1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
286 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
288 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
290 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
295 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
304 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
312 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
313 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
314 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
316 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
318 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
319 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
321 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
323 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
324 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
325 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
327 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
328 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
330 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
331 * client that doesn't support secure
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
335 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
341 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
342 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
343 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
352 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
353 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
354 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
355 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
358 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
361 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
367 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
369 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
370 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
372 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
373 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
376 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
378 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
379 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
382 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
385 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
386 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
387 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
389 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
403 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
408 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
424 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
425 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
452 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
453 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
454 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
457 * clear this, it may get reset by
458 * send_server_key_exchange
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
463 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
464 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
466 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
468 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
469 * message only if the cipher suite is either
470 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
471 * server certificate contains the server's
472 * public key for key exchange.
475 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
476 * hint if provided */
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
481 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
484 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
486 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
487 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
488 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
489 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
495 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
496 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
506 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
507 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
509 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
510 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
514 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
515 * and in RFC 2246): */
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
518 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
520 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
522 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
524 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
525 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
526 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
528 /* no cert request */
530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
538 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
539 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
540 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
541 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
545 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
553 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
554 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
562 /* This code originally checked to see if
563 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
564 * and then flushed. This caused problems
565 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
566 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
567 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
568 * still exist. So instead we just flush
572 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
573 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
578 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
580 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
585 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
587 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
596 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
601 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
602 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
603 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
604 * message is not sent.
605 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
606 * the client uses its key from the certificate
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
623 if (!s->session->peer)
625 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
626 * at this point and digest cached records.
628 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
634 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
642 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
645 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
646 * a client cert, it can be verified
647 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
648 * should be generalized. But it is next step
650 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
654 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
658 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
659 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
674 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
675 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
676 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
678 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
679 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
680 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
681 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
682 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
684 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
687 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
695 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
697 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
699 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
700 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
701 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
702 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
703 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
704 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
705 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
706 * the client's Finished message is read.
708 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
709 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
711 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
712 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
734 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
738 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
739 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
742 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
756 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
757 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
758 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
768 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
769 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
770 { ret= -1; goto end; }
772 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
773 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
775 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
779 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
780 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
789 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
790 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
793 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
794 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
795 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
798 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
799 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
801 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
806 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
815 /* clean a few things up */
816 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
818 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
821 /* remove buffering on output */
822 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
826 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
831 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
833 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
835 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
837 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
851 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
855 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
860 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
864 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
871 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
879 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
882 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
884 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
885 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
888 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
889 return ssl_do_write(s);
892 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
894 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
895 unsigned int cookie_len;
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
904 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
906 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
909 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
910 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
911 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
912 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
915 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
918 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
921 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
922 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
924 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
925 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
928 if (!ok) return((int)n);
930 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
932 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
933 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
934 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
938 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
939 : (s->client_version < s->version))
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
942 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
943 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
945 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
946 s->version = s->client_version;
948 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
952 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
953 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
954 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
956 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
958 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
960 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
961 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
963 if (cookie_length == 0)
967 /* load the client random */
968 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
971 /* get the session-id */
975 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
976 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
977 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
978 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
979 * won't even compile against older library versions).
981 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
982 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
983 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
984 * setting will be ignored.
986 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
988 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
993 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
995 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
997 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
998 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
999 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1000 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1001 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1003 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
1004 { /* previous session */
1011 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1021 cookie_len = *(p++);
1024 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1025 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1026 * does not cause an overflow.
