2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
53 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
68 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
93 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st->hand_state) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
125 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
126 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
142 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
143 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
164 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
167 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
172 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
173 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
174 # error Internal DTLS version error
176 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
177 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
178 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
180 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
181 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
182 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
183 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
185 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
196 /* No valid transition found */
201 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
202 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
203 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
204 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
206 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
207 * (transition not allowed)
209 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
211 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
215 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
216 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
218 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
219 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
224 switch (st->hand_state) {
228 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
234 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
236 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
242 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
244 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
245 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
256 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
261 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
266 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
267 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
268 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
270 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
271 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
272 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
273 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
275 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
276 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
277 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
278 * the server is resuming.
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
283 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
284 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
290 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
291 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
293 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
294 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
295 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
300 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
303 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
304 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
313 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
314 * |ext.status_expected| is set
316 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
322 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
323 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
324 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
325 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
326 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
335 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
337 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
345 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
346 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
352 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
353 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
358 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
364 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
365 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
366 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
371 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
372 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
373 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
379 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
387 /* No valid transition found */
388 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
392 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
393 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
396 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
397 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
398 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
399 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
407 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
408 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
411 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
413 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
416 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
417 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
418 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
420 switch (st->hand_state) {
422 /* Shouldn't happen */
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
427 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
433 * we already sent close_notify
435 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
436 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
438 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
444 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
445 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
447 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
448 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
451 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
452 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
456 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
464 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
465 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
470 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
471 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
480 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
481 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 /* Try to read from the server instead */
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
498 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
500 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
502 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
505 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
506 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
509 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
510 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
512 switch (st->hand_state) {
514 /* Shouldn't happen */
515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
519 if (!s->renegotiate) {
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
533 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
538 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
556 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
557 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
571 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
592 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
597 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
607 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
609 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
668 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
670 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
672 switch (st->hand_state) {
674 /* No pre work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
679 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
685 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
687 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
688 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
689 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
690 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
692 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
694 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
695 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
696 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
697 NID_undef, NULL, NULL)) {
698 /* SSLfatal already called */
704 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
705 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
708 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
709 * messages unless we need to.
713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
714 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
715 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
716 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
722 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
724 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
725 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
726 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
728 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
729 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
733 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
737 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
738 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
741 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
745 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
746 * client to the server.
748 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
750 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
751 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
755 switch (st->hand_state) {
757 /* No post work to be done */
760 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
761 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
762 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
764 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
765 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
766 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
768 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
769 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
770 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
775 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
776 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
780 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
781 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
786 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
787 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
793 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
794 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
795 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
797 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
798 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
800 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
801 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
802 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
804 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
809 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
810 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
811 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
813 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
814 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
816 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
818 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
823 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
824 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
825 /* SSLfatal() already called */
829 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
833 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
836 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
841 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
845 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
847 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
849 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
852 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
856 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
859 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
860 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
864 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
865 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
866 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
867 /* SSLfatal() already called */
874 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
875 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
877 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
878 /* SSLfatal() already called */
884 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
888 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
891 * Valid return values are:
895 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
896 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
898 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
900 switch (st->hand_state) {
902 /* Shouldn't happen */
903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
906 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
907 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
908 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
910 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
914 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
919 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
924 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
934 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
939 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
944 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
945 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
950 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
951 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
955 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
965 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
966 * reading. Excludes the message header.
968 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
970 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
972 switch (st->hand_state) {
974 /* Shouldn't happen */
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
978 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
980 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
981 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
984 return s->max_cert_list;
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
987 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
989 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
990 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
992 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
993 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
997 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
998 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
999 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1001 return s->max_cert_list;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1004 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1007 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1009 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1012 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1013 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1015 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1016 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1019 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1021 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1022 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1027 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1029 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1032 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1034 switch (st->hand_state) {
1036 /* Shouldn't happen */
1037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1041 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1043 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1044 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1047 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1050 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1052 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1053 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1055 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1056 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1058 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1059 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1061 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1062 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1065 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1068 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1073 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1074 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1077 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1080 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1085 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1088 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1091 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1093 switch (st->hand_state) {
1095 /* Shouldn't happen */
1096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1100 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1102 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1103 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1104 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1108 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1116 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1117 unsigned char *session_id;
1118 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1120 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1121 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1122 if (protverr != 0) {
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1124 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1128 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1129 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1130 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1131 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1132 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1133 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1136 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1138 p = s->s3.client_random;
1141 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1142 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1144 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1147 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1154 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1157 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1158 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1164 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1165 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1166 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1167 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1168 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1169 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1170 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1171 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1174 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1175 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1176 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1177 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1178 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1179 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1180 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1181 * know that is maximum server supports.
