1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
338 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
416 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
419 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
422 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
441 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
443 /* clear this, it may get reset by
444 * send_server_key_exchange */
445 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
447 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
448 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
450 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
451 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
452 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
453 * be able to handle this) */
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
456 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
459 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
460 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
462 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
464 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
465 * message only if the cipher suite is either
466 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
467 * server certificate contains the server's
468 * public key for key exchange.
470 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
471 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
472 * hint if provided */
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
492 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
506 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
507 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
508 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
509 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
510 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
511 * and in RFC 2246): */
512 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
513 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
514 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
515 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
516 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
518 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
519 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
520 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
521 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
522 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
524 /* no cert request */
526 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
528 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
529 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
534 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
535 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
536 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
537 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
541 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
549 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
558 /* This code originally checked to see if
559 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
560 * and then flushed. This caused problems
561 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
562 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
563 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
564 * still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
569 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
574 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
576 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
582 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
590 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
600 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
606 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
607 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
608 * message is not sent.
609 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
610 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
623 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
625 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
627 if (!s->session->peer)
629 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
630 * at this point and digest cached records.
632 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
637 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
649 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
650 * a client cert, it can be verified
651 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
652 * should be generalized. But it is next step
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
657 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
658 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
662 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
663 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
680 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
682 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
683 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
696 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
697 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
699 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
705 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
706 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
707 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
708 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
712 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
722 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
723 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
724 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
731 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
732 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
733 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
742 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
743 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
744 { ret= -1; goto end; }
746 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
747 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
753 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
754 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
764 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
766 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
767 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
768 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
769 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
772 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
775 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
777 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
778 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
781 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
785 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
790 /* clean a few things up */
791 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
793 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
796 /* remove buffering on output */
797 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
801 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
806 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
808 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
810 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
812 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
826 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
830 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
835 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
839 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
846 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
850 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
854 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
858 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
860 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
861 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
866 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
867 /* number of bytes to write */
872 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
873 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
876 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
881 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
882 * so permit appropriate message length */
883 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
889 if (!ok) return((int)n);
890 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
891 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
893 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
895 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
900 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
901 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
903 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
905 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
906 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
910 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
912 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
913 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
916 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
922 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
924 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
925 unsigned int cookie_len;
928 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
933 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
935 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
936 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
937 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
938 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
941 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
944 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
947 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
948 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
949 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
950 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
951 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
954 if (!ok) return((int)n);
956 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
958 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
959 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
960 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
963 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
964 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
967 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
968 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
970 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
971 s->version = s->client_version;
973 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
977 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
978 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
979 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
981 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
983 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
985 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
986 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
988 if (cookie_length == 0)
992 /* load the client random */
993 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 /* get the session-id */
1000 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1001 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1002 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1003 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1004 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1006 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1007 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1008 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1009 * setting will be ignored.
1011 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1018 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1020 { /* previous session */
1027 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1034 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1037 cookie_len = *(p++);
1040 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1041 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1042 * does not cause an overflow.
1044 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1052 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1053 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1056 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1058 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1060 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1063 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1065 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1068 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1070 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1071 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1073 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1075 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1088 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1089 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1095 /* not enough data */
1096 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1100 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1107 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1108 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1111 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1114 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1116 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1118 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1120 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1121 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1129 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1130 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1133 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1135 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1136 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1137 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1138 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1139 * enabled, though. */
1140 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1141 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1143 s->session->cipher = c;
1150 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1151 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1152 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1162 /* not enough data */
1163 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1170 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1177 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1184 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1186 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1188 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1193 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1198 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1199 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1200 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1201 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1204 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1205 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1207 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1212 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1214 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1216 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1217 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1218 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1221 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1222 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1226 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1227 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1228 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1230 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1235 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1238 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1240 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1241 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1243 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1244 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1249 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1250 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1251 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1252 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1254 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1255 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1257 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1258 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1259 /* Can't disable compression */
1260 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1262 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1266 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1267 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1269 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1270 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1272 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1276 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1278 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1282 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1283 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1285 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1290 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1297 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1298 { /* See if we have a match */
1299 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1301 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1302 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1304 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1317 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1322 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1323 * using compression.
1325 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1327 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1333 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1338 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1339 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1341 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1343 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1344 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1345 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1346 if (ciphers == NULL)
1348 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1353 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1354 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1358 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1362 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1366 /* Session-id reuse */
1367 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1368 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1369 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1370 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1372 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1374 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1375 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1377 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1378 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1380 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1384 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1385 else if (ec != NULL)
1386 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1388 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1392 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1395 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1397 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1404 /* we now have the following setup.
