2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
43 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
47 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
53 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
55 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
56 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
57 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
58 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
65 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
71 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
73 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
76 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
77 * ciphersuite or for SRP
79 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
88 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
89 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
90 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
91 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
93 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
94 * (transition not allowed)
96 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
98 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
101 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
102 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
103 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
106 switch (st->hand_state) {
110 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
112 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
113 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
121 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
128 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
145 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
146 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
160 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
168 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
170 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
175 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
176 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
191 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
192 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
193 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
194 # error Internal DTLS version error
196 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
197 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
198 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
200 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
201 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
202 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
203 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
205 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
216 /* No valid transition found */
221 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
222 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
223 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
224 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
226 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
227 * (transition not allowed)
229 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
231 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
235 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
236 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
238 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
239 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
244 switch (st->hand_state) {
248 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
255 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
256 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
264 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
265 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
274 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
276 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
286 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
287 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
288 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
290 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
291 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
292 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
293 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
295 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
296 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
297 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
298 * the server is resuming.
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
303 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
304 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
310 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
311 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
313 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
314 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
319 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
320 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
334 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
335 * |ext.status_expected| is set
337 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
343 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
344 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
345 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
346 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
347 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
358 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
373 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
374 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
379 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
386 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
393 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
408 /* No valid transition found */
409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
413 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
414 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
417 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
418 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
419 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
420 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
427 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
429 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
430 return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
431 && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
435 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
436 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
439 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
441 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
444 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
445 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
446 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
448 switch (st->hand_state) {
450 /* Shouldn't happen */
451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
454 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
455 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
456 if (do_compressed_cert(s))
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
464 * we already sent close_notify
466 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
475 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
476 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
478 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
479 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
481 else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
488 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
492 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
500 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
510 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
511 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
512 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
520 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
522 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 /* Try to read from the server instead */
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
539 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
541 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
543 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
546 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
547 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
550 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
551 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
553 switch (st->hand_state) {
555 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
560 if (!s->renegotiate) {
562 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
563 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
565 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
574 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
576 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
577 * actually selected a version yet.
579 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
589 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
590 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
592 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
594 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
595 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
596 * because we did early data.
598 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
599 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
606 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
609 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
614 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
615 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
619 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
627 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
628 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
631 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
632 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
633 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
634 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
636 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
641 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
651 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
653 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
656 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
659 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
660 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
667 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
668 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
669 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
673 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
675 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
676 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
678 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
681 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
683 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
686 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
690 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
692 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
695 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
696 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
698 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
700 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
701 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
703 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
704 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
709 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
710 * the client to the server.
712 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
714 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
716 switch (st->hand_state) {
718 /* No pre work to be done */
721 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
723 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
724 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
725 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
729 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
731 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
732 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
733 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
734 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
736 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
738 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
739 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
740 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
741 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
743 /* SSLfatal already called */
749 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
753 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
754 * messages unless we need to.
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
759 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
767 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
769 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
770 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
771 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
773 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
774 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
775 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
778 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
779 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
782 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
783 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
786 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
790 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
791 * client to the server.
