2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
626 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
628 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
630 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
633 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
636 /* If not EC nothing to do */
637 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
642 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
646 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
647 * supported curves extension.
649 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
652 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
653 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
655 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
662 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
663 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
664 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
665 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
668 return 0; /* Should never happen */
669 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
670 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
672 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
676 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
677 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
679 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
684 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
689 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
690 * no other curves permitted.
694 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
695 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
696 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
697 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
702 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
703 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
705 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
706 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
708 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
711 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
714 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
716 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
722 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
724 /* Need a shared curve */
725 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
731 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
736 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
738 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
742 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
746 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
750 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
751 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
755 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
757 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
760 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
761 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
763 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
766 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
767 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
769 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
772 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
773 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
774 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
775 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
777 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
779 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
780 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
783 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
784 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
787 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
790 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
794 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
795 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
796 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
799 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
801 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
804 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
807 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
808 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
810 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
811 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
814 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
815 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
819 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
820 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
822 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
823 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
825 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
827 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
828 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
832 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
834 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
836 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
839 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
842 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
843 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
845 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
846 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
848 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
849 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
850 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
851 /* Should never happen */
854 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
855 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
862 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
863 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
864 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
866 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
868 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
873 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
875 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
878 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
882 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
884 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
887 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
895 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
898 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
899 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
900 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
902 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
905 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
906 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
911 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
919 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
920 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
921 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
922 * session and not global settings.
925 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
928 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
929 size_t i, sigalgslen;
930 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
933 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
934 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
935 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
938 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
939 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
942 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
943 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
948 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
953 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
958 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
964 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
965 * signature algorithms.
969 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
970 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
974 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
975 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
979 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
980 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
983 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
985 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
986 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
990 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
991 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
993 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
994 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
996 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1000 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1001 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1003 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1004 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1013 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1016 unsigned char *ret = p;
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1020 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1028 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1030 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1031 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1032 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1033 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1042 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1043 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1044 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1049 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1051 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1053 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1054 unsigned long size_str;
1057 /* check for enough space.
1058 4 for the servername type and entension length
1059 2 for servernamelist length
1060 1 for the hostname type
1061 2 for hostname length
1065 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1066 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1069 /* extension type and length */
1070 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1071 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1073 /* length of servername list */
1074 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1076 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1077 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1079 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1083 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1088 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1096 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1099 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1109 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1110 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1111 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1113 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1114 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 /* check for enough space.
1121 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1122 1 for the srp user identity
1123 + srp user identity length
1125 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1127 /* fill in the extension */
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1129 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1130 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1131 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1139 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1141 const unsigned char *plist;
1143 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
1145 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1147 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1150 plist = ecformats_default;
1151 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1155 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1163 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1164 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1165 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1168 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1169 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1170 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1172 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1173 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1174 if (plistlen > 65532)
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1181 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1183 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1184 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1185 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1186 * resolves this to two bytes.
1189 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1192 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1194 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1197 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1198 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1199 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1200 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1202 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1203 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1204 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1207 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1209 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1213 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1214 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1216 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1219 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1224 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1230 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1233 const unsigned char *salg;
1234 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1235 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1237 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1238 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1240 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1244 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1246 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1248 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1250 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1252 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1255 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1258 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1263 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1264 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1267 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1271 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1273 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1274 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1280 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1282 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1289 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1291 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1293 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1294 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1296 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1298 /* save position of id len */
1299 unsigned char *q = ret;
1300 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1301 /* skip over id len */
1303 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1309 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1313 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1317 * 1: peer may send requests
1318 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1320 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1321 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1323 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1327 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1329 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1330 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1331 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1338 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1342 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1344 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1346 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1349 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1358 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1359 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1360 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1361 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1362 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1365 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1366 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1368 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1371 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1373 *(ret++) = list_len;
1374 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1377 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1384 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1387 unsigned char *ret = p;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1389 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1392 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1393 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1397 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1399 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1401 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1407 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1411 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1417 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1422 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1432 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1433 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1435 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1438 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1439 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1440 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1447 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1448 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1449 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1450 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1453 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1456 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1457 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1459 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1464 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1466 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1472 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1473 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1475 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1477 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1479 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1485 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1494 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1496 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1501 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1509 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1510 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1511 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1512 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1513 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1514 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1515 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1516 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1517 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1518 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1519 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1525 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1526 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1531 * 1: peer may send requests