1406 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1407 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1408 * compression - basically ignored right now
1409 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1410 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1411 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1412 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1415 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1416 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1418 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1429 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1432 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1436 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1439 unsigned char *p,*d;
1443 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1445 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1446 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1447 p=s->s3->server_random;
1448 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1451 /* Do the message type and length last */
1454 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1455 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1458 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1459 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1461 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1462 * back in the server hello:
1463 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1464 * we send back the old session ID.
1465 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1466 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1467 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1468 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1470 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1471 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1472 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1473 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1476 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1478 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1480 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1481 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1490 /* put the cipher */
1491 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1494 /* put the compression method */
1495 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1498 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1501 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1504 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1509 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1522 /* number of bytes to write */
1527 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1528 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1531 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1535 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1537 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1540 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1546 /* number of bytes to write */
1551 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1552 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1555 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1561 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1568 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1569 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1572 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1575 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1576 unsigned char *p,*d;
1586 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1587 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1589 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1594 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1600 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1602 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1603 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1604 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1607 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1616 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1622 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1627 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1630 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1631 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1633 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1641 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1654 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1655 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1656 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1658 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1667 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1668 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1669 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1670 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1683 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1685 const EC_GROUP *group;
1687 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1688 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1690 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1691 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1692 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1696 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1701 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1713 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1719 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1720 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1721 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1722 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1724 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1731 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1732 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1733 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1739 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1740 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1746 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1747 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1748 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1751 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1758 /* Encode the public key.
1759 * First check the size of encoding and
1760 * allocate memory accordingly.
1762 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1763 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1764 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1767 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1768 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1769 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1770 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1777 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1778 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1779 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1780 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1782 if (encodedlen == 0)
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1788 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1790 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1791 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1792 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1793 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1798 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1799 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1807 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1809 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1811 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1812 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1815 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1817 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1819 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1820 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1821 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1822 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1835 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1839 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1841 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1843 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1850 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1851 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1853 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1856 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1859 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1867 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1872 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1875 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1878 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1891 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1893 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1894 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1895 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1896 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1897 * the actual encoded point itself
1899 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1907 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1908 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1910 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1911 encodedPoint = NULL;
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1917 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1919 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1920 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1921 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1922 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1929 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1930 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1932 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1933 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1937 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1939 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1940 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1941 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1942 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1945 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1946 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1947 (unsigned int *)&i);
1951 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1952 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1964 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1966 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1968 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1970 /* Should never happen */
1971 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1978 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1981 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1984 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1985 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1986 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1993 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1998 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1999 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2005 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2008 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2014 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2015 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2016 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2018 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2021 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2022 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2024 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2028 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2030 unsigned char *p,*d;
2032 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2036 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2040 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2042 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2044 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2049 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2051 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2061 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2065 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2067 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2068 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2069 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2074 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2075 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2078 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2086 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2092 /* else no CA names */
2093 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2096 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2097 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2100 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2105 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2106 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2111 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2114 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2121 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2124 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2125 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2130 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2134 unsigned long alg_k;
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2138 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2146 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2149 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2150 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2151 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2152 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2155 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2156 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2157 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2158 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2162 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2163 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2165 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2170 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2171 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2173 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2174 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2175 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2176 * be sent already */
2179 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2187 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2188 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2189 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2190 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2192 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2199 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2200 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2205 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2217 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2221 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2223 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2224 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2227 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2229 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2230 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2231 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2232 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2233 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2235 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2236 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2237 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2239 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2242 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2243 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2244 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2245 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2246 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2247 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2248 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2254 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2255 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2256 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2258 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2259 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2260 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2261 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2265 s->session->master_key_length=
2266 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2267 s->session->master_key,
2269 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2274 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2279 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2291 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2299 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2301 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2306 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2309 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2316 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2325 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2330 s->session->master_key_length=
2331 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2332 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2333 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2338 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2340 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2341 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2342 krb5_data authenticator;
2344 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2346 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2347 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2348 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2349 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2351 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2352 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2356 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2359 enc_ticket.length = i;
2361 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2368 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2369 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2372 authenticator.length = i;
2374 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2381 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2382 p+=authenticator.length;
2386 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2389 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2392 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2399 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2400 enc_pms.length + 6))
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2403 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2407 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2411 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2412 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2414 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2415 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2421 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2422 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2424 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2425 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2428 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2429 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2431 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2432 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2445 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2446 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2448 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2452 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2454 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2457 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2460 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2461 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2467 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2473 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2480 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2483 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2486 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2488 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2489 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2490 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2491 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2492 * the protocol version.
2493 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2494 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2496 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2499 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2506 s->session->master_key_length=
2507 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2508 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2510 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2512 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2513 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2515 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2516 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2521 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2522 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2523 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2524 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2528 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2531 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2536 const EC_GROUP *group;
2537 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2539 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2540 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2548 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2550 /* use the certificate */
2551 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2555 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2556 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2558 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2561 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2562 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2564 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2565 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 /* Let's get client's public key */
2573 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2584 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2586 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2590 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2592 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2594 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2595 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2596 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2597 * never executed. When that support is
2598 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2599 * received in the certificate is
2600 * authorized for key agreement.
