2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
590 unsigned long idmask;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
609 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
642 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
654 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
707 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
726 if (i == num_formats)
731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
751 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
772 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
775 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
832 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
833 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
891 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
898 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
902 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
911 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
915 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
918 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
924 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
930 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
933 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
938 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
952 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
957 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
995 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
998 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1091 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1097 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1109 * signature algorithms.
1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1142 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1150 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1157 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1225 /* check for enough space.
1226 4 for the servername type and entension length
1227 2 for servernamelist length
1228 1 for the hostname type
1229 2 for hostname length
1233 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1234 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1237 /* extension type and length */
1238 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1239 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1241 /* length of servername list */
1242 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1244 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1247 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1252 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1253 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1254 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1256 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1257 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 /* check for enough space.
1264 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1265 1 for the srp user identity
1266 + srp user identity length
1268 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1270 /* fill in the extension */
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1272 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1273 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1274 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1282 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1284 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1285 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1287 unsigned char *etmp;
1289 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1291 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1292 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1293 if (num_formats > 255)
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1300 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1301 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1302 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1303 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1306 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1307 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1308 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1311 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1312 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1313 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1322 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1323 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1325 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1327 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1328 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1332 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1334 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1335 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1336 ret += curves_list_len;
1338 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1340 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1343 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1344 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1345 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1346 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1348 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1349 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1350 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1352 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1353 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1355 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1359 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1360 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1362 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1365 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1366 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1370 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1376 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1379 const unsigned char *salg;
1380 unsigned char *etmp;
1381 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1382 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1386 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1388 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1389 /* Fill in lengths */
1390 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1395 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1396 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1398 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1400 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1402 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1405 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1408 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1413 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1416 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1420 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1422 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1423 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1429 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1431 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1438 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1440 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1442 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1443 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1445 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1447 /* save position of id len */
1448 unsigned char *q = ret;
1449 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1450 /* skip over id len */
1452 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1458 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1462 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1463 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1465 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1468 * 1: peer may send requests
1469 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1471 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1472 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1474 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1478 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1480 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1481 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1482 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1489 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1491 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1494 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1495 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1496 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1497 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1498 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1501 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1505 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1507 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1512 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1520 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1521 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1523 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1524 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1528 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1529 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1531 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1532 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1534 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1536 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1537 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1538 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1539 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1541 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1543 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1545 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1553 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1560 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1563 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1567 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1570 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1571 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1573 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1576 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1578 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1579 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1583 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1585 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1589 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1600 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1610 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1613 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1624 const unsigned char *plist;
1626 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1629 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1631 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1632 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1640 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1641 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1642 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1646 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1647 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1649 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1651 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1656 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1658 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1663 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1664 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1666 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1668 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1670 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1676 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1681 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1685 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1687 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1692 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1701 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1702 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1703 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1704 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1705 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1706 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1707 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1708 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1709 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1710 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1716 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1717 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1719 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1721 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1724 * 1: peer may send requests
1725 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1727 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1728 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1730 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1736 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1737 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1738 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1740 const unsigned char *npa;
1741 unsigned int npalen;
1744 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1745 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1747 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1748 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1750 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1752 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1756 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1758 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1759 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1761 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1762 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1764 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1765 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1766 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1769 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1775 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1777 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1778 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1780 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1782 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1786 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1792 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1795 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1799 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1801 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1802 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1803 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1806 * returns: 0 on success. */
1807 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1808 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1812 const unsigned char *selected;
1813 unsigned char selected_len;
1816 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1822 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1823 * length-prefixed strings. */
1824 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1825 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1834 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1836 proto_len = data[i];
1842 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1848 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1849 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1851 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1852 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1853 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1854 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1871 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1872 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1877 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1878 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1879 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1880 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1882 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1883 unsigned short type, size;
1884 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1885 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1886 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1887 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1888 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1889 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1890 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1892 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1893 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1894 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1895 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1898 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1899 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1900 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1901 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1902 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1903 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1904 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1905 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1906 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1907 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1910 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1919 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1922 if (data+size > d+n)
1926 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1928 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1929 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1931 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1933 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1935 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1940 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1942 if (data + len != d+n)
1944 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1948 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1950 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1953 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1955 unsigned short type;
1956 unsigned short size;
1958 unsigned char *data = *p;
1959 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1961 s->servername_done = 0;
1962 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1964 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1967 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1970 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1974 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1975 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1979 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1980 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1981 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1983 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1984 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1986 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1987 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1990 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1991 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1994 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1998 if (data > (d+n-len))
2001 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2006 if (data+size > (d+n))
2009 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2011 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2012 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2013 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2014 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2016 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2018 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2020 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2022 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2024 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2025 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2026 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2027 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2028 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2029 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2030 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2031 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2032 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2033 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2034 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2035 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2036 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2037 the value of the Host: field.
