2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
33 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
58 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 switch (st->hand_state) {
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
70 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
71 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
72 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
76 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
87 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
93 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
94 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
101 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
108 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
142 /* No valid transition found */
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
157 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
165 switch (st->hand_state) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
190 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
192 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
193 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
200 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
313 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
314 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
374 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
376 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
377 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
379 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
382 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
383 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
385 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
386 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
389 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
391 * ... except when the application insists on
392 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
395 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
396 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
397 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
399 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
402 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
410 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
416 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
419 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
423 switch (st->hand_state) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
432 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 /* Try to read from the client instead */
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
448 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
449 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
451 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
458 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
467 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
504 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
505 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
506 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
509 * handshake at this point.
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
528 * been configured for.
530 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
531 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
540 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
542 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
544 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
547 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
548 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
552 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
554 switch (st->hand_state) {
556 /* Shouldn't happen */
557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
558 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
563 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
566 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
586 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
587 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
588 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
602 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
608 /* normal PSK or SRP */
609 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
610 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
637 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
673 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
680 * the server to the client.
682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
686 switch (st->hand_state) {
688 /* No pre work to be done */
691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
728 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
729 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
730 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
735 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
737 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
738 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
744 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
747 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
752 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
754 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
755 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
756 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
757 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
761 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
763 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
764 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
765 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
766 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
770 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
771 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
777 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
779 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
784 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
788 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
798 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
799 * server to the client.
801 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
803 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
807 switch (st->hand_state) {
809 /* No post work to be done */
812 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
813 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
815 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
822 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
824 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
825 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
830 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
831 * treat like it was the first packet
836 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
837 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
838 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
839 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
845 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
846 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
850 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
853 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
854 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
856 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
857 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
858 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
861 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
862 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
866 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
872 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
876 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
877 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
881 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
882 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
883 if (!statem_flush(s))
888 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
889 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
890 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
891 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
896 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
897 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
898 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
903 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
904 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
905 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
907 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
912 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
914 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
917 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
921 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
922 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
924 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
932 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
933 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
937 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
938 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
941 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
943 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
946 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
951 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
953 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
954 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
956 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
957 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
958 /* SSLfatal() already called */
963 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
964 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
965 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
970 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
971 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
973 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
981 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
982 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
983 && conn_is_closed()) {
985 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
986 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
987 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
988 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
989 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
991 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1000 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1004 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1007 * Valid return values are:
1011 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1012 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1014 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1016 switch (st->hand_state) {
1018 /* Shouldn't happen */
1019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1020 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1021 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1024 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1026 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1028 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1029 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1032 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1033 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1034 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1037 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1038 /* No construction function needed */
1040 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1043 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1044 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1045 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1048 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1049 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1050 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1053 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1054 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1055 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1059 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1060 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1061 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1064 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1065 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1066 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1069 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1070 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1071 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1074 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1075 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1076 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1079 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1080 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1081 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1084 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1085 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1086 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1089 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1091 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1094 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1095 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1096 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1099 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1100 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1101 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1109 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1110 * calculated as follows:
1112 * 2 + # client_version
1113 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1114 * 1 + # length of session_id
1115 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1116 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1117 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1118 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1119 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1120 * 2 + # length of extensions
1121 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1123 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1125 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1126 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1129 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1130 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1132 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1134 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1136 switch (st->hand_state) {
1138 /* Shouldn't happen */
1141 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1142 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1144 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1145 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1147 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1148 return s->max_cert_list;
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1151 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1153 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1154 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1158 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1161 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1162 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1164 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1165 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1167 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1168 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1173 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1175 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1177 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1179 switch (st->hand_state) {
1181 /* Shouldn't happen */
1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1183 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1187 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1188 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1190 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1191 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1193 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1194 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1196 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1197 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1199 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1200 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1203 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1204 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1207 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1208 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1210 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1211 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1213 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1214 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1220 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1223 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1227 switch (st->hand_state) {
1229 /* Shouldn't happen */
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1231 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1236 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1239 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1244 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1245 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1248 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1250 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1251 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1252 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1254 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1258 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1259 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1262 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1265 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1266 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1267 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1268 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1269 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1278 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1281 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1282 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1283 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1289 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1291 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1292 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1293 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1294 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1295 cookie_leni > 255) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1297 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1300 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1302 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1303 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1305 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1314 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1315 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1316 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1320 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1322 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1323 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1324 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1325 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1327 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1329 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1330 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1331 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1332 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1333 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1334 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1335 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1337 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1338 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1339 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1340 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1341 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1342 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1343 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1344 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1345 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1346 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1347 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1348 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1349 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1351 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1352 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1357 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1359 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1360 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1365 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1368 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1369 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1371 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1374 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1376 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1378 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1379 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1380 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1381 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1383 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1384 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1385 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1391 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1393 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1395 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1401 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1402 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1409 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1411 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1412 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1414 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1417 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1418 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1420 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1425 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1426 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1427 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1428 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1430 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1431 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1433 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1434 * 7-8 session_id_length