793 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
795 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
796 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
800 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 /* No post work to be done */
805 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
806 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
807 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
809 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
810 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
811 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
813 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
814 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
815 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
821 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
825 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
826 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
831 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
832 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
840 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
842 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
843 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
845 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
846 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
847 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
849 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
850 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
854 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
855 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
856 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
858 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
859 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
861 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
863 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
868 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
869 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
870 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
878 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
886 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
890 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
901 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
904 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
905 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
910 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
911 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
912 /* SSLfatal() already called */
919 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
920 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
922 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
933 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
936 * Valid return values are:
940 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
941 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
943 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
945 switch (st->hand_state) {
947 /* Shouldn't happen */
948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
951 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
952 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
953 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
955 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
959 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
960 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
964 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
969 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
980 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
981 *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
982 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
986 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
991 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
992 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
993 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
996 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
997 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
998 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
999 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
1002 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
1003 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1004 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1007 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
1008 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1009 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1017 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1018 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1020 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1022 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1024 switch (st->hand_state) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1030 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1032 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1033 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1037 return s->max_cert_list;
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1040 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1043 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1046 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1050 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1051 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1052 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1054 return s->max_cert_list;
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1057 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1060 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1062 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1065 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1066 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1069 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1072 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1075 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1080 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1082 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1085 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1087 switch (st->hand_state) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1094 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1096 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1097 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1100 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1103 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1104 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1108 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1110 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1111 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1113 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1114 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1116 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1117 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1120 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1122 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1123 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1125 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1126 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1128 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1129 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1131 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1132 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1134 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1135 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1137 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1138 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1143 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1146 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1149 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1151 switch (st->hand_state) {
1153 /* Shouldn't happen */
1154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1158 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1159 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1161 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1162 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1163 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1167 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1175 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1176 unsigned char *session_id;
1177 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1179 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1180 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1181 if (protverr != 0) {
1182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1183 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1187 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1188 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1189 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1190 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1192 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1195 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1197 p = s->s3.client_random;
1200 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1201 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1203 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1206 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1213 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1216 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1217 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1223 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1224 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1225 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1226 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1227 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1228 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1229 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1230 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1233 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1234 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1235 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1236 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1237 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1238 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1239 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1240 * know that is maximum server supports.
1241 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1242 * containing version 1.0.
1244 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1245 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1246 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1247 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1248 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1249 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1250 * the negotiated version.
1252 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1253 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1256 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1262 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1263 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1264 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1265 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1266 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1267 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1268 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1269 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1270 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1271 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1279 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1280 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1281 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1282 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1283 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1286 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1287 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1289 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1294 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1295 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1296 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1297 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1298 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1300 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1304 /* Ciphers supported */
1305 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1310 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1312 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1313 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1315 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1321 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1326 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1327 && sctx->comp_methods
1328 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1329 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1330 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1331 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1332 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1333 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1340 /* Add the NULL method */
1341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1346 /* TLS extensions */
1347 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1349 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1352 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1355 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1360 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1366 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1367 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1372 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1376 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1378 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1381 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1382 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1384 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1385 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1387 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1389 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1391 /* unknown cipher */
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1396 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1397 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1399 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1404 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1405 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1407 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1412 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1413 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1414 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1420 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1421 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1422 * set and use it for comparison.
1424 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1425 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1426 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1427 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1428 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1431 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1432 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1435 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1437 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1442 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1446 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1450 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1455 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1457 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1458 size_t session_id_len;
1459 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1461 unsigned int compression;
1462 unsigned int sversion;
1463 unsigned int context;
1464 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1465 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1470 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1475 /* load the server random */
1476 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1477 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1478 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1479 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1480 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1484 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1485 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1486 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1491 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1496 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1502 /* Get the session-id. */
1503 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1508 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1509 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1514 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1519 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1524 /* TLS extensions */
1525 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1526 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1527 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1528 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1534 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1535 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1536 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1537 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1542 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1548 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1549 if (compression != 0) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1551 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1555 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1556 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1557 session_id_len) != 0) {
1558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1564 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1565 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1569 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1573 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1574 * are appropriate for this version.
1576 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1577 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1578 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1585 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1587 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1588 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1590 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1592 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1596 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1597 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1598 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1599 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1605 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1606 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1607 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1608 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1609 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1610 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1611 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1612 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1613 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1614 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1616 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1617 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1618 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1620 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1621 * backwards compat reasons
1623 int master_key_length;
1625 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1626 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1629 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1630 && master_key_length > 0) {
1631 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1632 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1633 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 if (session_id_len != 0
1641 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1642 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1643 session_id_len) == 0)
1648 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1649 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1650 /* actually a client application bug */
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1652 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1657 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1658 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1659 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1660 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1661 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1663 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1664 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1665 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1666 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1671 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1673 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1674 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1675 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1676 * used for resumption.
1678 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1679 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1680 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1681 if (session_id_len > 0)
1682 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1687 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1688 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1690 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1694 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1697 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1698 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1700 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1705 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1706 if (compression != 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1708 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1712 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1713 * using compression.
