2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
274 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
275 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
278 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
279 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
281 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
284 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
285 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
287 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
290 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
291 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
293 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
296 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
297 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
298 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
299 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
301 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
303 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
304 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
307 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
308 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
311 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
314 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
318 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
321 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
322 return (int)sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
325 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
328 unsigned char *ret = p;
330 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
331 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
332 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
337 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
339 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
341 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
342 unsigned long size_str;
345 /* check for enough space.
346 4 for the servername type and entension length
347 2 for servernamelist length
348 1 for the hostname type
349 2 for hostname length
353 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
354 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
357 /* extension type and length */
358 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
361 /* length of servername list */
364 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
365 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
367 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
371 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
376 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
382 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
387 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
397 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
398 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
399 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
400 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
401 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
404 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
405 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
412 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
414 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
415 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
421 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
422 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
424 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
427 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
428 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
429 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
436 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
437 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
438 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
439 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
441 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
442 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
444 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
447 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
448 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
449 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
456 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
458 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
459 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
460 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
461 * resolves this to two bytes.
463 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
464 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
465 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
467 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
469 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
472 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
473 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
474 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
475 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
477 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
478 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
479 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
481 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
482 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
484 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
488 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
489 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
491 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
494 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
495 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
499 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
505 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
507 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
510 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
511 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
512 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
513 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
516 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
517 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
518 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
520 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
522 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
524 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
530 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
535 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
536 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
539 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
543 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
545 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
546 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
552 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
554 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
561 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
563 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
565 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
566 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
568 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
570 /* save position of id len */
571 unsigned char *q = ret;
572 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
573 /* skip over id len */
575 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
581 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
585 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
587 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
588 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
589 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
591 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
596 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
603 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
606 unsigned char *ret = p;
607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
608 int next_proto_neg_seen;
611 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
612 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
616 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
618 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
620 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
626 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
630 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
641 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
651 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
652 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
654 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
657 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
658 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
659 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
666 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
667 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
668 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
669 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
672 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
673 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
675 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
676 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
678 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
683 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
685 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
686 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
690 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
691 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
692 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
694 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
696 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
698 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
704 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
708 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
709 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
710 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
711 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
712 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
713 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
714 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
715 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
716 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
717 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
718 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
724 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
725 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
726 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
728 const unsigned char *npa;
732 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
733 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
735 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
738 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
740 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
745 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
752 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
757 unsigned char *data = *p;
758 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
761 s->servername_done = 0;
762 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
768 if (data > (d+n-len))
771 while (data <= (d+n-4))
776 if (data+size > (d+n))
779 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
781 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
782 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
783 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
784 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
786 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
787 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
788 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
789 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
790 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
791 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
792 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
793 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
794 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
795 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
796 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
797 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
798 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
799 the value of the Host: field.
800 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
801 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
802 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
803 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
807 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
809 unsigned char *sdata;
815 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
829 servname_type = *(sdata++);
835 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
838 if (s->servername_done == 0)
839 switch (servname_type)
841 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
844 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
849 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
851 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
854 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
859 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
860 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
861 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
862 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
863 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
864 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
867 s->servername_done = 1;
871 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
872 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
873 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
885 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
891 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
896 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
898 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
899 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
905 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
906 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
908 unsigned char *sdata = data;
909 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
911 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
913 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
918 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
920 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
921 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
923 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
924 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
926 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
929 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
930 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
933 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
934 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
935 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
936 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
937 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
940 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
941 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
943 unsigned char *sdata = data;
944 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
945 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
947 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
949 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
954 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
956 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
960 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
962 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
965 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
966 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
969 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
970 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
971 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
972 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
973 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
976 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
977 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
978 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
979 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
981 unsigned char *sdata = data;
985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
988 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
989 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
995 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
996 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
997 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
998 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1000 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1001 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1003 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1008 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1010 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1011 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1013 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1019 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1021 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1023 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1026 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1046 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1057 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1059 const unsigned char *sdata;
1061 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1066 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1079 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1102 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1103 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1105 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1106 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1109 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1110 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1112 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1113 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1118 /* Read in request_extensions */
1121 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1135 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1137 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1138 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1149 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1153 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1155 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1158 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1159 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1160 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1161 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1162 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1163 * anything like that, but this might change).
1165 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1166 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1167 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1168 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1169 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1170 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1174 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1182 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1184 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1185 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1187 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1189 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1197 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1198 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1199 * the length of the block. */
1200 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1202 unsigned int off = 0;
1216 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1218 unsigned short length;
1219 unsigned short type;
1220 unsigned short size;
1221 unsigned char *data = *p;
1222 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1223 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1225 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1229 if (data+length != d+n)
1231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1240 if (data+size > (d+n))
1243 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1244 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1245 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1247 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1249 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1251 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1254 tlsext_servername = 1;
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1258 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1259 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1261 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1262 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1264 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1266 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1269 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1270 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1271 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1273 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1276 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1279 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1280 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1281 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1282 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1283 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1286 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1290 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1291 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1293 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1296 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1299 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1302 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1304 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1305 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1306 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1308 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1312 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1315 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1316 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1322 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1323 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1324 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1325 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1327 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1329 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1331 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1336 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1337 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1339 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1340 * a status request message.