1532 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1534 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1535 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1537 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1543 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1544 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1545 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1547 const unsigned char *npa;
1548 unsigned int npalen;
1551 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1552 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1554 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1557 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1559 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1564 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1566 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1568 size_t authz_length;
1569 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1570 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1571 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1572 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1573 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1575 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1577 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1578 * uint8_t authz_type
1580 * uint8_t data[length]
1582 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1583 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1585 unsigned short length;
1589 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1591 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1595 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1603 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1604 * 2 bytes for extension type
1605 * 2 bytes for extension length
1606 * 1 byte for the list length
1607 * n bytes for the list */
1608 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1613 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1614 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1618 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1620 unsigned short length;
1625 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1627 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1630 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1637 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1644 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1646 unsigned short type;
1647 unsigned short size;
1649 unsigned char *data = *p;
1650 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1653 s->servername_done = 0;
1654 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1656 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1661 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1663 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1664 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1666 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1667 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1669 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1670 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1672 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1673 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1675 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1676 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1678 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1679 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1682 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1686 if (data > (d+n-len))
1689 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1694 if (data+size > (d+n))
1697 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1699 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1700 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1701 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1702 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1704 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1705 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1706 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1707 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1708 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1709 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1710 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1711 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1712 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1713 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1714 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1715 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1716 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1717 the value of the Host: field.
1718 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1719 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1720 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1721 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1725 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1727 unsigned char *sdata;
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1740 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1747 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1753 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1757 switch (servname_type)
1759 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1762 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1767 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1769 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1772 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1774 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1777 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1778 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1779 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1780 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1781 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1782 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1785 s->servername_done = 1;
1789 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1790 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1791 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1811 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1816 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1821 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1823 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1824 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1826 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1836 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1838 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1839 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1841 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1843 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1848 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1850 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1851 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1853 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1854 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1860 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1863 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1864 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1865 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1866 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1867 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1871 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1873 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1874 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1875 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1877 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1879 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1884 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1886 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1889 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1890 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1892 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1896 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1899 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1900 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1901 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1902 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1903 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1906 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1907 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1908 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1909 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1911 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1918 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1919 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1921 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1925 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1927 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1928 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1930 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1931 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1933 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1940 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1941 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1943 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1949 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1951 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1953 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1956 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1958 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1963 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1976 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1979 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1980 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1984 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1985 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1996 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1998 const unsigned char *sdata;
2000 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2041 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2042 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2044 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2045 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2049 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2051 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2057 /* Read in request_extensions */
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2075 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2076 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2079 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2080 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2082 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2083 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2090 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2094 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2101 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2102 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2104 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2105 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2106 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2108 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2115 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2117 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2120 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2121 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2122 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2123 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2124 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2125 * anything like that, but this might change).
2127 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2128 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2129 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2130 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2131 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2132 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2136 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2137 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2139 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2146 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2147 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2151 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2157 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2159 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2164 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2165 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2168 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2169 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2170 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2171 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2172 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2179 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2180 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2182 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2184 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2185 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2186 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2187 1 /* element size */,
2190 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2193 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2194 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2196 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2212 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2213 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2215 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2217 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2220 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2221 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2222 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2227 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2230 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2232 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2236 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2245 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2246 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2247 * the length of the block. */
2248 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2250 unsigned int off = 0;
2264 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2266 unsigned short length;
2267 unsigned short type;
2268 unsigned short size;
2269 unsigned char *data = *p;
2270 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2271 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2274 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2278 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2279 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2282 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2286 if (data+length != d+n)
2288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2297 if (data+size > (d+n))
2300 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2301 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2302 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2304 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2306 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2311 tlsext_servername = 1;
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2315 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2316 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2318 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2319 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2321 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2327 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2328 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2330 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2334 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2336 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2337 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2338 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2339 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2340 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2343 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2347 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2348 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2350 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2356 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2361 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2362 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2363 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2365 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2373 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2379 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2380 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2381 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2382 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2384 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2386 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2388 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2393 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2394 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2396 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2397 * a status request message.
