1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
152 #include "statem_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #include <openssl/dh.h>
159 #include <openssl/bn.h>
160 #include <openssl/engine.h>
162 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
163 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
164 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
165 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
170 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
176 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
178 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
179 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
180 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
181 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
188 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
195 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
197 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
200 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
201 * ciphersuite or for SRP
203 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
212 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
213 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
214 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
215 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
218 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
219 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
221 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
223 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
226 switch(st->hand_state) {
227 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
228 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
229 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
234 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
235 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
241 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
243 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
248 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
254 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
256 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
257 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
258 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
259 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
261 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
262 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
263 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
264 * the server is resuming.
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
269 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
270 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
276 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
277 if (ske_expected < 0)
279 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
281 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
282 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
283 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
284 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
287 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
288 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
291 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
301 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
302 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
304 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
310 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
311 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
312 if (ske_expected < 0)
314 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
360 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
371 /* No valid transition found */
376 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
377 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
379 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
381 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
383 switch(st->hand_state) {
385 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
387 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
388 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
392 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
395 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
397 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
402 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
414 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
415 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
418 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
419 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
420 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
421 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
423 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
428 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
433 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
438 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
441 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
449 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
457 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
463 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
469 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 /* Shouldn't happen */
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
480 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
481 * the client to the server.
483 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
485 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
487 switch(st->hand_state) {
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
491 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
492 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
497 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
500 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
503 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
504 * messages unless we need to.
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
509 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
510 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
513 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
516 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
519 /* No pre work to be done */
523 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
527 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
528 * client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
532 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
536 switch(st->hand_state) {
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
538 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
541 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
542 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
545 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
547 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
548 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
553 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
558 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
559 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
563 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
564 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
565 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
566 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
568 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
569 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
571 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
573 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
576 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
577 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
584 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
587 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
592 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
596 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
598 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
600 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
603 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
607 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
612 /* No post work to be done */
616 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
620 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
622 * Valid return values are:
626 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
628 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
630 switch(st->hand_state) {
631 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
632 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
635 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
637 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
638 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
640 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
641 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
643 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
645 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
647 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
649 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
650 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
651 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
654 return tls_construct_finished(s,
656 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
658 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
661 /* Shouldn't happen */
669 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
670 * reading. Excludes the message header.
672 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch(st->hand_state) {
677 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
678 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
680 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
681 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
684 return s->max_cert_list;
686 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
687 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
689 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
690 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
692 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
693 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
694 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
695 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
697 return s->max_cert_list;
699 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
700 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
702 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
703 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
706 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
709 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
712 /* Shouldn't happen */
720 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
722 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
724 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
726 switch(st->hand_state) {
727 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
728 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
730 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
731 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
734 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
736 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
737 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
739 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
740 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
742 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
743 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
745 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
746 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
749 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
752 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
755 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
758 /* Shouldn't happen */
762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
766 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
769 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
771 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
773 switch(st->hand_state) {
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
775 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
776 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
777 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
778 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
779 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
780 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
781 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
782 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
785 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
786 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
793 /* Shouldn't happen */
797 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
800 unsigned char *p, *d;
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
809 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
811 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
813 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
814 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
820 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
822 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
823 * "ticket" without a session ID.
825 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
826 (sess->not_resumable)) {
827 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
830 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
832 p = s->s3->client_random;
835 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
836 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
838 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
841 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
850 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
851 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
854 /* Do the message type and length last */
855 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
858 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
859 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
860 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
861 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
862 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
863 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
864 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
865 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
868 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
869 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
870 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
871 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
872 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
873 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
874 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
875 * know that is maximum server supports.
876 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
877 * containing version 1.0.
879 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
880 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
881 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
882 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
883 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
884 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
885 * the negotiated version.
887 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
888 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
891 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
892 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
898 i = s->session->session_id_length;
901 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
905 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
909 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
910 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
911 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
916 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
917 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
920 /* Ciphers supported */
921 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
926 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
928 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
929 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
932 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
933 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
934 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
940 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
944 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
947 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
949 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
950 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
954 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
957 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
962 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
964 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
970 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
971 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
982 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
985 unsigned int cookie_len;
988 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
989 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
990 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
995 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
996 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
997 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1002 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1003 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1007 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1009 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1012 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1018 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1019 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1021 size_t session_id_len;
1022 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1023 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1024 unsigned int compression;
1025 unsigned int sversion;
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1031 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1032 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1037 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1038 if (protverr != 0) {
1039 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1044 /* load the server hello data */
1045 /* load the server random */
1046 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1054 /* Get the session-id. */
1055 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1056 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1060 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1061 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1062 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1063 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1068 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1075 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1076 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1077 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1078 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1079 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1080 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1081 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1082 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1083 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1084 * server wants to resume.
