2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
43 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
47 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
53 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
55 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
56 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
57 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
58 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
65 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
71 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
73 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
76 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
77 * ciphersuite or for SRP
79 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
88 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
89 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
90 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
91 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
93 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
94 * (transition not allowed)
96 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
98 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
101 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
102 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
103 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
106 switch (st->hand_state) {
110 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
112 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
113 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
121 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
128 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
145 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
146 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
160 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
168 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
170 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
175 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
176 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
191 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
192 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
193 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
194 # error Internal DTLS version error
196 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
197 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
198 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
200 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
201 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
202 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
203 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
205 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
216 /* No valid transition found */
221 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
222 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
223 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
224 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
226 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
227 * (transition not allowed)
229 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
231 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
235 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
236 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
238 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
239 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
244 switch (st->hand_state) {
248 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
255 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
256 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
264 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
265 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
274 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
276 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
286 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
287 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
288 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
290 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
291 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
292 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
293 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
295 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
296 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
297 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
298 * the server is resuming.
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
303 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
304 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
310 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
311 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
313 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
314 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
319 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
320 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
334 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
335 * |ext.status_expected| is set
337 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
343 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
344 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
345 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
346 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
347 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
358 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
373 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
374 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
379 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
386 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
393 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
408 /* No valid transition found */
409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
413 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
414 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
417 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
418 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
419 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
420 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
427 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
429 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
430 return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
431 && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
435 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
436 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
439 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
441 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
444 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
445 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
446 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
448 switch (st->hand_state) {
450 /* Shouldn't happen */
451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
454 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
455 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
456 if (do_compressed_cert(s))
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
464 * we already sent close_notify
466 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
475 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
476 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
478 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
479 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
481 else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
488 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
492 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
500 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
510 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
511 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
512 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
520 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
522 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 /* Try to read from the server instead */
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
539 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
541 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
543 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
546 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
547 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
550 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
551 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
553 switch (st->hand_state) {
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
560 if (!s->renegotiate) {
562 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
563 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
565 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
574 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
576 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
577 * actually selected a version yet.
579 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
589 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
590 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
592 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
594 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
595 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
596 * because we did early data.
598 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
599 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
606 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
609 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
614 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
615 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
627 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
628 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
631 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
632 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
633 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
634 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
636 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
641 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
651 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
653 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
656 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
659 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
660 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
667 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
668 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
669 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
673 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
675 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
676 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
678 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
681 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
683 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
686 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
690 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
692 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
695 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
696 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
698 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
700 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
701 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
703 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
704 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
709 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
710 * the client to the server.
712 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
714 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
716 switch (st->hand_state) {
718 /* No pre work to be done */
721 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
723 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
724 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
725 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
729 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
731 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
732 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
733 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
734 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
736 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
738 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
739 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
740 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
741 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
743 /* SSLfatal already called */
749 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
753 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
754 * messages unless we need to.
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
759 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
767 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
769 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
770 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
771 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
773 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
774 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
775 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
778 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
782 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
783 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
786 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
790 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
791 * client to the server.
793 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
795 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
796 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
800 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 /* No post work to be done */
805 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
806 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
807 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
809 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
810 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
811 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
813 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
814 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
815 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
821 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
825 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
826 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
831 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
832 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
840 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
842 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
843 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
845 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
846 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
847 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
849 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
850 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
854 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
855 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
856 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
858 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
859 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
861 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
863 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
868 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
869 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
870 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
878 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
886 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
890 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
901 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
904 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
905 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
910 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
911 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
912 /* SSLfatal() already called */
919 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
920 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
922 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
933 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
936 * Valid return values are:
940 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
941 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
943 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
945 switch (st->hand_state) {
947 /* Shouldn't happen */
948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
951 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
952 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
953 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
955 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
959 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
960 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
964 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
969 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
980 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
981 *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
982 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
986 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
991 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
992 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
993 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
996 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
997 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
998 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
999 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
1002 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
1003 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1004 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1007 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
1008 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1009 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1017 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1018 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1020 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1022 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1024 switch (st->hand_state) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1030 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1032 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1033 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1037 return s->max_cert_list;
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1040 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1043 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1046 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1050 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1051 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1052 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1054 return s->max_cert_list;
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1057 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1060 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1062 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1065 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1066 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1069 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1072 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1075 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1080 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1082 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1085 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1087 switch (st->hand_state) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1094 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1096 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1097 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1100 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1103 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1104 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1108 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1110 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1111 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1113 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1114 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1116 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1117 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1120 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1122 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1123 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1125 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1126 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1128 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1129 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1131 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1132 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1134 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1135 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1137 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1138 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1143 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1146 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1149 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1151 switch (st->hand_state) {
1153 /* Shouldn't happen */
1154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1158 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1159 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1161 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1162 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1163 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1167 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1175 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1176 unsigned char *session_id;
1177 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1179 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1180 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1181 if (protverr != 0) {
1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1183 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1187 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1188 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1189 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1190 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1192 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1195 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1197 p = s->s3.client_random;
1200 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1201 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1203 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1206 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1213 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1216 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1217 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1223 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1224 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1225 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1226 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1227 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1228 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1229 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1230 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1233 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1234 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1235 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1236 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1237 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1238 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1239 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1240 * know that is maximum server supports.
