2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
36 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
53 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
68 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
93 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st->hand_state) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
125 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
126 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
140 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
148 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
155 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
163 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
165 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
170 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
182 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
183 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
187 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
188 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
189 # error Internal DTLS version error
191 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
192 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
193 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
195 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
196 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
197 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
198 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
200 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
201 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
211 /* No valid transition found */
216 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
217 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
218 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
219 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
221 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
222 * (transition not allowed)
224 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
226 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
230 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
231 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
233 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
234 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
239 switch (st->hand_state) {
243 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
249 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
250 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
251 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
257 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
259 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
260 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
269 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
271 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
272 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
276 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
281 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
282 && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
283 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
285 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
286 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
287 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
288 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
291 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
292 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
293 * the server is resuming.
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
298 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
299 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
300 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
305 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
308 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
309 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
310 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
314 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
315 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
318 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
339 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
342 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
362 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
363 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
369 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
374 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
381 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
388 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
389 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
395 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
408 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
409 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
412 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
413 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
414 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
415 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
418 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
423 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
424 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
427 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
429 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
433 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
434 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
436 switch (st->hand_state) {
438 /* Shouldn't happen */
439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
440 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
442 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
443 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
444 if (s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
452 * we already sent close_notify
454 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
455 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
457 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
463 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
464 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
466 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
467 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
469 else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
471 else if (s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
478 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
485 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
486 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
488 else if (s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
496 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
497 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
498 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
499 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
506 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
507 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
508 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 /* Try to read from the server instead */
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
524 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
525 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
527 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
529 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
532 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
533 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
536 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
537 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
539 switch (st->hand_state) {
541 /* Shouldn't happen */
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
546 if (!s->renegotiate) {
548 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
549 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
560 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
562 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
563 * actually selected a version yet.
565 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
575 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
579 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
580 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
581 * because we did early data.
583 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
584 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
591 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
593 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
598 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
608 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
610 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
611 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
614 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
615 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
616 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
617 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
619 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
624 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
634 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
636 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
642 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
651 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
664 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
673 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
675 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
678 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
679 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
681 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
683 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
686 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
692 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
693 * the client to the server.
695 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
697 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
699 switch (st->hand_state) {
701 /* No pre work to be done */
704 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
706 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
707 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
708 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
712 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
714 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
715 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
716 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
717 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
719 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
721 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
722 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
723 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
724 NID_undef, NULL, NULL)) {
725 /* SSLfatal already called */
731 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
732 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
735 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
736 * messages unless we need to.
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
742 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
743 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
749 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
751 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
752 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
753 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
755 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
756 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
757 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
764 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
765 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
772 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
773 * client to the server.
775 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
777 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
778 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
782 switch (st->hand_state) {
784 /* No post work to be done */
787 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
788 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
789 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
791 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
792 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
793 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
795 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
796 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
797 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
802 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
803 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
807 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
808 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
813 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
814 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
821 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
822 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
824 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
825 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
827 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
828 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
829 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
831 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
832 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
836 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
838 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
840 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
841 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
843 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
845 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
850 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
851 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
860 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
863 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
868 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
872 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
874 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
876 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
879 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
883 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
886 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
887 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
888 /* SSLfatal() already called */
891 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
892 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
893 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
894 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
902 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
904 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
905 /* SSLfatal() already called */
911 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
915 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
918 * Valid return values are:
922 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
923 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
925 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
927 switch (st->hand_state) {
929 /* Shouldn't happen */
930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
933 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
934 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
935 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
937 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
938 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
941 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
942 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
943 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
946 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
947 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
948 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
951 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
957 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
958 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
962 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
963 *confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
964 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
968 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
969 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
970 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
973 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
974 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
975 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
978 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
979 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
980 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
981 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
984 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
985 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
986 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
989 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
990 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
991 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
