2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "statem_local.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/trace.h>
25 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
27 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
32 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
33 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
34 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
35 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
36 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
40 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
41 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
43 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type)
47 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
49 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
50 s->init_num, &written);
53 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
55 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
56 * ignore the result anyway
57 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
59 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
60 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
61 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
62 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
63 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
64 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
67 if (written == s->init_num) {
69 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
70 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl,
74 s->init_off += written;
75 s->init_num -= written;
79 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
83 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
84 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
87 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
93 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
95 int ver_min, ver_max, ok;
96 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
97 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
99 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
100 /* SSLfatal() already called */
104 /* Reset any extension flags */
105 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
107 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
112 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */
113 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) {
114 int md5sha1_needed = 0;
116 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */
117 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION))
121 if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
124 if (md5sha1_needed) {
125 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
126 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,
127 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the"
128 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available"
129 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or"
130 " above, or load different providers");
135 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */
136 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
137 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
138 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION);
140 if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION)
141 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION);
144 /* Shouldn't happen */
145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
156 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
157 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
160 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
161 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
163 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
165 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
167 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
174 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
176 "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
180 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
181 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
182 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
184 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
185 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
187 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
190 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
191 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
193 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
194 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
196 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
197 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
200 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
202 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
203 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
210 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
211 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
213 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
214 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
216 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
217 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
219 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
220 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72"
221 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
222 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
223 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69"
224 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79";
226 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
229 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
230 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
231 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
232 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
233 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
234 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
236 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
239 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
240 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
241 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
243 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
244 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
245 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
246 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
247 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
248 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
249 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
255 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
260 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
273 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
274 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
275 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
276 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
277 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
279 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
280 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
281 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
282 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
284 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
288 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
290 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
301 /* Get the data to be signed */
302 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
307 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
312 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
313 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
314 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
320 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
321 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
322 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
323 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
328 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
330 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal
331 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them.
333 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
334 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
335 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
336 s->session->master_key) <= 0
337 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
342 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
344 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
350 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not
351 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal
353 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
357 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
359 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
367 int pktype = lu->sig;
369 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
370 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
371 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
372 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
376 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
382 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
388 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
389 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
392 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
393 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
398 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
399 const unsigned char *data;
400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
401 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
410 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
411 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
412 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
413 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
420 peer = s->session->peer;
421 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
429 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
433 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
436 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
440 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
444 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
455 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
456 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
458 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
460 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
461 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
464 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
465 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
466 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
467 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
468 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
469 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
470 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
473 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
478 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
483 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
488 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
489 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
491 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx,
492 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
493 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
500 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
501 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
502 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
503 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
504 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
506 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
512 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
513 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
514 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
515 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
520 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
521 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
522 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
523 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
524 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
528 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
533 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
541 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
542 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
543 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
544 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
545 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual
546 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
548 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
549 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
551 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
553 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
554 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
555 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
557 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
562 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
564 size_t finish_md_len;
567 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
569 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
570 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
571 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
574 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
577 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
579 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
580 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
583 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
587 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
588 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
590 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
591 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
594 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
596 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
597 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
598 /* SSLfatal() already called */
599 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
602 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
604 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
606 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
610 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
611 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
613 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
614 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key,
615 s->session->master_key_length)) {
616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
617 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
621 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
623 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
624 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
625 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
628 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
630 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
632 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
634 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
637 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
640 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
647 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
648 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
651 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
653 unsigned int updatetype;
656 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
657 * be on a record boundary.
659 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
664 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
667 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
671 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
674 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
675 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
677 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
681 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
682 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
683 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
685 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
686 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
688 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
693 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
697 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
700 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
704 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
707 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
708 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
710 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
711 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
714 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
715 ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
716 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
718 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
726 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
731 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
733 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
734 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
735 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
737 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
739 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
740 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
741 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
743 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
752 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
753 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
758 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
759 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
767 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
768 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
772 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
773 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
776 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
777 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
781 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
784 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
787 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
788 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s);
791 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
794 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
795 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than
798 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
799 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
800 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
801 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
802 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
803 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
805 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
810 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
811 * message must be on a record boundary.
