2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
24 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
26 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
31 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
32 s->init_num, &written);
35 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
37 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
38 * ignore the result anyway
40 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
41 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
45 if (written == s->init_num) {
47 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
48 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
52 s->init_off += written;
53 s->init_num -= written;
57 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
61 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
62 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
65 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
71 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
73 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
74 /* SSLfatal() already called */
78 /* Reset any extension flags */
79 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
82 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
83 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
86 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
87 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
90 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
91 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
92 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
95 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
96 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
99 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
100 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
102 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
110 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
111 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
115 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
116 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
117 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i,
118 s->session_ctx->lock);
119 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
120 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
123 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
125 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
127 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
128 * support secure renegotiation.
130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
131 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
134 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
135 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i,
138 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
142 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
143 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard,
144 s->session_ctx->lock);
146 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate,
147 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
149 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
150 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
153 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
156 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
163 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
164 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
166 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
167 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
169 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
170 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
172 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
173 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
175 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
178 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
179 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
180 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
181 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
182 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
183 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
185 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
188 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
189 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
190 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
192 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
193 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
194 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
195 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
196 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
197 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
198 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
208 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
222 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
223 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
224 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
226 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
228 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
229 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
232 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
238 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
243 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
249 /* Get the data to be signed */
250 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
251 /* SSLfatal() already called */
255 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
259 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
260 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
266 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
271 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
272 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
273 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
274 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
279 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
280 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
281 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
282 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
283 s->session->master_key)
284 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
289 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
296 int pktype = lu->sig;
298 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
299 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
300 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
301 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
305 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
311 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
315 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
319 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
324 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
326 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
327 const unsigned char *data;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
329 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
331 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
335 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
338 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
339 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
340 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
344 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
348 peer = s->session->peer;
349 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
356 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
358 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
362 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
365 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
370 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
371 /* SSLfatal() already called */
375 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
377 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
385 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
389 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
391 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
392 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
395 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
396 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
397 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
398 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
399 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
400 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
401 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
404 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
410 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
411 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
412 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
414 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
417 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
423 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
424 /* SSLfatal() already called */
429 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
431 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
438 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
439 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
440 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
441 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
442 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
444 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
447 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
453 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
454 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
455 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
456 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
462 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
463 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
464 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
465 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
466 s->session->master_key)) {
467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
471 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
473 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
477 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
480 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
485 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
487 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
488 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
489 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
491 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
496 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
498 size_t finish_md_len;
502 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
504 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
507 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
512 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
513 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
514 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
517 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
518 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
519 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
525 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
526 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
528 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
529 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
532 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
534 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
535 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
540 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
542 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
548 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
549 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
551 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
552 s->session->master_key,
553 s->session->master_key_length)) {
554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
559 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
561 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
566 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
568 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
570 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
572 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
581 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
588 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
592 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
596 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
598 unsigned int updatetype;
600 s->key_update_count++;
601 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
603 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
604 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
608 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
609 * be on a record boundary.
611 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
613 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
614 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
617 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
618 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
620 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
625 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
628 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
629 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
631 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
632 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
636 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
637 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
638 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
640 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
641 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
643 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
644 /* SSLfatal() already called */
645 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
648 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
653 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
656 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
661 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
662 * the appropriate error.
664 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
667 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
668 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
670 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
671 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
674 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
677 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
681 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
685 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
687 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
688 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
689 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
692 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
693 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
694 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
695 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
697 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
698 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
704 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
705 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
710 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
711 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
713 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
717 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
718 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
725 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
727 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
728 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
732 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
733 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
736 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
743 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
748 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
750 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
753 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
754 * message must be on a record boundary.
