2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
28 #include "ssl_local.h"
29 #include <openssl/ct.h>
31 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
32 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
34 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
38 tls1_generate_master_secret,
39 tls1_change_cipher_state,
40 tls1_final_finish_mac,
41 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 tls1_export_keying_material,
46 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47 tls_close_construct_packet,
51 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
55 tls1_generate_master_secret,
56 tls1_change_cipher_state,
57 tls1_final_finish_mac,
58 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
61 tls1_export_keying_material,
62 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 tls_close_construct_packet,
68 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
72 tls1_generate_master_secret,
73 tls1_change_cipher_state,
74 tls1_final_finish_mac,
75 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 tls1_export_keying_material,
79 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
80 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
81 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
82 tls_close_construct_packet,
86 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
89 tls13_setup_key_block,
90 tls13_generate_master_secret,
91 tls13_change_cipher_state,
92 tls13_final_finish_mac,
93 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
96 tls13_export_keying_material,
97 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
98 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
99 tls_close_construct_packet,
103 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
106 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
107 * http, the cache would over fill
109 return (60 * 60 * 2);
116 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
122 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
124 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
128 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
133 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
134 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
136 s->version = s->method->version;
141 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
142 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
147 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
148 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
149 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
150 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
151 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
152 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
153 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
154 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
155 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
156 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
157 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
158 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
159 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
160 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
161 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
162 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
163 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
164 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
165 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
166 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
167 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
168 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
169 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
170 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
171 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
172 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
173 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
174 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
176 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
184 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
185 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
186 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
187 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
188 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
193 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
194 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
198 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
200 /* The default curves */
201 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
202 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
203 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
204 29, /* X25519 (29) */
205 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
207 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
210 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
211 34, /* GC256A (34) */
212 35, /* GC256B (35) */
213 36, /* GC256C (36) */
214 37, /* GC256D (37) */
215 38, /* GC512A (38) */
216 39, /* GC512B (39) */
217 40, /* GC512C (40) */
219 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
220 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
221 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
222 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
223 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
224 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
227 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
230 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
236 struct provider_group_data_st {
238 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
241 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
242 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
243 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
245 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
246 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
247 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
249 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
250 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
254 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
255 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
257 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
258 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
259 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
261 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
262 (ctx->group_list_max_len
263 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
264 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
266 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
269 ctx->group_list = tmp;
270 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
272 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
273 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
276 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
278 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
279 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
280 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
283 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
284 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
285 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
289 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
290 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
291 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
294 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
295 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
296 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
300 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
301 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
302 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
305 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
307 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
308 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
309 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
312 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
313 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
314 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
318 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
319 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
320 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
324 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
325 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
326 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
330 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
331 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
332 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
336 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
337 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
338 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
342 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
343 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
344 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
348 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
349 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
350 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
354 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
355 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
357 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
358 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
360 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
361 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
362 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
363 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
364 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
365 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
368 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
369 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
370 ctx->group_list_len++;
373 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
377 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
378 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
379 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
380 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
385 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
387 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
390 pgd.provider = provider;
391 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
392 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
395 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
397 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx);
400 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
405 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
407 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(name);
409 if (nid == NID_undef)
410 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name);
411 if (nid == NID_undef)
412 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name);
414 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
415 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
417 && nid == tls1_group_id2nid(ctx->group_list[i].group_id,
419 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
425 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
429 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
430 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
431 return &ctx->group_list[i];
437 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
438 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
446 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
447 * work for groups we don't know about.
449 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
451 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
452 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
454 if (!include_unknown)
456 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
459 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
464 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
465 * work for groups we don't know about.
467 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
469 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
470 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
475 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
478 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
479 * the number of groups supported.
