2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
43 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
47 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
53 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
55 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
56 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
57 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
58 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
65 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
71 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
73 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
76 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
77 * ciphersuite or for SRP
79 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
88 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
89 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
90 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
91 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
93 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
94 * (transition not allowed)
96 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
98 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
101 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
102 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
103 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
106 switch (st->hand_state) {
110 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
112 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
113 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
121 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
128 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
145 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
146 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
160 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
168 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
170 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
175 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
176 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
191 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
192 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
193 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
194 # error Internal DTLS version error
196 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
197 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
198 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
200 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
201 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
202 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
203 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
205 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
216 /* No valid transition found */
221 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
222 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
223 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
224 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
226 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
227 * (transition not allowed)
229 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
231 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
235 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
236 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
238 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
239 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
244 switch (st->hand_state) {
248 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
255 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
256 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
264 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
265 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
274 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
276 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
286 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
287 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
288 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
290 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
291 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
292 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
293 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
295 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
296 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
297 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
298 * the server is resuming.
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
303 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
304 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
310 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
311 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
313 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
314 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
319 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
320 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
334 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
335 * |ext.status_expected| is set
337 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
343 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
344 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
345 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
346 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
347 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
358 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
373 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
374 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
379 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
386 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
393 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
394 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
408 /* No valid transition found */
409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
413 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
414 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
417 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
418 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
419 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
420 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
427 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
429 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
430 return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
431 && sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
435 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
436 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
439 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
441 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
444 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
445 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
446 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
448 switch (st->hand_state) {
450 /* Shouldn't happen */
451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
454 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
455 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
456 if (do_compressed_cert(s))
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
464 * we already sent close_notify
466 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
475 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
476 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
478 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
479 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
481 else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
487 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
489 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
490 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
497 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
498 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
500 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
503 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
506 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
508 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
509 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
510 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
518 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
519 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
520 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
527 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530 /* Try to read from the server instead */
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
537 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
539 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
541 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
544 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
545 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
548 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
549 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
551 switch (st->hand_state) {
553 /* Shouldn't happen */
554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
555 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
558 if (!s->renegotiate) {
560 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
561 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
572 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
574 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
575 * actually selected a version yet.
577 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
587 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
589 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
591 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
592 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
593 * because we did early data.
595 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
596 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
603 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
605 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
609 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
610 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
614 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
618 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
622 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
623 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
626 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
627 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
628 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
629 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
631 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
636 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
645 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
646 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
648 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
649 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
651 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
654 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
662 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
663 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
664 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
668 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
670 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
671 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
673 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
676 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
678 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
679 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
681 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
682 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
685 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
687 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
690 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
691 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
692 /* SSLfatal() already called */
693 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
695 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
696 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
698 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
699 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
704 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
705 * the client to the server.
707 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
709 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
711 switch (st->hand_state) {
713 /* No pre work to be done */
716 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
718 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
719 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
720 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
721 /* SSLfatal() already called */
724 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
726 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
727 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
728 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
729 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
731 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
733 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
734 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
735 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
736 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
738 /* SSLfatal already called */
744 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
745 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
748 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
749 * messages unless we need to.
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
754 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
755 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
756 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
762 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
764 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
765 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
766 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
768 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
769 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
770 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
773 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
774 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
785 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
786 * client to the server.
