2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
34 tls1_generate_master_secret,
35 tls1_change_cipher_state,
36 tls1_final_finish_mac,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
43 tls_close_construct_packet,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
49 tls1_generate_master_secret,
50 tls1_change_cipher_state,
51 tls1_final_finish_mac,
52 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
53 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_export_keying_material,
56 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
57 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
58 tls_close_construct_packet,
62 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_generate_master_secret,
65 tls1_change_cipher_state,
66 tls1_final_finish_mac,
67 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
70 tls1_export_keying_material,
71 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
72 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
73 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
74 tls_close_construct_packet,
78 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 OSSL_TIME tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
99 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
119 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
123 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
133 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
134 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
136 sc->version = s->method->version;
141 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
146 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
147 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
148 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
149 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
150 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
151 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
152 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
153 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
154 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
155 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
156 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
157 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
158 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
159 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
160 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
161 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
162 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
163 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
164 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
165 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
166 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
167 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
168 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
169 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
170 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
172 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
173 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
174 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
176 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13},
177 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13},
178 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
186 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
187 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
188 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
189 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
190 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
193 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
194 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
199 /* The default curves */
200 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
220 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
225 struct provider_group_data_st {
227 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
230 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
231 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
232 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
234 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
235 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
236 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
238 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
239 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
241 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
244 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
245 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
247 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
248 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
249 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
251 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
252 (ctx->group_list_max_len
253 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
254 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
257 ctx->group_list = tmp;
258 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
260 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
261 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
264 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
266 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
267 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
268 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
271 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
272 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL)
275 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
276 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
277 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
280 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
281 if (ginf->realname == NULL)
284 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
285 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
286 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
289 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
291 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
292 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
293 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
296 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
297 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL)
300 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
301 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
302 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
306 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
307 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
308 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
311 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
313 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
314 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
319 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
320 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
325 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
326 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
327 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
331 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
332 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
337 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
338 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
339 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
344 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
345 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
347 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
348 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
350 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
351 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
352 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
353 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
354 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
355 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
358 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
359 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
360 ctx->group_list_len++;
363 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
368 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
371 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
376 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
378 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
381 pgd.provider = provider;
382 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
383 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
386 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
388 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
389 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
391 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
394 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
395 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
396 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
397 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
403 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
406 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
407 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
409 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL)
412 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
414 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
415 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
420 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
424 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
425 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
426 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
427 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
433 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
437 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
438 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
439 return &ctx->group_list[i];
445 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
453 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
454 * work for groups we don't know about.
456 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
458 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
459 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
461 if (!include_unknown)
463 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
466 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
471 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
472 * work for groups we don't know about.
474 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
476 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
477 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
484 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
485 * the number of groups supported.
487 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
490 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
492 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
493 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
494 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
495 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
496 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
499 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
500 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
504 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
505 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
510 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
511 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
512 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
514 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
515 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
521 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
522 int minversion, int maxversion,
523 int isec, int *okfortls13)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
529 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
535 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
536 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
538 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
541 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
542 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
543 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
545 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
547 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
550 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
551 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
552 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
553 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
554 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
555 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
558 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
559 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
560 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
565 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
566 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
568 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
570 unsigned char gtmp[2];
575 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
576 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
577 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
578 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
581 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
582 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
585 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
592 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
593 * if there is no match.
594 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
595 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
596 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
598 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
600 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
601 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
604 /* Can't do anything on client side */
608 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
610 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
611 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
613 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
615 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
616 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
617 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
618 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
619 /* Should never happen */
622 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
626 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
627 * otherwise peer decides.
629 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
630 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
631 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
633 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
634 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
637 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
638 uint16_t id = pref[i];
640 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
641 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
649 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
653 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
654 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
659 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
660 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
662 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
663 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
664 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
667 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
670 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL)
672 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
673 unsigned long idmask;
675 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
676 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
678 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
679 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
680 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
694 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
695 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
703 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
705 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
708 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
712 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
714 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
717 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
720 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
722 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
725 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
727 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
728 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
731 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
732 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
734 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
738 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
739 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
747 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
748 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
749 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
752 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
760 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
763 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
767 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
770 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
774 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
775 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
776 int check_own_groups)
778 const uint16_t *groups;
784 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
785 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
786 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
788 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
789 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
791 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
792 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
795 /* Should never happen */
800 if (check_own_groups) {
801 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
802 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
803 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
807 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
810 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
814 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
815 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
818 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
819 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
820 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
821 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
825 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
828 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
832 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
834 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
835 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
836 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
838 *pformats = ecformats_default;
839 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
841 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
843 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
847 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
848 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
850 unsigned char comp_id;
854 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
855 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
859 /* Get required compression id */
860 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
863 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
864 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
865 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
867 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
872 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
874 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
875 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
876 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
877 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
882 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
883 * supported (see RFC4492).