481 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
484 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
485 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
486 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
487 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
488 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
489 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
490 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
493 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
494 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
498 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
499 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
505 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
506 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
507 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
509 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
510 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
517 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
520 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion)
522 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
528 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
529 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
531 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
534 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
535 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
536 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
538 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
540 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
543 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
544 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
545 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
551 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
552 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
554 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
555 unsigned char gtmp[2];
560 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
561 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
562 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
563 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
566 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
567 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
570 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
577 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
578 * if there is no match.
579 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
580 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
581 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
583 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
585 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
586 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
589 /* Can't do anything on client side */
593 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
595 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
596 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
598 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
600 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
601 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
602 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
603 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
604 /* Should never happen */
607 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
611 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
612 * otherwise peer decides.
614 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
615 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
616 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
618 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
619 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
622 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
623 uint16_t id = pref[i];
625 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
626 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
634 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
638 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
639 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
641 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
645 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
646 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
648 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
649 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
650 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
656 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
660 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
661 unsigned long idmask;
663 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
664 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
666 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
667 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
668 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
682 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
685 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
686 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
691 uint16_t gid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
694 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
696 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
703 if (garg->gidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
705 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
707 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
710 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
713 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
714 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
716 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
720 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
721 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
729 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
735 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
738 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
742 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
746 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
747 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
749 const uint16_t *groups;
755 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
756 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
757 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
759 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
760 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
762 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
763 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
766 /* Should never happen */
771 if (check_own_groups) {
772 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
773 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
774 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
778 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
781 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
785 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
786 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
789 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
790 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
791 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
792 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
796 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
800 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
804 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
806 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
807 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
808 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
810 *pformats = ecformats_default;
811 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
813 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
815 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
819 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
820 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
824 unsigned char comp_id;
827 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
828 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
830 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
831 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
833 /* Get required compression id */
834 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
835 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
836 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
838 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
843 int field_type = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp);
845 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
846 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
847 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
848 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
853 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
854 * supported (see RFC4492).
856 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
859 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
860 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
866 /* Return group id of a key */
867 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
869 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
871 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
873 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
877 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
878 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
880 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
884 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
887 /* If not EC nothing to do */
888 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
890 /* Check compression */
891 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
893 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
895 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
898 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
901 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
904 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
908 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
909 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
910 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
911 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
912 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
914 return 0; /* Should never happen */
915 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
916 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
925 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
927 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
929 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
930 * is compatible with the client extensions.
932 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
934 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
936 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
938 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
940 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
943 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
944 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
945 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
946 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
953 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
958 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
960 /* Default sigalg schemes */
961 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
964 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
965 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
966 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
971 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
972 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
973 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
983 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1005 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1007 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1011 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1013 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1014 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1015 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1016 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1017 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1018 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1019 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1020 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1021 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1022 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1023 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1024 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1025 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1026 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1027 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1028 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1029 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1030 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1031 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1032 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1033 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1035 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1036 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1037 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1038 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1039 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1040 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1041 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1042 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1043 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1044 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1045 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1046 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1047 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1048 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1049 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1050 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1051 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1052 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1053 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1054 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1055 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1056 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1057 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1058 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1059 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1060 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1061 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1062 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1063 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1064 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1065 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1066 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1067 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1069 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1070 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1071 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1072 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1073 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1074 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1076 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1077 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1079 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1080 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1082 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1083 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1086 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1087 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1088 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1089 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1091 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1092 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1093 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1094 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1095 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1096 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1097 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1098 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1099 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1100 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1101 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1103 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1104 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1108 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1109 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1110 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1111 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1112 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1117 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1118 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1120 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1121 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1122 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1123 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1124 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1125 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1126 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1128 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1129 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1132 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1135 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1136 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1137 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1138 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1141 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1145 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1146 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1152 * Check hash is available.
