2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
28 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
30 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
33 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
34 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
35 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
39 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
45 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
47 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
48 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
49 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
50 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
57 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
65 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
68 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
69 * ciphersuite or for SRP
71 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
80 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
81 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
82 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
83 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
85 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
86 * (transition not allowed)
88 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
90 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
93 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
94 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
95 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
98 switch (st->hand_state) {
102 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
104 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
105 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
108 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
113 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
120 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
160 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
165 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
168 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
169 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
170 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
172 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
173 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
175 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
176 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
177 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
178 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
180 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
206 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
210 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
211 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
219 switch (st->hand_state) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
224 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
230 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
231 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
237 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
239 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
240 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
249 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
251 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
252 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
256 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
262 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
264 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
265 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
266 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
267 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
270 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
271 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
272 * the server is resuming.
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
277 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
278 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
284 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
285 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
287 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
288 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
294 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
297 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
307 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
308 * |ext.status_expected| is set
310 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
316 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
317 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
318 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
319 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
320 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
321 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
322 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
329 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
330 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
331 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
340 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
346 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
347 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
352 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
358 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
359 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
360 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
366 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
367 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
373 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
374 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
381 /* No valid transition found */
382 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
386 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
387 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
390 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
391 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
392 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
393 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
396 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
407 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
414 switch (st->hand_state) {
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
418 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
421 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
427 * we already sent close_notify
429 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
430 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
432 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
438 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
439 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
441 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
442 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
445 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
446 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
450 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
457 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
458 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
459 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
464 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
465 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
473 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
475 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 /* Try to read from the server instead */
486 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
491 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
492 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
494 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
496 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
499 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
500 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
504 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
506 switch (st->hand_state) {
508 /* Shouldn't happen */
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
510 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513 if (!s->renegotiate) {
515 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
516 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
546 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
547 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
548 * because we did early data.
550 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
551 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
558 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
560 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
565 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
577 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
578 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
581 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
582 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
583 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
584 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
586 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
591 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
601 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
603 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
606 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
609 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
618 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
631 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
633 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
642 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
645 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
646 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
647 /* SSLfatal() already called */
648 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
650 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
651 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
660 * the client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
666 switch (st->hand_state) {
668 /* No pre work to be done */
671 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
674 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
675 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
682 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
687 * messages unless we need to.
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
692 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
693 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
694 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
700 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
702 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
703 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
704 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
706 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
707 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
711 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
712 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
715 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * client to the server.
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
734 /* No post work to be done */
737 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
738 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
739 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
741 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
742 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
743 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
745 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
746 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
747 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
752 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
753 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
757 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
758 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
763 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
765 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
766 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
768 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
769 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
772 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
773 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
780 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
782 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
783 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
785 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
786 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
787 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
789 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
790 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
794 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
795 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
796 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
798 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
799 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
801 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
803 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
808 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
809 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
818 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
821 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
826 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
830 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
832 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
834 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
837 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
841 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
845 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
850 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
851 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
859 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
860 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
862 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
869 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
873 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
876 * Valid return values are:
880 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
881 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
883 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
885 switch (st->hand_state) {
887 /* Shouldn't happen */
888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
891 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
893 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
895 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
896 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
900 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
901 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
904 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
905 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
906 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
909 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
919 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
924 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
930 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
931 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
932 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
935 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
936 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
937 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
940 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
950 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
951 * reading. Excludes the message header.
953 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
955 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
957 switch (st->hand_state) {
959 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
963 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
965 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
966 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
969 return s->max_cert_list;
971 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
972 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
974 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
975 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
977 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
978 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
980 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
982 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
983 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
984 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
986 return s->max_cert_list;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
989 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
992 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
994 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
997 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
999 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1000 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1003 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1006 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1013 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1015 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1017 switch (st->hand_state) {
1019 /* Shouldn't happen */
1020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1021 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1023 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1024 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1026 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1027 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1030 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1032 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1033 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1036 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1039 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1042 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1045 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1048 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1051 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1054 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1057 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1060 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1063 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1068 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1071 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1073 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1075 switch (st->hand_state) {
1077 /* Shouldn't happen */
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1082 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1083 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1087 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1095 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1096 unsigned char *session_id;
1098 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1099 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1100 if (protverr != 0) {
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1106 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1107 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1108 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1109 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1110 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1114 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1116 p = s->s3.client_random;
1119 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1120 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1122 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1132 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1135 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1136 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1143 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1144 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1145 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1146 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1147 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1148 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1149 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1152 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1153 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1154 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1155 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1156 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1157 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1158 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1159 * know that is maximum server supports.