999 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1000 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1002 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1004 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1006 switch (st->hand_state) {
1008 /* Shouldn't happen */
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1012 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1014 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1015 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1019 return s->max_cert_list;
1021 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1022 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1025 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1027 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1028 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1032 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1033 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1034 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1036 return s->max_cert_list;
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1039 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1042 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1044 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1047 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1048 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1051 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1054 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1057 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1062 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1064 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1067 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1069 switch (st->hand_state) {
1071 /* Shouldn't happen */
1072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1075 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1076 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1078 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1079 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1081 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1082 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1085 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1086 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1089 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1090 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1093 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1095 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1096 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1099 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1101 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1102 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1104 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1105 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1108 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1110 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1111 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1113 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1114 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1116 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1117 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1119 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1120 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1125 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1128 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1131 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1133 switch (st->hand_state) {
1135 /* Shouldn't happen */
1136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1140 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
1141 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1144 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1145 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1149 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1157 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1158 unsigned char *session_id;
1159 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1161 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1162 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1163 if (protverr != 0) {
1164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1165 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1169 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1170 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1171 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1172 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1173 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1174 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1177 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1179 p = s->s3.client_random;
1182 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1183 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1185 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1188 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1195 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1198 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1199 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1205 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1206 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1207 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1208 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1209 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1210 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1211 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1212 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1215 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1216 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1217 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1218 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1219 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1220 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1221 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1222 * know that is maximum server supports.
1223 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1224 * containing version 1.0.
1226 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1227 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1228 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1229 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1230 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1231 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1232 * the negotiated version.
1234 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1235 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1238 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1244 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1245 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1246 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1247 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1248 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1249 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1250 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1251 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1252 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1253 sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1261 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1262 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1263 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1264 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1265 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1268 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1269 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1271 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1276 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1277 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1278 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1279 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1280 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1282 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1286 /* Ciphers supported */
1287 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1292 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
1294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1295 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1297 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1303 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1308 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1309 && sctx->comp_methods
1310 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1311 || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1312 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
1313 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1314 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
1315 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1322 /* Add the NULL method */
1323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1328 /* TLS extensions */
1329 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1331 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1334 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1337 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1342 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1343 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1345 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1348 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1349 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1351 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1354 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1356 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1358 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1360 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1363 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1364 const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1366 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1367 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1369 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1371 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1373 /* unknown cipher */
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1378 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1379 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1381 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1386 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1387 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1389 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1394 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1395 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1396 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1402 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1403 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1404 * set and use it for comparison.
1406 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1407 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1408 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1410 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
1413 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1414 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1417 || md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1419 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1424 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1428 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1432 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1439 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1440 size_t session_id_len;
1441 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1443 unsigned int compression;
1444 unsigned int sversion;
1445 unsigned int context;
1446 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1447 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1452 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1457 /* load the server random */
1458 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1459 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1460 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1461 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1462 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1466 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1467 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1468 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1473 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1478 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1484 /* Get the session-id. */
1485 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1489 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1490 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1491 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1496 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1501 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1506 /* TLS extensions */
1507 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1508 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1509 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1510 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1516 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1517 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1518 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1519 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1520 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1524 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1530 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1531 if (compression != 0) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1533 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1537 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1538 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1539 session_id_len) != 0) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1546 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1551 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1555 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1556 * are appropriate for this version.
1558 context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1559 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1560 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1567 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1569 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1570 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1572 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1574 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1578 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1579 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1580 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1581 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1587 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1588 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1589 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1590 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1591 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1592 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1593 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1594 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1595 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1596 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1598 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1599 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1600 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1602 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1603 * backwards compat reasons
1605 int master_key_length;
1607 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1608 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1611 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1612 && master_key_length > 0) {
1613 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1614 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1615 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (session_id_len != 0
1623 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1624 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1625 session_id_len) == 0)
1630 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1631 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1632 /* actually a client application bug */
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1634 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1639 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1640 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1641 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1642 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1643 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1645 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1646 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1647 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1653 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1655 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1656 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1657 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1658 * used for resumption.