1182 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1183 * containing version 1.0.
1185 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1186 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1187 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1188 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1189 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1190 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1191 * the negotiated version.
1193 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1194 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1197 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1203 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1204 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1205 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1206 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1207 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1208 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1209 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1210 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1211 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1212 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1220 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1221 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1222 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1223 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1224 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1227 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1228 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1230 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1235 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1236 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1237 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1238 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1239 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1245 /* Ciphers supported */
1246 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1251 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1254 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1256 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1262 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1267 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1268 && sctx->comp_methods
1269 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1270 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1271 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1272 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1273 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1276 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1281 /* Add the NULL method */
1282 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1290 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1293 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1296 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1301 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1302 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1304 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1307 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1308 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1310 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1313 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1315 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1317 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1319 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1322 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1323 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1325 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1326 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1328 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1330 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1332 /* unknown cipher */
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1337 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1338 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1340 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1346 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1348 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1353 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1354 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1355 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1361 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1362 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1363 * set and use it for comparison.
1365 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1366 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1367 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1368 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1369 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1372 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1373 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1376 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1378 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1383 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1387 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1391 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1398 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1399 size_t session_id_len;
1400 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1402 unsigned int compression;
1403 unsigned int sversion;
1404 unsigned int context;
1405 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1406 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1411 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1416 /* load the server random */
1417 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1418 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1419 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1420 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1421 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1425 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1426 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1427 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1437 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1443 /* Get the session-id. */
1444 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1448 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1449 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1450 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1455 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1460 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1465 /* TLS extensions */
1466 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1467 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1468 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1469 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1475 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1476 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1477 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1478 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1483 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1489 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1490 if (compression != 0) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1492 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1496 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1497 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1498 session_id_len) != 0) {
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1505 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1506 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1510 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1514 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1515 * are appropriate for this version.
1517 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1518 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1519 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1526 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1528 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1529 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1531 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1533 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1537 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1538 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1539 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1540 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1546 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1547 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1548 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1549 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1550 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1551 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1552 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1553 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1554 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1555 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1557 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1558 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1559 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1561 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1562 * backwards compat reasons
1564 int master_key_length;
1566 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1567 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1570 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1571 && master_key_length > 0) {
1572 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1573 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1574 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 if (session_id_len != 0
1582 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1583 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1584 session_id_len) == 0)
1589 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1590 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1591 /* actually a client application bug */
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1593 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1598 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1599 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1600 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1601 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1602 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1604 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1605 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1606 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1612 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1614 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1615 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1616 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1617 * used for resumption.
1619 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1620 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1621 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1622 if (session_id_len > 0)
1623 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1628 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1629 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1631 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1635 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1638 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1639 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1641 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1646 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1647 if (compression != 0) {
1648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1649 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1653 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1654 * using compression.
1656 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1661 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1663 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1666 if (compression == 0)
1668 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1672 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1676 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1678 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1681 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1685 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1691 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1692 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1693 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1697 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1700 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1701 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1703 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1704 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1705 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1708 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1709 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1711 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1716 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1717 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1718 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1723 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1724 * we're done with this message
1726 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1727 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1728 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1729 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1734 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1735 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1737 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1741 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1744 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1747 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1748 * should not be used.
