2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st->hand_state) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
198 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
205 /* No valid transition found */
210 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
211 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
212 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
213 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
215 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
216 * (transition not allowed)
218 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
220 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
224 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
225 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
227 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
228 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
233 switch (st->hand_state) {
237 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
244 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
245 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
256 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
258 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
259 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
272 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
274 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
279 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
285 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
287 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
288 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
289 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
293 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
294 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
295 * the server is resuming.
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
300 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
301 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
302 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
307 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
316 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
317 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
320 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
331 * |ext.status_expected| is set
333 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
340 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
341 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
342 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
343 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
354 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
369 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
370 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
375 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
382 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
388 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
389 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
390 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
404 /* No valid transition found */
405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
411 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
417 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
420 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
422 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
424 switch (st->hand_state) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
430 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
433 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
438 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY)
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
441 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 /* Try to read from the server instead */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
485 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
486 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
488 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
490 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
493 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
494 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
498 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
500 switch (st->hand_state) {
502 /* Shouldn't happen */
503 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
506 if (!s->renegotiate) {
508 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
509 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
513 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
519 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
521 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
522 * actually selected a version yet.
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
533 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
541 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
553 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
554 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
557 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
558 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
559 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
560 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
562 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
567 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
577 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
579 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
581 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
588 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
589 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
602 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
608 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
613 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
616 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
617 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
618 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
619 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
631 * the client to the server.
633 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
635 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
637 switch (st->hand_state) {
639 /* No pre work to be done */
642 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
645 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
646 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
654 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
657 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
658 * messages unless we need to.
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
663 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
664 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
669 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
670 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
672 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
675 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
679 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
680 * client to the server.
682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
688 switch (st->hand_state) {
690 /* No post work to be done */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
694 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
698 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
702 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
703 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
705 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
706 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
707 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
709 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
710 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
715 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
716 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
721 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
722 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
723 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
726 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
728 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
730 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
734 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
737 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
744 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
749 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
753 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
755 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
757 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
760 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
769 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
775 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
777 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
782 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
786 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
789 * Valid return values are:
793 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
794 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
796 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
798 switch (st->hand_state) {
800 /* Shouldn't happen */
803 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
805 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
807 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
808 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
811 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
812 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
813 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
817 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
818 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
821 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
822 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
823 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
826 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
827 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
828 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
831 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
832 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
833 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
834 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
837 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
838 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
839 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
842 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
843 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
844 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
852 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
853 * reading. Excludes the message header.
855 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
857 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
859 switch (st->hand_state) {
861 /* Shouldn't happen */
864 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
865 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
867 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
868 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
870 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
871 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
874 return s->max_cert_list;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
877 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
879 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
880 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
883 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
887 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
888 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
889 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
891 return s->max_cert_list;
893 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
894 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
896 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
897 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
899 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
902 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
904 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
905 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
908 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
911 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
916 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
918 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
920 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
922 switch (st->hand_state) {
924 /* Shouldn't happen */
925 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
928 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
930 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
931 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
933 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
934 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
937 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
940 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
942 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
943 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
946 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
949 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
952 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
955 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
958 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
961 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
964 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
967 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
970 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
975 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
978 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
980 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
982 switch (st->hand_state) {
984 /* Shouldn't happen */
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
988 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
991 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
992 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
993 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
994 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
995 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
996 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
997 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
998 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1001 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1002 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1007 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1012 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1016 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1018 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1019 /* Should not happen */
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1025 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1026 if (protverr != 0) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1031 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1033 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1034 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1036 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1037 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1041 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1043 p = s->s3->client_random;
1046 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1047 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1052 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1061 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1065 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1066 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1067 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1068 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1069 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1070 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1071 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1072 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1075 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1076 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1077 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1078 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1079 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1080 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1081 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1082 * know that is maximum server supports.
1083 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1084 * containing version 1.0.
1086 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1087 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1088 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1089 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1090 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1091 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1092 * the negotiated version.
1094 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1095 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1098 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1107 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1108 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1109 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1110 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1112 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1119 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1120 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1121 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 /* Ciphers supported */
1128 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1133 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1135 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1146 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1147 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1148 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1149 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1150 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1151 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1152 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 /* Add the NULL method */
1160 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 /* TLS extensions */
1166 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1181 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1182 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1188 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1189 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1190 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1195 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1200 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1202 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1205 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1206 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1209 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1211 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1212 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1213 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1214 size_t session_id_len;
1215 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1216 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1217 unsigned int compression;
1218 unsigned int sversion;
1219 unsigned int context;
1221 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1233 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1234 if (protverr != 0) {
1235 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1241 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1242 * message must be on a record boundary.