1153 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1154 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1155 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1156 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1157 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1159 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1160 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1161 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1165 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1166 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1169 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1170 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1172 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1173 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1176 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1181 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1182 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1186 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1187 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1190 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1192 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1193 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1194 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1196 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg)
1201 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1202 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1207 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1208 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1211 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1221 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1223 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1224 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1225 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1227 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1228 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1235 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1237 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1243 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1244 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1245 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1246 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1247 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1249 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1255 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1256 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1257 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1259 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1266 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1268 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1271 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1273 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1280 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1281 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1283 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1286 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1288 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1295 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1298 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1300 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1301 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1303 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1305 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1309 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1311 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1313 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1314 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1317 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1319 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1321 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1324 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1328 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1331 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1335 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1336 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1337 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1338 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1340 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1341 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1345 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1350 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1351 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1352 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1354 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1355 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1356 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1357 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1358 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1359 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1361 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1362 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1368 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1369 * specified EC curve.
1371 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1373 const uint16_t *sigs;
1376 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1377 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1378 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1380 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1381 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1384 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1385 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1389 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1390 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1391 && curve == lu->curve)
1400 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1403 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1405 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1408 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1412 int md_type = EVP_MD_type(md);
1414 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1415 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1417 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1418 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1419 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1421 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1422 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1423 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1424 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1426 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1428 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1430 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1433 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1434 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1436 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1443 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1444 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1447 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1449 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1450 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1452 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1454 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1457 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1458 /* Should never happen */
1461 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1462 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1463 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1465 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1468 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1469 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1470 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1472 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1474 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1475 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1478 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1479 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1480 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1482 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1485 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1486 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1487 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1489 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1494 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1496 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1497 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1499 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1500 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1504 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1505 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1506 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1508 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1510 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1514 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1515 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1516 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1518 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1521 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1522 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1523 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1524 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1526 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1527 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1532 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1534 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1539 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1540 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1541 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1542 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1545 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1546 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1547 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1549 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1552 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1554 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1558 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1559 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1561 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1562 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1563 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1565 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1566 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1567 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1569 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1572 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1573 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1577 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1579 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1581 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1585 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1587 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1589 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1594 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1595 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1596 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1598 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1601 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1603 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1605 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1606 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1607 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1608 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1609 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1612 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1613 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1614 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1615 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1617 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1619 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1620 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1621 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1628 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1629 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1630 * @c: cipher to check
1631 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1632 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1634 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1636 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1638 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1639 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1641 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1643 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1644 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1647 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1648 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1650 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1651 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1652 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1654 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1657 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1658 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1661 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1664 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1666 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1668 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1671 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1675 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1676 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1677 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1678 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1679 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1680 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1681 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1683 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1684 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1686 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1687 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1688 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1689 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1691 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1692 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1697 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1698 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1699 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1700 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1708 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1710 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1713 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1716 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1718 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1723 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1725 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1726 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1727 * point to the resulting session.
1729 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1733 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1736 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1739 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1740 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1743 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1744 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1746 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1747 if (!ticketext->present)
1748 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1750 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1752 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1753 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1757 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1759 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1760 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1761 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1762 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1765 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1766 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1767 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1768 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1769 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1770 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1772 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1773 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1774 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1775 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1776 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1777 * point to the resulting session.
1779 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1780 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1781 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1783 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1784 unsigned char *sdec;
1785 const unsigned char *p;
1786 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1787 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1789 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1790 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1791 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1792 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1794 if (eticklen == 0) {
1796 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1797 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1799 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1802 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1804 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1805 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1806 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1807 * calculate the master secret later.
