2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
53 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
68 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
93 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st->hand_state) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
125 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
126 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
142 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
143 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
164 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
167 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
172 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
173 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
174 # error Internal DTLS version error
176 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
177 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
178 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
180 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
181 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
182 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
183 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
185 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
196 /* No valid transition found */
201 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
202 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
203 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
204 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
206 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
207 * (transition not allowed)
209 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
211 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
215 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
216 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
218 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
219 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
224 switch (st->hand_state) {
228 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
234 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
236 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
242 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
244 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
245 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
256 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
261 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
266 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
267 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
268 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
270 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
271 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
272 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
273 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
275 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
276 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
277 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
278 * the server is resuming.
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
283 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
284 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
290 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
291 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
293 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
294 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
295 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
300 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
303 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
304 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
313 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
314 * |ext.status_expected| is set
316 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
322 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
323 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
324 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
325 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
326 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
335 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
337 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
345 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
346 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
352 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
353 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
358 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
364 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
365 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
366 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
371 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
372 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
373 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
379 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
387 /* No valid transition found */
388 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
392 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
393 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
396 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
397 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
398 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
399 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
407 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
408 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
411 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
413 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
416 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
417 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
418 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
420 switch (st->hand_state) {
422 /* Shouldn't happen */
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
427 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
433 * we already sent close_notify
435 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
436 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
438 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
444 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
445 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
447 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
448 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
451 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
452 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
456 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
464 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
465 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
470 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
471 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
480 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
481 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 /* Try to read from the server instead */
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
498 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
500 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
502 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
505 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
506 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
509 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
510 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
512 switch (st->hand_state) {
514 /* Shouldn't happen */
515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
519 if (!s->renegotiate) {
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
533 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
538 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
556 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
557 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
571 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
592 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
597 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
607 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
609 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
668 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
670 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
672 switch (st->hand_state) {
674 /* No pre work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
679 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
689 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
692 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
693 * messages unless we need to.
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
699 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
700 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
706 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
708 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
709 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
710 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
712 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
713 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
714 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
717 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
729 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
730 * client to the server.
732 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
734 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
735 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
739 switch (st->hand_state) {
741 /* No post work to be done */
744 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
745 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
746 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
748 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
749 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
750 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
752 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
753 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
754 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
760 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
770 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
772 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
773 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
775 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
776 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
779 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
780 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
781 /* SSLfatal() already called */
786 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
787 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
788 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
790 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
791 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
793 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
794 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
795 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
797 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
798 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
802 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
803 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
804 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
806 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
807 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
809 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
811 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
817 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
829 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
834 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
838 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
840 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
842 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
845 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
849 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
852 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
853 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
857 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
858 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
859 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
860 /* SSLfatal() already called */
867 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
868 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
870 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
877 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
881 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
884 * Valid return values are:
888 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
889 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
891 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
893 switch (st->hand_state) {
895 /* Shouldn't happen */
896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
900 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
901 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
903 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
904 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
907 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
908 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
912 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
913 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
914 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
917 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
923 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
928 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
932 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
937 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
938 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
939 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
940 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
943 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
944 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
945 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
948 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
949 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
950 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
958 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
959 * reading. Excludes the message header.
961 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
963 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
965 switch (st->hand_state) {
967 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
971 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
973 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
974 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
977 return s->max_cert_list;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
983 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
986 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
990 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
991 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
992 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
994 return s->max_cert_list;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
997 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
999 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1000 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1002 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1005 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1006 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1009 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1012 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1015 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1020 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1022 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1025 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1027 switch (st->hand_state) {
1029 /* Shouldn't happen */
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1081 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1084 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1086 switch (st->hand_state) {
1088 /* Shouldn't happen */
1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1093 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1095 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1096 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1097 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1101 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1109 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1110 unsigned char *session_id;
1111 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1113 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1114 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1115 if (protverr != 0) {
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1117 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1121 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1122 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1123 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1124 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1125 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1126 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1129 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1131 p = s->s3.client_random;
1134 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1135 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1137 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1140 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1147 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1150 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1151 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1157 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1158 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1159 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1160 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1161 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1162 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1163 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1164 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1167 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1168 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1169 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1170 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1171 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1172 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1173 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1174 * know that is maximum server supports.
1175 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1176 * containing version 1.0.