1160 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1161 * containing version 1.0.
1163 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1164 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1165 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1166 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1167 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1168 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1169 * the negotiated version.
1171 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1172 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1175 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1182 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1183 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1184 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1185 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1186 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1187 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1188 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1189 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1190 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1199 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1200 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1201 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1202 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1205 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1206 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1208 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1214 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1215 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1216 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1217 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 /* Ciphers supported */
1224 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1233 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1244 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1245 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1246 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1247 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1248 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1249 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1250 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 /* Add the NULL method */
1258 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 /* TLS extensions */
1264 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1265 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1272 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1277 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1278 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1280 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1283 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1284 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1286 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1289 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1291 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1293 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1295 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1298 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1300 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1301 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1304 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1306 /* unknown cipher */
1307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1311 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1312 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1314 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1319 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1320 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1322 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1327 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1328 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1329 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1335 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1336 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1337 * set and use it for comparison.
1339 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1340 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1341 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1342 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1344 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1345 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1347 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1348 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1350 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1355 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1359 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1363 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1368 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1370 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1371 size_t session_id_len;
1372 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1374 unsigned int compression;
1375 unsigned int sversion;
1376 unsigned int context;
1377 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1382 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1387 /* load the server random */
1388 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1389 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1390 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1391 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1392 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1394 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1399 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1405 /* Get the session-id. */
1406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1410 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1411 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1412 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1417 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1422 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1427 /* TLS extensions */
1428 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1429 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1430 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1431 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1437 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1438 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1439 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1440 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1445 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1446 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1451 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1452 if (compression != 0) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1454 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1458 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1459 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1460 session_id_len) != 0) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1467 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1468 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1472 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1476 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1477 * are appropriate for this version.
1479 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1480 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1481 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1488 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1490 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1491 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1493 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1495 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1499 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1500 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1501 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1502 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1503 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1508 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1509 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1510 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1511 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1512 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1513 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1514 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1515 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1516 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1517 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1519 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1520 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1521 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1523 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1524 * backwards compat reasons
1526 int master_key_length;
1527 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1528 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1531 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1532 && master_key_length > 0) {
1533 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1534 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1535 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if (session_id_len != 0
1543 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1544 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1545 session_id_len) == 0)
1550 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1551 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1552 /* actually a client application bug */
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1554 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1559 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1560 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1561 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1562 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1563 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1565 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1566 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1567 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1568 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1573 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1575 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1576 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1577 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1578 * used for resumption.
1580 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1581 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1582 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1583 if (session_id_len > 0)
1584 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1589 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1590 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1592 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1596 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1599 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1600 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1602 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1607 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1608 if (compression != 0) {
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1610 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1614 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1615 * using compression.
1617 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1622 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1624 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1627 if (compression == 0)
1629 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1633 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1636 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1638 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1641 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1645 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1651 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1652 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1653 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1657 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1660 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1661 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1663 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1664 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1665 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1668 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1669 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1671 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1677 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1678 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1683 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1684 * we're done with this message
1687 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1688 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1689 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1694 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1695 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1697 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1698 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1701 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1704 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1707 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1708 * should not be used.