1028 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1036 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1037 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1040 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1042 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1044 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1047 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1049 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1052 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1054 /* default verification */
1055 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1056 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0)
1058 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1060 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1063 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1068 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1070 /* Select version to use */
1071 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1072 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1074 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1075 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1077 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1080 s->version = s->client_version;
1081 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1084 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1085 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1087 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1088 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1093 s->version = s->client_version;
1094 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1097 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1102 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1104 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1105 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1111 /* not enough data */
1112 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1116 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1123 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1124 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1127 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1130 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1132 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1134 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1136 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1137 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
1138 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1146 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1147 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1150 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1152 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1153 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1154 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1155 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1156 * enabled, though. */
1157 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1158 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1160 s->session->cipher = c;
1167 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1168 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1169 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1179 /* not enough data */
1180 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1189 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1196 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1203 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1205 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1212 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1213 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1214 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1215 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1218 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1219 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1225 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1227 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1229 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1230 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1231 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1234 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1235 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1239 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1240 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1241 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1243 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1248 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1251 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1253 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1254 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1256 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1257 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1262 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1263 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1264 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1265 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1267 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1268 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1270 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1271 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1272 /* Can't disable compression */
1273 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1278 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1279 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1281 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1282 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1284 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1288 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1293 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1294 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1296 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1301 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1308 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1309 { /* See if we have a match */
1310 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1312 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1313 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1315 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1328 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1333 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1334 * using compression.
1336 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1343 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1348 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1349 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1351 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1353 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1354 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1355 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1356 if (ciphers == NULL)
1358 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1363 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1368 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1370 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1372 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1375 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1381 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1384 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1386 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1387 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1391 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1395 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1396 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1397 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1398 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1399 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1400 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1401 /* do not send a session ticket */
1402 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1406 /* Session-id reuse */
1407 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1408 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1409 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1410 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1412 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1414 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1415 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1417 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1418 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1420 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1424 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1425 else if (ec != NULL)
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1428 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1435 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1437 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1442 * we now have the following setup.
1444 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1445 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1446 * compression - basically ignored right now
1447 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1448 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1449 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1450 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1453 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1454 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1456 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1463 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1467 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1470 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1471 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1474 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1477 unsigned char *p,*d;
1482 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1484 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1485 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1486 p=s->s3->server_random;
1487 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1490 /* Do the message type and length last */
1491 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1493 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1494 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1497 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1498 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1501 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1502 * back in the server hello:
1503 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1504 * we send back the old session ID.
1505 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1506 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1507 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1508 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1510 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1511 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1512 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1513 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1516 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1517 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1519 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1521 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1522 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1531 /* put the cipher */
1532 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1535 /* put the compression method */
1536 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1539 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1542 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1545 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1550 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1552 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1559 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1563 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1564 return ssl_do_write(s);
1567 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1570 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1572 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1573 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1576 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1577 return ssl_do_write(s);
1580 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1586 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1593 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1594 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1597 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1600 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1601 unsigned char *p,*d;
1611 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1612 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1614 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1619 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1622 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1625 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1627 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1628 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1629 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1632 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1641 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1647 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1652 if (type & SSL_kDHE)
1654 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1656 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1659 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1667 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1668 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1669 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1672 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1676 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1677 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
1679 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1683 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1689 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1691 else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1698 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1699 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1700 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1702 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1711 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1712 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1713 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1714 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1727 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1729 const EC_GROUP *group;
1731 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1734 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1735 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1736 if (nid != NID_undef)
1737 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1739 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1741 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1742 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1743 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1747 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1752 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1766 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1773 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1774 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1775 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1777 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1785 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1786 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1792 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1793 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1799 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1800 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1801 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1804 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1811 /* Encode the public key.
1812 * First check the size of encoding and
1813 * allocate memory accordingly.