1435 * 9-10 challenge_length
1439 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1440 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1442 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1443 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1444 * in the first place
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1458 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1459 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1461 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1462 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1463 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1465 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1468 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1469 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1470 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1476 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1482 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1484 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1485 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1486 /* No extensions. */
1487 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1489 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1492 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1494 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1495 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1496 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1497 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1499 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1500 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1501 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1502 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1503 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1504 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1505 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1506 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1512 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1514 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1515 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1516 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1517 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1518 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1519 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1521 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1525 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1526 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1531 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1532 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1533 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1535 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1540 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1541 * So check cookie length...
1543 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1544 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1545 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1546 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1551 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1557 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1559 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1563 /* Could be empty. */
1564 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1565 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1567 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1568 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1570 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1576 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1577 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1578 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1585 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1586 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1587 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1588 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1589 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1592 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1594 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1597 if (clienthello != NULL)
1598 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1599 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1601 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1604 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1607 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1612 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1614 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1615 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1616 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1617 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1618 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1620 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1621 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1622 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1623 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1624 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1625 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1627 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1628 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1630 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1633 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1634 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1639 /* Set up the client_random */
1640 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1642 /* Choose the version */
1644 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1645 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1646 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1647 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1649 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1653 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1654 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1658 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1661 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1662 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1664 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1665 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1666 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1667 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1668 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1674 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1675 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1676 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1679 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1683 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1684 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1687 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1692 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1693 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1694 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1695 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1696 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1698 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1699 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1701 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1703 /* default verification */
1704 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1705 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1706 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1708 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1709 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1712 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1714 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1715 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1716 if (protverr != 0) {
1717 s->version = s->client_version;
1718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1719 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1727 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1728 clienthello->isv2) ||
1729 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1730 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1735 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1736 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1737 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1738 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1739 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1740 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1741 if (s->renegotiate) {
1742 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1744 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1745 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1748 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1749 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1750 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1752 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1753 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1754 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1755 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1756 * an insecure downgrade.
1758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1759 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1760 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1766 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1768 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1769 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1771 if (cipher == NULL) {
1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1773 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1774 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1777 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1778 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1779 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1781 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1782 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1785 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1789 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1792 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1793 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1794 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1795 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1801 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1802 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1804 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1805 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1806 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1807 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1808 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1809 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1810 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1811 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1812 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1813 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1816 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1818 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1819 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1824 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1826 /* previous session */
1828 } else if (i == -1) {
1829 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1833 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1840 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1841 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1842 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1843 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1847 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1848 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1850 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1852 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1854 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1855 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1856 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1858 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1859 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1860 if (trc_out != NULL)
1861 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1862 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1870 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1874 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1875 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1876 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1879 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1882 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1883 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1887 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1890 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1891 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1896 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1897 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1898 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1900 /* TLS extensions */
1901 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1902 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1903 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1908 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1909 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1910 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1911 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1915 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1916 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1918 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1925 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1928 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1929 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1931 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1932 * backwards compat reasons
1934 int master_key_length;
1936 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1937 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1938 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1940 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1941 && master_key_length > 0) {
1942 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1944 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1945 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1949 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1950 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1951 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1952 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1953 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1955 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1956 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1960 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1961 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1962 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1963 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1964 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1969 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1970 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1971 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1973 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1974 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1976 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1977 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1978 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1980 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1982 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1983 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1988 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1989 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1990 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1992 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1993 /* Can't disable compression */
1994 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1996 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1997 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2000 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2001 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2002 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2003 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2004 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2008 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2010 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2011 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2014 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2015 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2016 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2019 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2021 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2022 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2025 } else if (s->hit) {
2027 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2028 /* See if we have a match */
2029 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2032 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2033 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2034 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2036 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2037 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2046 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2052 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2053 * using compression.