1750 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1751 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1753 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1754 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1755 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1756 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1761 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1764 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1766 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1767 * ClientHello will not change
1769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1774 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1775 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1777 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1783 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1784 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1785 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1788 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1789 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1794 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1796 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1800 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1801 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1804 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1806 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1808 unsigned int context = 0;
1809 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1811 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1816 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1818 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1819 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1820 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1824 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1825 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1826 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1831 certstart = certbytes;
1832 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
1834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1837 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1838 cert_len) == NULL) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1843 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1848 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1849 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1852 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1856 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1857 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1858 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1859 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1860 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1861 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1862 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1863 /* SSLfatal already called */
1866 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1869 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1875 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1879 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
1880 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1881 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1885 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1886 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1887 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1889 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1893 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1894 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1898 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1899 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1900 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1901 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1905 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1906 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1907 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1908 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1909 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1910 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1911 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1912 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1913 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1914 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1915 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1916 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1918 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1919 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1920 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1923 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1926 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1927 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1929 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1931 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1933 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1935 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1939 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1944 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1945 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1948 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1949 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1955 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1957 s->session->peer = x;
1958 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1960 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1961 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1962 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1963 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1964 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1965 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1968 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1971 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1974 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1976 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1978 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1984 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1985 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1986 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1989 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1994 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1996 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1997 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1998 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2013 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2015 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2016 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2017 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2018 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2024 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2025 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2027 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2028 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2030 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2031 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2033 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2034 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2039 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2040 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2044 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2045 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2046 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2055 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2057 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2058 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2059 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2060 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2061 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2062 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2063 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2066 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2067 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2068 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2073 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2074 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2076 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2077 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2078 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2083 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2085 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2086 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2087 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2089 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2099 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2100 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2105 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2106 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2109 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2110 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2111 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2112 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2114 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2115 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2120 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2121 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2127 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2131 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2132 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2134 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2135 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2136 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2141 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2142 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2143 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2144 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2152 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2155 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2158 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2159 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2160 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2162 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2167 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2168 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2170 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2171 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2176 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2178 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2182 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2187 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2188 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2189 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2195 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2196 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2199 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2200 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2201 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2202 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2203 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2205 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2206 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2210 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2213 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2214 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2215 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2216 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2217 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2219 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2221 save_param_start = *pkt;
2223 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2224 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2226 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2227 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2233 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2234 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2235 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2236 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2237 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2240 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2241 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2242 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2245 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2246 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2247 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2255 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2258 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2264 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2265 * equals the length of the parameters.
2267 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2268 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2269 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2274 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2275 unsigned int sigalg;
2277 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2281 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2285 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2292 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2295 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2296 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2297 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2299 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2300 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2305 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2306 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2311 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2312 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2313 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2318 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2319 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2320 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2321 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2326 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2327 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2333 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2334 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2340 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2343 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2344 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2345 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2346 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2347 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2350 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2353 /* still data left over */
2354 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2360 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2362 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2366 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2371 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2372 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2373 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2375 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2376 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2377 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2379 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2381 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2382 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2385 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2388 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2389 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2390 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2391 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2392 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2393 s->pha_context = NULL;
2394 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2396 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2397 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2404 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2406 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2407 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2409 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2410 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2412 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2413 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2415 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2416 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2418 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2423 /* get the certificate types */
2424 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2426 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2429 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2434 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2437 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2443 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2444 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2446 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2448 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2451 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2453 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2457 /* get the CA RDNs */
2458 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2459 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2464 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2469 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2470 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2473 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2474 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2475 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2476 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2477 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2480 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2481 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2484 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2487 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2490 unsigned int ticklen;
2491 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2492 unsigned int sess_len;
2493 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2495 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2496 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2498 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2500 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2501 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2502 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2503 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2504 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2505 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2506 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2507 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2513 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2514 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2515 * be 0 here in that instance
2518 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2521 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2522 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2523 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2524 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2525 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2528 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2529 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2532 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2535 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2540 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2541 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2543 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2544 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2545 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2547 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2550 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2551 s->session = new_sess;
2554 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2555 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2557 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2558 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2559 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2561 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2562 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2566 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2571 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2572 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2573 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2575 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2578 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2579 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2584 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2585 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2587 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2588 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2589 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2590 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2596 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2597 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2598 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2599 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2600 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2601 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2602 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2603 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2606 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2607 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2608 /* Error is already recorded */
2609 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2614 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2616 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2617 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2622 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2624 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2625 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2627 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2628 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2629 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2630 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2632 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2634 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2635 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2639 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2641 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2643 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2644 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2645 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2646 s->session->master_key,
2648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2651 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2654 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2655 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2658 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2660 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2662 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2666 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2667 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2669 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2674 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2675 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2679 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2680 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2684 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2685 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2686 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2690 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2691 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2702 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2704 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2707 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2711 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2712 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2713 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2716 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2718 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2721 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2724 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2725 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2730 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2731 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2732 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2734 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2735 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2736 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2737 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2741 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2746 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2751 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2752 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2753 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2763 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2765 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2766 /* should contain no data */