2399 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2404 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2405 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2409 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2411 unsigned char *selected;
2412 unsigned char selected_len;
2414 /* We must have requested it. */
2415 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2420 /* The data must be valid */
2421 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2428 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2432 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2438 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2439 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2442 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2444 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2446 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2453 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2454 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2456 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2457 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2458 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2460 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2465 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2467 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2474 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2475 * an authz hello extension if the client
2476 * didn't request a proof. */
2477 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2478 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2480 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2488 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2492 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2493 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2499 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2500 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2501 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2502 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2508 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2516 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2522 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2524 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2526 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2527 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2529 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2535 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2546 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2547 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2548 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2549 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2550 * absence on initial connect only.
2552 if (!renegotiate_seen
2553 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2554 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2556 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2558 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2566 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2569 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2573 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2575 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2580 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2582 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2583 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2585 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2586 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2588 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2589 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2594 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2598 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2599 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2606 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2609 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2610 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2611 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2614 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2615 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2616 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2617 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2621 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2622 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2627 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2628 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2629 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2630 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2632 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2637 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2639 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2640 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2643 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2644 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2646 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2647 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2651 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2652 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2653 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2654 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2656 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2657 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2658 * the certificate has changed.
2660 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2663 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2666 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2667 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2668 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2670 /* status request response should be sent */
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2672 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2673 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2675 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2677 /* something bad happened */
2678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2679 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2680 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2687 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2689 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2690 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2691 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
2695 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2697 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2700 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2701 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2707 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2708 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2710 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2712 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2713 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2715 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2716 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2718 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2719 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2721 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2722 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2724 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2725 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2728 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2732 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2734 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2735 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2736 * abort the handshake.
2738 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2739 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2747 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2748 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2752 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2756 s->servername_done=0;
2762 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2764 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2765 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2768 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2769 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2770 * it must contain uncompressed.
2772 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2773 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2774 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2775 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2776 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2778 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2780 unsigned char *list;
2781 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2782 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2783 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2785 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2787 found_uncompressed = 1;
2791 if (!found_uncompressed)
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2797 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2798 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2800 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2801 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2802 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2803 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2805 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2806 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2808 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2809 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2811 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2813 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2814 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2817 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2818 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2819 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2820 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2822 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2823 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2828 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2831 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2832 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2835 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2836 * there is no response.
2838 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2840 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2841 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2843 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2844 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2847 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2848 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2852 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2853 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2860 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2863 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2864 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2867 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2868 s->servername_done=0;
2874 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2877 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2879 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2885 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2893 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2894 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2895 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2897 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2898 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2899 * extension, if any.
2900 * len: the length of the session ID.
2901 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2902 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2903 * point to the resulting session.
2905 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2906 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2907 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2910 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2911 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2912 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2913 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2914 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2915 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2916 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2919 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2920 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2921 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2922 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2923 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2924 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2926 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2927 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2929 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2930 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2934 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2936 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2937 * to permit stateful resumption.
2939 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2941 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2945 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2946 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2953 /* Skip past cipher list */
2958 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2963 /* Now at start of extensions */
2964 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2967 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2969 unsigned short type, size;
2972 if (p + size > limit)
2974 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2979 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2980 * currently have one. */
2981 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2984 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2986 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2987 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2988 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2989 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2990 * calculate the master secret later. */
2993 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2996 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2997 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2999 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3001 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3004 default: /* fatal error */
3013 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3015 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3016 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3017 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3018 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3019 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3020 * point to the resulting session.
3023 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3024 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3025 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3026 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3028 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3029 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3030 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3033 unsigned char *sdec;
3034 const unsigned char *p;
3035 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3036 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3039 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3040 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3043 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3044 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3046 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3048 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3049 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3060 /* Check key name matches */
3061 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3063 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3064 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3065 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3066 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3068 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3069 * integrity checks on ticket.
3071 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3074 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3078 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3079 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3080 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3081 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3082 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3084 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3085 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3086 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3087 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3088 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3091 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3094 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3095 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3098 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3101 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3105 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3106 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3107 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3108 * as required by standard.