813 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
814 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
819 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
820 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
824 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
826 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
828 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
836 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
840 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
842 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
847 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
849 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
851 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
853 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
857 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
858 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
860 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
862 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
863 !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
864 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
869 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
871 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
872 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
877 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
878 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
882 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
890 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
891 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
892 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
894 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
897 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
899 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
904 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
907 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
908 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
909 X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp)
912 unsigned char *outbytes;
913 int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE;
916 context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION;
918 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
924 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
925 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
931 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp)
932 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) {
933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
940 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
941 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
945 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
946 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
947 X509_STORE *chain_store;
948 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
950 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
956 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
958 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
959 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
961 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs;
963 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
965 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
966 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
968 chain_store = sctx->cert_store;
970 if (chain_store != NULL) {
971 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx,
974 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
979 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
980 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
986 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
987 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
988 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
989 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
991 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
992 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
994 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
995 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
998 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
999 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1000 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1001 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
1003 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1008 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
1009 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
1010 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1012 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) {
1013 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1014 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1018 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
1020 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
1023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i);
1026 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) {
1027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1030 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
1031 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
1032 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) {
1033 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1041 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1042 CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp)
1044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp))
1053 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1063 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1064 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1067 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst,
1068 int clearbufs, int stop)
1070 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1071 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1072 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1073 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1076 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1079 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
1080 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions
1082 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used.
1084 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))
1088 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf
1089 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1091 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1095 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1103 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1104 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1107 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1108 * post handshake exchange
1111 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1114 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1115 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1117 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1121 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1124 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
1125 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1127 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1128 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1129 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1131 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1133 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1134 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1136 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1137 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1138 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1141 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1144 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1147 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1148 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1150 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1151 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx,
1152 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1155 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1156 /* done with handshaking */
1157 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1158 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1159 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1160 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1164 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1165 cb = s->info_callback;
1166 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL)
1167 cb = sctx->info_callback;
1169 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1170 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1174 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1175 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1176 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1180 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1181 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1182 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1185 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1188 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt)
1190 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1191 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1193 size_t l, readbytes;
1194 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1196 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1199 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1200 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1202 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1205 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1208 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1210 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1211 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1213 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1215 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1218 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1219 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1221 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1222 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1223 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1224 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1225 * with a valid cookie.
1229 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1230 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1231 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1232 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1234 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1236 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1239 s->init_num += readbytes;
1244 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1245 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1247 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1248 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1249 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1252 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1256 if (s->msg_callback)
1257 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1258 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1259 s->msg_callback_arg);
1261 } while (skip_message);
1262 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1265 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1267 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1269 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1272 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1273 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1275 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1276 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1278 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1279 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1282 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1283 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1285 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1288 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1290 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1297 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len)
1299 size_t n, readbytes;
1302 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1304 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1305 /* We've already read everything in */
1306 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1311 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1313 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1314 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1316 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1320 s->init_num += readbytes;
1325 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1326 * Finished verification.
1328 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1334 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1335 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1336 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1338 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1342 if (s->msg_callback)
1343 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1344 (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1347 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1348 * processing the message
1349 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1352 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1353 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1354 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1355 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1356 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1357 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1358 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1359 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1360 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1361 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1362 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1363 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1364 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1370 if (s->msg_callback)
1371 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1372 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1373 s->msg_callback_arg);
1380 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1381 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1382 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1383 {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1384 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1385 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1386 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1387 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1388 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1389 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1390 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1391 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1392 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1393 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1394 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1395 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1396 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1397 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1398 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1399 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1400 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1401 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1402 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1403 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1404 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1405 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1406 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1407 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1408 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1409 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1410 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1411 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1412 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1413 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1414 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1415 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1416 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1417 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1418 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1419 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1420 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1422 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1423 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1426 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1428 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1430 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1431 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1436 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1440 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1443 static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b)
1445 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
1450 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1451 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1456 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1457 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1460 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1461 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1464 /* Must be in order high to low */
1465 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1467 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1469 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1472 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1474 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1477 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1479 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1482 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1484 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1487 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1489 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1494 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1495 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1498 /* Must be in order high to low */
1499 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1501 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1503 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1506 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1507 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1509 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1510 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1516 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1518 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1519 * @method: the intended method.
