2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
125 static int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
145 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
151 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
152 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
156 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
159 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
167 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
170 s->version = s->method->version;
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
174 static int nid_list[] =
176 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
177 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
178 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
179 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
180 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
181 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
182 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
183 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
184 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
185 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
186 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
187 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
188 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
189 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
190 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
191 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
192 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
193 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
194 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
195 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
196 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
197 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
199 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
200 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
205 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
206 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
207 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
209 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
212 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
214 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
217 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
219 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
223 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
225 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
231 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
233 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
237 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
239 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
243 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
245 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
247 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
249 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
251 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
255 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
259 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
261 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
263 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
274 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
277 unsigned char *ret = p;
279 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
280 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
281 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
286 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
288 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
290 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
291 unsigned long size_str;
294 /* check for enough space.
295 4 for the servername type and entension length
296 2 for servernamelist length
297 1 for the hostname type
298 2 for hostname length
302 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
303 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
306 /* extension type and length */
307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
310 /* length of servername list */
313 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
314 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
316 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
320 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
325 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
331 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
336 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
346 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
347 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
348 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
349 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
350 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
353 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
354 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
361 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
363 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
364 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
370 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
371 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
373 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
376 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
377 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
378 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
385 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
386 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
387 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
388 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
390 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
391 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
393 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
396 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
397 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
398 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
405 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
407 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
408 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
409 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
410 * resolves this to two bytes.
412 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
414 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
416 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
418 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
421 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
422 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
423 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
424 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
426 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
427 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
428 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
430 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
431 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
433 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
437 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
438 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
440 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
443 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
448 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
454 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
456 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes.
457 * Should make this customisable at some point, for
458 * now include everything we support.
460 static unsigned char sigalgs[] = {
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
462 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
463 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
464 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
466 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
467 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
468 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
470 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
471 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
475 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
476 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
477 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
479 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
480 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
481 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
483 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
484 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
488 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
489 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
490 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
492 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
493 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
494 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
496 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
497 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_dsa
501 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(sigalgs) + 6)
503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
504 s2n(sizeof(sigalgs) + 2, ret);
505 s2n(sizeof(sigalgs), ret);
506 memcpy(ret, sigalgs, sizeof(sigalgs));
507 ret += sizeof(sigalgs);
510 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
511 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
512 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
514 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
516 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
518 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
524 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
529 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
530 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
533 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
537 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
539 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
540 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
546 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
548 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
557 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
559 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
560 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
562 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
564 /* save position of id len */
565 unsigned char *q = ret;
566 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
567 /* skip over id len */
569 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
575 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
579 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
581 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
582 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
583 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
585 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
590 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
597 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
600 unsigned char *ret = p;
601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
602 int next_proto_neg_seen;
605 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
606 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
610 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
612 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
620 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
624 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
630 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
635 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
645 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
646 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
648 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
651 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
652 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
653 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
660 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
661 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
662 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
663 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
666 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
669 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
670 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
672 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
677 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
679 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
684 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
685 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
686 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
688 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
690 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
692 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
698 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
702 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
703 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
704 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
705 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
706 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
707 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
708 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
709 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
710 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
711 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
712 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
718 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
719 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
720 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
722 const unsigned char *npa;
726 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
727 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
729 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
730 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
732 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
734 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
739 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
746 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
751 unsigned char *data = *p;
752 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
755 s->servername_done = 0;
756 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
762 if (data > (d+n-len))
765 while (data <= (d+n-4))
770 if (data+size > (d+n))
773 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
775 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
776 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
777 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
778 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
780 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
781 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
782 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
783 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
784 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
785 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
786 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
787 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
788 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
789 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
790 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
791 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
792 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
793 the value of the Host: field.
794 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
795 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
796 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
797 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
801 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
803 unsigned char *sdata;
809 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
816 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
823 servname_type = *(sdata++);
829 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
832 if (s->servername_done == 0)
833 switch (servname_type)
835 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
838 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
843 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
845 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
848 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
850 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
853 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
854 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
855 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
856 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
857 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
858 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
861 s->servername_done = 1;
865 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
866 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
867 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
879 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
890 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
892 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
893 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
899 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
900 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
902 unsigned char *sdata = data;
903 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
905 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
907 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
912 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
914 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
915 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
917 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
918 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
920 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
923 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
924 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
927 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
928 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
929 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
930 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
931 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
934 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
935 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
937 unsigned char *sdata = data;
938 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
939 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
941 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
943 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
948 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
950 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
953 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
954 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
956 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
959 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
960 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
963 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
964 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
965 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
966 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
967 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
970 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
971 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
972 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
973 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
975 unsigned char *sdata = data;
979 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
982 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
983 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
989 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
990 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
991 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
992 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
994 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
995 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
997 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1002 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1004 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1005 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1007 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1011 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1013 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1015 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1020 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1033 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1040 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1049 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1051 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1053 const unsigned char *sdata;
1055 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1095 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1096 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1097 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1099 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1100 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1103 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1104 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1106 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1107 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1112 /* Read in request_extensions */
1115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1129 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1131 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1132 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1134 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1143 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1147 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1149 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1152 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1153 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1154 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1155 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1156 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1157 * anything like that, but this might change).