1715 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1720 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1722 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1725 if (compression == 0)
1727 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1731 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1735 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1737 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1740 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1744 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1750 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1751 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1752 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1756 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1759 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1760 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1762 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1763 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1764 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1767 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1768 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1770 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1775 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1776 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1777 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1782 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1783 * we're done with this message
1785 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1786 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1787 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1788 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1793 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1794 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1796 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1800 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1803 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1806 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1807 * the old wrlmethod.
1809 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1810 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
1812 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
1813 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
1814 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1815 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
1816 /* SSLfatal already called */
1819 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1820 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
1822 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1823 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1824 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1825 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1830 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1833 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1835 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1836 * ClientHello will not change
1838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1843 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1844 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1846 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1852 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1853 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1854 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1857 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1858 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1863 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1865 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1869 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
1873 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
1874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1878 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
1879 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1883 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
1884 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
1886 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1889 static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
1893 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1895 if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
1896 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1897 SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1901 if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1902 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1903 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
1904 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1907 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
1908 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
1909 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1914 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1915 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1918 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1919 if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
1925 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
1926 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
1927 sc->session->peer = NULL;
1928 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1929 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1930 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
1932 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1933 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
1934 && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
1935 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
1936 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1937 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1941 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1944 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1945 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1948 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1950 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1952 unsigned int context = 0;
1953 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1955 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
1956 return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
1957 if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
1958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
1959 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1963 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1968 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1970 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1971 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1972 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1976 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1977 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1978 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1983 certstart = certbytes;
1984 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
1986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1989 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1990 cert_len) == NULL) {
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1995 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2000 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2001 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2004 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2008 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2009 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
2010 NULL, chainidx == 0)
2011 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
2012 rawexts, x, chainidx,
2013 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2015 /* SSLfatal already called */
2018 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2021 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2027 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2031 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
2032 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
2033 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2037 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
2038 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
2039 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
2041 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2045 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2046 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2050 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
2051 return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
2053 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
2054 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2055 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
2056 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
2060 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
2061 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
2062 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
2063 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
2064 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
2065 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
2066 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
2067 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
2068 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
2069 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
2070 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
2071 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
2073 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
2074 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
2075 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2078 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
2081 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
2082 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
2084 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
2086 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2088 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
2089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2090 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
2094 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
2095 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) {
2096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2100 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
2101 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2104 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2105 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
2106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2111 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2113 s->session->peer = x;
2114 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2115 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
2116 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
2117 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
2119 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2120 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2121 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
2122 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
2123 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
2124 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2127 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2131 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
2133 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2135 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
2137 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
2138 ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
2145 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2148 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2150 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2152 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2158 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2159 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2160 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2168 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2169 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2170 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2171 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2172 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2184 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2187 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2189 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2190 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2191 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2192 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2198 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2199 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2201 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2202 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2204 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2205 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2207 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2208 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2213 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2218 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2219 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2220 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2229 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2231 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2232 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2233 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2234 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2235 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2236 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2237 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2240 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2241 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2242 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2247 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2248 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2250 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2251 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2252 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2257 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2259 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2260 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2261 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2263 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2268 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2273 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2274 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2279 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2280 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2283 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2284 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2285 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2286 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2288 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2289 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2294 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2295 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2301 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2305 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2306 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2308 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2309 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2310 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2315 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2316 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2317 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2318 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2326 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2329 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2332 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2333 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2334 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2336 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2341 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2342 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2344 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2345 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2350 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2352 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2361 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2362 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2363 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2369 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2370 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2373 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2374 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2375 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2376 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2377 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2379 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2380 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2387 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2388 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2389 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2390 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2391 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2393 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2395 save_param_start = *pkt;
2397 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2398 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2400 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2401 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2407 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2408 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2409 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2410 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2415 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2419 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2420 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2429 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2432 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2438 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2439 * equals the length of the parameters.