788 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
790 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
791 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
795 switch (st->hand_state) {
797 /* No post work to be done */
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
802 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
804 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
805 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
806 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
808 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
809 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
810 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
815 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
816 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
820 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
821 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
826 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
827 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
828 /* SSLfatal() already called */
833 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
834 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
835 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
837 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
838 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
840 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
841 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
842 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
844 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
845 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
849 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
851 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
853 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
854 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
856 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
858 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
863 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
864 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
869 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
873 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
876 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
881 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
885 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
887 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
889 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
892 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
896 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
899 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
900 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
905 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
906 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
907 /* SSLfatal() already called */
914 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
915 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
917 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
918 /* SSLfatal() already called */
924 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
928 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
931 * Valid return values are:
935 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
936 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
938 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
940 switch (st->hand_state) {
942 /* Shouldn't happen */
943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
946 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
947 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
948 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
950 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
954 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
959 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
960 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
964 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
975 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
976 *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
977 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
981 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
982 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
983 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
986 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
987 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
988 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
991 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
992 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
993 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
994 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
997 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
998 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
999 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1002 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
1003 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1004 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1012 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1013 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1015 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1017 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1019 switch (st->hand_state) {
1021 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1025 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1027 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1028 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1031 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1032 return s->max_cert_list;
1034 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1035 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1038 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1041 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1043 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1045 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1046 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1047 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1049 return s->max_cert_list;
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1052 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1055 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1057 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1060 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1061 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1064 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1067 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1070 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1075 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1077 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1080 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1082 switch (st->hand_state) {
1084 /* Shouldn't happen */
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1088 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1089 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1091 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1092 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1094 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1095 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1099 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1102 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1103 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1105 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1106 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1108 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1109 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1111 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1112 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1114 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1115 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1117 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1118 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1120 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1121 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1123 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1124 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1126 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1127 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1129 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1130 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1132 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1133 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1138 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1141 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1144 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1146 switch (st->hand_state) {
1148 /* Shouldn't happen */
1149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1153 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1154 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1156 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1158 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1162 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1170 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1171 unsigned char *session_id;
1172 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1174 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1175 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1176 if (protverr != 0) {
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1178 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1182 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1183 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1184 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1185 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1187 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1190 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1192 p = s->s3.client_random;
1195 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1196 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1198 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1201 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1208 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1211 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1212 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1218 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1219 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1220 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1221 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1222 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1223 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1224 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1225 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1228 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1229 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1230 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1231 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1232 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1233 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1234 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1235 * know that is maximum server supports.
1236 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1237 * containing version 1.0.
1239 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1240 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1241 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1242 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1243 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1244 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1245 * the negotiated version.
1247 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1248 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1250 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1251 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1257 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1258 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1259 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1260 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1261 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1262 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1263 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1264 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1265 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1266 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1274 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1275 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1276 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1277 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1278 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1281 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1282 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1284 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1289 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1290 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1291 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1292 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1293 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1299 /* Ciphers supported */
1300 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1302 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1305 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1307 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1308 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1310 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1316 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1318 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1321 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1322 && sctx->comp_methods
1323 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1324 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1325 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1326 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1327 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1328 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1335 /* Add the NULL method */
1336 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1341 /* TLS extensions */
1342 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1343 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1344 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1347 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1350 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1355 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1356 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1358 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1361 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1362 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1364 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1367 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1371 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1373 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1376 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1377 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1379 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1380 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1382 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1384 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1386 /* unknown cipher */
1387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1391 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1392 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1394 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1399 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1400 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1402 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1407 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1408 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1409 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1415 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1416 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1417 * set and use it for comparison.
1419 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1420 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1421 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1422 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1423 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1426 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1427 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1430 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1432 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1437 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1441 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1445 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1450 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1452 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1453 size_t session_id_len;
1454 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1456 unsigned int compression;
1457 unsigned int sversion;
1458 unsigned int context;
1459 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1460 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1465 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1470 /* load the server random */
1471 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1472 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1473 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1474 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1475 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1479 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1480 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1481 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1491 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1497 /* Get the session-id. */
1498 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1502 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1503 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1504 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1509 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1514 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1519 /* TLS extensions */
1520 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1521 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1522 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1523 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1529 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1530 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1531 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1532 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1533 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1537 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1538 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1543 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1544 if (compression != 0) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1546 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1550 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1551 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1552 session_id_len) != 0) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1559 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1560 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1564 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1568 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1569 * are appropriate for this version.
1571 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1572 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1573 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1580 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1582 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1583 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1585 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1587 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1591 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1592 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1593 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1594 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1600 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1601 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1602 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1603 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1604 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1605 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1606 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1607 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1608 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1609 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1611 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1612 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1613 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1615 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1616 * backwards compat reasons
1618 int master_key_length;
1620 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1621 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1624 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1625 && master_key_length > 0) {
1626 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1627 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1628 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1635 if (session_id_len != 0
1636 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1637 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1638 session_id_len) == 0)
1643 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1644 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1645 /* actually a client application bug */
1646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1647 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1652 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1653 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1654 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1655 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1656 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1658 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1659 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1660 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1661 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1666 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1668 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1669 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1670 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1671 * used for resumption.