1178 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1179 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1180 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1181 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1182 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1183 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1184 * the negotiated version.
1186 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1187 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1190 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1196 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1197 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1198 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1201 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1202 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1203 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1205 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1213 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1214 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1215 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1216 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1217 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1220 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1221 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1223 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1228 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1229 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1230 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1231 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1232 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1238 /* Ciphers supported */
1239 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1244 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1246 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1255 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1260 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1261 && sctx->comp_methods
1262 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1263 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1264 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1265 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1266 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1274 /* Add the NULL method */
1275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1277 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1280 /* TLS extensions */
1281 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1283 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1286 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1289 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1294 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1295 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1297 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1300 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1301 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1303 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1306 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1310 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1312 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1315 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1316 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1318 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1319 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1321 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1323 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1325 /* unknown cipher */
1326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1330 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1331 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1333 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1338 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1339 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1341 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1346 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1347 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1348 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1354 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1355 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1356 * set and use it for comparison.
1358 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1359 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1360 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1361 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1362 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1365 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1366 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1369 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1371 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1376 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1380 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1384 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1389 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1391 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1392 size_t session_id_len;
1393 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1395 unsigned int compression;
1396 unsigned int sversion;
1397 unsigned int context;
1398 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1399 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1404 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1409 /* load the server random */
1410 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1411 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1412 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1414 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1418 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1419 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1420 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1425 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1430 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 /* Get the session-id. */
1437 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1441 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1442 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1443 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1448 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1453 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1458 /* TLS extensions */
1459 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1460 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1461 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1462 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1468 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1469 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1470 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1471 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1476 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1482 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1483 if (compression != 0) {
1484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1485 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1489 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1490 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1491 session_id_len) != 0) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1498 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1503 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1507 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1508 * are appropriate for this version.
1510 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1511 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1512 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1519 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1521 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1522 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1524 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1526 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1530 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1531 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1532 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1533 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1539 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1540 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1541 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1542 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1543 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1544 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1545 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1546 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1547 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1548 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1550 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1551 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1552 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1554 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1555 * backwards compat reasons
1557 int master_key_length;
1559 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1560 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1563 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1564 && master_key_length > 0) {
1565 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1566 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1567 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 if (session_id_len != 0
1575 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1576 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1577 session_id_len) == 0)
1582 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1583 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1584 /* actually a client application bug */
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1586 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1591 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1592 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1593 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1594 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1595 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1597 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1598 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1599 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1605 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1607 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1608 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1609 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1610 * used for resumption.
1612 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1613 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1614 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1615 if (session_id_len > 0)
1616 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1621 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1622 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1624 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1628 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1631 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1632 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1634 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1639 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1640 if (compression != 0) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1642 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1646 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1647 * using compression.
1649 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1654 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1656 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1659 if (compression == 0)
1661 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1665 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1669 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1671 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1674 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1678 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1684 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1685 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1686 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1690 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1693 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1694 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1696 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1697 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1698 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1701 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1702 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1704 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1709 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1710 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1711 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1716 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1717 * we're done with this message
1719 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1720 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1721 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1722 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1723 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1727 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1728 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1730 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1731 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1734 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1737 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1740 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1741 * should not be used.