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
758 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
762 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
763 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
765 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
766 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
768 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
770 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
772 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
774 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
778 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
781 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
782 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
786 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
788 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
791 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
794 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
796 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
798 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
800 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
804 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
805 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
807 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
809 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
810 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
815 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
816 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
817 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
819 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
824 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
826 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
836 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
838 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
847 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
848 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
851 unsigned char *outbytes;
853 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
859 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
860 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
867 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
869 /* SSLfatal() already called */
876 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
877 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
881 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
882 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
883 X509_STORE *chain_store;
885 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
891 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
893 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
894 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
896 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
898 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
900 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
901 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
903 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
905 if (chain_store != NULL) {
906 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
908 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
910 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
913 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
914 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
920 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
921 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
922 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
923 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
925 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
926 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
928 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
929 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
932 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
937 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
941 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
942 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
943 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
945 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
946 /* SSLfatal() already called */
947 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
951 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
953 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
958 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
962 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
963 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
964 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
973 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
975 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
981 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
984 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
995 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
998 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
1001 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1004 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
1006 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
1007 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1013 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1015 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1016 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1018 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1021 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
1026 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1027 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1030 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1032 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1035 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1037 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1038 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard,
1040 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1043 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1046 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1047 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1049 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard,
1050 s->session_ctx->lock);
1052 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1053 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1,
1054 &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
1057 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1058 cb = s->info_callback;
1059 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1060 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1063 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1066 /* done with handshaking */
1067 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1068 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1069 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1070 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1075 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1079 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1081 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1082 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1085 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1087 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1088 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1090 size_t l, readbytes;
1092 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1095 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1096 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1098 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1101 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1104 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1106 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1107 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1109 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1112 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1115 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1116 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1117 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1118 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1120 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1121 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1125 s->init_num += readbytes;
1130 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1131 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1133 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1134 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1135 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1138 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1142 if (s->msg_callback)
1143 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1144 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1145 s->msg_callback_arg);
1147 } while (skip_message);
1148 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1151 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1153 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1155 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1158 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1159 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1161 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1162 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1163 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1165 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1166 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1169 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1170 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1175 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1177 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1187 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1189 size_t n, readbytes;
1193 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1194 /* We've already read everything in */
1195 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1200 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1202 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1203 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1205 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1209 s->init_num += readbytes;
1213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1215 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1216 * Finished verification.
1218 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1222 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1223 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1224 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1227 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 if (s->msg_callback)
1232 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1233 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1236 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1237 * processing the message
1239 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1240 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1241 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 if (s->msg_callback)
1248 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1249 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1250 s->msg_callback_arg);
1257 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1262 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1263 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1265 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1267 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1273 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1277 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1285 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1287 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1289 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1291 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1293 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1296 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1298 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1299 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1300 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1301 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1304 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1305 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1306 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1308 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1311 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1313 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1316 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1317 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1320 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1326 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1330 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1333 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1335 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1340 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1341 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1346 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1347 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1350 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1351 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1354 /* Must be in order high to low */
1355 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1357 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1359 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1362 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1364 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1367 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1369 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1372 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1374 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1377 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1379 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1384 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1385 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1388 /* Must be in order high to low */
1389 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1391 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1393 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1396 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1397 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1399 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1400 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1406 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1408 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1409 * @method: the intended method.
1411 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1413 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1415 int version = method->version;
1417 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1418 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1419 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1420 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1422 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1423 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1424 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1426 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1427 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1428 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1429 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1435 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1438 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1439 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1441 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1443 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1445 const version_info *vent;
1446 const version_info *table;
1448 switch (s->method->version) {
1450 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1451 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1452 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1453 table = tls_version_table;
1455 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1456 table = dtls_version_table;
1461 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1463 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1464 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1465 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1473 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1474 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1475 * supported protocol version.
1477 * @s server SSL handle.
1479 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1481 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1483 const version_info *vent;
1484 const version_info *table;
1487 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1488 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1491 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1495 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1496 * highest protocol version).
1498 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1499 table = tls_version_table;
1500 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1501 table = dtls_version_table;
1503 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1507 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1508 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1509 return s->version == vent->version;
1515 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1516 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1517 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1518 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1520 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1521 * @version: the intended limit.
1522 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1524 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1526 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1534 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1535 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1536 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1538 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1539 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1540 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1541 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1542 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1544 switch (method_version) {
1547 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1548 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1549 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1550 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1555 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1556 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1560 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1561 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1562 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1571 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1573 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1574 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1575 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1576 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1577 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1578 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1579 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1581 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1586 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1587 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1588 * the version specific method.
