2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
127 OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.session_ticket);
131 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
133 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
141 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
142 sc->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
144 sc->version = s->method->version;
149 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
154 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
155 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
156 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
157 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
158 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
159 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
160 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
161 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
162 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
163 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
164 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
165 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
166 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
167 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
168 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
169 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
170 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
171 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
172 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
173 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
174 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
175 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
176 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
177 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
178 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
179 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
180 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
181 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
182 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
183 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D},
188 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A},
189 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B},
190 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C},
191 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
192 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
193 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
194 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
195 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
198 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
201 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
204 /* The default curves */
205 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519, /* X25519 (29) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448, /* X448 (30) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A, /* GC256A (34) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B, /* GC256B (35) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C, /* GC256C (36) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D, /* GC256D (37) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A, /* GC512A (38) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B, /* GC512B (39) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C, /* GC512C (40) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
219 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
220 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
221 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
225 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
226 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1,
227 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1,
230 struct provider_group_data_st {
232 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
235 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
236 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
237 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
239 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
240 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
241 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
243 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
244 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
246 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
249 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
250 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
252 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
253 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
254 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
256 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
257 (ctx->group_list_max_len
258 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
259 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
261 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
264 ctx->group_list = tmp;
265 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
267 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
268 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
271 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
273 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
274 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
275 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
278 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
279 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
284 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
285 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
286 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
289 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
290 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
295 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
296 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
297 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
300 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
302 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
303 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
304 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
307 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
308 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
313 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
314 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
319 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
320 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
324 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
326 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
327 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
332 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
333 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
338 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
339 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
340 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
344 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
345 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
346 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
350 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
351 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
352 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
357 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
358 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
360 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
361 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
363 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
364 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
365 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
366 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
367 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
368 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
371 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
372 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
373 ctx->group_list_len++;
376 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
384 ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
394 pgd.provider = provider;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
401 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
402 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
404 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
407 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
408 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
409 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
410 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
416 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
419 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
420 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
422 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
423 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
427 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
429 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
430 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
435 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
439 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
440 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
441 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
442 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
448 uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id)
451 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
452 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13;
453 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
454 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13;
455 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
456 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13;
457 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
458 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
459 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
466 uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id)
469 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1:
470 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1:
471 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1:
473 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13:
474 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1;
475 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13:
476 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1;
477 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13:
478 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1;
484 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
488 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
489 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
490 return &ctx->group_list[i];
496 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
504 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
505 * work for groups we don't know about.
507 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
509 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
510 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
512 if (!include_unknown)
514 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
517 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
522 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
523 * work for groups we don't know about.
525 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
527 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
528 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
535 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
536 * the number of groups supported.
538 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
541 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
543 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
544 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
545 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
546 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
547 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
550 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
551 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
555 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
556 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
561 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
562 *pgroups = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
563 *pgroupslen = sctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
565 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
566 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
572 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
573 int minversion, int maxversion,
574 int isec, int *okfortls13)
576 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
580 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
586 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
587 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
589 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
592 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
593 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
594 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
596 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
598 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
601 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
602 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
603 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
604 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
605 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
606 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
609 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
610 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
611 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
616 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
617 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group, int op)
619 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
621 unsigned char gtmp[2];
626 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
627 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
628 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
629 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
632 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
633 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
636 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
643 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
644 * if there is no match.
645 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
646 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
647 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
649 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int nmatch)
651 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
652 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
655 /* Can't do anything on client side */
659 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
661 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
662 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
664 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
666 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
667 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1;
668 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
669 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1;
670 /* Should never happen */
673 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
677 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
678 * otherwise peer decides.
