2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
618 * Valid return values are:
622 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
624 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
626 switch (st->hand_state) {
628 /* Shouldn't happen */
631 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
632 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
634 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
635 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
638 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
641 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
644 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
646 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
647 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
649 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
650 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
653 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
656 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
658 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
660 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
662 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
664 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
665 return tls_construct_finished(s,
667 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
669 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
674 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
675 * calculated as follows:
677 * 2 + # client_version
678 * 32 + # only valid length for random
679 * 1 + # length of session_id
680 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
681 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
682 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
683 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
684 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
685 * 2 + # length of extensions
686 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
688 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
690 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
691 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
694 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
695 * reading. Excludes the message header.
697 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch (st->hand_state) {
703 /* Shouldn't happen */
706 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
707 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
710 return s->max_cert_list;
712 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
713 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
715 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
716 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
719 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
720 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
723 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
724 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
726 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
727 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
732 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
736 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
738 switch (st->hand_state) {
740 /* Shouldn't happen */
741 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
743 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
744 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
747 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
749 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
750 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
752 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
753 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
756 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
757 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
761 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
763 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
764 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
769 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
772 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
774 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
776 switch (st->hand_state) {
778 /* Shouldn't happen */
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
782 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
785 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
790 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
791 /* Are we renegotiating? */
792 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
793 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
794 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
795 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
796 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
797 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
800 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
803 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
809 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
811 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
813 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
815 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
816 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
817 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
819 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
823 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
825 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
832 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
834 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
836 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
843 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
844 unsigned char cookie_len)
846 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
847 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
848 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
854 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
859 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
860 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
861 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
862 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
864 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
865 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
869 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
870 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt,
871 DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
872 || !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&pkt, s->d1->cookie,
875 * We don't call close_construct_packet() because we don't want
876 * to buffer this message
878 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
879 || !WPACKET_get_length(&pkt, &msglen)
880 || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
882 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
883 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
887 /* number of bytes to write */
888 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
889 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
890 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
896 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
898 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
899 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
903 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
905 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
907 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
908 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
910 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
912 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
914 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
915 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
917 unsigned int version;
920 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
921 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
922 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
923 * the rest right through. Its format is:
925 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
926 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
928 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
929 * 7-8 session_id_length
930 * 9-10 challenge_length
934 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
935 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
937 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
938 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
945 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
946 /* No protocol version supplied! */
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
950 if (version == 0x0002) {
951 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
954 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
956 s->client_version = version;
958 /* No idea what protocol this is */
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
964 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
965 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
967 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
968 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
975 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
976 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
978 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
979 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
980 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
981 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
982 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
989 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
991 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
994 s->version = s->client_version;
996 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1000 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1003 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1004 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1005 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1007 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1011 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1012 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1014 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1015 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1020 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1025 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1026 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1027 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1028 /* No extensions. */
1029 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1031 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1032 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1036 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1037 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1039 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1040 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1041 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1042 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1043 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1044 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1046 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1050 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1052 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1053 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1054 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1060 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1061 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1066 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1067 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1073 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1074 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1075 * So check cookie length...
1077 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1078 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1083 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1084 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1085 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 /* Could be empty. */
1093 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1094 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1095 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1096 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1097 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1098 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1100 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1102 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1106 /* default verification */
1107 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1108 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1112 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1114 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1115 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1116 if (protverr != 0) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1118 s->version = s->client_version;
1119 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1128 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1129 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1131 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1132 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1133 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1134 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1135 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1136 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1137 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1138 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1139 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1140 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1145 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1146 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1149 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1151 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1153 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1154 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1155 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1156 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1157 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1159 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1160 /* previous session */
1162 } else if (i == -1) {
1166 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1171 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1172 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1176 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1179 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1182 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1184 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1185 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1187 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1188 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1197 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1200 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1202 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1207 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1208 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1209 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1215 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1220 /* TLS extensions */
1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1222 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1229 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1230 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1231 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1232 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1236 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1237 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1242 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1243 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1245 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1246 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1247 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1249 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1251 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1252 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1256 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1258 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1263 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1269 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1270 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1271 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1272 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1273 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1278 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1279 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1280 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1284 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1285 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1286 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1288 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1289 /* Can't disable compression */
1290 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1292 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1295 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1296 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1297 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1298 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1299 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1303 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1305 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1308 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1309 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1310 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1314 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1316 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1321 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1322 /* See if we have a match */
1323 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1326 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1327 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1328 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1330 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1331 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1340 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1346 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1347 * using compression.
1349 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1356 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1360 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1361 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1363 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1365 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1366 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1367 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1379 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1380 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1384 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1386 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1387 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1391 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1393 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1394 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1396 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1399 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1400 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1402 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1404 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1408 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1411 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1414 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1416 if (cipher == NULL) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1422 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1423 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1424 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1425 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1426 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1427 /* do not send a session ticket */
1428 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1430 /* Session-id reuse */
1431 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1434 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1435 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1442 * we now have the following setup.
