406 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1408 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1409 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1415 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1416 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1418 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1421 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1422 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
1424 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1425 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1427 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1428 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu->sig) == -1)
1430 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1431 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1432 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1433 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1434 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1435 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1439 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1440 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1444 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1446 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1447 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1448 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1450 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1451 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1452 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1454 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1455 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1456 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1462 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1463 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1465 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1471 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1477 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1484 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1486 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1488 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1491 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1492 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1497 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1498 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1500 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1502 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1505 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1506 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1508 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1509 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1510 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1511 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1519 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1520 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1521 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1522 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1524 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1525 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1526 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1527 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1529 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1530 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1532 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1533 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1544 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1545 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1547 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1548 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1550 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1552 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1554 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1555 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1556 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1557 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1558 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1559 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1560 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1561 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1562 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1563 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1565 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1566 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1569 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1570 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1574 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1575 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1577 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1579 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1582 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1586 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1587 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1591 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1593 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1599 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1600 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1602 /* Should never happen */
1606 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1608 /* Invalid data length */
1609 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1614 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1615 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1616 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1617 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1619 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1620 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1621 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1629 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1632 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1635 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1638 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1641 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1642 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1643 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1645 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1646 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1648 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1649 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig) != -1)
1650 pvalid[sigptr->sig_idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1655 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1656 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1657 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1659 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1660 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1661 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1664 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1666 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1670 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1672 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1673 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1675 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1677 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1678 if (psignhash != NULL)
1679 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1681 return (int)numsigalgs;
1684 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1685 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1686 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1688 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1689 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1691 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1692 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1694 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1696 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1698 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1699 if (psignhash != NULL)
1700 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1702 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1704 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1705 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1708 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1709 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1713 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1716 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1718 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1719 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1720 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1721 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1722 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1723 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1724 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1725 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1727 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1728 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1729 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1732 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1733 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1735 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1737 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1739 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1740 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1743 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1745 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1747 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1749 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1750 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1752 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1754 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1756 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1767 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1768 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1771 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1774 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1775 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1778 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1779 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1784 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1785 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1787 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1791 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1795 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1798 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1800 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1805 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1806 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1808 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1810 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1811 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1812 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1814 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1816 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1817 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1822 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1827 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1828 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1829 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1831 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1832 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1833 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1839 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1843 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1847 if (default_nid == -1)
1849 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1851 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1852 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1853 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1858 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1859 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1863 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1864 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1865 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1872 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1873 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1874 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1875 * attempting to use them.
1878 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1880 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1881 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1882 /* Strict mode flags */
1883 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1884 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1885 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1887 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1892 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1893 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1896 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1897 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1899 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1902 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1904 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1905 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1907 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1909 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1910 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1916 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1919 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1921 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1924 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1931 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1932 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1933 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1935 else if (!check_flags)
1940 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1941 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1943 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1946 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1948 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1952 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1953 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1956 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1957 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1958 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1962 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1963 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1966 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1967 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1968 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1971 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1972 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1973 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1976 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1977 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1978 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1987 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1988 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1990 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1992 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1993 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1994 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1996 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1999 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2006 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2007 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2013 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2014 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2016 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2023 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2024 else if (check_flags)
2025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2027 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2028 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2030 else if (!check_flags)
2033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2034 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2035 else if (strict_mode) {
2036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2037 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2038 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2039 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2041 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2048 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2049 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2051 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2053 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2056 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2059 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2063 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2066 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2067 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2072 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2078 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2089 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2096 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2101 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2106 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2107 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2119 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2120 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2127 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2128 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2138 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2139 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2141 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2145 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2147 int dh_secbits = 80;
2148 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2149 return DH_get_1024_160();
2150 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2151 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2156 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2158 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2161 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2169 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2170 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2172 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2173 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2181 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2182 return DH_get_2048_224();
2183 return DH_get_1024_160();
2187 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2190 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2193 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2194 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2195 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2196 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2198 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2201 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2203 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2206 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2208 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2209 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2210 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2211 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2213 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2215 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2216 if (nid == NID_undef)
2219 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2221 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2224 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2227 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2229 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2230 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2232 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2233 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2235 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2236 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2241 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2242 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2243 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2246 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2248 int rv, start_idx, i;
2250 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2255 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2259 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2260 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2261 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2269 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2270 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2272 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2273 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2275 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2276 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2277 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2279 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2282 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2284 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2285 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2287 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2290 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2293 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2294 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2295 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2297 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2298 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2299 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2300 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2301 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2303 if (ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
2306 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2308 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2311 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2313 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2314 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2315 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2318 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2326 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2329 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2331 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2336 /* Find index corresponding to ciphersuite */
2337 idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
2338 /* If no certificate for ciphersuite return */
2341 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
2342 /* Work out which GOST certificate is available */
2343 if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
2344 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
2345 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
2346 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
2347 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
2348 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2352 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2356 } else if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) {
2359 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2364 /* Find index for client certificate */
2365 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2366 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2370 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2371 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2376 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2377 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2378 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2379 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2386 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2389 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2390 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2391 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2392 if (lu->sig_idx == idx)
2395 if (lu->sig_idx == idx
2396 && (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve))
2399 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
2402 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2405 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2411 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2413 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2414 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2416 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2419 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2425 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2426 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2427 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2430 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2434 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2439 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2442 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
2456 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2457 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;