680 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
681 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
682 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
684 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
685 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
688 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
689 uint16_t id = pref[i];
692 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
693 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
694 cid = ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id);
696 cid = id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id);
698 if (!tls1_in_list(cid, supp, num_supp)
699 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
707 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
711 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
712 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
717 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
718 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
720 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
721 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
722 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
725 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
728 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
729 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
732 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
733 unsigned long idmask;
735 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
736 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
738 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
739 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
740 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
754 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
755 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
763 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
765 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
768 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
772 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
774 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
777 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
780 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
782 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
785 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
787 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
788 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
791 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
792 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
794 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
798 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
799 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
807 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
808 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
809 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
812 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
820 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
823 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
827 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
830 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
834 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
835 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id,
836 int check_own_groups)
838 const uint16_t *groups;
844 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
845 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
846 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
849 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
851 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
852 if (group_id != OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
855 /* Should never happen */
860 if (check_own_groups) {
861 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
862 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
863 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
867 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
870 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
874 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
875 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
878 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
879 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
880 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
881 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
885 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
888 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
892 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
894 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
895 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
896 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
898 *pformats = ecformats_default;
899 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
901 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
903 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
907 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
908 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
910 unsigned char comp_id;
914 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
915 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
919 /* Get required compression id */
920 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
923 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
924 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
925 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
927 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
932 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
934 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
935 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
936 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
937 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
942 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
943 * supported (see RFC4492).
945 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
948 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
949 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
955 /* Return group id of a key */
956 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
958 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
960 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
962 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
966 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
967 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
969 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
973 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
976 /* If not EC nothing to do */
977 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
979 /* Check compression */
980 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
982 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
984 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
987 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
990 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
993 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
997 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
998 if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1)
999 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
1000 else if (group_id == OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1)
1001 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
1003 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1004 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1005 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1014 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1015 * @s: SSL connection
1016 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1018 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1019 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1021 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1023 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned long cid)
1025 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1026 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
1027 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
1029 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1032 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
1033 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1, 1);
1034 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
1035 return tls1_check_group_id(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1, 1);
1040 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1041 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1042 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1043 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1044 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1045 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1046 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1048 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1049 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1051 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1052 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1053 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1054 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1055 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1056 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1058 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1059 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1060 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1062 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1063 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1065 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1066 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1068 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1069 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1071 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1072 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1073 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1076 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1077 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1078 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1079 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1080 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1085 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1086 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1087 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1090 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1091 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1092 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1093 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1094 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1095 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1096 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1097 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1098 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1099 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1100 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1101 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1102 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1103 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1104 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1106 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1107 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1108 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1109 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1110 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1111 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1112 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256,
1113 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1114 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_brainpoolP256r1, 1},
1115 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384,
1116 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1117 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_brainpoolP384r1, 1},
1118 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512,
1119 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1120 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_brainpoolP512r1, 1},
1121 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1122 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1123 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1124 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1125 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1126 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1127 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1128 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1129 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1130 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1131 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1132 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1133 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1134 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1135 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1136 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1137 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1138 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1139 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1140 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1141 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1142 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1143 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1144 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1145 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1146 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1147 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1148 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1149 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1150 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1151 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1152 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1153 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1154 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1155 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1156 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1157 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1158 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1159 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1160 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1161 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1162 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1163 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1164 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1165 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1166 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1167 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1168 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1170 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1171 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1172 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1173 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1174 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1175 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1176 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1177 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1178 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1179 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1180 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1181 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1182 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1183 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1184 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1185 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1186 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1187 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1188 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1189 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1192 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1193 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1194 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1195 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1196 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1197 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1201 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1202 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1204 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1205 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1206 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1207 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1208 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1209 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1210 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1211 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1212 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1213 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1216 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1219 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1220 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1221 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1222 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1225 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1229 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1230 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1236 * Check hash is available.
1237 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1238 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1239 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1240 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1241 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1243 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1244 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1245 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1249 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1250 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1253 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1254 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1256 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1257 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1260 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1265 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1266 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1270 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1271 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1275 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1277 for (i = 0, lu = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1278 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1279 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1281 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1289 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1290 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1296 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1297 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1300 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1310 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1312 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1313 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1314 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1316 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1317 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1318 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1324 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1326 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1332 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1333 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1334 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1335 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1336 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1338 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1345 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1346 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1347 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1351 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1358 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1360 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1363 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1365 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1372 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1373 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1375 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1378 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1380 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1387 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1390 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1392 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1393 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1397 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, NULL))
1399 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1403 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1405 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1407 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1408 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1411 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1413 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1415 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1418 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1422 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1425 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1428 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1429 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1430 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1431 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1433 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1434 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1437 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1438 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1442 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1443 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1444 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1446 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1447 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1448 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1449 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1450 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1451 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1453 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1454 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1459 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1460 * specified EC curve.