2038 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2039 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2040 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2041 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2045 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2047 unsigned char *sdata;
2053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2077 switch (servname_type)
2079 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2082 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2092 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2098 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2099 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2100 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2101 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2102 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2105 s->servername_done = 1;
2109 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2110 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2111 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2131 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2143 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2144 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2146 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2157 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2158 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2160 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2161 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2170 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2174 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2179 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2183 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2184 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2185 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2186 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2187 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2190 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2192 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2193 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2194 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2196 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2197 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2198 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2199 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2201 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2208 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2212 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2214 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2218 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2221 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2222 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2223 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2224 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2225 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2228 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2229 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2232 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2249 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2252 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2254 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2261 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2262 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2271 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2300 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2302 const unsigned char *sdata;
2304 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2344 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2345 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2346 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2348 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2349 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2352 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2353 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2355 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2356 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2361 /* Read in request_extensions */
2364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2379 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2380 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2383 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2384 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2386 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2387 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2389 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2398 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2405 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2406 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2408 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2409 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2410 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2412 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2418 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2419 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2420 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2422 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2425 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2426 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2427 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2428 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2429 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2430 * anything like that, but this might change).
2432 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2433 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2434 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2435 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2436 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2437 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2442 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2443 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2445 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2448 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2449 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2453 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2454 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2455 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2457 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2461 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2462 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2463 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2465 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2466 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2467 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2468 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2469 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2473 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2484 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2486 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2487 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2489 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2491 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2498 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2501 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2502 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2504 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2508 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2517 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2518 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2519 * the length of the block. */
2520 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2522 unsigned int off = 0;
2536 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2538 unsigned short length;
2539 unsigned short type;
2540 unsigned short size;
2541 unsigned char *data = *p;
2542 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2543 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2548 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2550 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2552 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2553 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2557 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2558 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2561 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2562 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2565 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2569 if (data+length != d+n)
2571 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2580 if (data+size > (d+n))
2583 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2584 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2585 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2588 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2590 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2592 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2594 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2596 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2598 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2603 tlsext_servername = 1;
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2609 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2610 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2612 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2619 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2620 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2621 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2627 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2630 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2631 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2632 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2633 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2634 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2637 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2639 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2641 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2642 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2647 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2652 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2654 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2655 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2657 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2661 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2664 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2665 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2667 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2672 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2673 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2674 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2676 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2678 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2687 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2688 * a status request message.
2690 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2695 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2696 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2699 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2700 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2702 unsigned char *selected;
2703 unsigned char selected_len;
2705 /* We must have requested it. */
2706 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2708 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2711 /* The data must be valid */
2712 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2717 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2723 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2725 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2728 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2729 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2730 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2734 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2738 /* We must have requested it. */
2739 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2749 /* The extension data consists of:
2750 * uint16 list_length
2751 * uint8 proto_length;
2752 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2756 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2758 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2762 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2764 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2769 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2770 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2772 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2775 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2776 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2779 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2783 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2784 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2786 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2787 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2788 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2790 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2795 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2797 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2801 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2804 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2805 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2806 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2807 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2810 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2811 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2813 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2825 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2827 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2829 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2831 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2832 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2834 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2850 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2851 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2852 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2853 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2854 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2855 * absence on initial connect only.
2857 if (!renegotiate_seen
2858 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2859 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2861 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2863 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2871 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2874 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2878 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2880 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2885 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2887 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2888 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2890 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2891 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2893 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2894 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2903 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2904 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2911 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2916 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2918 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2919 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2922 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2923 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2925 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2926 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2930 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2931 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2932 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2933 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2935 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2937 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2938 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2939 * so this has to happen here in
2940 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2944 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2946 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2949 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2950 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2956 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2957 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2959 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2961 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2962 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2964 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2965 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2967 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2968 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2971 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2973 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2974 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2977 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2981 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2983 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2984 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2985 * abort the handshake.