1521 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1523 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1525 int version = method->version;
1527 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1528 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1529 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1530 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1532 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1533 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1534 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1536 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1537 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1538 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1539 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1545 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1546 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has
1547 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0.
1549 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1553 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1555 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL))
1559 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername
1560 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok
1562 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL
1563 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL)
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1567 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1571 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1574 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1575 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1577 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1578 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1579 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1580 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1585 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1587 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1590 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1591 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1592 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1594 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1595 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1603 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1606 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1607 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1609 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1611 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1612 const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1614 const version_info *vent;
1615 const version_info *table;
1617 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) {
1619 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1620 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1621 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1622 table = tls_version_table;
1624 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1625 table = dtls_version_table;
1630 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1632 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1633 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1634 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1636 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1637 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1639 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1647 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1648 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1649 * supported protocol version.
1651 * @s server SSL handle.
1653 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1655 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1657 const version_info *vent;
1658 const version_info *table;
1659 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1662 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1663 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1666 if (s->version == sctx->method->version)
1670 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1671 * highest protocol version).
1673 if (sctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1674 table = tls_version_table;
1675 else if (sctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1676 table = dtls_version_table;
1678 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1682 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1683 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1684 return s->version == vent->version;
1690 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1691 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1692 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1693 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1695 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1696 * @version: the intended limit.
1697 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1699 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1701 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1711 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
1713 DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) &&
1714 DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER);
1716 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls)
1720 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1721 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1722 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1724 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1725 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1726 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1727 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1728 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1730 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods,
1731 * returning success.
1733 switch (method_version) {
1737 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1742 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1750 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1752 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1753 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1754 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1755 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1756 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1758 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1759 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1760 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1761 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1762 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1764 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1765 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1767 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1772 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1773 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1774 * the version specific method.
1776 * @s: server SSL handle.
1778 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1780 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1784 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1786 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1787 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1789 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1792 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1793 int server_version = ssl->method->version;
1794 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1795 const version_info *vent;
1796 const version_info *table;
1798 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1800 s->client_version = client_version;
1802 switch (server_version) {
1804 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1805 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1806 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1807 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1809 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1810 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1811 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1812 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1813 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1818 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1819 * a HelloRetryRequest
1822 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1823 table = tls_version_table;
1825 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1826 table = dtls_version_table;
1830 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1832 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1833 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1834 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1836 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1837 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1838 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1839 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1840 PACKET versionslist;
1842 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1844 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1845 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1846 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1850 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1851 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1852 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1853 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1854 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1855 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1856 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1858 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1859 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1861 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1862 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1864 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1865 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1867 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1868 /* Trailing data? */
1869 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1872 if (best_vers > 0) {
1873 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1875 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1876 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1878 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1879 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1882 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1883 s->version = best_vers;
1884 ssl->method = best_method;
1885 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers))
1886 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1890 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1894 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1895 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1897 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1898 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1901 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1904 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1905 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1907 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1908 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1910 method = vent->smeth();
1911 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1912 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1913 s->version = vent->version;
1914 ssl->method = method;
1915 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version))
1916 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1926 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1927 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1928 * the version specific method.
1930 * @s: client SSL handle.