1462 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int curve)
1464 const uint16_t *sigs;
1467 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1468 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1469 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1471 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1472 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1475 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1476 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1480 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1481 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1482 && curve == lu->curve)
1490 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1493 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1495 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1498 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1502 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1504 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1505 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1507 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1508 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1509 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1511 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1512 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1513 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1514 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1516 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1518 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1520 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1523 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1524 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1526 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1533 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1534 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1537 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1539 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1540 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1542 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1544 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1547 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1548 /* Should never happen */
1551 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1552 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1553 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1557 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1558 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1559 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1561 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1563 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1564 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1567 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1568 && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1569 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1570 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1574 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1575 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1576 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1581 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1583 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1584 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1586 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1590 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1591 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1592 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1594 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1599 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1600 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1601 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1605 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1606 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1607 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1608 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1610 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1615 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1620 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1621 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1622 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1623 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1626 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1627 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1628 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1632 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu, &md)) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1637 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1638 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1640 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1641 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1642 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
1644 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1645 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1646 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1650 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1651 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1655 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1657 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1662 if (sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1664 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1668 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1670 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
1675 if (sc->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1677 *pnid = sc->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1682 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1683 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1684 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1686 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1689 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1691 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1693 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1694 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1695 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1696 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1697 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1700 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1701 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1702 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1703 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1705 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1707 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1708 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1709 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1716 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1717 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1718 * @c: cipher to check
1719 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1720 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1722 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1724 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c,
1727 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1728 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1730 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1732 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1733 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1736 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1737 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1739 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1740 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1741 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1743 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1746 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1747 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1748 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1751 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1754 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1756 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1758 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1761 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1765 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1767 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1768 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1769 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1770 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1771 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1773 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1774 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1776 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1777 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1778 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1779 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1781 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1782 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1787 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1788 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1789 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1790 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1798 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1802 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1805 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1807 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1812 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1814 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1815 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1816 * point to the resulting session.
1818 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1819 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1823 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1826 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1829 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1830 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1833 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1834 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1836 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1837 if (!ticketext->present)
1838 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1840 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1842 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1843 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1847 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1849 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1850 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1851 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1852 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1855 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1856 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1857 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1858 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1859 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1860 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1862 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1863 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1864 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1865 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1866 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1867 * point to the resulting session.
1869 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1870 const unsigned char *etick,
1872 const unsigned char *sess_id,
1873 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1875 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1876 unsigned char *sdec;
1877 const unsigned char *p;
1878 int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1879 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1881 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1882 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1883 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1884 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1886 if (eticklen == 0) {
1888 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1889 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1891 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1894 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1896 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1897 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1898 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1899 * calculate the master secret later.
1901 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1905 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1906 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1907 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1911 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1912 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1914 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1917 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1919 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1923 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1925 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1928 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1931 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1932 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1933 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1935 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1938 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1939 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1940 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), nctick,
1941 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1942 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1945 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1949 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1955 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1956 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1958 /* Check key name matches */
1959 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1960 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1961 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1965 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1967 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1968 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1969 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1971 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1972 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1973 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1974 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1975 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1978 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1979 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1983 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1986 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1988 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1992 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1994 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1998 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1999 if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
2000 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2004 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2005 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
2006 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
2007 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2011 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2012 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2015 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2016 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2017 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
2018 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
2019 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2020 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
2021 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
2023 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2026 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
2028 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2034 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2038 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2040 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2042 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2046 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2047 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2048 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2052 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2053 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2056 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2058 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2063 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2065 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2068 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2069 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2072 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2073 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2074 * performs any action
2076 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2077 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2078 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2079 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2080 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2081 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2084 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2085 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2086 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2087 sess, etick, keyname_len,
2089 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2091 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2092 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2095 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2096 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2097 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2101 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2102 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2103 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2104 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2105 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2109 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2110 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2111 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2112 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2113 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2114 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2115 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2117 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2121 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2125 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2127 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2128 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2129 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2130 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2139 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2140 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op,
2141 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2143 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2146 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2148 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2149 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2152 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2155 if (!s->server && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2156 && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2157 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2158 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2159 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2162 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2163 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu->sig_idx))
2166 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2167 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2168 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2169 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2170 if (s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
2173 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2174 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2176 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2179 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2180 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2181 * ciphersuites enabled.