2055 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2057 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2058 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2064 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2067 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2068 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2069 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2070 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2072 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2073 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2080 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2081 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2083 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2085 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2086 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2091 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2092 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2093 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2094 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2095 s->clienthello = NULL;
2098 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2099 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2100 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2101 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2102 s->clienthello = NULL;
2108 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2109 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2111 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2113 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2116 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2117 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2118 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2119 * influence which certificate is sent
2121 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2122 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2125 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2126 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2128 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2129 * et al can pick it up.
2131 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2132 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2134 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2135 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2136 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2138 /* status request response should be sent */
2139 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2140 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2141 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2143 /* something bad happened */
2144 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2147 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2148 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2158 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2159 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2161 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2163 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2164 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2166 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2167 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2168 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2169 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2170 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2172 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2173 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2174 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2175 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2180 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2182 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2186 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2187 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2188 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2189 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2190 selected_len) != 0) {
2191 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2192 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2196 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2197 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2200 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2202 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2208 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2210 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2214 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2219 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2221 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2225 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2230 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2231 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2232 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2233 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2239 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2241 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2243 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2244 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2246 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2253 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2254 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2255 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2256 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2257 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2260 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2261 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2265 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2268 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2271 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2272 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2274 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2276 if (cipher == NULL) {
2277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2278 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2279 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2282 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2285 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2286 /* SSLfatal already called */
2289 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2290 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2291 s->session->not_resumable =
2292 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2293 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2294 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2295 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2296 /* do not send a session ticket */
2297 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2300 /* Session-id reuse */
2301 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2305 * we now have the following setup.
2307 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2308 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2309 * compression - basically ignored right now
2310 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2311 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2312 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2313 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2317 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2318 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2320 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2321 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2325 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2326 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2327 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2328 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2330 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2338 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2340 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2342 * callback indicates further work to be done
2344 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2354 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2359 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2364 unsigned char *session_id;
2365 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2367 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2370 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2371 * tls_process_client_hello()
2373 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2374 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2375 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2376 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2378 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2383 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2384 * back in the server hello:
2385 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2386 * we send back the old session ID.