2441 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2442 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2443 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2448 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2449 unsigned int sigalg;
2451 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2455 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2456 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2459 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2461 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2465 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2467 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2470 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2471 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2472 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2474 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2480 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2481 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2486 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2487 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2488 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2493 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2494 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2495 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2496 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2501 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2502 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2508 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2509 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2515 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2518 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2519 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2520 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2521 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2522 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2525 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2528 /* still data left over */
2529 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2537 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2538 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2541 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2544 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2545 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
2546 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2548 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2550 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2551 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2554 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2555 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2556 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2558 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2560 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2561 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2564 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2567 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2568 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2569 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2570 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2571 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2572 s->pha_context = NULL;
2573 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2575 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2576 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2578 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2581 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2585 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2586 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2588 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2589 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2590 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2591 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2592 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2594 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2595 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2602 /* get the certificate types */
2603 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2608 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2610 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2613 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2616 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2622 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2623 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2625 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2627 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2628 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2630 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2632 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2636 /* get the CA RDNs */
2637 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2638 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2639 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2643 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2645 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2648 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2649 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2652 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2653 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2654 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2655 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2656 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2659 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2660 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2661 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2669 unsigned int ticklen;
2670 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2671 unsigned int sess_len;
2672 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2674 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2675 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2677 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2679 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2680 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2681 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2682 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2683 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2684 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2685 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2686 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2692 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2693 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2694 * be 0 here in that instance
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2700 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2701 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2702 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2703 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2704 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2707 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2708 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2711 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2714 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2715 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2719 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2720 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2722 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2723 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2724 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2726 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2729 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2730 s->session = new_sess;
2733 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2734 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2736 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2737 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2738 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2740 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2741 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2745 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2750 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2751 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2752 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2754 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2757 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2758 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2763 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2764 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2766 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2767 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2768 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2769 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2775 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2776 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2777 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2778 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2779 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2780 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2781 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2782 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2785 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2786 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2787 /* Error is already recorded */
2788 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2793 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2795 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2796 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2801 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2803 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2804 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2806 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2807 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2808 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2809 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2811 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2813 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2814 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2820 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2822 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2823 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2824 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2825 s->session->master_key,
2827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2830 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2833 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2834 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2837 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2839 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2845 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2846 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2848 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2853 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2854 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2858 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2859 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2863 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2864 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2865 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2869 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2870 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2881 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2883 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2886 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2890 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2891 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2892 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2895 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2897 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2900 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2903 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2909 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2910 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2911 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2913 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2914 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2915 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2916 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2920 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2925 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2930 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2931 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2932 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2942 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2944 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2945 /* should contain no data */
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2947 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2950 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2951 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2953 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2958 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2960 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2963 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2966 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2971 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2972 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2975 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2976 size_t identitylen = 0;
2977 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2978 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2979 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2982 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2987 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2989 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2990 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2991 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2994 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2996 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2998 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3003 identitylen = strlen(identity);
3004 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3009 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
3010 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
3011 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
3012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3016 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
3017 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
3018 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
3020 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3021 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
3024 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
3025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3032 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
3033 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3034 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
3035 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
3039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3044 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3046 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3047 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3050 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3052 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3054 if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
3056 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3067 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
3068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3073 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3079 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3080 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3081 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
3082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
3086 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3087 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
3093 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3094 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3098 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3099 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3103 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3106 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3107 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3112 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3113 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3118 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3119 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3123 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3129 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3131 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3132 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3134 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
3135 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
3138 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3150 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3151 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3155 /* send off the data */
3157 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3158 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
3159 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3161 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
3166 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3167 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3170 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
3171 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
3173 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
3174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3177 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
3180 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3187 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3188 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3192 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3194 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3195 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3196 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3199 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3205 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3211 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3212 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3216 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3217 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3219 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3224 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3231 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3232 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3236 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3239 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3240 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3241 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3243 unsigned int md_len;
3244 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3245 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3246 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3247 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3249 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3251 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3252 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3255 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3257 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3259 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3263 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3266 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3271 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3272 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3273 * certificate key for key exchange
3276 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3278 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3284 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3285 /* Generate session key
3287 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3292 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3295 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3296 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3297 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3298 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3299 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3300 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3301 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3302 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3308 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3309 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3313 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3315 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3318 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3324 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3325 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3330 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3331 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3332 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3336 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3337 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3338 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3347 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3349 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3350 return NID_magma_ctr;
3351 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3352 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3357 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3359 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3360 unsigned int md_len;
3361 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3362 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3368 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3369 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3370 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3371 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3372 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3373 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3374 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3378 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3379 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3384 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3387 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3388 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3389 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3390 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3392 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3395 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3396 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3398 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3403 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3408 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3410 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3416 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3421 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3422 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3424 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3428 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3431 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3436 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3441 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3442 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3443 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3448 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3449 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3454 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3459 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3460 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3465 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3467 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3468 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3472 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3473 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3481 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3484 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3486 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3487 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3492 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3494 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3495 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3496 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3511 unsigned long alg_k;
3513 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3516 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3517 * no need to do so here.