1710 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1711 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1713 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1714 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1715 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1716 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1721 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1724 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1725 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1726 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1730 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1731 * ClientHello will not change
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1738 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1739 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1741 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1747 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1748 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1749 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1752 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1753 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1758 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1760 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1764 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1767 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1768 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1770 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1771 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1772 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1773 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1774 unsigned int context = 0;
1775 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1777 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1782 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1784 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1785 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1786 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1790 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1791 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1792 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1797 certstart = certbytes;
1798 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1801 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1804 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1805 cert_len) == NULL) {
1806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1810 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1815 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1816 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1819 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1823 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1824 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1825 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1826 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1827 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1828 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1829 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1830 /* SSLfatal already called */
1833 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1836 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1843 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1845 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1846 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1847 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1848 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1849 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1850 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1851 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1852 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1853 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1854 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1855 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1856 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1858 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1860 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1863 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i);
1869 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1871 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1872 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1874 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1877 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1879 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1882 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1886 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1892 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1893 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1896 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1897 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1903 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1905 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1907 s->session->peer = x;
1908 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1911 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1913 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1914 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1915 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1916 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1920 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1924 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1928 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1931 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1933 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1935 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1941 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1942 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1943 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1946 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1951 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1953 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1954 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1955 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1967 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1970 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1972 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1973 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1974 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1975 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1980 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1982 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1983 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1985 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1986 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1988 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1989 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1991 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1992 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1997 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
1998 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2002 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2003 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2004 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2013 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2015 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2016 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2017 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2018 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2019 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2020 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2023 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2024 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2025 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2030 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2031 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2032 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2034 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2035 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2036 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2041 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2043 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2044 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2045 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2047 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2052 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2057 if (EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2058 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, params) <= 0) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2063 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2064 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, peer_tmp, s->ctx->propq);
2066 || EVP_PKEY_param_check(pctx) != 1
2067 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2072 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2078 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2082 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2083 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2085 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2086 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2087 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2092 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2093 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
2094 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2095 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2103 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2107 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2110 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2111 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2112 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2114 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2119 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2120 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2122 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2123 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2128 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2130 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2134 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2139 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2140 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2141 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2147 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2148 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2151 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2152 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2153 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2154 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2155 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2164 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2167 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2168 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2169 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2170 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2172 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2174 save_param_start = *pkt;
2176 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2177 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2178 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2181 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2182 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2188 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2189 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2190 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2191 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2192 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2196 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2200 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2201 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2202 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2210 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2213 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2219 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2220 * equals the length of the parameters.
2222 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2223 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2224 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2229 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2230 unsigned int sigalg;
2232 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2236 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2237 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2240 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2245 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2247 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2250 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2251 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2252 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2254 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2255 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2260 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2261 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2267 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2268 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey) <= 0) {
2269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2272 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2273 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2274 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2275 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2280 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2281 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2287 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2288 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2294 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2297 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2298 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2299 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2300 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2301 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2304 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2307 /* still data left over */
2308 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2314 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2316 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2320 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2324 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2325 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2326 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2328 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2329 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2330 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2332 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2334 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2335 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2338 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2341 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2342 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2343 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2344 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2345 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2346 s->pha_context = NULL;
2348 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2349 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2351 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2356 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2358 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2359 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2361 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2362 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2363 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2364 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2365 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2367 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2368 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2375 /* get the certificate types */
2376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2378 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2381 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2383 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2386 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2389 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2391 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2395 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2396 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2398 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2400 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2401 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2403 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2405 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2409 /* get the CA RDNs */
2410 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2412 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2416 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2418 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2421 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2422 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2425 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2426 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2427 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2428 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2429 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2432 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2438 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2440 unsigned int ticklen;
2441 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2442 unsigned int sess_len;
2443 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2445 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2447 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2449 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2451 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2452 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2453 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2454 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2455 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2461 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2462 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2463 * be 0 here in that instance
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2469 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2470 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2471 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2472 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2473 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2476 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2477 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2480 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2483 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2488 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2489 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2491 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2492 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2493 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2495 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2498 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2499 s->session = new_sess;
2503 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2504 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2506 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2508 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2509 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2510 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2512 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2513 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2517 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2522 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2523 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2524 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2526 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2529 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2530 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2535 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2536 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2538 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2539 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2540 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2547 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2548 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2549 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2550 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2551 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2552 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2553 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2554 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2557 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2558 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
2563 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2564 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2566 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2567 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2572 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2574 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2575 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2577 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2578 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2579 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2580 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2582 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2584 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2585 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2589 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2591 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2593 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2594 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2595 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2596 s->session->master_key,