1809 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1813 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1814 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1815 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1819 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1820 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1822 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1825 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1827 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1831 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1833 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1836 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1839 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1840 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1841 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1843 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1846 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1847 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1848 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1849 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1850 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1853 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1857 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1863 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1865 /* Check key name matches */
1866 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1867 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1868 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1872 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1874 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1875 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1876 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1878 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1879 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1880 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1881 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1882 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1885 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1886 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1890 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1893 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1895 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1899 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1901 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1902 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1906 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1907 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1908 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1909 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1913 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1914 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1917 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1918 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1919 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1920 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1921 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1922 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1923 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1925 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1928 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1930 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1936 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1940 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1942 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1944 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1948 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1949 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1950 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1954 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1955 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1958 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1960 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1965 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1967 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1970 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1971 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1974 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1975 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1976 * performs any action
1978 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1979 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1980 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1981 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1982 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1983 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1986 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1987 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1988 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1990 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1992 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1993 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1996 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1997 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1998 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2002 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2003 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2004 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2005 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2006 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2010 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2011 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2012 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2013 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2014 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2015 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2016 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2018 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2022 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2026 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2028 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2029 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2030 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2031 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2040 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2041 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2043 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2046 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2048 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2049 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2051 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2052 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2053 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2054 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2055 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2058 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2059 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
2062 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2063 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2064 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2065 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2066 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2069 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2070 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2072 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2075 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2076 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2077 * ciphersuites enabled.
2080 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2083 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2084 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2085 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2086 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2088 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2089 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2090 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2093 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2101 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2102 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2103 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2104 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2105 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2109 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2110 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2114 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2116 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2117 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2118 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2120 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2123 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2124 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2125 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2126 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2131 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2135 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2136 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2137 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2138 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2140 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2143 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2144 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2149 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2150 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2152 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2154 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2157 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2158 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2160 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2161 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2162 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2163 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2171 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2172 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2173 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2174 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2176 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2177 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2178 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2179 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2181 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2182 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2184 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2185 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2196 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2197 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2199 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2200 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2202 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2204 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2206 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2207 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2208 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2209 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2210 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2211 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2212 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2213 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2214 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2215 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2217 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2218 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2221 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2222 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2226 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2227 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2229 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2231 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2235 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2239 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2240 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2244 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2250 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2252 /* Invalid data length */
2253 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2258 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2262 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2270 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2277 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2279 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2280 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2282 /* Should never happen */
2283 if (s->cert == NULL)
2287 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2288 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2290 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2291 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2295 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2297 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2300 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2302 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2305 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2308 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2309 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2310 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2312 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2313 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2315 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2316 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2317 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2322 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2323 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2324 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2326 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2327 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2328 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2331 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2333 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2337 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2339 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2340 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2342 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2344 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2345 if (psignhash != NULL)
2346 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2348 return (int)numsigalgs;
2351 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2352 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2353 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2355 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2356 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2358 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2359 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2361 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2363 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2365 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2366 if (psignhash != NULL)
2367 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2369 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2371 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2372 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2375 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2376 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2380 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2381 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2384 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2386 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2387 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2388 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2389 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2390 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2391 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2392 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2393 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2395 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2396 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2397 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2400 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2401 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2403 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2405 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2407 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2408 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2409 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2412 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2414 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2416 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2418 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2420 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2421 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2422 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2423 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2424 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2425 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2429 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2431 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2432 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2436 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2443 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2444 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2445 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2447 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2449 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2450 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2454 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2458 /* Reject duplicates */
2459 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2460 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2469 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2470 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2472 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2476 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2480 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2483 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2488 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2492 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2495 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2496 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2497 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2499 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2500 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2501 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2507 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2509 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2514 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2518 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2520 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2521 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2522 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2524 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2526 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2527 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2532 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2537 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2538 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2539 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2541 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2542 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2543 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2549 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2553 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2555 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2557 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2559 if (default_nid == -1)
2561 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2563 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2565 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2567 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2568 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2569 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2571 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2574 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2576 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2577 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2578 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2579 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2580 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2586 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2587 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2589 const X509_NAME *nm;
2591 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2592 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2593 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2600 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2601 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2602 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2603 * attempting to use them.