1673 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1674 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1675 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1676 if (session_id_len > 0)
1677 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1682 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1683 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1685 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1689 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1692 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1693 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1695 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1696 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1700 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1701 if (compression != 0) {
1702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1703 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1707 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1708 * using compression.
1710 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1715 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1717 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1720 if (compression == 0)
1722 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1726 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1730 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1732 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1735 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1739 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1745 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1746 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1747 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1751 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1754 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1755 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1757 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1758 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1759 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1762 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1763 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1765 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1770 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1771 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1772 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1777 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1778 * we're done with this message
1780 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1781 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1782 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1783 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1784 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1788 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1789 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1791 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1792 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1795 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1798 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1801 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1802 * the old wrlmethod.
1804 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1805 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
1807 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
1808 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
1809 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1810 NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal already called */
1814 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1815 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
1817 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1818 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1819 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1820 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1825 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1828 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1830 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1831 * ClientHello will not change
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1838 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1839 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1841 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1847 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1848 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1849 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1852 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1853 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1858 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1860 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1861 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1864 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
1868 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
1869 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1870 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1873 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
1874 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1878 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
1879 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
1881 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1884 static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
1888 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1890 if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
1891 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1892 SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
1896 if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1897 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1898 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
1899 && sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1902 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
1903 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
1904 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1909 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1910 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1913 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
1914 if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
1920 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
1921 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
1922 sc->session->peer = NULL;
1923 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1924 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1925 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
1927 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1928 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
1929 && !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
1930 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
1931 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1936 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1939 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1940 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1943 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1945 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1947 unsigned int context = 0;
1948 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1950 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
1951 return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
1952 if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
1954 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1958 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1963 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1965 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1966 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1967 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1971 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1972 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1973 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1978 certstart = certbytes;
1979 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
1981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1984 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1985 cert_len) == NULL) {
1986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1990 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1995 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1996 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1999 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2003 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2004 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
2005 NULL, chainidx == 0)
2006 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
2007 rawexts, x, chainidx,
2008 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2009 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2010 /* SSLfatal already called */
2013 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2016 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2022 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2026 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
2027 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
2028 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2032 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
2033 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
2034 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
2036 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2040 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2041 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2045 if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
2046 return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
2048 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
2049 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2050 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
2051 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
2055 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
2056 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
2057 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
2058 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
2059 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
2060 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
2061 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
2062 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
2063 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
2064 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
2065 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
2066 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
2068 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
2070 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2073 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
2076 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
2077 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
2079 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
2081 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2083 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
2084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2085 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
2089 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
2090 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) {
2091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2095 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
2096 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
2099 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2100 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2106 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2108 s->session->peer = x;
2109 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2110 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
2111 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
2112 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
2114 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2115 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2116 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
2117 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
2118 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
2119 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2122 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2126 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
2128 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2130 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
2132 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
2133 ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
2140 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2143 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2145 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2153 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2154 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2155 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2158 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2164 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2165 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2166 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2167 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2179 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2182 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2184 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2185 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2186 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2187 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2193 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2194 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2196 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2197 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2199 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2200 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2202 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2203 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2208 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2213 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2214 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2215 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2224 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2226 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2227 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2228 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2229 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2230 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2231 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2232 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2235 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2236 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2237 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2242 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2243 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2245 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2246 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2247 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2252 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2254 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2255 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2256 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2258 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2268 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2269 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2274 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2275 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2278 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2279 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2280 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2281 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2283 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2284 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2289 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2290 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2296 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2300 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2301 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2303 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2304 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2305 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2310 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2311 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2312 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2313 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2321 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2324 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2327 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2328 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2329 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2331 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2336 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2337 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2339 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2340 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2345 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2347 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2356 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2357 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2358 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2364 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2365 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2368 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2369 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2370 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2371 *pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
2372 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2374 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2375 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2379 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2382 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2383 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2384 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2385 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2386 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2388 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2390 save_param_start = *pkt;
2392 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2393 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2395 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2396 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2402 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2403 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2404 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2405 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2406 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2409 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2410 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2415 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2424 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2427 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2433 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2434 * equals the length of the parameters.