885 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
888 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
889 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
895 /* Return group id of a key */
896 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
898 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
900 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
902 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
906 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
907 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
909 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
913 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
916 /* If not EC nothing to do */
917 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
919 /* Check compression */
920 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
922 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
924 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
927 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
930 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
933 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
937 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
938 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
939 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
940 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
941 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
943 return 0; /* Should never happen */
944 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
945 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
954 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
956 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
958 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
959 * is compatible with the client extensions.
961 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
963 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
965 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
967 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
969 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
972 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
973 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
974 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
975 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
980 /* Default sigalg schemes */
981 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
983 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
994 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1016 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1017 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1018 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1020 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1025 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1030 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1031 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1032 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1033 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1034 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1035 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1036 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1037 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1038 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1039 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1040 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1041 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1042 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1043 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1044 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1045 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1046 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1047 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1048 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1049 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1050 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1051 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1052 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1053 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1054 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1055 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1056 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1057 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1058 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1059 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1060 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1062 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1063 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1065 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1066 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1067 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1068 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1069 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1070 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1071 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1072 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1073 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1074 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1075 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1076 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1077 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1078 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1079 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1080 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1081 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1082 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1083 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1084 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1085 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1086 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1087 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1088 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1089 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1090 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1091 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1092 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1093 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1094 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1095 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1096 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1097 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1098 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1099 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1100 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1101 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1102 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1103 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1104 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1106 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1107 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1108 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1110 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1111 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1112 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1114 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1115 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1116 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1117 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1118 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1119 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1120 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1121 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1122 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1123 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1124 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1125 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1126 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1127 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1128 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1129 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1132 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1133 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1134 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1135 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1136 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1137 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1141 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1142 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1144 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1145 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1146 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1147 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1148 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1149 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1150 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1151 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1152 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1153 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1156 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1159 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1160 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1161 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1162 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1165 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1169 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1170 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1176 * Check hash is available.
1177 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1178 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1179 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1180 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1181 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1183 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1184 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1185 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1189 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1190 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1193 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1194 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1196 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1197 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1200 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1205 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1206 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1210 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1211 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1215 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1217 for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1218 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1219 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1221 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1229 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1230 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1236 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1237 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1240 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1250 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1252 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1253 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1254 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1256 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1257 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1258 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1264 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1266 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1272 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1273 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1274 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1275 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1276 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1278 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1285 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1286 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1287 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1291 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1298 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1300 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1303 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1305 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1312 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1313 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1315 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1318 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1320 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1327 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1330 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1333 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1337 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
1339 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1343 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1345 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1347 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1348 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1351 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1353 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1355 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1358 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1362 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1365 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1368 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1369 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1370 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1371 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1373 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1374 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1378 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1382 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1383 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1384 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1386 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1387 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1388 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1389 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1390 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1391 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1393 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1394 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1399 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1400 * specified EC curve.
1402 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
1404 const uint16_t *sigs;
1407 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1408 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1409 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1411 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1412 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1415 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1416 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1420 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1421 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1422 && curve == lu->curve)
1430 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1433 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1435 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1438 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1442 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1444 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1445 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1447 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1448 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1449 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1451 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1452 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1453 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1454 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1456 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1458 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1460 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1463 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1464 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1466 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1473 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1474 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1477 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1479 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1480 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1482 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1484 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1487 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1488 /* Should never happen */
1491 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1492 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1493 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1497 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1498 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1499 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1501 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1503 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1504 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1507 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1508 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1509 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1510 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1514 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1515 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1516 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1521 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1523 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1524 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1526 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1530 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1531 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1532 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1534 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1539 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1540 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1541 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1545 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1546 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1547 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1548 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1550 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1555 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1560 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1561 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1562 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1563 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1566 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1567 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1568 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1572 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1577 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1578 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1580 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1581 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1582 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
1584 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1585 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1586 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1590 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1591 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1595 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1597 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1602 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1604 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1608 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1610 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1615 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1617 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1622 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1623 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1624 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1626 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1629 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1631 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1633 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1634 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1635 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1636 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1637 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1640 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1641 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1642 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1643 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1645 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1647 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1648 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1649 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1656 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1657 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1658 * @c: cipher to check
1659 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1660 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1662 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1664 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
1667 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1668 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1670 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1672 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1673 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1676 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1677 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1679 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1680 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1681 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1683 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1686 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1687 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1688 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1691 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1694 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1696 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1698 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1701 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1705 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1706 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1707 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1708 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1709 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1710 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1711 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1713 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1714 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1716 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1717 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1718 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1719 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1721 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1722 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1727 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1728 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1729 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1730 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1738 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1745 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1747 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1752 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1754 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1755 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1756 * point to the resulting session.