1743 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1744 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1746 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1747 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1748 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1749 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1754 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1757 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1759 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1760 * ClientHello will not change
1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1767 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1768 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1770 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1776 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1777 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1778 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1781 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1782 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1787 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1789 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1793 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1794 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1797 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1799 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1801 unsigned int context = 0;
1802 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1804 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1809 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1811 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1812 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1813 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1817 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1818 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1819 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1824 certstart = certbytes;
1825 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
1827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1830 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1831 cert_len) == NULL) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1836 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1841 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1842 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1845 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1849 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1850 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1851 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1852 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1853 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1854 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1855 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1856 /* SSLfatal already called */
1859 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1862 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1868 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1872 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
1873 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1874 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1878 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1879 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1880 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1882 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1886 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1887 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1891 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1892 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1893 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1894 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1898 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1899 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1900 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1901 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1902 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1903 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1904 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1905 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1906 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1907 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1908 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1909 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1911 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1912 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1913 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1916 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1919 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1920 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1922 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1924 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1926 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1928 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1932 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1937 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1938 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1941 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1942 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1948 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1950 s->session->peer = x;
1951 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1953 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1954 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1955 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1956 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1957 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1958 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1961 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1964 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1967 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1969 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1971 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1977 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1978 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1979 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1982 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1987 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1988 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1989 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1990 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1991 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2003 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2006 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2008 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2009 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2010 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2011 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2017 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2018 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2020 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2021 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2023 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2024 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2026 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2027 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2032 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2033 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2037 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2038 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2039 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2050 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2051 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2052 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2053 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2054 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2055 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2056 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2059 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2060 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2061 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2066 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2067 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2069 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2070 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2071 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2076 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2078 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2079 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2080 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2082 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2087 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2092 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2093 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2098 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2099 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2102 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2103 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2104 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2105 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2107 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2108 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2113 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2114 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2120 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2124 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2125 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2127 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2128 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2129 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2134 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2135 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2136 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2137 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2145 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2148 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2151 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2152 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2153 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2155 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2160 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2161 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2163 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2164 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2169 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2171 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2175 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2180 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2181 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2182 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2188 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2189 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2192 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2193 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2194 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2195 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2196 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2198 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2199 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2203 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2206 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2207 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2208 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2209 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2210 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2212 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2214 save_param_start = *pkt;
2216 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2217 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2219 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2220 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2226 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2227 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2228 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2229 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2233 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2234 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2235 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2238 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2239 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2248 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2251 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2257 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2258 * equals the length of the parameters.
2260 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2261 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2262 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2268 unsigned int sigalg;
2270 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2274 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2283 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2285 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2288 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2289 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2290 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2292 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2293 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2298 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2299 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2304 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2305 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2306 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2311 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2312 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2313 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2314 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2319 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2320 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2326 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2327 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2333 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2336 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2337 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2338 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2339 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2340 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2343 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2346 /* still data left over */
2347 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2353 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2355 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2356 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2359 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2364 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2365 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2366 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2368 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2369 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2370 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2372 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2374 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2375 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2381 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2383 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2384 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2385 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2386 s->pha_context = NULL;
2387 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2389 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2390 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2399 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2400 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2402 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2403 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2405 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2406 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2408 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2409 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2411 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2416 /* get the certificate types */
2417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2419 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2422 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2427 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2430 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2436 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2437 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2439 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2441 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2444 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2446 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2450 /* get the CA RDNs */
2451 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2452 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2453 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2457 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2459 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2462 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2463 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2466 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2467 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2468 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2469 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2470 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2473 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2474 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2475 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2480 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2483 unsigned int ticklen;
2484 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2485 unsigned int sess_len;
2486 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2488 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2489 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2491 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2493 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2494 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2495 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2496 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2497 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2498 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2499 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2500 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2507 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2508 * be 0 here in that instance
2511 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2514 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2515 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2516 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2517 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2518 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2521 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2522 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2525 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2528 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2533 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2534 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2536 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2537 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2538 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2540 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2543 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2544 s->session = new_sess;
2547 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2548 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2550 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2551 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2552 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2554 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2555 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2559 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2564 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2565 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2566 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2568 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2571 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2572 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2577 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2578 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2580 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2581 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2582 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2589 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2590 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2591 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2592 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2593 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2594 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2595 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2596 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2599 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2600 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2601 /* Error is already recorded */
2602 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2607 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2609 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2610 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2615 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2617 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2618 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2620 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2621 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2622 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2623 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2625 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2627 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2628 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2632 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2634 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2636 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2637 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2638 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2639 s->session->master_key,
2641 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2644 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2647 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2648 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2651 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2653 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2655 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2659 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2660 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2662 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2667 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2668 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2672 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2673 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2677 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2678 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2679 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2683 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2684 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2693 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2695 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2696 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2700 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2704 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2705 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2706 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2709 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2711 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2714 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2717 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2723 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2724 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2725 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2727 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2728 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2729 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2730 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2734 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2739 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2744 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2745 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2746 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2756 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2758 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2759 /* should contain no data */