1086 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1087 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1088 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1089 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1090 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1091 &s->session->master_key_length,
1093 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1094 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1095 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1103 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1104 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1105 session_id_len) == 0) {
1106 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1107 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1108 /* actually a client application bug */
1109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1111 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1117 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1118 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1119 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1120 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1121 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1123 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1124 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1129 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1130 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1131 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1135 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1137 /* unknown cipher */
1138 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1143 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1146 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1147 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1149 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1150 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1152 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1158 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1159 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1161 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1162 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1168 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1169 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1170 * set and use it for comparison.
1172 if (s->session->cipher)
1173 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1174 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1175 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1177 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1180 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1181 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1183 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1188 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1189 if (compression != 0) {
1190 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1192 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1196 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1197 * using compression.
1199 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1204 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1210 if (compression == 0)
1212 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1213 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1217 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1220 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1221 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1223 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1226 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1230 /* TLS extensions */
1231 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1236 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1237 /* wrong packet length */
1238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1245 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1246 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1249 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1252 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1253 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1255 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1256 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1258 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1262 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1263 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1264 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1268 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1270 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1272 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1273 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1278 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1279 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1281 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1282 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1283 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1285 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1290 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1291 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1296 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1297 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1298 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1299 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1301 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 certstart = certbytes;
1306 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1308 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1312 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1315 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1318 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1325 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1326 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1327 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1329 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1332 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1335 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1339 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1341 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1342 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1344 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1347 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1350 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1352 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1356 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1360 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1365 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1369 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1370 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1371 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1372 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1373 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1375 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1377 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1380 s->session->peer_type = i;
1382 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1384 s->session->peer = x;
1385 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1388 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1394 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1397 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1401 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1406 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1412 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1414 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1416 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1417 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1423 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1425 save_param_start = *pkt;
1427 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1428 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1429 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1432 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1434 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1437 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1438 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1439 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1440 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1446 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1447 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1448 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1451 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1452 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1457 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1458 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1459 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1460 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1461 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1467 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1468 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1470 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1472 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1478 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1479 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1480 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1481 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1482 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1483 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1489 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1490 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1492 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1493 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1495 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1496 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1498 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1499 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1504 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1509 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1510 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1511 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1513 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1515 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1516 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1520 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1521 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1522 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1527 s->s3->peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1530 if (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1536 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s->s3->peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1542 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1543 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1544 || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1545 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1547 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1548 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1553 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1558 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1559 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1563 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1564 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1565 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1567 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1570 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1572 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1576 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1577 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1578 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1580 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1585 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1586 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1588 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1593 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1594 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1595 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1597 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1601 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1602 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1604 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1605 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1606 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1607 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1611 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1614 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1619 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1620 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1621 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1627 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1628 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1632 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1633 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1634 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1636 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1637 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1638 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1640 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1642 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1646 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1648 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1652 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1653 * equals the length of the parameters.
1655 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1656 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1657 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1658 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1664 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1666 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1670 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1677 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1679 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1680 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1685 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1686 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1690 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 * Check signature length
1699 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1700 /* wrong packet length */
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1704 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1705 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1706 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1707 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1708 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1709 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1710 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1711 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1715 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1716 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1718 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1723 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1724 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1725 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1726 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1727 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 /* still data left over */
1732 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1737 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1738 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1740 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1746 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1748 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1749 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1750 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1753 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1755 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1756 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1757 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1758 const unsigned char *data;
1759 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1760 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1762 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1767 /* get the certificate types */
1768 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1769 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1770 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1774 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1775 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1776 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1777 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1778 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1779 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1783 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1784 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1785 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1787 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1788 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1790 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1791 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1792 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1795 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1799 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1800 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1801 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1802 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1804 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1805 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1807 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1810 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1811 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1816 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1819 /* get the CA RDNs */
1820 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1821 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
1822 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1827 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1828 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
1829 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
1830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1832 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1836 namestart = namebytes;
1838 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
1839 name_len)) == NULL) {
1840 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1845 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
1846 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1848 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1851 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1857 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1858 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
1859 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
1860 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
1861 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
1864 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1867 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1869 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
1873 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
1875 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
1878 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1881 unsigned int ticklen;
1882 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
1884 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
1885 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
1886 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
1887 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1892 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1894 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1896 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1897 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
1898 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
1900 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1903 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
1905 * Remove the old session from the cache
1907 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
1908 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
1909 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
1912 /* We carry on if this fails */
1913 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1917 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
1918 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1923 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1924 s->session = new_sess;
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
1928 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
1930 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1931 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1935 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
1936 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1941 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
1942 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1944 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1945 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1946 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1947 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1948 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1949 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1950 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1951 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1952 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1954 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1955 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