1444 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1445 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1446 * compression - basically ignored right now
1447 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1448 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1449 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1450 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1453 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1454 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1455 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1457 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1465 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1467 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1469 * callback indicates further work to be done
1471 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1474 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1476 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1477 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1479 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1481 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1488 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1490 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1491 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1495 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1498 unsigned char *p, *d;
1503 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1505 /* Do the message type and length last */
1506 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1508 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1509 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1512 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1513 * tls_process_client_hello()
1515 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1516 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1519 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1520 * back in the server hello:
1521 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1522 * we send back the old session ID.
1523 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1524 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1525 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1526 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1528 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1529 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1530 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1531 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1534 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1535 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1537 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1539 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1540 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1546 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1549 /* put the cipher */
1550 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char_old(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1553 /* put the compression method */
1554 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1557 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1560 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1563 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1565 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1569 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1571 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1579 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1588 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1590 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1592 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1596 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1597 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1598 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1605 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1608 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1612 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1617 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1618 unsigned char *p, *d;
1625 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1627 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1629 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1633 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1637 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1640 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1642 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1645 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1646 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1648 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1649 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1651 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1653 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1654 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1656 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1659 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1660 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1661 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1662 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1664 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1666 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1672 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1674 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1675 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1676 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1686 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1688 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1691 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1692 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1693 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1695 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1698 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1700 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1704 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1706 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1711 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1713 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1716 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1717 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1721 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1724 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1731 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1732 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1733 if (curve_id == 0) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1735 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1738 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1739 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1740 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1741 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1746 /* Encode the public key. */
1747 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1749 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1755 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1756 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1757 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1759 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1762 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1763 * can set these to NULLs
1770 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1772 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1773 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1774 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1775 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1777 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1780 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1781 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1782 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1783 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1787 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1789 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1792 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1793 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1795 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1801 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1802 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1803 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1805 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
1812 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1813 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1814 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1816 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1819 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1820 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1821 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1823 /* Allow space for signature length */
1830 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1834 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1837 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1838 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1839 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1840 size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1841 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1843 * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1851 memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
1859 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1861 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1868 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1869 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1874 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1886 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1888 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1889 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1890 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1891 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1893 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1901 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1902 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1903 encodedPoint = NULL;
1911 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1912 * points to the space at the end.
1915 /* send signature algorithm */
1916 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1917 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash_old(p, pkey, md)) {
1918 /* Should never happen */
1919 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1927 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1929 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1930 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1931 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1932 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1933 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1934 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1935 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1936 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1938 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1943 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1946 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1947 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1949 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1954 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1955 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1963 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1966 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1971 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1972 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1976 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1978 unsigned char *p, *d;
1979 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1980 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1986 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1988 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1990 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1995 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1996 const unsigned char *psigs;
1997 unsigned char *etmp = p;
1998 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1999 /* Skip over length for now */
2001 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(s, p, psigs, nl);
2002 /* Now fill in length */
2012 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2016 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2017 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2018 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2022 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2024 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2029 /* else no CA names */
2030 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2033 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2042 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2046 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2049 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2051 PACKET psk_identity;
2053 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2058 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2059 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2063 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2069 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2075 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2078 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2082 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2084 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2086 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2088 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2092 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2093 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2094 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2096 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2097 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2102 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2106 /* Should never happen */
2107 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2113 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2116 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2118 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2119 size_t j, padding_len;
2120 PACKET enc_premaster;
2122 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2125 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2127 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2132 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2133 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2134 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2136 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2137 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2145 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2146 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2147 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2148 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2150 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2151 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2156 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2157 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2158 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2164 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2165 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2166 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2167 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2168 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2171 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2175 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2176 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2178 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2179 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2180 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2181 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2184 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2187 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2188 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2189 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2191 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2197 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2198 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2199 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2200 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2201 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2203 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2206 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2207 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2208 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2209 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2210 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2211 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2214 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2215 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2217 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2218 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2221 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2222 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2223 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2224 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2225 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2226 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2229 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2230 unsigned char workaround_good;
2231 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2232 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2234 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2235 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2236 version_good |= workaround_good;
2240 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2241 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2243 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2246 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2247 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2248 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2249 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2251 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2252 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2253 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2254 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2255 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2258 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2259 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2260 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2270 /* Should never happen */
2271 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2277 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2280 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2284 const unsigned char *data;
2285 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2288 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2289 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2291 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2294 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2296 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2301 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2302 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2306 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2307 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2312 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2313 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2317 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2318 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2320 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 if (pub_key != NULL)
2327 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2328 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2334 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2335 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2337 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2340 /* Should never happen */
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2347 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2350 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2351 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2354 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2355 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2356 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2361 const unsigned char *data;
2364 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2365 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2368 /* Get encoded point length */
2369 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2370 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2375 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2376 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2380 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2381 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2387 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2388 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2394 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2395 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2397 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2401 /* Should never happen */
2402 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2412 const unsigned char *data;
2414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2415 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2416 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2420 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2424 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2425 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2429 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2430 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2431 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2436 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 /* Should never happen */
2444 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2450 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2453 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2454 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2455 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2456 const unsigned char *start;
2457 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2458 unsigned long alg_a;
2462 const unsigned char *data;
2465 /* Get our certificate private key */
2466 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2467 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2469 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2471 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2473 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2476 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2478 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2479 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2482 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2483 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2484 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2488 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2489 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2494 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2495 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2496 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2497 * client certificate for authorization only.