2436 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2437 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2438 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2444 unsigned int sigalg;
2446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2450 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2451 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2454 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2456 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2460 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2462 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2465 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2466 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2467 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2469 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2475 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2476 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2481 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2482 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2483 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2488 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2489 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2490 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2491 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2496 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2497 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2503 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2504 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2510 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2513 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2514 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2515 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2516 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2517 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2520 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2523 /* still data left over */
2524 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2532 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2533 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2536 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2539 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2540 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
2541 memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2543 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
2545 /* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
2546 if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
2549 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2550 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2551 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2553 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2555 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2556 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2559 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2562 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2563 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2564 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2565 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2566 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2567 s->pha_context = NULL;
2568 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2570 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2571 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2573 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2576 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2578 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2580 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2581 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2583 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2584 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2585 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2586 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2587 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2589 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2590 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2592 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2597 /* get the certificate types */
2598 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2600 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2603 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2608 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2611 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2613 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2617 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2618 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2620 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2623 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2625 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2627 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2631 /* get the CA RDNs */
2632 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2633 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2638 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2640 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2643 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2644 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2647 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2648 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2649 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2650 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2651 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2654 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2655 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2656 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2658 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2661 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2664 unsigned int ticklen;
2665 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2666 unsigned int sess_len;
2667 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2669 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2670 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2672 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2674 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2675 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2676 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2677 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2678 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2679 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2680 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2681 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2687 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2688 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2689 * be 0 here in that instance
2692 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2695 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2696 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2697 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2698 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2699 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2702 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2703 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2706 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2709 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2714 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2715 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2717 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2718 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2719 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2721 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2724 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2725 s->session = new_sess;
2728 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2729 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2731 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2732 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2733 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2735 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2736 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2740 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2745 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2746 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2747 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2749 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2752 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2753 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2759 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2761 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2762 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2763 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2764 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2770 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2771 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2772 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2773 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2774 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2775 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2776 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2777 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2780 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2781 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2782 /* Error is already recorded */
2783 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2788 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2790 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2791 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2793 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2796 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2798 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2799 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2801 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2802 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2803 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2804 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2806 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2808 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2809 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2813 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2815 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2817 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2818 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2819 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2820 s->session->master_key,
2822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2825 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2828 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2829 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2832 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2834 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2836 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2840 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2841 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2843 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2848 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2849 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2853 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2854 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2858 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2859 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2860 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2864 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2865 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2874 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2876 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2877 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2878 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2881 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2885 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2886 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2887 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2890 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2892 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2895 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2898 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2904 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2905 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2906 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2908 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2909 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2910 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2911 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2915 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2920 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2925 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2926 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2927 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2928 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2937 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2939 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2940 /* should contain no data */
2941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2945 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2946 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2948 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2953 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2954 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2955 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2958 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2961 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2966 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2967 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2970 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2971 size_t identitylen = 0;
2972 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2973 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2974 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2977 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2982 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2984 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2985 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2986 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2989 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2993 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2998 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2999 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
3005 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
3006 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
3007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3011 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
3012 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
3013 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
3015 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3016 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
3019 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3027 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
3028 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3029 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
3030 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
3034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3041 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3042 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3043 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3045 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3047 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3049 if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
3051 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
3063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3067 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3068 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3074 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3075 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3076 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
3081 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3082 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
3088 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3089 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3093 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3094 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3098 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3101 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3102 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3108 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3109 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3113 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3114 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3118 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3119 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3124 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3126 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3127 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3129 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
3130 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
3133 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3139 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3146 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3150 /* send off the data */
3152 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3153 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
3154 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
3155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3156 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3157 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
3161 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3162 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3165 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
3166 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
3168 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
3169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
3175 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
3176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3182 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3183 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3187 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3189 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3190 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3191 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3194 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3206 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3211 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3212 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3214 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3219 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3227 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3231 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3234 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3235 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3236 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3238 unsigned int md_len;
3239 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3240 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3241 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3242 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3244 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3246 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3247 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3250 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3252 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3254 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3258 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3261 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3266 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3267 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3268 * certificate key for key exchange
3271 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3273 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3279 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3280 /* Generate session key
3282 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3290 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3291 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3292 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3293 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3294 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3295 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3296 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3297 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3301 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3303 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3304 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3308 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3310 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3313 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3319 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3320 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3325 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3326 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3327 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3331 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3332 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3333 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3342 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3344 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3345 return NID_magma_ctr;
3346 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3347 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3352 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3354 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3355 unsigned int md_len;
3356 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3357 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3363 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3364 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3365 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3366 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3367 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3368 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3369 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3373 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3374 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3379 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3382 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3383 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3384 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3385 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3387 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3390 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3391 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3393 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3398 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3403 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3405 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3411 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3417 if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
3418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3419 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3423 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3426 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3431 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3436 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3437 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3438 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3443 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3444 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3449 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3454 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3455 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3460 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3462 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3463 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3467 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3468 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3476 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3479 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3481 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3482 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3487 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3489 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3490 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3491 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3503 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3506 unsigned long alg_k;
3508 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3511 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3512 * no need to do so here.