1241 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1242 * containing version 1.0.
1244 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1245 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1246 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1247 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1248 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1249 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1250 * the negotiated version.
1252 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1253 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1256 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1262 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1263 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1264 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1265 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1266 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1267 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1268 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1269 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1270 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1271 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1279 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1280 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1281 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1282 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1283 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1286 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1287 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1289 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1294 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1295 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1296 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1297 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1298 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1300 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1304 /* Ciphers supported */
1305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1310 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1313 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1315 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1321 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1326 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1327 && sctx->comp_methods
1328 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1329 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1330 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1331 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1332 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1333 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1340 /* Add the NULL method */
1341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1346 /* TLS extensions */
1347 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1349 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1352 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1355 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1360 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1366 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1367 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1372 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1376 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1381 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1382 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1384 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1385 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1387 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1389 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1391 /* unknown cipher */
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1396 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1397 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1399 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1404 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1405 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1407 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1412 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1413 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1414 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1420 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1421 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1422 * set and use it for comparison.
1424 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1425 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1426 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1427 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1428 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1430 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1436 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1439 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1441 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1446 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1450 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1454 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1459 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1461 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1462 size_t session_id_len;
1463 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1465 unsigned int compression;
1466 unsigned int sversion;
1467 unsigned int context;
1468 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1469 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1474 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1479 /* load the server random */
1480 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1481 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1482 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1483 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1484 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1488 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1489 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1490 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1500 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1506 /* Get the session-id. */
1507 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1511 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1512 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1513 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1518 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1523 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1528 /* TLS extensions */
1529 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1530 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1531 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1532 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1538 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1539 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1540 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1541 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1546 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1552 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1553 if (compression != 0) {
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1555 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1559 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1560 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1561 session_id_len) != 0) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1568 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1569 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1573 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1577 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1578 * are appropriate for this version.
1580 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1581 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1582 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1589 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1591 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1592 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1594 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1596 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1600 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1601 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1602 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1603 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1604 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1609 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1610 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1611 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1612 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1613 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1614 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1615 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1616 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1617 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1618 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1620 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1621 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1622 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1624 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1625 * backwards compat reasons
1627 int master_key_length;
1629 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1630 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1633 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1634 && master_key_length > 0) {
1635 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1636 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1637 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 if (session_id_len != 0
1645 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1646 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1647 session_id_len) == 0)
1652 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1653 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1654 /* actually a client application bug */
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1656 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1661 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1662 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1663 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1664 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1665 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1667 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1668 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1669 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1675 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1677 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1678 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1679 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1680 * used for resumption.
1682 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1683 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1684 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1685 if (session_id_len > 0)
1686 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1691 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1692 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1694 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1698 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1701 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1702 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1704 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1709 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1710 if (compression != 0) {
1711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1712 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1716 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1717 * using compression.
1719 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1724 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1726 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1729 if (compression == 0)
1731 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1735 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1739 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1741 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1744 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1748 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1754 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1755 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1756 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1760 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1763 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1764 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1766 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1767 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1768 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1771 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1772 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1774 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1779 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1780 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1781 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1786 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1787 * we're done with this message
1789 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1790 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1791 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1792 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
1793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1797 * If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS
1798 * (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys
1799 * immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible
1800 * early data is written. We could just always defer until the last
1801 * moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys
1802 * are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox
1803 * compat this doesn't cause a problem.