1342 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1344 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1347 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1348 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1351 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1353 unsigned char *selected;
1354 unsigned char selected_len;
1356 /* We must have requested it. */
1357 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1359 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1362 /* The data must be valid */
1363 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1365 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1368 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1370 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1373 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1374 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1376 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1379 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1380 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1383 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1385 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1387 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1398 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1400 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1402 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1404 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1405 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1407 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1423 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1424 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1425 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1426 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1427 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1428 * absence on initial connect only.
1430 if (!renegotiate_seen
1431 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1432 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1434 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1436 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1444 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1448 * and elliptic curves we support.
1453 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1454 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1456 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1458 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1460 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1461 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1462 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1468 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1472 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1477 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1478 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1479 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1480 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1482 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1484 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1485 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1487 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1491 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1492 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1495 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1497 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1501 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1503 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1508 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1510 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1511 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1513 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1514 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1516 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1517 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1522 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1526 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1527 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1534 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1537 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1538 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1539 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1542 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1543 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1544 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1545 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1550 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1555 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1556 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1557 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1558 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1560 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1565 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1567 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1568 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1571 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1572 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1574 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1575 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1579 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1580 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1581 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1582 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1584 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1585 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1586 * the certificate has changed.
1588 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1591 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1594 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1595 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1596 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1598 /* status request response should be sent */
1599 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1600 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1601 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1603 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1605 /* something bad happened */
1606 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1607 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1608 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1613 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1615 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1617 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1618 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1619 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1623 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1625 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1628 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1629 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1634 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1635 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1636 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1638 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1640 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1641 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1643 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1644 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1646 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1647 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1649 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1652 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1653 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1656 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1660 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1662 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1663 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1664 * abort the handshake.
1666 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1667 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1676 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1680 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1683 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1684 s->servername_done=0;
1690 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1692 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1693 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1696 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1697 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1698 * it must contain uncompressed.
1700 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1701 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1702 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1703 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1704 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1706 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1708 unsigned char *list;
1709 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1710 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1711 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1713 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1715 found_uncompressed = 1;
1719 if (!found_uncompressed)
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1725 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1726 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1728 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1729 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1730 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1731 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1733 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1734 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1736 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1737 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1739 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1741 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1742 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1745 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1746 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1747 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1748 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1750 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1751 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1756 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1759 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1760 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1763 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1764 * there is no response.
1766 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1768 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1769 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1771 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1772 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1775 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1776 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1788 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1792 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1795 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1796 s->servername_done=0;
1802 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1803 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1804 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1807 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1808 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1810 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1811 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1814 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1815 * to permit stateful resumption.
1817 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1820 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1824 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1825 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1832 /* Skip past cipher list */
1837 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1842 /* Now at start of extensions */
1843 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1846 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1848 unsigned short type, size;
1851 if (p + size > limit)
1853 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1855 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1856 * trigger a full handshake
1858 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1860 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1861 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1865 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1866 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1868 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1870 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1871 * generating the session from ticket now,
1872 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1873 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1877 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1885 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1886 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1887 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1890 unsigned char *sdec;
1891 const unsigned char *p;
1892 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1893 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1896 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1897 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1900 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1901 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1902 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1903 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1905 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1906 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1917 /* Check key name matches */
1918 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1920 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1921 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1922 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1923 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1925 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1926 * integrity checks on ticket.
1928 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1931 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1935 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1936 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1937 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1938 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1939 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1941 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1942 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1943 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1944 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1945 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1948 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1951 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1952 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1955 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1958 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1962 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1963 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1964 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1965 * as required by standard.
1968 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1969 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1971 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1974 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1978 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1982 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1990 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
1992 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1995 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1998 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1999 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2002 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2003 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2007 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2009 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2012 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2015 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2019 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2022 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2024 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2030 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2033 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2035 if (table[i].id == id)
2036 return table[i].nid;
2042 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2045 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2046 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2049 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2052 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2053 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2057 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2059 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2060 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2063 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2068 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2072 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2076 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2077 return EVP_sha224();
2079 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2080 return EVP_sha256();
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2083 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2084 return EVP_sha384();
2086 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2087 return EVP_sha512();
2095 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2097 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2102 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2105 /* Should never happen */
2109 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2110 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2111 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2112 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2114 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2116 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2121 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2122 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2126 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2127 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2131 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2139 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2141 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2144 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2145 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2146 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2153 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2154 * supported it stays as NULL.
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2157 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2158 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2161 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2163 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2164 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2168 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2169 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();