3111 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3112 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3120 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3125 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3133 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3134 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3135 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3136 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3137 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3138 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3139 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3142 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3143 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3144 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3145 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3148 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3151 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3153 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3159 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3162 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3164 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3165 return table[i].nid;
3170 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3175 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3176 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3179 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3182 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3183 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3187 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3189 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3190 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3193 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3198 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3206 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3210 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3211 return EVP_sha224();
3213 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3214 return EVP_sha256();
3216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3217 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3218 return EVP_sha384();
3220 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3221 return EVP_sha512();
3229 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3234 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3235 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3238 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3239 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3249 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3250 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3251 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3253 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3254 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3256 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3258 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3259 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3261 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3263 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3265 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3266 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3268 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3272 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3273 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3274 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3276 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3279 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3280 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3281 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3282 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3284 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3285 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3286 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3288 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3289 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3291 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3293 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3295 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3300 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3301 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3302 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3304 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3315 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3316 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3318 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3319 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3321 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3323 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3324 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3325 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3327 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3328 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3330 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3332 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3333 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3336 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3337 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3341 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3342 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3348 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3349 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3351 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3354 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3357 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3358 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3359 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3364 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3366 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3372 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3373 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3374 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3376 /* Should never happen */
3380 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3381 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3383 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3384 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3386 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3388 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3389 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3391 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3392 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3394 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3395 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3396 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3397 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3399 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3400 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3405 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3406 * use the certificate for signing.
3408 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3410 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3411 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3414 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3415 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3418 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3420 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3421 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3425 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3426 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3433 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3434 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3435 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3437 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3443 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3450 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3452 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3455 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3456 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3457 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3459 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3460 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3464 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3466 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3468 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3470 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3472 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3473 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3479 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3481 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3482 unsigned short hbtype;
3483 unsigned int payload;
3484 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3486 /* Read type and payload length first */
3491 if (s->msg_callback)
3492 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3493 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3494 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3496 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3498 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3501 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3502 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3503 * payload, plus padding
3505 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3508 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3509 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3511 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3513 /* Random padding */
3514 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3516 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3518 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3519 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3520 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3521 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3523 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3528 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3532 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3533 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3534 * sequence number */
3537 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3540 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3548 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3550 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3552 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3553 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3555 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3556 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3557 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3563 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3564 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3570 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3571 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3577 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3578 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3580 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3582 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3583 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3584 * some random stuff.
3585 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3586 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3587 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3588 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3591 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3594 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3595 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3597 /* Sequence number */
3598 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3599 /* 16 random bytes */
3600 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3602 /* Random padding */
3603 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3605 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3608 if (s->msg_callback)
3609 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3610 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3611 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3613 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3622 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3627 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3630 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3632 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3635 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3636 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3638 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3640 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3642 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3650 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3651 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3652 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3653 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3654 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3655 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3658 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3659 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3660 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3661 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3664 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3666 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3667 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3670 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3671 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3675 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3676 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3677 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3681 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3683 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3686 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3688 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3693 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3694 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3696 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3698 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3699 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3700 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3701 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3703 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3711 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3712 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3713 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3714 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3718 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3719 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3720 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3721 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3727 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3731 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3735 if (default_nid == -1)
3737 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3739 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3740 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3741 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3745 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3746 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3750 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3751 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3753 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3759 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3760 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3761 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3762 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3765 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3767 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3768 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3769 /* Strict mode flags */
3770 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3771 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3772 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3774 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3779 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3780 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3782 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3783 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3786 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3790 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3793 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3795 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3797 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3798 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3806 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3809 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3810 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3811 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3813 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3821 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3822 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3823 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3832 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3833 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3836 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3839 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3840 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3842 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3847 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3848 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3849 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3850 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3851 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3854 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3855 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3856 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3857 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3861 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3862 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3870 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3871 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3874 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3877 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3878 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3880 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3883 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3891 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3892 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3894 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3899 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3901 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3906 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3914 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3915 else if(check_flags)
3916 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3918 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3919 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3921 else if (!check_flags)
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3925 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3926 else if (strict_mode)
3928 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3929 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3931 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3932 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3936 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3944 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3946 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3951 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3954 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3957 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3962 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
3963 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
3964 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
3965 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
3966 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
3971 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3976 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3980 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3981 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3983 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
3985 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
3987 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3991 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3998 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4000 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4003 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4005 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4006 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4008 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4010 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4012 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4013 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4020 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4026 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4027 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4031 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4033 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4034 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4035 else if (cpk->digest)
4036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4041 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4042 * if the chain is invalid.
4046 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4047 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4050 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4051 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4058 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4059 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4061 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4062 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4063 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4064 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4065 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4066 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4068 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4069 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4071 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);