1805 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
1806 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
1807 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1808 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
1809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1815 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1817 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1818 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1821 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1824 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1827 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1828 * the old wrlmethod.
1830 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1831 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
1833 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
1834 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
1835 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1836 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
1837 /* SSLfatal already called */
1840 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1841 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
1843 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1844 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1845 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1846 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1851 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1854 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1856 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1857 * ClientHello will not change
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1864 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1865 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1867 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1873 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1874 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1875 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1878 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1879 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1880 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1884 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1886 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1887 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1890 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
1894 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
1895 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1896 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1899 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
1900 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1901 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1904 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
1905 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
1907 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1910 static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
1914 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1916 if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
1917 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1918 SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1922 if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1923 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1924 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
1925 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1928 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
1929 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
1930 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1935 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1936 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1939 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1940 if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1941 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
1946 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
1947 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
1948 sc->session->peer = NULL;
1949 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1950 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1951 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
1953 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1954 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
1955 && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
1956 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
1957 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1958 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1962 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1965 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1966 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1969 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1971 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1973 unsigned int context = 0;
1974 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1976 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
1977 return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
1978 if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
1980 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1984 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1989 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1991 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1992 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1993 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1997 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1998 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1999 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2004 certstart = certbytes;
2005 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2010 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
2011 cert_len) == NULL) {
2012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2016 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2021 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2022 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2025 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2029 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2030 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
2031 NULL, chainidx == 0)
2032 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
2033 rawexts, x, chainidx,
2034 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2035 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2036 /* SSLfatal already called */
2039 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2042 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2048 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2052 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
2053 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
2054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2058 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
2059 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
2060 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
2062 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2066 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2067 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2071 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
2072 return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
2074 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
2075 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2076 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
2077 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
2081 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
2082 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
2083 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
2084 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
2085 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
2086 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
2087 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
2088 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
2089 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
2090 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
2091 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
2092 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
2094 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
2095 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
2096 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2099 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
2102 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
2103 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
2105 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
2107 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2109 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
2110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2111 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
2115 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
2116 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2121 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
2122 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2125 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2126 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
2127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2132 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2134 s->session->peer = x;
2135 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2136 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
2137 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
2138 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
2140 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2141 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2142 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
2143 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
2144 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
2145 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2148 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
2154 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2156 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
2158 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
2159 ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
2166 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2169 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2171 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2173 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2179 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2180 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2181 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2184 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2189 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2190 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2191 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2192 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2193 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2205 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2208 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2211 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2212 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2213 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2219 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2220 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2222 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2223 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2225 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2226 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2228 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2229 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2234 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2235 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2239 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2240 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2241 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2250 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2252 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2253 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2254 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2255 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2256 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2257 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2258 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2261 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2262 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2263 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2268 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2269 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2271 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2272 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2273 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2278 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2280 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2281 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2282 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2284 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2289 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2294 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2295 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2300 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2301 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2304 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2305 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2306 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2307 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2309 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2310 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2315 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2316 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2322 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2326 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2327 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2329 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2330 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2331 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2336 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2337 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2338 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2339 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2347 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2350 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2353 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2354 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2355 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2357 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2362 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2363 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2365 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2366 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2371 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2373 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2382 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2383 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2384 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2390 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2391 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2394 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2395 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2396 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2397 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2398 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2400 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2401 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2405 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2408 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2409 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2410 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2411 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2412 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2414 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2416 save_param_start = *pkt;
2418 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2419 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2421 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2422 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2428 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2429 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2430 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2431 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2432 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2435 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2436 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2437 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2440 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2441 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2450 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2453 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2459 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2460 * equals the length of the parameters.