1815 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1816 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1817 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1820 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1821 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1822 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1823 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1830 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1831 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1832 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1833 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1835 if (encodedlen == 0)
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1841 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1843 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1844 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1845 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1846 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1851 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1852 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1860 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1862 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1864 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1865 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1868 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1870 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1872 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1873 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1874 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1875 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1888 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1892 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1894 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1903 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1904 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1906 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1909 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1912 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1920 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1925 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1927 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1930 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1943 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1945 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1946 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1947 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1948 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1949 * the actual encoded point itself
1951 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1959 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1960 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1962 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1963 encodedPoint = NULL;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1969 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1971 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1972 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1973 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1974 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1981 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1982 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1984 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1988 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1990 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1991 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1992 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1993 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1994 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1995 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1996 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1997 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1998 (unsigned int *)&i);
2002 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2003 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2015 /* send signature algorithm */
2016 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2018 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2020 /* Should never happen */
2021 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2031 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2032 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2033 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2034 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2035 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2036 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2043 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2048 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2049 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2055 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2058 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2059 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2060 return ssl_do_write(s);
2062 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2065 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2066 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2072 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2074 unsigned char *p,*d;
2076 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2080 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2084 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2086 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2088 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2093 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2095 const unsigned char *psigs;
2096 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2097 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2098 /* Skip over length for now */
2100 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2101 /* Now fill in length */
2111 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2115 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2117 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2118 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2119 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2124 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2125 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2135 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2136 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2142 /* else no CA names */
2143 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2146 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2148 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2149 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2151 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2156 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2158 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2166 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2170 return ssl_do_write(s);
2175 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2179 unsigned long alg_k;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2183 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2187 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2191 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2194 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2195 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2196 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2197 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2200 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2203 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2208 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2210 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2213 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2215 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2217 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2220 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2221 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2223 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2224 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2225 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2226 * be sent already */
2229 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2237 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2238 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2239 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2240 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2242 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2249 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2250 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2255 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2269 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2270 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2271 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2272 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2273 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2275 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2277 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2282 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2283 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2284 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2285 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2286 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2287 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2289 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2290 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2291 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2293 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2296 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2297 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2298 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2300 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2301 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2302 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2303 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2304 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2305 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2306 * decryption error. */
2307 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2308 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2310 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2311 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2312 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2313 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2314 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2315 * support the requested protocol version. If
2316 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2317 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2319 unsigned char workaround_good;
2320 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2321 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2322 version_good |= workaround_good;
2325 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2326 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2327 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2330 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2331 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2332 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2333 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2335 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
2337 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2338 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2341 s->session->master_key_length=
2342 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2343 s->session->master_key,
2344 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2345 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2350 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2353 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2360 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2371 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2372 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2373 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2374 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2377 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2378 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2379 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2380 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2382 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2386 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2388 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2390 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2395 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2399 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2400 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2403 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2404 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2406 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2412 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2413 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2416 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2423 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2432 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2439 s->session->master_key_length=
2440 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2441 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2442 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2449 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2451 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2452 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2453 krb5_data authenticator;
2455 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2457 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2458 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2459 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2460 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2462 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2463 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2467 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2470 enc_ticket.length = i;
2472 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2479 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2480 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2483 authenticator.length = i;
2485 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2492 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2493 p+=authenticator.length;
2497 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2500 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2503 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2510 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2511 enc_pms.length + 6))
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2518 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2522 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2523 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2525 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2526 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2533 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2535 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2536 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2539 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2540 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2542 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2543 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2556 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2557 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2559 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2563 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2565 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2571 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2572 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2578 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2581 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2584 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2587 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2591 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2594 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2597 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2599 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2600 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2601 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2602 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2603 * the protocol version.
2604 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2605 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2607 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2615 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2617 s->session->master_key_length=
2618 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2619 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2621 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2623 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2624 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2626 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2627 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2632 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2633 * but it caused problems for apache.
2634 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2635 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2639 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2642 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2647 const EC_GROUP *group;
2648 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2650 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2651 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2654 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2658 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2659 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2661 /* use the certificate */
2662 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2666 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2667 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2669 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2672 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2673 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2675 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2676 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 /* Let's get client's public key */
2684 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2687 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2693 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2695 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
2697 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2701 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2703 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2705 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2706 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2707 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2708 * never executed. When that support is
2709 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2710 * received in the certificate is
2711 * authorized for key agreement.