1931 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1932 * @extensions: The extensions received
1934 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1936 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1937 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1939 const version_info *vent;
1940 const version_info *table;
1941 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1942 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1945 s->version = version;
1947 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1948 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1949 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1950 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1956 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1957 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1963 switch (ssl->method->version) {
1965 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) {
1967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1971 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1972 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1973 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1974 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1975 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1977 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1982 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1983 table = tls_version_table;
1985 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1986 table = dtls_version_table;
1990 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret);
1996 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1997 : s->version < ver_min) {
1999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2001 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
2002 : s->version > ver_max) {
2004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2008 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
2011 /* Check for downgrades */
2012 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
2013 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
2014 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2015 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
2016 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2019 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2022 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
2023 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
2024 && real_max > s->version) {
2025 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
2026 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
2027 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
2028 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
2030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2031 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
2036 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2037 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
2040 ssl->method = vent->cmeth();
2041 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
2042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
2054 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
2055 * @s: The SSL connection
2056 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2057 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2058 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2059 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2062 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2063 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2064 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2065 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2066 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2068 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2069 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2070 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2072 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2073 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2075 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
2076 int *max_version, int *real_max)
2078 int version, tmp_real_max;
2080 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2081 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2082 const version_info *table;
2083 const version_info *vent;
2084 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2086 switch (ssl->method->version) {
2089 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2090 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2091 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2092 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2093 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2095 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2097 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2100 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2101 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2103 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2104 table = tls_version_table;
2106 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2107 table = dtls_version_table;
2112 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2113 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2114 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2115 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2117 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2118 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2119 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2121 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2122 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2123 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2125 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2126 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2127 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2128 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2129 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2130 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2132 *min_version = version = 0;
2134 if (real_max != NULL)
2137 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2139 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2140 * "version capability" vector.
2142 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2147 method = vent->cmeth();
2149 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2150 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2152 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2156 *min_version = method->version;
2158 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2159 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2160 version = (single = method)->version;
2161 *min_version = version;
2166 *max_version = version;
2168 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2170 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2176 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2177 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2179 * @s: client SSL handle.
2181 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2183 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2185 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2188 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2189 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2191 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2194 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2199 s->version = ver_max;
2201 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2202 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2204 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
2205 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
2206 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
2207 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
2208 * about this immediately.
2210 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
2213 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2214 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2215 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2218 s->client_version = ver_max;
2223 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2224 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2225 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2226 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2228 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2229 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2233 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2236 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2237 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2239 if (group_id == group
2241 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2249 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2250 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2251 const unsigned char *hashval,
2252 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2255 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2256 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2258 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2260 if (hashval == NULL) {
2261 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2263 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2264 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2265 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2272 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2273 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2279 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2280 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2281 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2282 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2288 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2289 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2290 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2293 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2294 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2295 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2296 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2297 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2304 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2306 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2309 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2311 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2312 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2315 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2319 /* get the CA RDNs */
2320 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2325 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2326 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2327 unsigned int name_len;
2329 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2330 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2335 namestart = namebytes;
2336 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2340 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2345 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2352 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2353 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2358 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2363 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2365 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2366 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2369 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
2370 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2375 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl);
2380 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk,
2383 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2384 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2389 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) {
2392 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2393 unsigned char *namebytes;
2394 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2398 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2399 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2401 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2416 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2417 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2418 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2420 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2421 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2427 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2428 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2430 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2437 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2438 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2440 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2442 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2443 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2444 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2447 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2448 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2452 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2453 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
2464 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2465 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2467 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2469 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2473 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2482 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
2487 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2489 COMP_METHOD *method = NULL;
2490 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
2491 size_t expected_length;
2497 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2500 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) {
2501 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2504 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */
2505 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) {
2506 for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) {
2507 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) {
2513 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2517 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) {
2518 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2522 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
2523 method = COMP_zlib();
2525 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
2526 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
2528 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
2529 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
2532 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2536 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
2537 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length)
2538 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)
2539 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length
2540 || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length)
2541 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length)
2542 || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length,
2543 (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) {
2544 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
2547 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2549 COMP_CTX_free(comp);