3514 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3515 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3518 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3519 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3521 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3522 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3524 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3525 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3527 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3528 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3530 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3531 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3533 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3534 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3536 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3541 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3543 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3544 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3545 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3547 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3548 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3549 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3551 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3554 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3556 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3559 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3560 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3564 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3565 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3566 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3573 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3577 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3579 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3588 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3589 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3590 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3592 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3595 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3598 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3599 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3601 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3602 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3603 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3606 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3607 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3608 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3613 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3614 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3620 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3621 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3622 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3627 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3628 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3629 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3631 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3633 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3634 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3637 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3638 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3640 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3641 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3646 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3649 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3651 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3653 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3654 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3655 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3656 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3658 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3665 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3667 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3668 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3669 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3671 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3674 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3678 /* We need to get a client cert */
3679 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3681 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3682 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3684 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3686 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3689 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3690 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3691 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3692 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3694 } else if (i == 1) {
3696 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3700 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3701 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3704 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3705 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3706 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3707 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3709 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3710 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3711 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3712 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3718 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3719 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
3720 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3722 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3723 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3724 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3727 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3732 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3735 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3736 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3738 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3739 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3740 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3741 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3743 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3745 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3747 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3750 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
3752 switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
3753 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3754 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3756 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3759 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3760 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3762 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3767 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3770 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3771 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3772 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3773 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3775 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3776 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3779 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3782 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3786 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
3789 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
3791 BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
3794 COMP_METHOD *method;
3795 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
3798 int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
3800 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3802 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
3805 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3806 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
3807 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3808 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
3810 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
3813 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
3814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3818 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3820 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
3821 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
3825 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
3826 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3828 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
3829 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3831 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
3832 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3837 max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
3839 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
3840 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3841 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
3844 comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
3845 (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
3849 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
3850 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3853 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3854 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
3855 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3857 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3858 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3860 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3867 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3870 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3871 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
3874 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
3879 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3881 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3886 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3887 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3889 /* we don't have a certificate */
3890 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3893 /* This is the passed certificate */
3894 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3895 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
3897 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3898 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3903 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3905 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3909 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3914 /* Early out to skip the checks below */
3915 if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
3918 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3919 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3929 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3931 size_t len, padding_len;
3932 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3934 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3935 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3937 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3938 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3940 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3943 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3945 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3949 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3951 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3953 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3954 /* should contain no data */
3955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3956 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3959 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3960 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3961 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3965 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3966 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3967 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3968 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3969 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3971 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
3972 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
3974 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
3976 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3979 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3983 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3985 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3986 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3991 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3992 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3994 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3995 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3996 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4000 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4001 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4004 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
4005 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4008 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
4011 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
4013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
4014 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
4015 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
4020 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
4021 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
4025 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
4029 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
4030 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
4031 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
4032 || s->min_proto_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
4033 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
4035 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
4036 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
4037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
4042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4046 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
4047 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
4048 # error Max cipher length too short
4051 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
4052 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
4055 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4056 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
4059 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
4062 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
4064 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
4067 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
4068 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
4070 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
4071 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
4072 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
4075 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
4076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4080 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
4082 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
4083 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4084 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
4087 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
4088 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
4096 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
4097 const char *maxvertext =
4099 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
4102 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
4108 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
4109 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4110 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4112 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4117 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
4118 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
4119 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
4121 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
4122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4131 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4133 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4134 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
4135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4136 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4139 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
4140 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;