1159 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1160 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1161 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1162 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1163 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1164 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1168 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1176 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1178 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1179 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1181 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1183 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1191 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1192 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1193 * the length of the block. */
1194 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1196 unsigned int off = 0;
1210 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1212 unsigned short length;
1213 unsigned short type;
1214 unsigned short size;
1215 unsigned char *data = *p;
1216 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1217 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1219 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1223 if (data+length != d+n)
1225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1234 if (data+size > (d+n))
1237 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1238 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1239 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1241 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1243 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1245 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1248 tlsext_servername = 1;
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1253 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1255 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1256 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1258 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1260 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1263 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1264 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1265 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1267 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1270 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1271 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1273 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1274 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1275 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1276 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1277 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1280 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1284 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1285 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1290 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1293 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1296 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1298 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1300 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1302 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1309 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1310 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1312 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1316 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1317 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1318 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1319 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1321 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1323 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1325 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1330 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1331 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1333 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1334 * a status request message.
1336 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1338 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1341 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1342 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1347 unsigned char *selected;
1348 unsigned char selected_len;
1350 /* We must have requested it. */
1351 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1353 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1356 /* The data must be valid */
1357 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1359 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1362 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1364 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1367 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1368 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1370 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1373 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1374 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1379 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1381 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1392 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1394 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1396 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1398 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1399 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1401 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1407 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1417 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1418 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1419 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1420 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1421 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1422 * absence on initial connect only.
1424 if (!renegotiate_seen
1425 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1426 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1428 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1430 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1438 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1441 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1442 * and elliptic curves we support.
1447 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1448 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1450 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1452 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1454 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1455 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1456 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1462 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1465 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1466 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1471 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1472 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1473 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1474 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1476 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1477 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1478 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1479 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1481 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1485 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1486 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1489 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1491 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1495 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1497 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1502 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1504 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1505 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1507 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1508 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1510 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1511 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1516 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1520 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1521 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1528 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1531 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1532 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1533 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1536 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1537 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1538 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1539 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1543 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1544 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1549 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1550 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1551 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1552 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1554 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1559 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1561 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1562 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1565 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1566 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1568 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1569 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1573 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1574 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1575 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1576 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1578 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1579 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1580 * the certificate has changed.
1582 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1585 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1588 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1589 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1590 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1592 /* status request response should be sent */
1593 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1595 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1597 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1599 /* something bad happened */
1600 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1601 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1602 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1607 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1609 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1611 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1612 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1613 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1617 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1619 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1622 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1623 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1628 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1629 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1630 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1632 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1634 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1635 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1637 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1638 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1640 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1641 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1643 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1644 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1646 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1647 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1650 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1654 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1656 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1657 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1658 * abort the handshake.
1660 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1661 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1670 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1674 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1678 s->servername_done=0;
1684 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1686 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1687 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1690 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1691 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1692 * it must contain uncompressed.
1694 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1695 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1696 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1697 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1698 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1700 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1702 unsigned char *list;
1703 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1704 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1705 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1707 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1709 found_uncompressed = 1;
1713 if (!found_uncompressed)
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1719 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1722 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1723 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1724 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1725 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1727 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1728 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1730 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1731 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1733 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1735 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1739 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1740 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1741 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1742 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1744 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1745 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1750 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1753 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1754 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1757 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1758 * there is no response.
1760 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1762 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1763 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1765 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1766 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1769 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1770 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1774 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1775 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1781 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1782 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1786 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1790 s->servername_done=0;
1796 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1797 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1798 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1801 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1802 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1804 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1805 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1808 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1809 * to permit stateful resumption.
1811 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1814 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1818 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1819 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1826 /* Skip past cipher list */
1831 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1836 /* Now at start of extensions */
1837 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1840 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1842 unsigned short type, size;
1845 if (p + size > limit)
1847 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1849 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1850 * trigger a full handshake
1852 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1854 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1855 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1859 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1860 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1862 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1864 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1865 * generating the session from ticket now,
1866 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1867 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1871 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1879 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1880 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1881 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1884 unsigned char *sdec;
1885 const unsigned char *p;
1886 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1887 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1890 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1891 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1894 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1895 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1896 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1897 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1899 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1900 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1911 /* Check key name matches */
1912 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1914 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1915 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1916 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1917 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1919 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1920 * integrity checks on ticket.
1922 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1925 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1929 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1930 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1931 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1932 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1933 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1935 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1936 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1937 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1938 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1939 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1942 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1945 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1946 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1949 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1952 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1956 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1957 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1958 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1959 * as required by standard.
1962 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1963 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1965 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1968 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1972 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1976 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1984 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
1986 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1989 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1992 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1993 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1996 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1997 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2001 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2003 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2006 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2009 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2013 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2016 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2018 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2024 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2027 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2029 if (table[i].id == id)
2030 return table[i].nid;
2036 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2039 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2040 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2043 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2046 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2047 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2051 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2053 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2054 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2057 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2062 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2066 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2070 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2071 return EVP_sha224();
2073 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2074 return EVP_sha256();
2076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2077 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2078 return EVP_sha384();
2080 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2081 return EVP_sha512();
2089 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2091 static int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2096 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2097 if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2100 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2101 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2102 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2103 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2105 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2107 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2112 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2113 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2117 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2118 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2122 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2130 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2132 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2135 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2136 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2137 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2143 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2144 * supported it stays as NULL.
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2147 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2148 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2151 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2153 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2154 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2158 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2159 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();