2601 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2602 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2605 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2611 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2612 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2618 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2622 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2623 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2625 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 /* Get encoded point length */
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2642 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2649 * currently, so set it to the start
2651 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2654 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2655 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2656 if (field_size <= 0)
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2671 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2672 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2673 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2674 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2675 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2677 /* Compute the master secret */
2678 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2679 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2681 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2687 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2689 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2690 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2691 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2693 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2704 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2710 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2717 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2718 * string for the callback */
2719 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2720 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2721 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2722 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2723 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2725 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2731 else if (psk_len == 0)
2733 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2735 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2736 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2740 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2741 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2743 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2745 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2749 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2750 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2751 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2752 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2759 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2760 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2761 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2762 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2763 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2766 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2770 s->session->master_key_length=
2771 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2772 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2775 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2782 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2790 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2794 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2799 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2800 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2802 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2806 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2807 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2808 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2809 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2812 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2816 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2825 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2826 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2830 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2831 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2832 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2833 unsigned long alg_a;
2837 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2838 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2839 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2840 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2841 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2842 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2844 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2845 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2846 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2847 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2848 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2849 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2850 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2851 if (client_pub_pkey)
2853 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2856 /* Decrypt session key */
2857 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2858 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2859 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2866 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2872 /* Generate master secret */
2873 s->session->master_key_length=
2874 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2875 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2876 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2882 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2883 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2891 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2893 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2900 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2905 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2906 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2907 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2908 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2913 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2915 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2921 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2923 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2925 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2926 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2927 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2929 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2932 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2934 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2936 peer=s->session->peer;
2937 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2938 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2946 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2948 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2949 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2951 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2962 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2966 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2969 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2973 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2976 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2980 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2981 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2982 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2983 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2984 * signature without length field */
2985 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2986 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2994 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2995 /* Should never happen */
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3003 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3006 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3009 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3013 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3017 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3027 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3032 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3035 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3043 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3047 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3051 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3054 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3055 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3058 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3062 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3064 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3071 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3073 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3074 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3078 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3084 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3092 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3094 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3095 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3096 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3100 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3108 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3110 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3111 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3112 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3116 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3118 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3124 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3125 { unsigned char signature[64];
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3128 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3130 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3132 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3133 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3135 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3136 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3139 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3141 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3160 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3162 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3163 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3164 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3166 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3171 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3173 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3175 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3176 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3178 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3180 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3187 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3189 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3191 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3192 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3195 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3198 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3199 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3202 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3205 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3209 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3211 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3215 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3217 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3226 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3230 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3233 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3235 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3241 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3249 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3253 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3262 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3264 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3265 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3271 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3272 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3273 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3276 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3279 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3280 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3282 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3288 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3291 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3297 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3298 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3299 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3300 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3302 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3303 * when we arrive here. */
3304 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3306 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3307 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3313 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3314 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3315 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3316 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3317 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3325 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3328 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3329 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3333 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3338 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3340 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3343 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3344 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3345 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3352 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3358 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3359 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3363 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3364 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3366 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3368 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3369 const unsigned char *const_p;
3370 int len, slen_full, slen;
3375 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3376 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3377 unsigned char key_name[16];
3379 /* get session encoding length */
3380 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3381 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3384 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3386 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3390 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3392 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3394 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3400 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3402 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3403 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3409 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3410 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3412 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3413 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3414 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3415 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3416 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3417 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3419 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3420 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3421 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3424 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3426 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3427 /* Skip message length for now */
3429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3430 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3431 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3432 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3435 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3437 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3446 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3447 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3448 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3449 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3450 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3451 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3454 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3455 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3456 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3457 * as their sessions. */
3458 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3460 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3462 /* Output key name */
3464 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3467 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3468 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3469 /* Encrypt session data */
3470 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3472 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3474 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3476 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3477 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3478 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3481 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3483 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3484 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3485 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3487 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3489 /* number of bytes to write */
3491 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3496 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3497 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3500 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3502 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3505 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3506 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3507 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3510 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3513 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3516 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3517 /* message length */
3518 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3520 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3521 /* length of OCSP response */
3522 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3523 /* actual response */
3524 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3525 /* number of bytes to write */
3526 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3527 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3531 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3532 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3535 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3536 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3537 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3538 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3541 int proto_len, padding_len;
3543 const unsigned char *p;
3545 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3546 * extension in their ClientHello */
3547 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3553 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3554 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3555 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3557 514, /* See the payload format below */
3563 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3564 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3565 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3566 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3573 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3575 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3577 /* The payload looks like:
3579 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3580 * uint8 padding_len;
3581 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3584 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3586 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3587 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3590 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3591 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3596 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3597 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;