1244 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1245 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1250 /* load the server hello data */
1251 /* load the server random */
1252 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1253 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1258 /* Get the session-id. */
1259 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1260 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1265 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1266 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1267 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1268 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1270 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1274 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1278 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1280 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1285 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1287 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1294 /* TLS extensions */
1295 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1296 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1297 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1303 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1304 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1305 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1310 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1311 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1312 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1313 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1314 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1318 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1319 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1320 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1321 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1322 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1323 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1324 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1325 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1326 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1327 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1329 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1330 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1331 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1333 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1334 * backwards compat reasons
1336 int master_key_length;
1337 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1338 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1341 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1342 && master_key_length > 0) {
1343 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1344 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1345 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1348 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 if (session_id_len != 0
1354 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1355 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1356 session_id_len) == 0)
1361 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1362 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1363 /* actually a client application bug */
1364 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1366 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1371 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1372 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1373 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1374 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1375 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1377 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1379 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1380 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1381 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1382 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1387 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1388 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1389 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1390 if (session_id_len > 0)
1391 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1395 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1396 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1397 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1404 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1406 /* unknown cipher */
1407 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1412 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1415 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1416 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1418 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1419 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1421 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1422 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1427 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1428 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1430 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1431 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1437 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1438 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1439 * set and use it for comparison.
1441 if (s->session->cipher)
1442 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1443 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1444 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1449 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1452 if (compression != 0) {
1453 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1459 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1460 * using compression.
1462 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1467 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1468 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1473 if (compression == 0)
1475 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1480 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1483 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1484 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1486 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1489 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1493 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1497 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1498 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1499 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1502 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1505 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1506 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1508 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1509 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1511 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1514 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1515 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1516 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1521 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1522 * we're done with this message
1525 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1526 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1527 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1528 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1533 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1534 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1536 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1537 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1538 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1542 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1544 unsigned int sversion;
1546 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1550 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1551 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1556 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1558 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1559 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1560 if (errorcode != 0) {
1561 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1566 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1572 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1573 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1574 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1575 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1578 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1580 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1582 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1584 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1585 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1590 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1591 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1593 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1594 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1595 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1597 unsigned int context = 0;
1599 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1604 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1606 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1607 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1608 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1612 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1613 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1614 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1615 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1617 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1621 certstart = certbytes;
1622 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1624 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1628 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1629 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1631 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1635 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1636 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1640 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1644 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1645 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1646 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1647 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1648 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1651 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1654 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1661 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1663 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1664 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1665 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1666 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1667 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1668 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1669 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1670 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1671 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1672 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1673 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1674 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1676 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1677 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1679 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1682 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1689 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1691 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1692 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1694 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1697 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1700 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1702 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1706 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1710 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1715 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1719 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1720 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1723 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1724 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1725 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1726 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1727 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1728 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1730 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1732 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1736 s->session->peer_type = i;
1738 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1740 s->session->peer = x;
1741 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1744 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1746 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1747 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1748 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1749 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1758 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1760 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1763 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1767 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1770 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1772 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1774 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1781 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1782 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1783 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1786 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1787 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1792 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1793 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1794 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1795 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1796 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1797 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1804 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1812 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1814 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1815 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1816 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1817 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1823 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1825 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1826 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1828 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1829 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1831 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1832 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1834 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1835 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1836 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1841 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1842 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1847 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1848 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1849 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1854 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1862 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1863 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1866 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1871 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1872 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1873 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1878 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1881 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1882 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1887 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1888 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1889 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1891 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1892 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1893 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1894 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1899 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1900 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1901 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1906 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1907 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1913 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1914 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1919 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1926 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1927 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1932 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1933 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1938 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1941 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1942 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1944 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1945 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1946 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1965 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1971 unsigned int curve_flags;
1972 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1975 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1976 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1977 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1979 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1985 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1986 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1988 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1994 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1996 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1999 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2003 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2004 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2006 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2007 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2012 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2014 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2015 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2017 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2018 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2019 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2020 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2025 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2029 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2035 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2036 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2037 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2044 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2045 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2048 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2049 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2050 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2051 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2052 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2066 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2067 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2068 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2069 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2071 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2073 save_param_start = *pkt;
2075 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2076 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2077 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2080 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2081 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2085 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2086 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2087 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2088 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2090 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2091 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2093 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2094 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2097 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2102 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2106 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2109 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2110 * equals the length of the parameters.