1660 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1661 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1662 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1663 if (session_id_len > 0)
1664 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1669 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1670 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1672 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1676 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1679 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1680 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1682 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1687 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1688 if (compression != 0) {
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1690 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1694 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1695 * using compression.
1697 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1702 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1704 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1707 if (compression == 0)
1709 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1713 comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
1717 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1719 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1722 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1726 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1732 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1733 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1734 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1738 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1741 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1742 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1744 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1745 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1746 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1749 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
1750 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1752 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1757 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
1758 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1759 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1764 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1765 * we're done with this message
1767 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1768 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1769 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1770 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1775 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1776 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1782 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1785 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1788 * If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
1789 * the old wrlmethod.
1791 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
1792 && !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
1794 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
1795 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
1796 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1797 NID_undef, NULL, NULL)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal already called */
1801 /* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
1802 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
1804 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1805 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1806 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1807 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1812 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1815 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1817 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1818 * ClientHello will not change
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1825 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1826 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1828 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1829 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1834 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1835 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1836 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1839 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1840 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1845 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1847 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1848 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1851 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1852 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1855 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1857 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1859 unsigned int context = 0;
1860 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1862 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1867 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1869 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1870 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1871 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1875 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1876 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1877 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1882 certstart = certbytes;
1883 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
1885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1888 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1889 cert_len) == NULL) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1894 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1899 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1900 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1903 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1907 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1908 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1909 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1910 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1911 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1912 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1913 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1914 /* SSLfatal already called */
1917 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1920 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
1926 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1930 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
1931 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1932 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1936 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1937 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1938 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1940 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1944 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1945 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1949 if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
1950 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1951 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1952 if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
1956 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1957 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1958 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1959 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1960 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1961 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1962 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1963 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1964 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1965 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1966 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1967 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1969 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1970 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1971 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1974 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1977 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1978 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1980 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1982 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1984 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1986 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1990 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1995 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1996 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1999 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2000 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
2001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2006 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2008 s->session->peer = x;
2009 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2011 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2012 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2013 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
2014 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
2015 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
2016 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2019 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
2025 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2027 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
2029 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
2030 ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
2037 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2040 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2042 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2044 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2050 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2051 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2052 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2055 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2060 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2061 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2062 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2063 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2064 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2076 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2079 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2081 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2084 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2090 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2091 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2093 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2094 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2096 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2097 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2099 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2100 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2105 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2106 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2110 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2111 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2112 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2121 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2123 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2124 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2125 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2126 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2127 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2128 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2129 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2132 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2133 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2134 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2139 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2140 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2142 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2143 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2144 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2149 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2151 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2152 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2153 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2155 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2160 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
2162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2165 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2166 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2171 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2172 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
2175 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2176 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2177 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2178 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2180 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2181 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2186 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2187 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2193 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2197 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2198 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2200 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2201 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2202 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2207 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2208 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2209 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2210 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2218 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2221 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2224 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2225 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2226 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2228 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2233 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2234 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2236 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2237 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2242 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2244 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2248 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2253 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2254 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2255 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2261 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2262 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2265 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2266 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2267 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2268 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2269 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2271 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2272 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2279 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2280 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2281 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2282 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2283 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2285 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2287 save_param_start = *pkt;
2289 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2290 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2292 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2293 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2300 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2301 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2302 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2306 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2307 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2308 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2311 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2312 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2313 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2321 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2324 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2330 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2331 * equals the length of the parameters.