2987 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2988 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2996 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2997 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3000 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3001 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3005 s->servername_done=0;
3011 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3015 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3016 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3018 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3019 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3021 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3022 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3024 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3025 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3028 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3029 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3031 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3034 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3039 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3042 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3043 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3048 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3055 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3057 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3060 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3061 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3062 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3063 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3065 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3068 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3069 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3070 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3071 if (certpkey == NULL)
3073 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3076 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3077 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3079 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3080 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3085 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3087 /* status request response should be sent */
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3089 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3090 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3092 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3094 /* something bad happened */
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3096 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3097 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3102 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3107 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3120 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3122 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3123 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3126 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3127 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3128 * it must contain uncompressed.
3130 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3131 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3132 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3133 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3134 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3136 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3138 unsigned char *list;
3139 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3140 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3141 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3143 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3145 found_uncompressed = 1;
3149 if (!found_uncompressed)
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3156 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3158 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3159 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3160 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3161 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3163 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3164 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3166 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3167 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3169 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3172 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3175 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3176 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3178 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3180 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3181 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3186 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3189 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3190 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3193 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3194 * there is no response.
3196 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3198 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3199 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3201 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3202 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3205 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3206 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3217 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3221 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3225 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3226 s->servername_done=0;
3232 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3235 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3237 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3239 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3243 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3251 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3252 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3253 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3255 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3256 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3257 * extension, if any.
3258 * len: the length of the session ID.
3259 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3260 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3261 * point to the resulting session.
3263 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3264 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3265 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3268 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3269 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3270 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3271 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3272 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3273 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3274 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3277 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3278 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3279 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3280 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3281 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3282 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3284 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3285 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3287 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3288 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3292 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3294 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3295 * to permit stateful resumption.
3297 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3299 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3303 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3311 /* Skip past cipher list */
3316 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3321 /* Now at start of extensions */
3322 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3325 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3327 unsigned short type, size;
3330 if (p + size > limit)
3332 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3337 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3338 * currently have one. */
3339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3342 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3344 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3345 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3346 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3347 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3348 * calculate the master secret later. */
3351 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3354 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3357 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3359 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3362 default: /* fatal error */
3371 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3373 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3374 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3375 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3376 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3377 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3378 * point to the resulting session.
3381 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3382 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3383 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3384 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3386 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3387 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3388 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3391 unsigned char *sdec;
3392 const unsigned char *p;
3393 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3394 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3397 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3398 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3401 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3402 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3404 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3406 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3407 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3418 /* Check key name matches */
3419 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3421 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3422 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3423 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3424 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3426 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3427 * integrity checks on ticket.
3429 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3432 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3437 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3438 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3439 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3440 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3442 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3445 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3446 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3447 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3448 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3449 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3452 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3455 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3456 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3470 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3471 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3472 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3473 * as required by standard.
3476 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3477 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3485 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3490 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3498 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3499 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3500 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3501 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3502 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3503 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3504 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3507 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3508 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3509 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3510 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3513 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3516 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3518 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3524 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3527 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3529 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3530 return table[i].nid;
3535 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3540 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3541 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3544 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3547 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3548 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3552 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3554 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3555 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3562 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3565 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3566 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3569 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3571 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3574 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3576 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3577 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3578 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3580 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3581 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3583 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3584 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3585 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3587 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3588 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3592 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3596 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3598 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3601 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3603 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3604 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3606 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3607 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3609 return inf->mfunc();
3612 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3617 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3618 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3621 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3622 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3626 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3632 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3633 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3634 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3636 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3637 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3639 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3641 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3642 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3644 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3646 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3648 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3649 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3651 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3655 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3656 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3657 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3659 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3662 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3663 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3665 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3666 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3667 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3669 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3670 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3672 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3673 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3676 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3677 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3678 * then RSA is disabled.
3681 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3683 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3684 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3685 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3686 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3687 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3688 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3691 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3692 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3697 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3698 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3703 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3704 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3709 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3710 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3717 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3719 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3721 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3724 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3725 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3727 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3729 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3731 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3733 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3734 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3737 return tmpout - out;
3740 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3741 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3742 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3743 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3745 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3746 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3747 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3749 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3750 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3752 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3754 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3759 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3760 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3761 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3763 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3774 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3775 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3777 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3778 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3780 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3782 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3783 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3785 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3786 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3788 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3789 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3791 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3792 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3794 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3796 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3797 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3800 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3801 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3805 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3806 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3812 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3813 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3815 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3818 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3821 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3822 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3823 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3828 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3830 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3833 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3834 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3836 /* Should never happen */
3840 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3841 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3842 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3843 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3845 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3846 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3850 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3856 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3857 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3860 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3861 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3863 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3864 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3866 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3868 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3870 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3873 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3874 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3875 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3876 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3877 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3879 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3880 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3886 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3887 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3889 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3890 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3892 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3893 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3894 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3895 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3897 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3898 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3903 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3904 * use the certificate for signing.