1758 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1759 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1763 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1766 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1769 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1770 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1773 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1774 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1776 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1777 if (!ticketext->present)
1778 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1780 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1782 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1783 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1787 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1789 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1790 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1791 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1792 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1795 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1796 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1797 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1798 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1799 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1800 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1802 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1803 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1804 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1805 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1806 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1807 * point to the resulting session.
1809 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1810 const unsigned char *etick,
1812 const unsigned char *sess_id,
1813 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1815 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1816 unsigned char *sdec;
1817 const unsigned char *p;
1818 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1819 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1821 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1822 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1823 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1824 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1826 if (eticklen == 0) {
1828 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1829 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1831 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1834 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1836 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1837 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1838 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1839 * calculate the master secret later.
1841 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1845 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1846 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1847 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1851 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1852 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1854 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1857 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1859 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1863 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1865 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1868 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1871 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1872 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1873 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1875 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1878 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1879 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1880 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1881 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1882 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1885 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1889 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1895 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1896 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1898 /* Check key name matches */
1899 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1900 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1901 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1905 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1907 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1908 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1909 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1911 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1912 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1913 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1914 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1915 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1918 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1919 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1923 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1926 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1928 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1932 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1934 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1938 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1939 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
1940 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1944 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1945 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1946 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1947 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1951 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1952 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1955 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1956 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1957 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1958 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1959 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1960 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1961 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1963 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1966 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1968 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1974 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1978 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1980 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1982 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1986 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1987 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1988 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1992 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1993 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1996 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1998 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2003 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2005 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2008 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2009 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2012 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2013 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2014 * performs any action
2016 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2017 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2018 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2019 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2020 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2021 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2024 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2025 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2026 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2027 sess, etick, keyname_len,
2029 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2031 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2032 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2035 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2036 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2037 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2041 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2042 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2043 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2044 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2045 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2049 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2050 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2051 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2052 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2053 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2054 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2055 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2057 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2061 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2065 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2067 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2068 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2069 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2070 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2079 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2080 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
2081 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2083 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2086 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2088 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2089 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2092 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2095 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2096 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2097 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2098 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2099 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2102 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2103 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
2106 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2107 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2108 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2109 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2110 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2113 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2114 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2119 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2120 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2121 * ciphersuites enabled.
2124 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2127 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
2128 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2129 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2130 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2132 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2133 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2134 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2137 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2145 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2146 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2147 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2148 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2149 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2153 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2154 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2158 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
2160 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2161 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2162 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2164 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2167 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2168 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2169 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2170 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2175 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2179 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2180 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2181 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2182 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2184 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2187 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2188 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2193 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2194 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2197 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2199 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2202 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2203 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2205 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2206 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2207 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2208 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2212 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2216 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2217 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2218 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2219 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2220 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2222 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2223 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2224 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2225 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2227 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2229 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2231 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2232 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2243 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2244 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2246 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2247 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2249 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2251 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2253 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2254 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2255 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2256 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2257 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2258 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2259 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2260 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2261 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2262 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2264 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2265 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2268 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2269 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2273 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2274 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2276 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2278 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL)
2280 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2284 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2285 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2289 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2295 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2297 /* Invalid data length */
2298 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2303 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL)
2305 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2313 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2320 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2322 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2323 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2325 /* Should never happen */
2326 if (s->cert == NULL)
2330 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2331 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2333 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2334 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2338 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2340 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2343 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2345 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2348 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2351 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2352 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2353 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2355 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2356 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2358 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2359 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
2360 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
2361 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2366 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2367 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2368 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2372 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2377 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2378 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2380 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2383 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2385 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2389 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2391 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2392 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
2394 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2396 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2397 if (psignhash != NULL)
2398 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2400 return (int)numsigalgs;
2403 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2404 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2405 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2407 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2408 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2413 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2415 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
2416 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2418 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2420 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2422 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2423 if (psignhash != NULL)
2424 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2426 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2428 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2429 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
2432 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2433 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2437 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2438 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2441 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2443 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2444 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2445 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2446 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2447 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2448 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2449 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2450 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2452 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2453 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2454 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2457 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2458 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2460 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2462 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2464 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2465 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2466 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2469 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2471 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2473 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2475 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2477 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2478 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2479 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2480 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2481 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2482 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2486 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2488 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2489 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2493 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2500 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2501 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2502 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2504 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2506 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2507 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2511 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2515 /* Reject duplicates */
2516 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2517 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2526 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2527 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2529 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2533 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2537 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2540 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2545 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2547 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2550 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2551 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2552 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2554 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2555 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2556 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2562 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2564 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2569 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL)
2571 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2573 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2574 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2575 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2577 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2579 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2580 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2585 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2590 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2591 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2592 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2594 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2595 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2596 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2602 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2606 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2608 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2610 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2613 if (default_nid == -1)
2615 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2617 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2619 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2621 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2622 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2623 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2625 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2628 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2630 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2631 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2632 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2633 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2634 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2640 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2641 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2643 const X509_NAME *nm;
2645 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2646 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2647 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2654 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2655 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2656 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2657 * attempting to use them.