2767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2771 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2772 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2779 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2781 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2784 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2787 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2792 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2793 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2796 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2797 size_t identitylen = 0;
2798 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2799 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2800 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2803 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2808 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2810 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2811 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2812 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2815 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2817 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2819 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2824 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2825 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2830 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2831 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2832 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2838 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2839 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2841 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2842 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2845 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2854 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2855 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2856 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2867 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2868 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2869 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2871 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2873 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2875 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2877 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2883 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2884 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2889 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2890 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2896 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2897 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2898 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
2903 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2904 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2909 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
2910 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2911 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2915 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2916 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2920 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2923 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2924 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2929 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2930 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2931 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2935 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2936 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2940 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2941 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2946 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2948 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2949 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2951 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2952 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2955 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2972 /* send off the data */
2974 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2975 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2976 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2979 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2983 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2984 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2987 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
2988 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2990 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2997 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3005 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3009 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3011 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3012 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3013 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3016 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3028 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3029 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3033 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3034 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3036 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3041 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3049 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3053 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3056 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3057 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3060 unsigned int md_len;
3061 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3062 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3063 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3064 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3066 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3068 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3069 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3072 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3074 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3075 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3077 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3081 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3082 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3084 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3089 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3090 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3091 * certificate key for key exchange
3094 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3096 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3102 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3103 /* Generate session key
3105 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3110 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3113 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3114 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3115 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3116 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3117 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3118 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3119 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3120 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3126 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3131 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3133 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3136 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3142 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3143 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3149 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3150 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3154 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3155 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3156 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3165 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3167 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3168 return NID_magma_ctr;
3169 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3170 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3175 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3177 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3178 unsigned int md_len;
3179 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3180 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3186 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3187 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3188 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3189 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3190 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3191 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3192 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3196 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3197 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3202 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3205 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3206 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3207 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3208 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3210 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3213 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3214 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3216 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3221 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3228 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3234 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3239 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3240 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3241 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3243 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3247 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3248 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3250 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3255 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3260 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3261 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3262 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3267 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3268 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3273 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3278 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3279 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3284 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3286 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3287 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3291 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3292 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3300 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3303 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3305 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3306 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3311 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3313 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3314 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3315 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3330 unsigned long alg_k;
3332 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3335 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3336 * no need to do so here.
3338 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3339 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3342 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3343 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3345 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3346 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3348 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3349 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3351 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3352 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3354 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3355 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3357 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3358 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3360 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3365 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3367 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3368 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3369 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3371 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3372 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3373 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3375 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3378 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3380 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3383 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3384 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3388 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3389 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3390 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3397 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3401 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3403 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3412 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3413 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3414 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3416 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3419 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3422 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3423 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3425 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3426 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3427 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3430 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3431 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3432 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3437 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3438 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3444 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3445 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3446 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3451 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3452 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3453 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3455 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3457 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3458 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3461 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3462 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3464 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3465 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3470 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3473 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3475 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3477 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3478 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3479 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3480 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3482 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3489 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3491 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3492 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3493 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3495 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3498 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3502 /* We need to get a client cert */
3503 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3505 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3506 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3508 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3510 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3513 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3514 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3515 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3516 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3518 } else if (i == 1) {
3520 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3524 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3525 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3528 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3529 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3530 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3531 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3533 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3534 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3535 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3541 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3542 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3543 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3546 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3554 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3556 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3557 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3558 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3559 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3561 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3563 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3565 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3568 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3569 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3572 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3575 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3576 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3577 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3578 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3580 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3581 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3584 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3587 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3590 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3592 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3596 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3597 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3599 /* we don't have a certificate */
3600 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3603 /* This is the passed certificate */
3604 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3606 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3607 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3612 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3613 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3619 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3621 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3625 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3634 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3636 size_t len, padding_len;
3637 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3639 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3640 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3642 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3643 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3645 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3648 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3650 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3654 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3656 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3658 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3659 /* should contain no data */
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3664 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3666 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3670 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3671 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3672 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3673 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3674 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3676 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
3677 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
3679 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
3681 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3684 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3688 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3690 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3691 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3696 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3697 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3699 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3700 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3705 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3706 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3709 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3710 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3713 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3716 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3719 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
3720 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3725 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
3726 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
3730 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3734 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3735 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3736 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3738 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3739 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3749 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3750 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3751 # error Max cipher length too short
3754 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3755 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3758 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3759 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3762 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3765 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3767 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3770 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3771 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3773 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3774 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3775 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3778 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3783 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3785 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3786 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3787 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3790 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3791 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3799 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3800 const char *maxvertext =
3802 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3805 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3811 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3812 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3813 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3815 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3820 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3821 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3822 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3824 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3834 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3836 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3837 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3839 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3842 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3843 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;