2606 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2608 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2609 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2610 /* Strict mode flags */
2611 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2612 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2613 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2615 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2620 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2621 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2624 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2625 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2627 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2630 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2632 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2633 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2635 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2637 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2638 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2647 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2650 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2652 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2653 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2655 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2662 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2663 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2664 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2665 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2666 else if (!check_flags)
2671 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2672 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2674 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2677 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2678 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2680 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2684 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2685 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2688 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2689 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2690 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2694 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2695 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2698 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2699 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2700 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2703 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2704 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2705 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2708 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2709 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2710 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2719 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2720 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2722 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2724 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2725 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2726 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2728 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2731 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2738 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2739 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2741 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2742 * so check_flags is always set.
2744 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2745 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2746 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2750 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2751 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2752 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2753 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2755 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2762 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2763 else if (check_flags)
2764 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2766 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2767 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2768 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2769 else if (!check_flags)
2772 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2773 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2774 else if (strict_mode) {
2775 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2776 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2777 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2778 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2780 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2787 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2788 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2791 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2792 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2793 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2794 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2795 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2796 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2799 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2802 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2803 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2804 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2808 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2811 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2814 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2816 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2817 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2819 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2820 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2821 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2823 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2824 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2825 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2826 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2832 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2835 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2837 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2838 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2842 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2843 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2845 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2848 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2852 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2855 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2856 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2863 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2864 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2866 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2867 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2868 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2869 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2870 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2871 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2872 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2873 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2874 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2877 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2878 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2880 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2884 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2888 int dh_secbits = 80;
2889 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2890 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2891 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2896 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2898 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2906 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2911 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2912 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2913 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2914 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2915 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2916 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2917 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2918 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2920 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2921 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2931 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2934 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2937 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2938 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2939 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2940 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2942 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2945 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2947 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2950 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2952 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2953 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2954 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2955 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2957 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2959 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2960 if (nid == NID_undef)
2963 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2965 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2968 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2971 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2973 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2974 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2976 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2977 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2979 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2980 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2985 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2986 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2987 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2990 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2992 int rv, start_idx, i;
2994 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2999 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3003 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3004 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3005 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3013 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3014 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3017 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3019 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3020 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3022 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3024 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3025 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3026 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3029 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3033 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3034 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3036 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3038 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3041 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3042 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3046 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3047 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3050 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
3056 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3057 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3059 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3060 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3062 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3063 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3068 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3069 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3070 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3071 * signing certificate.
3073 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3080 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3081 * a viable public key is permitted.
3087 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3088 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3089 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3090 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3091 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3093 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3095 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3098 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3101 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3102 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3106 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3107 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3109 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3114 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3117 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3118 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3121 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3125 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3126 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3127 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3129 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3131 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3138 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3139 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3140 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3142 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3143 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3144 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3145 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3146 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3148 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3149 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3151 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3152 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3155 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3156 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3158 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3161 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3162 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3167 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3168 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3169 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3175 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3182 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3183 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3185 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3186 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3188 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3189 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3190 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3192 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3194 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3197 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3198 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3200 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3201 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3206 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3210 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3211 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3213 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3216 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3218 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3222 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3225 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3230 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3233 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3234 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3237 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3240 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3242 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3243 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3246 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3247 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3249 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3250 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3251 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3253 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3257 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3263 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3264 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3265 * we have to assume GOST support.
3267 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3268 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3272 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3273 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3277 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3281 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3285 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3286 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3291 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3293 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3294 size_t sent_sigslen;
3296 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3300 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3304 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3305 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3306 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3307 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3308 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3311 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3315 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3316 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3321 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3325 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3331 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3332 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3333 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3334 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3338 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3340 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3341 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3343 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3347 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3351 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3353 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3354 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3356 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3360 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3364 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3366 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3370 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3372 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3374 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3375 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3380 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3381 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3382 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3383 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3388 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3389 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3394 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3400 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3403 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3405 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3412 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3414 return ctx->old_ctx;
3418 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3423 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3425 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3427 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3428 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3429 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3430 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3431 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3435 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3436 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3437 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3442 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3444 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3445 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3447 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3448 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3453 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3456 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3457 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3459 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3462 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3472 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3474 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3475 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3477 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3478 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);