2462 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2463 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2464 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2469 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2470 unsigned int sigalg;
2472 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2476 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2480 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2486 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2488 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2491 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2492 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2493 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2495 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2496 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2501 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2502 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2507 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2508 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2509 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2514 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2515 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2516 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2517 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2522 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2523 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2529 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2530 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2536 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2539 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2540 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2541 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2542 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2543 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2546 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2549 /* still data left over */
2550 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2556 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2558 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2559 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2562 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2565 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2566 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
2567 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2569 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2571 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2572 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2575 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2576 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2577 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2579 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2581 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2582 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2585 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2588 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2589 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2590 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2591 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2592 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2593 s->pha_context = NULL;
2594 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2596 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2597 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2599 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2602 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2604 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2606 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2607 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2609 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2610 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2611 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2612 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2613 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2615 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2616 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2623 /* get the certificate types */
2624 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2629 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2631 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2634 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2637 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2639 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2643 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2644 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2646 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2648 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2651 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2657 /* get the CA RDNs */
2658 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2660 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2664 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2666 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2669 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2670 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2673 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2674 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2675 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2676 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2677 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2680 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2681 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2682 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2684 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2687 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2690 unsigned int ticklen;
2691 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2692 unsigned int sess_len;
2693 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2695 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2696 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2698 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2700 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2701 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2702 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2703 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2704 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2705 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2706 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2707 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2713 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2714 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2715 * be 0 here in that instance
2718 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2721 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2722 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2723 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2724 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2725 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2728 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2729 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2732 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2735 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2740 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2741 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2743 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2744 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2745 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2747 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2750 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2751 s->session = new_sess;
2754 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2755 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2758 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2759 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2761 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2762 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2766 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2771 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2772 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2773 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2775 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2778 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2779 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2784 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2785 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2787 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2788 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2789 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2796 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2797 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2798 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2799 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2800 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2801 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2802 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2803 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2806 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2807 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2808 /* Error is already recorded */
2809 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2813 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2814 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2816 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2817 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2822 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2824 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2825 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2827 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2828 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2829 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2830 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2832 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2834 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2835 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2841 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2843 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2844 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2845 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2846 s->session->master_key,
2848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2851 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2854 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2855 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2858 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2860 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2862 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2866 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2867 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2869 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2874 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2875 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2879 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2880 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2884 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2885 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2886 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2890 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2891 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2900 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2902 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2903 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2904 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2907 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2911 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2912 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2913 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2916 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2918 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2921 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2924 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2925 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2930 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2931 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2932 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2934 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2935 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2936 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2937 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2941 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2946 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2951 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2952 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2953 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2954 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2963 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2965 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2966 /* should contain no data */
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2968 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2971 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2972 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2974 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2979 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2981 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2984 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2987 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2992 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2993 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2996 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2997 size_t identitylen = 0;
2998 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2999 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
3000 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
3003 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
3008 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
3010 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3011 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
3012 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
3015 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
3019 } else if (psklen == 0) {
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3024 identitylen = strlen(identity);
3025 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3030 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
3031 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
3032 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3037 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
3038 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
3039 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
3041 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3042 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
3045 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
3046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3053 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
3054 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3055 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
3056 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
3060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3067 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3068 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3069 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3071 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3073 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3075 if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
3077 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
3079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3088 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
3089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3093 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3094 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3100 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3101 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3102 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
3107 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3108 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
3114 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3115 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3119 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3120 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3127 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3128 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3134 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3139 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3140 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3144 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3145 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3150 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3152 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3153 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3155 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
3156 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
3159 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3165 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3172 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3176 /* send off the data */
3178 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3179 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
3180 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3182 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3183 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
3187 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3188 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3191 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
3192 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
3194 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3198 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
3201 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3208 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3209 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3213 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3215 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3216 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3217 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3220 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3232 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3237 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3238 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3240 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3245 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3253 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3257 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3260 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3261 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3262 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3264 unsigned int md_len;
3265 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3266 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3267 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3268 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3270 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3272 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3273 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3276 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3278 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3280 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3284 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3287 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3292 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3293 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3294 * certificate key for key exchange
3297 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3299 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3305 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3306 /* Generate session key
3308 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3316 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3317 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3318 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3319 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3320 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3321 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3322 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3323 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3329 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3330 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3334 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3336 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3339 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3344 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3345 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3346 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3351 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3352 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3353 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3357 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3358 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3359 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3368 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3370 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3371 return NID_magma_ctr;
3372 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3373 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3378 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3380 EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL;
3381 unsigned int md_len;
3382 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3383 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3389 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3390 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3391 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3392 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3393 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3394 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3395 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3399 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3400 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3405 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3408 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3409 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3410 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3411 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3413 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3416 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3417 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3419 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3429 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3431 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3437 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3442 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3443 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3445 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3449 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3452 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3457 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3462 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3463 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3464 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3469 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3470 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3475 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3480 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3481 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3486 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3488 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3489 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3493 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3494 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3502 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3505 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3507 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3508 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3515 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3516 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3517 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3529 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3532 unsigned long alg_k;
3534 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3537 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3538 * no need to do so here.