1956 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
1957 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1961 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1965 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1968 unsigned long resplen;
1971 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
1972 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1973 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
1977 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
1978 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
1979 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1983 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
1984 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
1985 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1989 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
1990 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1994 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
1995 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1997 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1998 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1999 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2002 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2004 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2005 /* should contain no data */
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2008 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2009 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2014 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2017 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2018 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2024 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2027 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2028 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2029 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2030 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2034 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2035 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2036 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2038 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2040 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
2043 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2045 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2046 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2051 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2056 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2057 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s)) {
2058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2059 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2065 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2066 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2067 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2068 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2071 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2074 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2079 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2081 unsigned long alg_k;
2082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2084 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2085 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2087 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2088 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2091 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2092 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2094 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2096 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2098 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2102 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2105 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2106 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2109 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2111 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2114 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2116 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2120 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2122 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2123 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2126 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2132 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2135 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2136 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2137 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2139 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2140 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2144 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2145 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2146 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2151 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2152 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2153 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2154 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2158 s2n(identitylen, p);
2159 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2160 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2164 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2170 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2175 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2179 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2181 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2182 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2186 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2188 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2195 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2196 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2202 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2203 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2204 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2208 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2209 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2211 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2212 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2213 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2220 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2224 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2227 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2229 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2233 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2234 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2241 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2243 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2249 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2250 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2252 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 /* send off the data */
2260 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2262 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2264 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2272 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2273 if ((skey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey) == NULL) {
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2279 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2281 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2286 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2287 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2288 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2289 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2291 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2296 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2301 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2302 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2304 /* copy the point */
2305 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2306 /* increment n to account for length field */
2309 /* Free allocated memory */
2310 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2312 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2314 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2315 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2316 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2319 unsigned int md_len;
2320 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2321 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2322 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2323 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2324 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2328 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2333 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2335 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2342 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2343 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2345 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2350 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2351 * certificate key for key exchange
2354 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2356 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2357 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2358 /* Generate session key */
2359 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2360 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2368 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2369 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2370 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2372 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2379 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2382 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2383 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2384 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2385 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2386 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2387 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2388 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2389 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2390 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2396 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2397 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2403 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2405 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2407 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2409 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2416 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2419 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2422 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2423 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2424 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2425 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2426 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2427 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2429 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2434 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2435 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2436 /* send off the data */
2437 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2439 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2447 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2448 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2456 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2465 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2472 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2473 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2478 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2481 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2482 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2484 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2487 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2489 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2490 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2493 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2494 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2496 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2500 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2502 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2507 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2508 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2516 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2517 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2519 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2524 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2525 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2532 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2533 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2536 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2539 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2540 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2542 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2543 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2544 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2547 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2548 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2554 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2555 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2559 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2563 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2566 unsigned long n = 0;
2570 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2577 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2579 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2580 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2585 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2593 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2595 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2596 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2597 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2598 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2599 s->session->master_key_length,
2600 s->session->master_key))
2601 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2607 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2608 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2609 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2610 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2611 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2617 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2618 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2620 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2625 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2628 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2633 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2634 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2635 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2637 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2639 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2641 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2642 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2645 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2646 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2648 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2649 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2654 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2657 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2660 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2661 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2662 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2663 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2665 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2669 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2673 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2675 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2676 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2678 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2682 /* We need to get a client cert */
2683 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2685 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2686 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2688 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2690 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2693 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2694 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2695 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2697 } else if (i == 1) {
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2700 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2704 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2705 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2708 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2709 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2710 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2711 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2713 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2714 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2715 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2725 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2729 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2731 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2732 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2733 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2736 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2743 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2745 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2752 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2753 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2756 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2758 /* we don't have a certificate */
2759 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2762 /* This is the passed certificate */
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2765 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2766 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2767 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2774 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2776 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2780 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2781 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
2783 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2784 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2786 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2790 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2792 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2797 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
2798 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2800 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2805 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
2806 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2819 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
2821 unsigned int len, padding_len;
2824 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
2825 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
2826 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2828 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
2829 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
2830 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
2831 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
2832 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
2833 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
2840 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
2843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2844 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
2845 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
2846 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
2847 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
2852 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
2853 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
2857 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
2861 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2863 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
2864 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2865 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
2871 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
2872 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2873 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2874 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
2876 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
2880 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2884 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
2885 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2886 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2888 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
2891 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
2892 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
2893 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2895 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);