2184 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2187 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
2188 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2189 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2190 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2192 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2193 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2194 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2197 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2205 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2206 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), lu);
2207 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2208 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2209 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2213 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2214 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2218 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op)
2220 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2221 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2222 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2224 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2227 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2228 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2230 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2235 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2239 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2240 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2241 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2242 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2244 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2247 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2248 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2253 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2254 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2257 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2259 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2262 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2263 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2265 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2266 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2267 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2268 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2272 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2276 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2277 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2278 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2279 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2280 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2282 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2283 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2284 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2285 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2287 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2289 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2291 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2292 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2303 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2304 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2306 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2307 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2309 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2311 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2313 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2314 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2315 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2316 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2317 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2318 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2319 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2320 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2321 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2322 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2324 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2325 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2328 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2329 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2333 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2334 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2336 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2338 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2339 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2342 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2346 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2347 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2351 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2357 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2359 /* Invalid data length */
2360 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2365 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2366 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2369 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2377 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2384 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2386 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2387 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2389 /* Should never happen */
2390 if (s->cert == NULL)
2394 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2395 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2397 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2398 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2402 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2404 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2407 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2409 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2412 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2415 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2416 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2417 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2419 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2420 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2422 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2423 if (pvalid[idx] == 0
2424 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), idx))
2425 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2430 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2431 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2432 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2436 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2441 psig = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2442 numsigalgs = sc->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2444 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2447 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2449 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2453 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2455 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2456 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc, *psig);
2458 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2460 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2461 if (psignhash != NULL)
2462 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2464 return (int)numsigalgs;
2467 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2468 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2469 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2471 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2472 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
2477 if (sc->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2479 || idx >= (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen
2480 || sc->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2482 shsigalgs = sc->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2484 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2486 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2487 if (psignhash != NULL)
2488 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2490 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2492 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2493 return (int)sc->shared_sigalgslen;
2496 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2497 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2501 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2502 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2505 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2507 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2508 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2509 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2510 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2511 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2512 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2513 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2514 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2516 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2517 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2518 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2521 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2522 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2524 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2526 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2528 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2529 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2530 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2533 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2535 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2537 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2539 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2541 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2542 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2543 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2544 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2545 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2546 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2550 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2552 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2553 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2557 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2564 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2565 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2566 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2568 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2570 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2571 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2575 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2579 /* Reject duplicates */
2580 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2581 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2590 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2591 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2593 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2597 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2601 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2604 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2609 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2610 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2613 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2616 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2617 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2618 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2620 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2621 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2622 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2628 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2630 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2635 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2636 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2639 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2641 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2642 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2643 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2645 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2647 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2648 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2653 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2658 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2659 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2660 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2662 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2663 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2664 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2670 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2674 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2676 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2678 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2681 if (default_nid == -1)
2683 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2685 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2687 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2689 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2690 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2691 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2693 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2696 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2698 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2699 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2700 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2701 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2702 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2708 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2709 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2711 const X509_NAME *nm;
2713 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2714 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2715 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2722 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2723 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2724 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2725 * attempting to use them.
2728 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2730 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2731 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2732 /* Strict mode flags */
2733 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2734 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2735 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2737 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk,
2738 STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx)
2742 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2743 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2746 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2748 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2750 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2753 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2755 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2756 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2758 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2760 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2761 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2770 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2773 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2775 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2776 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2778 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2785 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2786 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2787 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2788 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2789 else if (!check_flags)
2794 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2795 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2797 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
2802 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2803 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2805 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2809 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2810 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2813 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2814 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2815 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2819 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2820 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2823 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2824 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2825 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2828 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2829 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2830 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2833 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2834 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2835 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2844 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2845 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2847 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2849 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2850 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2851 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2853 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2856 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2863 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2864 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2866 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2867 * so check_flags is always set.