2387 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2388 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2389 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2390 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2392 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2393 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2394 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2396 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2397 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2400 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2401 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2403 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2406 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2407 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2409 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2410 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2413 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2414 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 /* set up the compression method */
2420 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2423 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2426 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2429 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2430 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2431 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2433 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2437 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2438 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2439 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2441 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2442 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2444 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2448 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2449 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2450 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2455 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2456 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2458 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2459 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2462 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2463 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2464 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2471 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2473 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2474 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2482 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2485 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2488 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2489 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2492 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2496 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2497 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2498 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2500 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2502 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2506 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2508 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2512 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2514 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2516 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2517 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2519 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2521 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2522 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2524 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2527 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2528 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2529 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2530 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2537 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2540 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2542 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2543 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2544 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2553 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2559 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2560 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2566 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2568 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2573 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2574 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2575 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2579 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2583 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2587 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2590 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2591 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2595 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2597 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2599 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2604 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2605 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2606 if (curve_id == 0) {
2607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2608 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2612 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2613 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2614 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2619 /* Encode the public key. */
2620 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2622 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2624 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2629 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2630 * can set these to NULLs
2637 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2639 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2640 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2641 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2642 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2644 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2648 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2649 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2650 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2651 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2656 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2657 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2661 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2662 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2664 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2671 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2672 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2673 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2676 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2677 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2679 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2680 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2683 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2691 unsigned char *binval;
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2695 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2696 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2699 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2703 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2710 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2711 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2714 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2715 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2718 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2720 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2724 memset(binval, 0, len);
2728 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2729 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2731 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2732 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2736 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2740 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2742 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2743 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2744 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2747 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2748 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2749 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2750 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2752 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2753 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2757 encodedPoint = NULL;
2763 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2765 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2766 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2768 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2769 /* Should never happen */
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2771 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2776 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 /* send signature algorithm */
2783 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2790 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2797 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2798 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2800 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2805 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2806 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2813 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2814 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2815 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2816 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2817 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2820 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2831 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2834 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2836 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2840 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2842 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2843 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2844 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2845 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2846 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2847 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2848 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2849 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2850 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2852 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2853 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2856 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2857 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2862 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2864 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2865 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2871 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2873 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2879 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2880 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2881 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2883 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2888 const uint16_t *psigs;
2889 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2891 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2892 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2893 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2894 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2896 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2897 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2903 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2909 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2913 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2916 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2918 PACKET psk_identity;
2920 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2922 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2925 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2927 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2930 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2932 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2936 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2945 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2947 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2949 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2951 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2954 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2955 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2959 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2960 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2961 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2963 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2965 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2969 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2973 /* Should never happen */
2974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2975 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2984 PACKET enc_premaster;
2985 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2986 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2988 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2989 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2991 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2994 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2998 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2999 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
3000 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3002 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3003 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3005 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3010 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3011 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3012 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3014 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3018 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3021 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3026 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3027 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3028 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3029 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3030 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3031 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3032 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3033 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3034 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3036 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3037 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3039 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3043 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3044 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3045 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3046 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3047 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3048 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3049 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3051 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3052 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3053 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3054 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3056 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3061 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3062 * we double check anyway.
3064 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3065 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3067 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3071 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3072 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
3073 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
3074 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3080 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3081 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3084 /* Should never happen */
3085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3094 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3098 const unsigned char *data;
3099 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3102 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3104 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3107 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3110 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3114 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3116 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3119 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3120 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3125 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3126 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3132 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3133 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3134 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3141 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3142 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3147 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3148 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3150 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3153 /* Should never happen */
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3163 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3164 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3167 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3168 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3170 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3174 const unsigned char *data;
3177 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3178 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3181 /* Get encoded point length */
3182 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3183 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3185 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3190 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3194 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3195 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3200 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3207 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3213 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3214 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3216 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3220 /* Should never happen */
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3227 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3231 const unsigned char *data;
3233 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3234 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3236 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3239 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3244 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3246 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3249 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3250 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3251 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3257 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3264 /* Should never happen */
3265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3271 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3274 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3275 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3276 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3277 const unsigned char *start;
3278 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3279 unsigned long alg_a;
3280 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3281 const unsigned char *ptr;
3284 /* Get our certificate private key */
3285 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3286 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3288 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3290 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3292 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3295 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3297 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3298 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3301 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3302 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3304 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3307 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3314 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3315 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3316 * client certificate for authorization only.