3906 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3908 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3909 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3912 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3913 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3916 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3918 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3919 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3923 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3924 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3931 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3932 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3933 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3935 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3941 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3948 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3950 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3953 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3954 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3955 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3957 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3958 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3962 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3964 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3966 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3968 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3970 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3971 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3977 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3979 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3980 unsigned short hbtype;
3981 unsigned int payload;
3982 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3984 if (s->msg_callback)
3985 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3986 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3987 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3989 /* Read type and payload length first */
3990 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3991 return 0; /* silently discard */
3994 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3995 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3998 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4000 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4003 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4004 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4005 * payload, plus padding
4007 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4015 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4016 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4018 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4020 /* Random padding */
4021 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4023 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4025 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4026 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4027 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4028 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4030 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4035 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4039 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4040 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4041 * sequence number */
4044 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4047 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4055 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4057 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4059 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4060 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4062 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4063 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4064 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4070 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4071 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4077 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4078 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4084 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4085 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4087 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4089 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4090 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4091 * some random stuff.
4092 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4093 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4094 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4095 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4098 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4106 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4107 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4109 /* Sequence number */
4110 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4111 /* 16 random bytes */
4112 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4114 /* Random padding */
4115 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4117 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4120 if (s->msg_callback)
4121 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4122 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4123 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4125 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4134 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4139 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4142 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4144 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4147 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4148 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4150 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4152 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4154 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4162 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4163 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4164 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4165 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4166 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4167 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4170 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4171 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4172 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4173 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4176 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4178 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4179 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4182 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4183 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4187 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4188 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4189 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4193 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4197 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4200 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4202 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4207 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4208 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4210 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4212 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4213 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4214 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4215 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4217 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4225 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4226 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4227 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4228 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4232 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4233 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4234 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4235 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4241 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4245 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4249 if (default_nid == -1)
4251 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4253 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4254 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4255 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4259 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4260 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4264 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4265 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4267 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4273 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4274 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4275 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4276 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4279 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4281 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4282 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4283 /* Strict mode flags */
4284 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4285 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4286 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4288 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4293 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4294 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4296 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4297 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4300 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4304 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4307 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4309 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4311 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4312 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4315 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4316 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4317 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4319 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4320 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4329 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4332 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4333 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4334 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4336 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4344 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4345 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4346 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4348 else if (!check_flags)
4352 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4353 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4356 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4359 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4360 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4362 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4367 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4368 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4369 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4370 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4371 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4374 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4375 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4376 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4377 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4381 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4382 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4390 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4391 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4394 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4397 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4398 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4400 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4403 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4411 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4412 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4414 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4418 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4419 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4421 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4426 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4434 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4435 else if(check_flags)
4436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4438 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4439 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4441 else if (!check_flags)
4444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4445 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4446 else if (strict_mode)
4448 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4449 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4451 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4452 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4456 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4464 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4466 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4471 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4474 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4477 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4482 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4483 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4484 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4485 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4486 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4491 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4496 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4500 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4501 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4503 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4505 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4511 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4515 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4518 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4520 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4523 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4525 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4526 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4528 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4530 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4532 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4533 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4540 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4544 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4546 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4547 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4551 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4553 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4554 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4555 else if (cpk->digest)
4556 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4559 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4561 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4562 * if the chain is invalid.
4566 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4567 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4570 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4571 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4578 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4579 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4581 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4582 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4583 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4584 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4585 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4586 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4588 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4589 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4591 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4597 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4599 int dh_secbits = 80;
4600 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4601 return DH_get_1024_160();
4602 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4604 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4611 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4612 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4615 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4622 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4623 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4624 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4626 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4627 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4634 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4635 return DH_get_2048_224();
4636 return DH_get_1024_160();
4640 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4643 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4646 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4647 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4652 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4654 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4657 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4659 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4660 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4661 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4662 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4665 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4666 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4669 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4671 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4674 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4677 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4680 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4681 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4685 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4686 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4688 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4689 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4693 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4694 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4695 * not sending one to the peer.
4696 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4699 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4701 int rv, start_idx, i;
4704 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4710 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4714 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4716 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4717 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);