2333 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2334 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2335 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2341 unsigned int sigalg;
2343 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2347 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2351 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2353 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
2357 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2359 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2362 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2363 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2364 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
2366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2367 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2372 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2378 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2379 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2380 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2385 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2386 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2387 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2388 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2393 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2394 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2401 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2407 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2410 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2411 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2412 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2413 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2414 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2417 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2420 /* still data left over */
2421 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2427 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2429 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2430 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2433 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2438 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2439 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2440 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2442 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2443 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2444 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2446 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2448 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2449 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2452 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2455 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2456 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2457 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2458 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2459 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2460 s->pha_context = NULL;
2461 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2463 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2464 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2469 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2471 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2473 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2474 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2476 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2477 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2478 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2479 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2482 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2483 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 /* get the certificate types */
2491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2496 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2501 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2510 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2511 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2513 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2515 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2516 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2518 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2524 /* get the CA RDNs */
2525 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2526 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2527 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2531 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2533 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2536 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2537 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2540 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2541 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2542 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2543 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2544 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2547 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2548 && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2554 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2557 unsigned int ticklen;
2558 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2559 unsigned int sess_len;
2560 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2562 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2563 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2565 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2567 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2568 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2569 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2570 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2571 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2572 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
2573 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2574 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2580 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2581 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2582 * be 0 here in that instance
2585 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2588 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2589 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2590 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2591 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2592 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2595 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2596 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2599 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2602 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
2607 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2608 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2610 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2611 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2612 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2614 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2617 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2618 s->session = new_sess;
2621 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
2622 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
2624 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2625 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2626 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2628 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2629 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2633 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2638 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2639 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2640 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2642 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2645 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2646 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2651 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2652 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2654 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2655 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2656 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2663 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2664 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2665 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2666 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2667 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2668 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2669 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2670 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2673 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
2674 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2675 /* Error is already recorded */
2676 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2680 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2681 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2683 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2684 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2689 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2691 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2692 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2694 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2695 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2696 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2697 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
2699 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2701 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2702 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2706 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2708 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2710 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2711 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2712 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2713 s->session->master_key,
2715 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2718 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2721 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2722 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2725 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2727 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2733 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2734 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2736 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2741 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2742 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2746 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2747 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2751 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2752 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2753 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2757 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2758 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2767 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2769 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2770 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2774 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2778 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2779 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2780 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2783 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2785 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2788 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2791 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2797 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2798 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2799 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2801 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2802 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2803 int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2804 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2808 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2813 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2818 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2819 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2820 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2830 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2832 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2833 /* should contain no data */
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2835 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2838 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2839 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2846 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2848 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2851 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2854 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2859 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2860 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2863 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2864 size_t identitylen = 0;
2865 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2866 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2867 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2870 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2875 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2877 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2878 s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2879 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2882 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2886 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2891 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2892 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2897 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2898 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2899 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2905 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2906 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2908 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2909 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2912 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2920 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2921 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2922 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2923 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2934 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2935 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2936 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2938 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2940 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2942 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2944 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2951 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2957 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2963 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2964 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2965 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
2966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
2970 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2971 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2976 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
2977 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2978 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2982 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2983 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2987 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2990 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2991 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2996 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2997 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2998 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3002 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3003 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3007 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3008 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3013 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3015 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3016 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3018 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
3019 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
3022 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3035 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3039 /* send off the data */
3041 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3042 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
3043 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
3044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3046 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
3050 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3051 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3054 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
3055 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
3057 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
3058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3061 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
3064 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
3065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
3072 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3076 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3078 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3079 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3080 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3083 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3095 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3096 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3100 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3101 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3103 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3108 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3115 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3116 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3120 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3123 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3124 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3127 unsigned int md_len;
3128 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3129 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3130 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3131 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3133 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3135 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3136 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3139 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3141 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3142 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3144 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3148 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3149 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3151 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3156 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3157 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3158 * certificate key for key exchange
3161 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3163 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3169 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3170 /* Generate session key
3172 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3177 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3180 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3181 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3182 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3183 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3184 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3185 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3186 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3187 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3193 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3194 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3198 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3200 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3203 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3209 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3210 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3215 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3216 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3217 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3221 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3222 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3223 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3232 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3234 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3235 return NID_magma_ctr;
3236 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3237 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3242 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3244 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3245 unsigned int md_len;
3246 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3247 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
3253 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3254 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3255 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3256 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3257 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3258 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3259 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3263 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3264 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3269 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3272 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3273 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3274 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
3275 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3277 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3280 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3281 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3283 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3288 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3295 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3301 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
3302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3307 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3308 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3310 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3314 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
3315 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3317 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3322 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3328 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3329 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3334 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3335 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3340 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3345 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
3346 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3351 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3353 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3354 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3358 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3359 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3367 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3370 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3372 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3373 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3380 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3381 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3382 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3394 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3397 unsigned long alg_k;
3399 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3402 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3403 * no need to do so here.