3318 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3319 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3320 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3324 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3325 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3326 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3327 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3329 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3330 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3332 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3336 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3338 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3342 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3344 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3348 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3349 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3351 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3354 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3357 /* Generate master secret */
3358 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3359 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3360 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3363 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3364 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3366 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3370 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3371 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3374 /* Should never happen */
3375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3383 unsigned long alg_k;
3385 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3387 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3388 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3389 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3393 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3394 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3395 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3398 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3401 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3402 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3403 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3406 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3407 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3411 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3412 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3416 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3417 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3421 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3422 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3426 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3427 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3433 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3434 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3438 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3441 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3442 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3447 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3450 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3451 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3452 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3453 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3456 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3459 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3460 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3462 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3463 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3464 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3467 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3468 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3473 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3477 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3478 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3483 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3485 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3486 * the handshake_buffer
3488 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3492 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3494 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3496 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3501 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3502 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3504 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3505 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3510 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3513 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3516 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3519 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3520 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3521 PACKET spkt, context;
3523 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3526 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3527 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3530 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3532 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3534 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3538 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3539 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3540 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3541 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3543 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3547 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3548 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3550 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3554 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3555 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3556 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3558 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3559 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3563 certstart = certbytes;
3564 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3567 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3570 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3572 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3573 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3577 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3578 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3581 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3583 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3587 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3588 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3589 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3590 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3591 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3592 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3593 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3596 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3599 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3601 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3602 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3608 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3609 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3610 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3612 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3613 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3616 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3617 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3618 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3620 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3621 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3624 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3625 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3626 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3631 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3633 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3634 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3635 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3640 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3643 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3646 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3647 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3653 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3654 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3655 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3656 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3657 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3660 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3661 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3663 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3664 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3668 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3669 s->session = new_sess;
3672 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3673 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3674 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3676 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3677 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3680 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3683 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3689 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3690 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3694 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3695 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3696 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3697 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3698 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3703 /* Resend session tickets */
3704 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3707 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3711 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3715 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3717 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3721 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3726 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3727 * for the server Certificate message
3729 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3731 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3734 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3742 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3743 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3746 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3747 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3748 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3751 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3752 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3753 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3755 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3759 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3760 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3761 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3768 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3769 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3771 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3778 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3779 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3781 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3782 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3783 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3784 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3785 const unsigned char *const_p;
3786 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3789 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3790 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3791 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3793 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3795 /* get session encoding length */
3796 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3798 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3801 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3803 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3806 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3809 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3813 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3814 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3815 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3817 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3822 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3824 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3829 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3832 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3839 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3840 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3841 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3844 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3848 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3850 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3851 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3854 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3857 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3858 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3861 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3863 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3868 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3869 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3870 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3873 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3874 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3875 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3876 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3881 /* Put timeout and length */
3882 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3883 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3885 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3890 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3891 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3896 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3899 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3901 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3903 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3904 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3905 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3906 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3907 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3908 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3914 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3915 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3918 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3923 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3924 /* Output key name */
3925 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3927 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3928 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3930 /* Encrypt session data */
3931 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3932 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3933 || encdata1 != encdata2
3934 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3935 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3936 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3937 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3938 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3939 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
3940 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3941 macendoffset - macoffset)
3942 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3943 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
3944 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3945 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3946 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3948 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3952 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3953 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3962 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3963 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3967 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3968 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3970 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3971 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3975 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3976 s->session->session_id_length)
3977 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3986 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3988 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3989 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3991 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3995 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3997 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4000 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4001 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4002 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4004 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4005 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4007 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4011 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4014 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4015 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4016 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4018 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4019 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4021 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4022 /* SSLfatal already called */
4026 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4027 s->session = new_sess;
4030 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4031 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4034 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
4035 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4037 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4041 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4043 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4044 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4045 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4049 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4051 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4054 s->session->master_key,
4056 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4059 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4061 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4062 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4063 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4064 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4065 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4066 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4068 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4069 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4072 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4074 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4077 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4078 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4082 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4083 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4084 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4087 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4088 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4089 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4090 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4091 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4094 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4096 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4100 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4101 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4102 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4104 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4108 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4109 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4110 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4113 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4114 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4123 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4124 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4126 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4129 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4130 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4139 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4141 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4142 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4151 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4152 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4154 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4156 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4157 size_t next_proto_len;
4160 * The payload looks like:
4162 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4163 * uint8 padding_len;
4164 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4166 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4167 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4168 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4170 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4171 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4174 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4178 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4181 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4183 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4187 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4189 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4198 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4200 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4202 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4203 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4206 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4207 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4210 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4214 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4215 * a record boundary.
4217 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4219 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4220 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4221 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4224 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4225 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4226 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4228 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4231 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;