2869 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2870 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2871 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2875 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2876 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2877 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2878 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2880 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2887 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2888 else if (check_flags)
2889 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2891 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2892 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2894 else if (!check_flags)
2897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2898 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2899 else if (strict_mode) {
2900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2901 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2902 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2903 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2905 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2912 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2913 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2916 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2917 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2918 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2919 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2920 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2921 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2924 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2927 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2928 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2933 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2936 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2939 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2942 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2943 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2944 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2946 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2947 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2949 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2950 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2955 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2958 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2960 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2965 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2966 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2968 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2971 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2975 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2978 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2979 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2986 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2987 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2989 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2990 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2991 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2992 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2993 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2994 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2995 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2996 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2997 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
3000 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
3001 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3003 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
3008 return tls1_check_chain(sc, x, pk, chain, -1);
3011 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3013 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
3015 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
3016 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3017 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
3018 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
3019 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3021 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
3022 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3023 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3028 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
3030 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
3034 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3035 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3037 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
3038 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
3040 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3041 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3042 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
3043 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
3044 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
3045 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3046 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3047 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
3049 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
3053 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
3055 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
3058 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3060 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
3061 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
3064 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
3066 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
3070 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
3071 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
3072 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3077 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3081 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3085 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3086 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3087 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3088 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3090 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
3093 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3095 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3098 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
3101 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3102 int secbits, nid, pknid;
3104 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3105 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3107 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3109 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3110 if (nid == NID_undef)
3113 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3115 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3118 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy,
3122 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3124 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3125 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3127 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3128 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3130 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3131 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3136 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3137 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3138 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3141 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
3144 int rv, start_idx, i;
3147 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3149 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3154 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3158 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3159 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3160 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3168 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3169 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3172 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3173 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3175 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3176 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3178 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3180 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3181 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3182 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3185 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3189 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3190 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3192 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3194 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig,
3195 X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3197 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3198 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3200 const char *mdname = NULL;
3201 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3204 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3205 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3207 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3208 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3209 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, sctx->libctx,
3216 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3217 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3219 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3220 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3222 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3223 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3228 * This does not differentiate between the
3229 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3230 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3231 * signing certificate.
3233 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3240 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3241 * a viable public key is permitted.
3247 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3248 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3249 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3250 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3251 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3253 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3255 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3258 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3261 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3262 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3266 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3267 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3269 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3274 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3277 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3278 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3281 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3285 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3286 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3287 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3289 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 *x,
3292 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3296 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3298 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3299 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3300 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3302 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3303 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3304 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3305 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3306 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3308 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3309 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, NULL))
3311 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3312 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3315 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3316 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3318 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3320 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3321 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3323 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3324 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3325 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, tmppkey, lu))
3331 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3338 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3339 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3341 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3342 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3344 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3345 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3346 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3348 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int fatalerrs)
3350 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3353 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3354 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3356 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3357 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3362 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3366 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3367 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3369 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3372 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3374 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3376 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3378 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3380 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3384 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3387 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3388 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3391 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3394 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3396 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3397 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3400 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3401 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3403 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3404 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3405 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3407 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx, pkey, lu))
3410 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3415 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3416 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3417 * we have to assume GOST support.
3419 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen
3420 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
3421 & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) != 0) {
3422 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3426 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3430 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3434 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3438 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3443 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3445 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3446 size_t sent_sigslen;
3448 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3452 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3456 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3457 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3458 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3459 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3460 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3463 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3467 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3472 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3476 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3482 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3483 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3484 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3485 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3489 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3491 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3492 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3493 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3497 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3501 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3503 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
3508 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3509 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3510 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3514 sc->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3518 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3520 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3524 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3526 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3528 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3529 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3534 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3535 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3536 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3541 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3542 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3547 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3553 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3556 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3558 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3564 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3569 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3571 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3573 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3574 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3575 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3576 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3580 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3581 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3586 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3588 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3589 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3591 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3592 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3597 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3600 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3601 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3603 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3604 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3609 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3611 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3612 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3614 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3615 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3620 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3622 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3624 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3625 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3630 __owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3631 const unsigned char *enckey,
3634 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3635 int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3637 if (bits <= 0 || enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3638 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3640 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3641 if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3642 || enckey[0] != 0x04)
3646 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);