2499 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2500 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2501 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2504 /* Decrypt session key */
2505 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2506 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2507 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2511 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2512 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2513 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2514 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2520 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2521 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2522 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2526 /* Generate master secret */
2527 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2528 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2529 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2534 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2535 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2536 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2540 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2543 /* Should never happen */
2544 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2550 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2553 unsigned long alg_k;
2555 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2557 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2558 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2561 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2562 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2563 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2564 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2569 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2570 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2571 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2576 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2578 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2579 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2581 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2582 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2584 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2585 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2587 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2588 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2591 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2593 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2600 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2602 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2603 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2605 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2606 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2609 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2612 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2613 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2614 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2615 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2617 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2620 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2621 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2623 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2624 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2625 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2627 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2631 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2632 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2637 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2639 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2640 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2642 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2643 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2644 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2645 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2646 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2647 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2648 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2649 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2652 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2656 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2658 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2659 * the handshake_buffer
2661 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2662 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2665 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2667 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2674 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2675 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2677 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2678 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2683 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2686 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2688 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2689 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2691 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2693 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2697 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2701 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2705 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 peer = s->session->peer;
2710 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2711 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2713 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2715 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2716 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2720 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2722 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2723 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2726 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2727 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2732 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2735 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2736 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2741 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 } else if (rv == 0) {
2744 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2751 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2752 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2754 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2756 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2761 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2763 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2768 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2769 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2774 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2776 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2781 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2789 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2790 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2792 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2797 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2798 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2799 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2800 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2801 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2803 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2806 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2812 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2813 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2814 s->session->master_key_length,
2815 s->session->master_key)) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2817 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2822 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2827 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2831 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2833 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2834 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2835 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2837 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2842 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2844 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2846 unsigned long l, llen;
2847 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2848 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2851 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2856 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2857 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2858 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2859 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2864 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2865 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2866 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2867 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2869 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2873 certstart = certbytes;
2874 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2879 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2880 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2882 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2885 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2893 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2894 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2895 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2897 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2900 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2901 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2902 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2904 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2905 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2908 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2909 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2914 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2916 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2918 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2923 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2926 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2928 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2930 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2935 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2936 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2937 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2939 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2940 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2942 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2943 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2946 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2951 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2954 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2958 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2962 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2969 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2978 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2980 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2981 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2982 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2983 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2984 const unsigned char *const_p;
2985 int len, slen_full, slen;
2988 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2989 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2990 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2993 /* get session encoding length */
2994 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2996 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2999 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3000 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3003 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3005 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3009 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3010 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3013 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3017 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3020 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3023 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3025 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3026 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3027 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3031 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3032 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3035 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3038 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3039 * follows handshake_header_length +
3040 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3041 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3042 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3043 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3045 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3046 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
3047 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3048 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3051 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3053 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3054 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3056 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3057 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3058 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3062 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3063 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3064 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
3065 (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
3068 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3069 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3074 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3076 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3078 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3079 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3081 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3082 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3084 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3085 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3086 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3088 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3089 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3093 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3094 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3095 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3097 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3099 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3101 /* Output key name */
3103 memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
3104 p += sizeof(key_name);
3106 memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
3108 /* Encrypt session data */
3109 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3112 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3116 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3118 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3121 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3122 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3127 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3129 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3130 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3131 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3133 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3141 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3142 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3146 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3152 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3153 * follows handshake_header_length +
3154 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3157 msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3158 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
3161 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3164 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3165 /* length of OCSP response */
3166 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3167 /* actual response */
3168 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3170 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
3176 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3182 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3183 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3185 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3187 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3188 size_t next_proto_len;
3191 * The payload looks like:
3193 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3194 * uint8 padding_len;
3195 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3197 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3198 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3199 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3204 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3205 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3209 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3211 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3213 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3214 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3218 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3220 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3221 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3222 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3223 int sslv2format, int *al)
3225 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3226 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3228 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3229 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3231 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3233 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3235 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3237 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3241 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3243 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3248 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3249 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3252 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3257 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3260 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3261 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3262 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3266 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3268 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3269 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3270 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3272 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3275 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3276 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3277 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3278 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3279 if (s->renegotiate) {
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3281 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3282 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3285 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3289 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3290 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3291 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3293 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3294 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3297 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3299 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3300 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3306 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3307 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3309 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3311 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3316 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3317 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3326 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3327 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);