1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
305 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
308 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
310 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
311 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
313 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
319 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
320 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
322 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
323 * client that doesn't support secure
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
333 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
334 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
346 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
350 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
353 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
362 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
364 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
365 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
450 /* clear this, it may get reset by
451 * send_server_key_exchange */
452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
454 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
455 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
457 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
458 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
459 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
460 * be able to handle this) */
461 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
463 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
466 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
467 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
469 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
471 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
472 * message only if the cipher suite is either
473 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
474 * server certificate contains the server's
475 * public key for key exchange.
477 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
478 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
479 * hint if provided */
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
484 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
487 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
489 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
490 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
491 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
498 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
510 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
511 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
512 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
513 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
514 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
515 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
516 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
517 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
518 * and in RFC 2246): */
519 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
520 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
521 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
524 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
525 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
527 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
528 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
529 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
531 /* no cert request */
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
541 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
542 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
543 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
544 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
556 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
557 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
558 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
563 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
565 /* This code originally checked to see if
566 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
567 * and then flushed. This caused problems
568 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
569 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
570 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
571 * still exist. So instead we just flush
575 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
576 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
583 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
586 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
588 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
589 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
593 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
595 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
605 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
606 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
607 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
612 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
613 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
614 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
615 * message is not sent.
616 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
617 * the client uses its key from the certificate
620 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
626 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
636 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
637 * at this point and digest cached records.
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
656 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
657 * a client cert, it can be verified
658 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
659 * should be generalized. But it is next step
661 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
662 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
664 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
665 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
669 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
670 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
682 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
684 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
685 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
686 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
687 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
689 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
690 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
691 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
692 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
695 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
701 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
707 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
708 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
710 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
711 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
712 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
713 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
715 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
716 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
717 * the client's Finished message is read.
719 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
720 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
732 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
733 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
734 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
735 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
736 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
737 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
738 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
739 * the client's Finished message is read.
741 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
742 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
743 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
744 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
745 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
749 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
760 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
761 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
762 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
768 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
769 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
779 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
781 { ret= -1; goto end; }
783 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
800 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
801 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
802 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
804 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
805 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
806 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
809 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
812 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
821 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
826 /* clean a few things up */
827 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
829 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
832 /* remove buffering on output */
833 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
837 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
842 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
844 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
846 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
848 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
862 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
866 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
871 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
886 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
894 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
896 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
897 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
902 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
903 /* number of bytes to write */
908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
909 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
912 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
917 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
918 * so permit appropriate message length */
919 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
925 if (!ok) return((int)n);
926 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
927 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
929 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
931 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
936 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
937 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
939 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
941 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
942 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
946 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
948 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
949 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
952 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
958 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
960 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
961 unsigned int cookie_len;
964 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
971 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
972 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
973 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
974 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
977 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
980 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
983 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
984 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
986 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
987 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
990 if (!ok) return((int)n);
992 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
994 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
995 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
996 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
999 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1000 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1003 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1004 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
1006 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1007 s->version = s->client_version;
1009 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1013 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1014 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1015 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1017 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1019 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1021 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1022 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1024 if (cookie_length == 0)
1028 /* load the client random */
1029 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1030 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1032 /* get the session-id */
1036 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1037 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1038 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1039 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1040 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1042 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1043 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1044 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1045 * setting will be ignored.
1047 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1049 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1054 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1056 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1058 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1059 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1060 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1061 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1062 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1064 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1065 { /* previous session */
1072 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1079 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1082 cookie_len = *(p++);
1085 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1086 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1087 * does not cause an overflow.
1089 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1092 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1097 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1098 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1101 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1103 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1105 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1108 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1110 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1113 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1115 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1116 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1118 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1120 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1131 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1133 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1134 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1140 /* not enough data */
1141 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1145 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1152 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1153 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1156 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1159 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1161 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1163 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1165 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1166 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1167 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1175 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1176 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1179 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1181 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1182 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1183 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1184 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1185 * enabled, though. */
1186 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1187 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1189 s->session->cipher = c;
1196 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1197 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1198 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1208 /* not enough data */
1209 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1216 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1223 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1230 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1232 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1234 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1239 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1244 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1245 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1246 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1247 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1250 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1251 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1253 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1258 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1260 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1262 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1263 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1264 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1267 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1268 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1272 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1273 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1274 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1276 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1281 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1284 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1286 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1289 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1290 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1295 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1296 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1297 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1300 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1301 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1303 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1304 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1305 /* Can't disable compression */
1306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1308 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1312 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1313 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1315 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1316 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1318 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1322 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1324 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1328 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1329 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1331 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1336 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1343 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1344 { /* See if we have a match */
1345 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1347 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1348 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1350 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1363 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1368 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1371 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1373 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1379 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1384 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1385 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1387 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1389 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1390 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1391 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1392 if (ciphers == NULL)
1394 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1399 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1400 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1412 /* Session-id reuse */
1413 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1414 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1415 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1416 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1418 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1420 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1421 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1423 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1424 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1426 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1431 else if (ec != NULL)
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1441 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1443 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1445 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1450 /* we now have the following setup.