3405 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3406 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3409 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3410 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3412 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3413 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3415 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3416 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3418 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3419 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3421 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3422 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3424 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3425 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3427 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3432 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3434 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3435 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3436 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3438 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3439 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3440 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3442 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3445 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3447 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3450 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3451 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3455 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3456 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3464 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
3468 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3469 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3479 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3480 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3481 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3483 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3486 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3489 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3490 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3492 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3493 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3494 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3497 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
3498 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3499 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3504 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3505 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3511 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3512 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3513 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3518 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3519 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3520 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3522 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3524 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3525 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3528 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3529 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3531 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3532 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3537 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3540 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3542 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3544 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3545 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3546 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3547 i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3549 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3556 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3558 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3559 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3560 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3562 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3565 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3569 /* We need to get a client cert */
3570 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3572 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3573 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3575 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3577 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3580 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3581 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3582 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
3583 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
3585 } else if (i == 1) {
3587 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3591 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3592 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3595 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3596 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3597 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3598 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3600 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3601 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3602 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3609 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3610 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
3611 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
3613 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3614 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3615 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3618 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3623 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3626 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3628 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3629 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3630 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3631 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3633 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3635 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3637 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3640 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3641 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3642 : s->cert->key, 0)) {
3643 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3644 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3647 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3648 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3649 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3650 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3652 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3653 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3656 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3659 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3663 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
3666 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
3668 BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
3671 COMP_METHOD *method;
3672 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
3675 int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
3677 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3679 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
3682 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3683 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
3684 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3685 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
3687 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
3690 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
3691 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3695 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3696 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3697 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
3698 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
3702 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
3703 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
3705 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
3706 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3708 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
3709 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3714 max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
3716 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
3717 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3718 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
3721 comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
3722 (unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
3726 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
3727 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3730 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
3731 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
3732 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3734 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3735 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3737 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3744 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3747 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3748 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
3751 COMP_CTX_free(comp);
3756 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
3758 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3762 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3763 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3765 /* we don't have a certificate */
3766 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3769 /* This is the passed certificate */
3770 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3772 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3773 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3778 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3779 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3785 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3787 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3791 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3800 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3802 size_t len, padding_len;
3803 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3805 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3806 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3808 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3809 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3811 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3814 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3816 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3820 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3822 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3824 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3825 /* should contain no data */
3826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3827 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3830 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3831 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3832 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3836 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3837 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3838 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3839 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3840 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3842 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
3843 SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
3845 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
3847 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3850 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3854 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3856 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3857 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3862 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3863 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3865 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3866 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3867 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3871 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3872 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3875 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3876 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3879 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3882 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3885 if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
3886 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3891 if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
3892 i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
3896 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3900 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3901 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3902 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3904 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3905 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3915 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3916 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3917 # error Max cipher length too short
3920 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3921 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3924 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3925 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3928 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3931 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3933 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3936 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3937 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3939 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3940 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3941 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3944 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3949 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3951 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3952 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3953 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3956 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3957 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3965 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3966 const char *maxvertext =
3968 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3971 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3977 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3978 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3979 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3981 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3986 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3987 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3988 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3990 if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4000 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4002 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
4003 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
4004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4005 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4008 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
4009 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;