3519 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3520 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3523 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3524 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3526 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3527 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3529 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3530 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3532 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3533 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3535 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3536 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3538 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3539 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3541 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3546 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3548 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3549 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3550 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3552 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3553 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3554 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3556 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3559 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3561 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3564 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3565 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3569 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3570 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3578 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3582 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3583 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3584 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3593 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3594 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3595 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3597 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3600 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3603 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3604 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3606 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3607 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3608 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3611 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3612 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3613 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3618 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3619 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3625 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3626 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3627 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3632 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3633 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3634 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3636 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3638 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3639 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3642 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3643 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3645 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3646 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3651 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3654 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3656 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3658 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3659 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3660 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3661 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3663 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3670 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3672 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3673 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3674 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3676 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3679 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3683 /* We need to get a client cert */
3684 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3686 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3687 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3689 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3691 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3694 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3695 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3696 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3697 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3699 } else if (i == 1) {
3701 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3705 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3706 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3709 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3710 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3711 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3714 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3715 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3716 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3723 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3724 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
3725 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3727 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3728 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3729 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3732 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3737 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3740 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3741 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3743 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3744 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3745 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3748 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3750 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3752 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3755 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
3757 switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
3758 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3759 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3761 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3764 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3765 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3767 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3772 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3775 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3776 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3777 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3778 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3780 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3781 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3784 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3787 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3791 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
3794 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
3796 BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
3799 COMP_METHOD *method;
3800 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
3803 int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
3805 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3807 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
3810 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3811 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
3812 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3813 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
3815 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
3818 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
3819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3823 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3824 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3825 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
3826 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
3830 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
3831 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3833 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
3834 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3836 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
3837 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3842 max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
3844 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
3845 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3846 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
3849 comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
3850 (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
3854 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
3855 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3858 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3859 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
3860 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3862 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3863 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3865 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3872 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3875 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3876 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
3879 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
3884 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3886 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3891 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3892 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3894 /* we don't have a certificate */
3895 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3898 /* This is the passed certificate */
3899 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3900 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3902 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3903 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3908 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3910 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3914 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3919 /* Early out to skip the checks below */
3920 if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
3923 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3924 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3934 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3936 size_t len, padding_len;
3937 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3939 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3940 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3942 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3943 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3945 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3948 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3950 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3954 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3956 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3958 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3959 /* should contain no data */
3960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3961 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3964 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3966 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3970 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3971 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3972 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3973 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3974 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3976 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
3977 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
3979 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
3981 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3984 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3988 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3990 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3991 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3996 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3997 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3999 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4000 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
4001 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4005 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4006 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4009 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4010 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4013 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
4016 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
4019 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
4020 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
4025 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
4026 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
4030 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
4034 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
4035 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
4036 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
4037 || s->min_proto_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
4038 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
4040 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
4041 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
4042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
4047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4051 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
4052 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
4053 # error Max cipher length too short
4056 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
4057 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
4060 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4061 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
4064 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
4067 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
4069 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
4072 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
4073 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
4075 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
4076 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
4077 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
4080 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
4081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4085 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
4087 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
4088 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4089 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
4092 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
4093 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4101 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
4102 const char *maxvertext =
4104 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
4107 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
4113 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
4114 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4115 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4117 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4122 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
4123 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4124 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4126 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4136 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4138 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4139 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
4140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4141 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4144 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
4145 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;