1452 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1461 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1464 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1475 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1478 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1482 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1485 unsigned char *p,*d;
1489 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1491 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1492 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1493 p=s->s3->server_random;
1494 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1497 /* Do the message type and length last */
1500 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1501 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1504 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1505 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1507 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1508 * back in the server hello:
1509 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1510 * we send back the old session ID.
1511 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1512 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1513 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1514 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1516 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1517 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1518 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1519 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1522 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1524 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1526 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1527 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1536 /* put the cipher */
1537 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1540 /* put the compression method */
1541 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1544 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1547 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1550 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1555 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1567 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1568 /* number of bytes to write */
1573 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1574 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1577 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1583 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1586 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1592 /* number of bytes to write */
1597 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1598 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1601 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1607 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1614 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1615 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1618 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1621 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1622 unsigned char *p,*d;
1632 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1633 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1635 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1640 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1643 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1646 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1648 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1649 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1650 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1653 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1662 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1668 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1673 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1676 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1677 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1678 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1687 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1700 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1701 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1702 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1704 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1714 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1715 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1716 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1729 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1731 const EC_GROUP *group;
1733 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1734 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1736 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1737 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1738 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1742 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1747 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1753 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1759 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1765 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1766 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1767 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1768 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1770 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1777 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1779 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1785 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1786 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1792 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1793 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1794 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1797 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1804 /* Encode the public key.
1805 * First check the size of encoding and
1806 * allocate memory accordingly.
1808 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1809 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1810 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1813 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1814 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1815 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1816 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1823 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1824 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1825 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1826 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1828 if (encodedlen == 0)
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1834 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1836 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1837 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1838 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1839 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1844 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1845 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1853 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1855 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1857 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1858 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1861 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1863 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1865 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1866 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1867 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1868 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1881 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1885 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1887 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1889 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1896 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1897 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1899 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1902 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1905 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1913 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1918 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1921 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1937 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1939 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1940 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1941 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1942 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1943 * the actual encoded point itself
1945 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1953 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1954 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1956 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1957 encodedPoint = NULL;
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1963 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1965 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1966 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1967 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1968 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1975 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1976 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1978 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1979 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1983 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1986 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1987 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1988 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1989 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1990 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1991 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1992 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1993 (unsigned int *)&i);
1997 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1998 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2010 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2012 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2014 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2024 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2027 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2029 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2030 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2031 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2032 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2039 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2044 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2045 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2051 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2054 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2060 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2061 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2062 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2064 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2067 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2068 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2070 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2074 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2076 unsigned char *p,*d;
2078 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2082 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2086 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2088 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2090 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2095 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2097 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2107 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2111 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2113 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2114 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2115 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2120 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2121 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2124 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2131 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2132 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2138 /* else no CA names */
2139 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2142 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2143 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2146 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2151 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2152 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2157 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2160 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2167 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2170 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2171 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2176 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2180 unsigned long alg_k;
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2184 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2192 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2195 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2196 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2197 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2198 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2201 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2203 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2204 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2208 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2209 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2211 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2214 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2216 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2218 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2221 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2222 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2224 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2225 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2226 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2227 * be sent already */
2230 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2238 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2239 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2240 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2241 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2243 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2250 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2251 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2256 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2270 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2271 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2272 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2273 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2274 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2276 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2278 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2283 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2284 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2285 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2286 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2287 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2288 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2290 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2291 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2292 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2294 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2297 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2298 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2299 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2301 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2302 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2303 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2304 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2305 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2306 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2307 * decryption error. */
2308 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2309 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2311 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2312 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2313 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2314 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2315 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2316 * support the requested protocol version. If
2317 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2318 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2320 unsigned char workaround_good;
2321 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2322 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2323 version_good |= workaround_good;
2326 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2327 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2328 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2331 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2332 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2333 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2334 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2336 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2338 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2339 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2342 s->session->master_key_length=
2343 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2344 s->session->master_key,
2345 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2346 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2351 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2356 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2368 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2370 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2376 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2378 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2383 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2386 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2393 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2402 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2407 s->session->master_key_length=
2408 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2409 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2410 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2415 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2417 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2418 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2419 krb5_data authenticator;
2421 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2423 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2424 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2425 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2426 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2428 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2429 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2433 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2436 enc_ticket.length = i;
2438 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2441 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2445 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2446 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2449 authenticator.length = i;
2451 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2458 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2459 p+=authenticator.length;
2463 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2466 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2469 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2476 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2477 enc_pms.length + 6))
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2484 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2488 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2489 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2491 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2492 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2499 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2501 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2502 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2505 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2506 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2508 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2509 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2522 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2523 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2525 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2529 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2531 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2534 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2537 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2538 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2544 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2550 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2553 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2557 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2563 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2565 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2566 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2567 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2568 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2569 * the protocol version.