1590 * @s: server SSL handle.
1592 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1594 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1597 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1599 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1600 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1602 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1605 int server_version = s->method->version;
1606 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1607 const version_info *vent;
1608 const version_info *table;
1610 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1612 s->client_version = client_version;
1614 switch (server_version) {
1616 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1617 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1618 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1619 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1621 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1622 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1623 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1624 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1625 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1630 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1631 * a HelloRetryRequest
1634 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1635 table = tls_version_table;
1637 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1638 table = dtls_version_table;
1642 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1644 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1645 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1646 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1647 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1648 PACKET versionslist;
1650 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1652 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1653 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1654 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1657 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1658 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1659 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1660 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1662 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1663 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1664 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1666 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1669 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1672 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1673 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1675 method = vent->smeth();
1676 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1677 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1678 best_method = method;
1682 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1683 /* Trailing data? */
1684 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1687 if (best_vers > 0) {
1688 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1690 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1691 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1693 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1694 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1697 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1698 s->version = best_vers;
1699 s->method = best_method;
1702 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1706 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1707 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1709 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1710 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1713 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1716 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1717 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1719 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1720 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1722 method = vent->smeth();
1723 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1724 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1725 s->version = vent->version;
1731 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1735 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1736 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1737 * the version specific method.
1739 * @s: client SSL handle.
1740 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1741 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1742 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1744 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1746 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1748 const version_info *vent;
1749 const version_info *table;
1752 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1753 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1754 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1756 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1758 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1761 switch (s->method->version) {
1763 if (version != s->version) {
1764 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1765 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1768 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1769 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1770 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1771 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1772 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1775 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1776 table = tls_version_table;
1778 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1779 table = dtls_version_table;
1783 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1784 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1787 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1790 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1793 method = vent->cmeth();
1794 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1796 if (version == vent->version) {
1797 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1804 highver = vent->version;
1806 if (version != vent->version)
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1810 /* Check for downgrades */
1812 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1813 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1814 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1815 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1816 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1817 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1818 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1820 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1821 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1822 && highver > version) {
1823 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1824 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1825 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1826 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1828 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1835 s->version = version;
1839 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1840 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1844 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1845 * @s: The SSL connection
1846 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1847 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1849 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1850 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1851 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1852 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1853 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1855 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1856 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1857 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1859 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1860 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1862 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1866 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1867 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1868 const version_info *table;
1869 const version_info *vent;
1871 switch (s->method->version) {
1874 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1875 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1876 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1877 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1878 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1880 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1882 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1883 table = tls_version_table;
1885 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1886 table = dtls_version_table;
1891 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1892 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1893 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1894 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1896 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1897 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1898 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1900 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1901 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1902 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1904 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1905 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1906 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1907 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1908 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1909 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1911 *min_version = version = 0;
1913 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1915 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1916 * "version capability" vector.
1918 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1922 method = vent->cmeth();
1923 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1927 *min_version = method->version;
1929 version = (single = method)->version;
1930 *min_version = version;
1935 *max_version = version;
1937 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1939 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1945 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1946 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1948 * @s: client SSL handle.
1950 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1952 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1954 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1956 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1961 s->version = ver_max;
1963 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1964 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1965 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1967 s->client_version = ver_max;
1972 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1973 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1974 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1975 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1978 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
1979 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1983 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1986 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1987 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1989 if (group_id == group
1991 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2000 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2001 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
2003 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2005 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2007 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2009 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2010 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2011 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
2012 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2016 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2017 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2018 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2022 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2023 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2024 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2025 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2026 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2034 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2036 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2039 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2041 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2042 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2045 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2047 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2050 /* get the CA RDNs */
2051 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2053 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2057 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2058 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2059 unsigned int name_len;
2061 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2062 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2064 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2068 namestart = namebytes;
2069 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2074 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2076 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2082 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2088 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2089 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2094 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2099 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2101 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2103 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2104 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2110 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2113 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2114 unsigned char *namebytes;
2115 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2119 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2120 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2122 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2139 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2140 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2141 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2143 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2144 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2148 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2151 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2152 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2154 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);