3540 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3541 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3544 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3545 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3547 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3548 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3550 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3551 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3553 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3554 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3556 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3557 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3559 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3560 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3562 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3567 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3569 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3570 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3571 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3573 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3574 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3575 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3577 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3580 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3582 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3585 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3586 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3590 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3591 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3592 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3599 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3603 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3604 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3605 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3614 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3615 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3616 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3618 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3621 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3624 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3625 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3627 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3628 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3629 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3632 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3633 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3634 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3639 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3640 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3646 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3647 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3648 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3653 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3654 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3655 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3657 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3659 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3660 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3663 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3664 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3666 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3667 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3672 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3675 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3677 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3679 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3680 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3681 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3682 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3684 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3691 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3693 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3694 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3695 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3697 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3700 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3704 /* We need to get a client cert */
3705 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3707 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3708 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3710 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3712 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3715 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3716 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3717 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3718 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3720 } else if (i == 1) {
3722 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3726 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3727 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3730 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3731 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3732 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3733 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3735 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3736 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3737 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3738 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3744 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3745 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
3746 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3748 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3749 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3750 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3753 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3758 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3761 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3762 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3764 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3765 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3766 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3767 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3769 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3771 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3773 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3776 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
3778 switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
3779 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3780 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3781 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3782 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3785 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3786 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3788 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3793 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3797 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
3798 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
3799 * moment. We need to do it now.
3801 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3802 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3803 && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
3804 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
3805 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3806 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3808 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3809 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3812 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3815 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3819 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
3822 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
3824 BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
3827 COMP_METHOD *method;
3828 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
3831 int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
3833 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3835 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
3838 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3839 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
3840 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3841 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
3843 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
3846 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
3847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3851 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3852 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3853 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
3854 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
3858 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
3859 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3861 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
3862 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3864 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
3865 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3870 max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
3872 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
3873 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3874 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
3877 comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
3878 (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
3882 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
3883 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3887 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
3888 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
3889 * moment. We need to do it now.
3891 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3892 && (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
3893 || (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
3894 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
3895 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3897 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3898 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3900 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3907 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3910 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3911 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
3914 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
3919 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3921 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3926 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3927 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3929 /* we don't have a certificate */
3930 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3933 /* This is the passed certificate */
3934 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3935 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3937 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3938 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3943 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3945 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3949 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3954 /* Early out to skip the checks below */
3955 if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
3958 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3959 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3969 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3971 size_t len, padding_len;
3972 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3974 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3975 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3977 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3978 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3980 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3983 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3985 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3989 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3991 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3993 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3994 /* should contain no data */
3995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3996 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3999 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
4000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
4001 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
4005 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
4006 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
4007 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
4008 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
4009 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
4011 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
4012 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
4014 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
4016 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
4019 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4023 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
4025 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
4026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4031 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
4032 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
4034 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4035 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
4036 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4040 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4041 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4044 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4048 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
4051 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
4054 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
4055 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
4060 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
4061 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
4065 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
4069 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
4070 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
4071 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
4072 || s->min_proto_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
4073 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
4075 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
4076 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
4077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
4082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4086 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
4087 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
4088 # error Max cipher length too short
4091 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
4092 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
4095 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4096 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
4099 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
4102 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
4104 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
4107 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
4108 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
4110 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
4111 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
4112 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
4115 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
4116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4120 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
4122 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
4123 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4124 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
4127 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
4128 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4136 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
4137 const char *maxvertext =
4139 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
4142 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
4148 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
4149 static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4150 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4152 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4157 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
4158 static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4159 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4161 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4171 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4173 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4174 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
4175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4176 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4179 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
4180 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;