2570 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2571 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2573 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2581 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2583 s->session->master_key_length=
2584 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2585 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2587 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2589 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2590 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2592 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2593 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2598 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2599 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2600 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2601 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2605 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2608 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2613 const EC_GROUP *group;
2614 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2616 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2617 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2625 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2627 /* use the certificate */
2628 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2632 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2633 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2635 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2638 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2639 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2641 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2642 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 /* Let's get client's public key */
2650 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2659 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2661 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2663 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2667 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2669 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2671 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2672 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2673 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2674 * never executed. When that support is
2675 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2676 * received in the certificate is
2677 * authorized for key agreement.
2678 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2679 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2682 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2688 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2689 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2699 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2700 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2702 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2705 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2709 /* Get encoded point length */
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2718 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2719 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2726 * currently, so set it to the start
2728 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2731 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2732 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2733 if (field_size <= 0)
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2747 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2748 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2749 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2750 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2751 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2752 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2754 /* Compute the master secret */
2755 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2756 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2758 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2764 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2766 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2767 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2768 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2770 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2772 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2787 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2790 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2794 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2795 * string for the callback */
2796 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2797 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2798 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2799 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2800 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2802 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 else if (psk_len == 0)
2810 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2812 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2813 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2817 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2818 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2820 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2822 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2826 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2827 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2828 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2829 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2836 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2838 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2839 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2840 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2847 s->session->master_key_length=
2848 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2849 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2852 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2859 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2867 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2871 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2876 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2877 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2879 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2883 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2884 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2885 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2886 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2893 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2903 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2906 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2907 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2908 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2909 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2910 unsigned long alg_a;
2914 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2915 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2916 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2917 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2918 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2919 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2921 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2922 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2923 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2924 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2925 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2926 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2927 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2928 if (client_pub_pkey)
2930 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2933 /* Decrypt session key */
2934 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2935 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2936 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2943 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2949 /* Generate master secret */
2950 s->session->master_key_length=
2951 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2952 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2953 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2954 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2959 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2968 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2970 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2977 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2981 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2982 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2983 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2984 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2985 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2990 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2992 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2998 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3000 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3002 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3003 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3004 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3006 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3009 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3011 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3013 peer=s->session->peer;
3014 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3015 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3023 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3025 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3026 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3028 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3039 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3043 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3050 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3053 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3057 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3058 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3059 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3060 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3061 * signature without length field */
3062 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3063 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3069 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3071 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3072 /* Should never happen */
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3076 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3080 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3083 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3086 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3094 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3104 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3108 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3109 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3112 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3116 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3120 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3128 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3131 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3132 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3135 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3139 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3141 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3148 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3150 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3151 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3155 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3161 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3169 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3171 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3172 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3173 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3177 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3185 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3187 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3188 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3189 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3193 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3195 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3201 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3202 { unsigned char signature[64];
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3205 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3207 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3209 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3210 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3212 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3213 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3216 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3218 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3225 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3234 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3237 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3239 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3240 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3241 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3243 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3244 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3248 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3250 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3252 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3253 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3255 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3257 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3264 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3266 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3268 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3269 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3275 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3276 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3279 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3282 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3286 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3288 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3292 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3294 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3303 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3307 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3310 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3312 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3318 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3326 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3330 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3339 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3341 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3342 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3348 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3349 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3350 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3353 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3356 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3357 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3359 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3365 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3368 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3374 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3375 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3376 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3377 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3379 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3380 * when we arrive here. */
3381 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3383 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3384 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3390 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3391 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3392 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3393 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3394 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3402 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3405 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3406 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3410 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3415 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3417 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3420 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3421 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3422 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3429 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3440 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3441 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3445 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3446 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3448 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3450 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3451 const unsigned char *const_p;
3452 int len, slen_full, slen;
3457 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3458 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3459 unsigned char key_name[16];
3461 /* get session encoding length */
3462 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3463 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3466 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3468 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3472 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3474 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3476 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3482 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3484 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3485 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3491 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3492 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3494 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3495 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3496 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3497 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3498 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3499 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3501 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3502 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3503 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3506 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3508 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3509 /* Skip message length for now */
3511 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3512 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3513 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3514 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3517 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3519 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3528 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3529 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3530 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3531 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3532 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3533 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3536 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3537 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3538 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3539 * as their sessions. */
3540 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3542 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3544 /* Output key name */
3546 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3549 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3550 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3551 /* Encrypt session data */
3552 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3554 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3556 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3558 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3559 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3560 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3563 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3565 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3567 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3569 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3571 /* number of bytes to write */
3573 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3578 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3579 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3582 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3587 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3588 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3589 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3592 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3595 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3598 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3599 /* message length */
3600 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3602 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3603 /* length of OCSP response */
3604 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3605 /* actual response */
3606 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3607 /* number of bytes to write */
3608 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3609 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3613 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3614 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3617 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3618 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3619 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3620 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3623 int proto_len, padding_len;
3625 const unsigned char *p;
3627 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3628 * extension in their ClientHello */
3629 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3635 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3636 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3637 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3639 514, /* See the payload format below */
3645 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3646 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3647 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3648 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3655 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3657 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3659 /* The payload looks like:
3661 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3662 * uint8 padding_len;
3663 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3666 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3668 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3669 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3672 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3673 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3678 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3679 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;