2598 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2601 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2604 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2608 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2610 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2612 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2616 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2617 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2619 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2624 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2625 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2629 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2630 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2634 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2635 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2639 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2643 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2649 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2651 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2652 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2656 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2660 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2661 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2662 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2665 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2668 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2671 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2672 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2677 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2678 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2679 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2681 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2682 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2683 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2687 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2696 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2697 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2698 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2708 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2710 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2711 /* should contain no data */
2712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2713 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2716 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2717 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2719 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2724 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2725 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2726 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2729 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2732 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2737 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2738 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2741 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2742 size_t identitylen = 0;
2743 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2744 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2745 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2748 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2753 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2755 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2756 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2759 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2767 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2768 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2774 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2775 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2780 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2781 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2782 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2785 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2788 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2797 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2798 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2799 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2811 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2812 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2813 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2815 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2818 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2820 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2827 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2833 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2840 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2841 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2842 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2847 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2848 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
2854 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2855 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2859 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2860 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2867 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2868 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2873 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2874 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2875 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2879 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2880 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2884 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2885 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2896 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2897 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2899 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2900 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2903 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2909 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2916 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2920 /* send off the data */
2922 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2923 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2924 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2927 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2931 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2932 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2935 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ckey);
2936 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2938 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2945 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
2953 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2957 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2960 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2961 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2962 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2965 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2977 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2982 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2983 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2985 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2990 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2997 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2998 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3006 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3009 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3010 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3013 unsigned int md_len;
3014 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3015 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3016 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3017 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3020 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3021 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3024 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3026 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3027 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3029 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3033 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3034 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3036 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3041 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3042 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3043 * certificate key for key exchange
3046 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3048 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3054 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3055 /* Generate session key
3056 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3058 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3066 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3067 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3068 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3069 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3070 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3071 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3072 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3073 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3079 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3080 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3084 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3086 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3089 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3094 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3095 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3096 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3101 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3102 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3103 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3107 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3108 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3109 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3118 int gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3120 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3121 return NID_magma_ctr;
3122 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3123 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3128 int gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3130 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3131 unsigned int md_len;
3132 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3137 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3138 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3139 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3140 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3141 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3142 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3143 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3147 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3148 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3153 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3156 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3157 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3158 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3160 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3163 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3165 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3175 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3177 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3183 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3189 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3190 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3192 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3196 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3197 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3199 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3210 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3211 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3216 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3217 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3223 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3228 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3233 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3234 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3235 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3239 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3240 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3251 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3253 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3254 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3259 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3261 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3262 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3263 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3275 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3277 unsigned long alg_k;
3279 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3282 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3283 * no need to do so here.
3285 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3286 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3289 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3290 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3292 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3293 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3295 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3296 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3298 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3299 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3301 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3302 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3304 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3305 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3307 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3315 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3317 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3318 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3323 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3325 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3328 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3329 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3333 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3334 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3335 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3342 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3346 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3357 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3358 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3359 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3363 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3366 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3367 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3369 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3370 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3371 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3374 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3375 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3376 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3382 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3388 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3389 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3394 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3395 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3396 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3398 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3400 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3401 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3404 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3405 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3407 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3408 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3413 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3416 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3419 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3420 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3421 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3422 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3424 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3431 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3433 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3434 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3435 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3437 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3440 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3444 /* We need to get a client cert */
3445 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3447 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3448 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3450 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3452 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3455 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3456 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3457 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3459 } else if (i == 1) {
3461 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3465 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3466 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3469 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3470 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3472 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3474 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3475 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3476 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3482 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3483 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3484 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3487 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3492 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3495 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3496 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3497 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3501 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3506 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3507 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3509 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3514 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3515 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3516 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3518 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3519 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3528 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3530 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3534 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3535 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3537 /* we don't have a certificate */
3538 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3541 /* This is the passed certificate */
3542 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3544 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3545 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3551 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3552 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3559 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3561 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3566 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3576 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3578 size_t len, padding_len;
3579 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3581 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3582 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3584 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3585 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3590 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3596 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3598 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3599 /* should contain no data */
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3601 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3604 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3605 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3606 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3610 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3611 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3612 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3613 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3614 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3619 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3621 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3624 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3627 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3629 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3630 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3635 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3636 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3638 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3639 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3640 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3644 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3645 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3648 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3652 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3656 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3657 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3662 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3663 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3667 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3670 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3671 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3673 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3674 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3684 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3685 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3686 # error Max cipher length too short
3689 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3690 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3693 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3694 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3697 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3700 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3702 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3705 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3706 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3708 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3709 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3710 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3713 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3718 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3720 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3721 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3722 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3725 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3726 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3734 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3735 const char *maxvertext =
3737 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3740 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3746 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3747 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3748 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3750 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3755 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3756 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3757 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3759 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3769 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3771 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3772 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3777 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;