2712 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2713 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2716 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2718 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2722 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2723 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2733 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2734 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2736 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2743 /* Get encoded point length */
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2753 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2759 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2760 * currently, so set it to the start
2762 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2765 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2766 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2767 if (field_size <= 0)
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2781 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2782 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2783 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2784 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2785 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2786 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2788 /* Compute the master secret */
2789 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2790 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2792 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2798 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2800 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2801 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2802 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2804 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2812 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2815 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2818 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2821 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2824 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2828 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2829 * string for the callback */
2830 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2831 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2832 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2833 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2834 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2836 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 else if (psk_len == 0)
2844 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2846 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2847 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2851 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2852 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2854 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2856 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2860 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2861 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2862 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2863 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2866 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2870 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2872 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2873 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2874 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2877 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 s->session->master_key_length=
2882 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2883 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2886 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2893 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2901 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2905 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2910 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2911 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2913 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2917 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2918 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2919 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2920 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2923 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2927 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2937 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2940 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2941 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2942 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2943 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2944 unsigned long alg_a;
2948 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2949 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2950 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2951 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2952 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2953 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2955 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2956 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2957 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2958 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2959 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2960 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2961 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2962 if (client_pub_pkey)
2964 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2967 /* Decrypt session key */
2968 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2969 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2970 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2977 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2983 /* Generate master secret */
2984 s->session->master_key_length=
2985 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2986 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2987 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2988 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2993 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2994 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3002 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3004 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3011 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3015 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3016 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3017 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3018 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3019 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3024 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3026 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3032 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3034 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3036 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3037 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3038 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3040 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3043 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3045 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3047 peer=s->session->peer;
3048 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3049 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3057 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3059 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3062 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3073 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3077 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3080 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3084 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3087 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3091 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3092 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3093 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3094 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3095 * signature without length field */
3096 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3097 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3105 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3117 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3127 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3131 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3132 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3135 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3139 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3143 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3147 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3151 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3154 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3155 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3158 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3162 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3164 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3171 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3173 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3174 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3178 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3184 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3192 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3194 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3195 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3196 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3200 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3208 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3210 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3211 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3212 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3216 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3218 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3224 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3225 { unsigned char signature[64];
3227 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3228 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3230 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3232 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3233 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3235 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3239 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3241 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3260 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3262 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3263 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3264 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3266 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3267 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3271 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3273 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3275 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3276 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3278 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3280 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3287 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3289 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3291 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3292 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3298 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3299 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3302 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3305 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3309 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3311 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3315 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3317 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3326 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3330 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3333 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3335 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3341 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3349 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3353 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3362 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3364 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3365 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3367 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3371 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3372 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3373 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3376 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3379 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3380 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3382 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3389 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3392 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3399 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3402 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3405 al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3407 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3410 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3413 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3414 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3415 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3416 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3418 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3419 * when we arrive here. */
3420 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3422 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3423 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3429 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3430 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3431 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3432 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3433 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3441 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3444 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3445 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3449 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3453 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3455 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3458 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3459 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3460 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3467 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
3469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3472 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3475 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3476 return ssl_do_write(s);
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3480 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3481 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3483 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3485 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3486 const unsigned char *const_p;
3487 int len, slen_full, slen;
3492 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3493 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3494 unsigned char key_name[16];
3496 /* get session encoding length */
3497 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3498 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3501 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3503 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3507 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3509 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3511 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3517 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3519 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3520 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3526 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3527 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3530 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3531 * follows handshake_header_length +
3532 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3533 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3534 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3535 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3537 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3538 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3539 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3541 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3542 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3543 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3544 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3545 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3548 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3550 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3559 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3560 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3561 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3562 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3563 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3564 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3567 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3568 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3569 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3570 * as their sessions. */
3571 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3573 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3575 /* Output key name */
3577 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3580 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3581 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3582 /* Encrypt session data */
3583 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3585 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3589 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3590 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3591 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3594 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3596 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3597 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3598 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3599 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3605 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3606 return ssl_do_write(s);
3609 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3611 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3615 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3616 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3617 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3620 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3623 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3626 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3627 /* message length */
3628 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3630 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3631 /* length of OCSP response */
3632 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3633 /* actual response */
3634 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3635 /* number of bytes to write */
3636 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3641 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3642 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3645 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3646 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3647 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3648 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3651 int proto_len, padding_len;
3653 const unsigned char *p;
3655 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3656 * extension in their ClientHello */
3657 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3663 /* See the payload format below */
3664 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3665 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3666 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3674 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3675 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3676 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3677 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3684 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3686 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3689 * The payload looks like:
3691 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3692 * uint8 padding_len;
3693 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3696 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3698 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3699 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3702 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3703 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3708 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3709 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;