2112 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2113 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2114 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2115 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2120 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2121 unsigned int sigalg;
2124 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2129 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2133 } else if (rv == 0) {
2134 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2140 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2141 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2145 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2148 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2149 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2153 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2155 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2161 * Check signature length
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2164 /* wrong packet length */
2165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2167 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2171 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2172 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2173 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2178 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2183 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2184 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2185 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2186 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2192 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2193 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2194 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2195 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2196 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2197 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2202 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2203 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2205 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2209 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2212 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2213 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2214 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2215 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2216 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2217 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2218 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 /* still data left over */
2226 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2233 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2237 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2238 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2239 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2242 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2244 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2245 unsigned int i, name_len;
2246 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2247 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2248 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2251 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2256 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2259 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2260 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2261 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2262 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2263 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2264 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2266 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 /* get the certificate types */
2273 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2280 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2286 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2289 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2290 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2292 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2296 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2297 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2298 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2299 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2300 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2302 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2305 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2312 /* get the CA RDNs */
2313 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2319 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2320 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2321 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2324 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2328 namestart = namebytes;
2330 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2331 name_len)) == NULL) {
2332 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2337 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2338 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2340 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2343 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2350 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2353 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2356 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2361 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2362 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2367 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2368 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2369 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2370 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2373 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2376 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2379 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2383 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2385 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2388 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2390 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 unsigned int ticklen;
2392 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2393 unsigned int sess_len;
2394 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2396 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2397 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2398 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2399 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2401 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2408 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2409 * be 0 here in that instance
2412 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2414 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2415 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2416 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2417 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2419 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2422 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2424 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2426 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2429 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2430 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2435 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2436 s->session = new_sess;
2440 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2441 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2443 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2445 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2446 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2447 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2449 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2450 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2454 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2455 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2460 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2461 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2462 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2464 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2467 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2468 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2469 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2471 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2472 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2479 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2480 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2481 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2482 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2483 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2484 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2485 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2486 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2487 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2490 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2491 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2493 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2494 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2495 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2499 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2501 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2504 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2505 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2512 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2514 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2518 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2519 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2520 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2522 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2527 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2528 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2529 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2531 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2534 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2535 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2536 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2540 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2541 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2542 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2546 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2547 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2551 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2557 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2561 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2563 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2564 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2567 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2571 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2572 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2573 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2576 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2579 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2582 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2583 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2588 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2589 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2590 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2592 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2593 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2594 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2597 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2599 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2603 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2605 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2610 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2611 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2612 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2613 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2622 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2624 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2627 /* should contain no data */
2628 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2633 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2634 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2642 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2644 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2648 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2649 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2650 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2651 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2654 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2659 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2662 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2667 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2668 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2671 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2672 size_t identitylen = 0;
2673 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2674 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2675 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2678 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2680 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2686 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2687 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2690 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2692 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2694 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2696 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2697 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2701 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2702 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2704 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2708 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2709 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2710 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2712 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2717 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2718 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2720 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2721 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2724 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2726 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2733 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2734 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2735 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2736 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2749 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2750 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2751 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2753 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2756 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2758 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2764 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2765 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2770 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2771 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2774 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2778 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2779 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2780 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2781 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2785 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2786 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2790 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2791 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2792 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2796 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2797 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2801 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2804 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2805 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2810 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2811 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2813 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2814 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2819 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2820 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2825 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2830 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2834 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2835 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2836 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2838 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2842 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2846 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2848 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2851 /* send off the data */
2852 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2853 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2856 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2857 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2861 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2868 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2871 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2872 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2873 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2876 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2888 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2893 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2894 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2896 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2901 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2908 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2909 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2913 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2918 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2921 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2922 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2925 unsigned int md_len;
2926 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2927 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2928 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2929 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2932 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2933 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2936 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2938 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2940 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2942 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2946 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2947 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2948 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2953 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2954 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2955 * certificate key for key exchange
2958 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2960 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2962 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2967 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2968 /* Generate session key
2969 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2971 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2972 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2980 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2981 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2982 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2983 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2984 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2986 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2987 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2988 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2992 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2994 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2995 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3000 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3002 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3006 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3011 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3012 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3013 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3014 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3020 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3021 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3025 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3026 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3027 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3036 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3039 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3041 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3042 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3047 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3049 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3050 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3051 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3059 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3066 unsigned long alg_k;
3069 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3071 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3072 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3075 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3076 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3078 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3079 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3081 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3082 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3084 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3085 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3087 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3088 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3090 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3099 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3100 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3101 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3103 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3104 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3109 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3111 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3114 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3115 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3119 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3120 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3134 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3137 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3147 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3148 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3151 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3154 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3155 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3157 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3158 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3159 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3162 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3163 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3169 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3170 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3175 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3176 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3177 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3179 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3181 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3182 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3185 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3186 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3188 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3189 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3194 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3197 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3200 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3201 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3202 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3203 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3205 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3213 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3215 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3216 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3218 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3222 /* We need to get a client cert */
3223 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3225 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3226 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3228 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3230 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3233 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3234 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3235 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3237 } else if (i == 1) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3240 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3244 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3245 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3248 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3249 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3250 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3251 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3253 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3254 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3255 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3256 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3262 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3265 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3269 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3271 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3274 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3277 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3278 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3279 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3288 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3289 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3291 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3301 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3303 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3310 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3311 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3313 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3314 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3316 /* we don't have a certificate */
3317 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3320 /* This is the passed certificate */
3322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3323 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3324 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3325 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3332 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3334 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3338 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3339 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3341 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3342 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3344 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3348 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3350 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3356 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3358 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3363 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3364 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3377 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3379 size_t len, padding_len;
3380 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3382 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3383 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3385 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3386 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3395 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3400 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3403 /* should contain no data */
3404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3406 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3411 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3412 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3413 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3414 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3415 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3420 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3422 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3425 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3427 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3429 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3431 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3432 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3437 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3438 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3439 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3440 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3443 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3444 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3447 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3448 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3449 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3453 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3457 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3458 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3459 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3460 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3465 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3466 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3470 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3473 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3474 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3475 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3476 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3481 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3482 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3483 # error Max cipher length too short
3486 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3487 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3490 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3491 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3494 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3497 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3499 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3502 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3503 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3505 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3506 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3507 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3510 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3524 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3525 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3526 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3528 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3533 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3534 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3535 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3537 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);