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2764 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2765 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2767 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2772 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2777 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2780 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2785 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2786 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2789 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2790 size_t identitylen = 0;
2791 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2792 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2793 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2796 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2801 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2803 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2804 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2805 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2808 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2810 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2812 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2817 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2818 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2824 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2825 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2830 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2831 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2832 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2834 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2835 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2838 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2847 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2848 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2849 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2860 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2861 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2862 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2864 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2866 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2868 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2870 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2876 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2877 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2883 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2889 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2890 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2891 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
2896 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2897 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
2903 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2904 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2908 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2909 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2913 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2916 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2917 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2922 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2923 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2924 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2928 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2929 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2933 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2934 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2939 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2941 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2942 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2944 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2945 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2948 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2954 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2965 /* send off the data */
2967 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2968 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2969 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2972 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2976 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2977 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2980 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
2981 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2983 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2990 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2997 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
2998 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3002 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3004 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3005 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3006 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3009 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3015 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3021 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3022 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3026 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3027 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3029 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3034 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3041 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3042 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3046 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3049 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3050 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3053 unsigned int md_len;
3054 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3055 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3056 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3057 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3059 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3061 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3062 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3065 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3067 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3068 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3070 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3074 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3075 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3077 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3082 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3083 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3084 * certificate key for key exchange
3087 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3089 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3095 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3096 /* Generate session key
3098 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3106 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3107 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3108 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3109 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3110 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3111 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3112 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3113 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3117 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3119 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3120 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3124 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3126 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3129 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3135 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3136 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3141 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3142 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3143 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3147 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3148 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3149 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3158 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3160 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3161 return NID_magma_ctr;
3162 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3163 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3168 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3170 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3171 unsigned int md_len;
3172 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3173 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3179 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3180 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3181 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3182 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3183 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3184 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3185 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3189 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3190 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3195 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3198 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3199 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3200 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3201 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3203 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3206 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3207 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3209 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3219 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3221 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3227 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3232 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3233 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3234 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3236 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3240 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3241 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3243 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3248 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3253 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3254 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3255 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3260 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3261 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3266 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3271 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3272 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3279 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3280 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3284 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3285 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3296 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3298 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3299 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3304 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3306 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3307 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3308 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3323 unsigned long alg_k;
3325 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3328 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3329 * no need to do so here.
3331 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3332 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3335 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3338 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3341 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3342 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3344 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3345 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3347 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3348 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3350 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3351 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3353 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3358 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3360 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3361 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3362 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3364 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3365 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3366 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3368 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3371 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3373 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3376 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3377 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3381 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3382 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3394 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3395 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3396 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3405 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3406 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3407 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3409 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3412 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3415 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3416 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3418 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3419 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3420 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3423 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3424 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3425 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3430 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3431 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3437 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3438 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3439 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3444 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3445 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3446 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3448 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3450 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3451 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3454 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3455 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3457 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3458 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3463 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3466 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3468 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3470 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3471 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3472 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3473 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3475 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3482 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3484 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3485 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3486 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3488 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3491 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3495 /* We need to get a client cert */
3496 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3498 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3499 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3501 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3503 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3506 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3507 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3508 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3509 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3511 } else if (i == 1) {
3513 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3517 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3518 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3521 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3522 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3523 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3524 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3526 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3527 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3534 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3535 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3536 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3539 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3544 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3547 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3549 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3550 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3551 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3552 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3554 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3556 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3558 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3561 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3562 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3564 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3565 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3568 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3569 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3570 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3571 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3573 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3574 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3577 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3580 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3583 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3585 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3589 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3590 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3592 /* we don't have a certificate */
3593 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3596 /* This is the passed certificate */
3597 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3599 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3600 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3605 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3606 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3612 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3614 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3618 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3627 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3629 size_t len, padding_len;
3630 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3632 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3633 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3635 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3636 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3638 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3641 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3643 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3647 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3649 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3651 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3652 /* should contain no data */
3653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3654 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3657 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3658 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3659 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3663 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3664 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3665 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3666 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3667 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3669 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
3670 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
3672 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
3674 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3677 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3681 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3683 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3684 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3689 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3690 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3692 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3693 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3698 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3699 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3702 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3703 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3706 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3709 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3712 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
3713 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3718 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
3719 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
3723 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3727 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3728 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3729 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3731 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3732 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3742 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3743 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3744 # error Max cipher length too short
3747 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3748 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3751 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3752 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3755 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3758 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3760 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3763 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3764 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3766 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3767 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3768 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3771 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3776 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3778 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3779 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3780 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3783 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3784 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3792 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3793 const char *maxvertext =
3795 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3798 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3804 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3805 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3806 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3808 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3813 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3814 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3815 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3817 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3827 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3829 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3830 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3832 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3835 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3836 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;