2660 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2662 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2663 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2664 /* Strict mode flags */
2665 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2666 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2667 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2669 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
2670 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
2674 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2675 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2678 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2680 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2682 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2685 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2687 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2688 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2690 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2692 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2693 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2702 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2705 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2707 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2708 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2710 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2717 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2718 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2719 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2720 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2721 else if (!check_flags)
2726 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2727 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2729 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
2734 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2735 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2737 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2741 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2742 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2745 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2746 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2747 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2751 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2752 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2755 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2756 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2757 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2760 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2761 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2762 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2766 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2767 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2776 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2777 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2779 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2781 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2782 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2783 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2785 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2788 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2795 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2796 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2798 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2799 * so check_flags is always set.
2801 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2802 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2803 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2807 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2808 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2809 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2810 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2812 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2819 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2820 else if (check_flags)
2821 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2823 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2824 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2826 else if (!check_flags)
2829 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2830 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2831 else if (strict_mode) {
2832 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2833 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2834 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2835 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2837 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2844 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2845 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2848 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2849 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2850 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2851 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2852 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2853 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2856 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2859 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2860 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2861 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2865 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2868 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2871 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2874 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2875 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2876 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2879 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2881 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2882 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2887 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2890 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2892 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2897 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2898 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2903 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2907 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2910 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2911 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2918 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2919 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2921 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2922 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2923 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2924 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2925 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2932 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2933 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2935 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2940 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
2943 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2945 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2947 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2949 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2950 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2951 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2953 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2954 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2955 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2960 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2962 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2966 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2967 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2969 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2970 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2972 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2973 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2974 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2975 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2976 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2977 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2978 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2979 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2981 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2985 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2987 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2990 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2992 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2993 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2996 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2998 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3002 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3003 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3004 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3009 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3013 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3017 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3018 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3019 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3020 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3022 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3025 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3027 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3030 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3033 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3034 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3036 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3037 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3039 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3041 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3042 if (nid == NID_undef)
3045 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3047 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3050 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
3054 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3056 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3057 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3059 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3060 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3062 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3063 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3068 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3069 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3070 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3073 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
3076 int rv, start_idx, i;
3079 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3081 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3086 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3090 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3091 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3092 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3100 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3101 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3104 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3105 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3107 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3108 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3110 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3112 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3113 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3114 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3117 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3121 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3122 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3124 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3126 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
3127 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3129 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3130 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3132 const char *mdname = NULL;
3133 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3136 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3137 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3139 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3140 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3141 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
3148 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3149 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3151 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3152 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3154 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3155 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3160 * This does not differentiate between the
3161 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3162 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3163 * signing certificate.
3165 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3172 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3173 * a viable public key is permitted.
3179 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3180 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3181 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3182 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3183 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3185 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3187 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3190 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3193 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3194 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3198 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3199 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3201 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3206 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3209 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3210 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3213 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3217 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3218 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3219 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3221 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
3224 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3228 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3230 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3231 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3232 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3234 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3235 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3236 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3237 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3238 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3240 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3241 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
3243 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3244 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3247 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3248 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3250 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3252 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3253 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3255 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3256 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3257 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
3263 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3270 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3271 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3273 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3274 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3276 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3277 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3278 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3280 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
3282 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3285 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3286 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3288 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3289 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3294 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3298 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3299 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3301 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3304 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3306 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3308 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3310 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3312 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3316 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3319 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3320 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3323 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3326 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3328 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3329 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3332 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3333 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3335 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3336 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3339 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
3342 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3347 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3348 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3349 * we have to assume GOST support.
3351 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
3352 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
3353 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
3354 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3358 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3362 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3366 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3370 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3375 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3377 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3378 size_t sent_sigslen;
3380 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3384 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3388 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3389 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3390 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3391 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3392 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3395 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3399 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3404 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3408 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3414 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3415 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3416 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3417 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3421 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3423 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3424 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3425 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3429 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3433 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3435 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
3440 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3441 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3442 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3446 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3450 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3452 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3456 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3458 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3460 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3461 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3466 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3467 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3468 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3473 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3474 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3479 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3485 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3488 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3490 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3496 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3501 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3503 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3505 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3506 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3507 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3508 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3512 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3513 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3518 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3520 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3521 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3523 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3524 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3529 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3532 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3533 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3535 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3536 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3541 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3543 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3544 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3546 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3547 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3552 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3554 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3556 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3557 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3562 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3563 const unsigned char *enckey,
3566 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3567 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3569 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3570 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3572 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3573 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3574 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3578 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);