2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
122 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
123 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
125 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
128 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
129 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
130 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
131 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
132 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
144 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
148 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
149 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
150 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
157 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
159 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
162 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
163 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
164 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
166 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
167 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
168 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
169 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered.
172 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
176 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 s->packet_length = 0;
178 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
182 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
183 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
186 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
187 if (left == 0 && extend)
189 if (left > 0 && n > left)
193 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
195 s->packet_length += n;
201 /* else we need to read more data */
203 len = s->packet_length;
204 pkt = rb->buf + align;
206 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
207 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
209 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
210 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
212 rb->offset = len + align;
215 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
221 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
222 /* ignore max parameter */
227 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
228 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
233 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
234 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
239 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
240 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
241 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
251 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
258 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
259 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
260 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
262 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION
263 || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
265 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
269 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
272 s->packet_length += n;
273 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
278 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
279 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
280 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
281 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
283 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
286 * Call this to get a new input record.
287 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
288 * or non-blocking IO.
289 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
290 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
291 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
292 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
294 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
295 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
297 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
298 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
302 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
304 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
306 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
312 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
315 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
317 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
318 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
325 /* check if we have the header */
326 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
327 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
328 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
330 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
331 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
335 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
339 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
342 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
345 /* Lets check version */
346 if (!s->first_packet) {
347 if (version != s->version) {
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
349 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
350 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
352 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
354 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
355 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
360 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
366 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
371 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
374 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
376 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
377 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
379 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
381 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
383 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
388 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
391 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
392 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
394 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
397 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
398 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
399 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
400 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
404 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
405 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
408 /* check is not needed I believe */
409 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
410 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
415 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
416 rr->data = rr->input;
418 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
421 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
422 * 1: if the padding is valid
423 * -1: if the padding is invalid
426 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
431 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
434 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
435 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
440 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
441 if ((sess != NULL) &&
442 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
443 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
444 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
445 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
446 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
447 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
450 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
452 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
455 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
456 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
457 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
458 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
460 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
461 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
462 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
463 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
464 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
469 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
471 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
472 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
473 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
474 * contents of the padding bytes.
477 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
478 rr->length -= mac_size;
481 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
482 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
485 rr->length -= mac_size;
486 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
489 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
490 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
491 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
493 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
499 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
500 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
501 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
502 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
503 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
505 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
507 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
511 /* r->length is now just compressed */
512 if (s->expand != NULL) {
513 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
514 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
518 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
519 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
525 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
526 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
533 * So at this point the following is true
534 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
535 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
536 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
537 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
541 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
542 s->packet_length = 0;
544 /* just read a 0 length packet */
545 if (rr->length == 0) {
546 empty_record_count++;
547 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
548 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
555 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
567 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
573 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
574 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
575 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
586 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
592 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
593 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
594 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
595 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
601 wr->input = wr->data;
607 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
608 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
610 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
612 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
616 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
617 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
621 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
622 i = s->handshake_func(s);
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
632 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
633 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
634 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
635 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
636 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
637 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
638 * report the error in a way the user will notice
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
647 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
648 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
652 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
659 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
660 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
662 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
663 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
665 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
675 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
676 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
678 unsigned char *p, *plen;
679 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
684 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
688 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
689 * will happen with non blocking IO
692 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
694 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
695 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
696 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
699 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
703 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
706 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
712 if ((sess == NULL) ||
713 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
714 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
716 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
722 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
728 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
730 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
732 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
733 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
736 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
738 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
739 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
740 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
743 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
748 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
750 /* insufficient space */
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
756 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
759 if (create_empty_fragment) {
760 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
762 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
763 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
764 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
766 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
767 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
771 } else if (prefix_len) {
772 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
774 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
775 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
776 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
782 /* write the header */
784 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
787 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
789 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
790 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
792 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
793 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
796 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
798 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
801 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
802 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
803 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
804 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
805 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
809 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
810 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
811 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
817 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
818 wr->data = p + eivlen;
819 wr->length = (int)len;
820 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
823 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
826 /* first we compress */
827 if (s->compress != NULL) {
828 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
833 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
834 wr->input = wr->data;
838 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
839 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
844 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
846 wr->length += mac_size;
854 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
856 wr->length += eivlen;
859 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
862 /* record length after mac and block padding */
863 s2n(wr->length, plen);
866 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
869 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
870 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
872 if (create_empty_fragment) {
874 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
880 /* now let's set up wb */
881 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
884 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
887 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
888 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
889 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
890 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
892 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
893 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
898 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
899 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
903 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
906 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
907 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
908 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
909 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
916 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
917 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
918 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
919 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
920 (unsigned int)wb->left);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
928 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
929 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION
930 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
931 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
932 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
933 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
935 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
937 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
938 * using a datagram service
950 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
951 * 'type' is one of the following:
953 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
954 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
955 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
957 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
958 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
960 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
961 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
962 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
963 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
964 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
965 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
966 * Change cipher spec protocol
967 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
969 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
971 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
972 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
973 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
974 * Application data protocol
975 * none of our business
977 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
982 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
984 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
985 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
988 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
989 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
991 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
996 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
997 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
999 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1000 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1005 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1008 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1011 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1012 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1013 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1018 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1021 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1022 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1023 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1032 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1035 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1036 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1037 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1038 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1040 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1042 /* get new packet if necessary */
1043 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1044 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1049 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1051 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1052 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1053 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1054 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1060 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1063 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1065 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1069 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1070 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1072 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1073 * doing a handshake for the first time
1075 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1076 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1077 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1085 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1088 n = (unsigned int)len;
1090 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1094 if (rr->length == 0) {
1095 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1097 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1098 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1099 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1106 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1107 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1111 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1112 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1115 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1116 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1117 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1119 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1120 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1121 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1122 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1123 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1124 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1125 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1126 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1129 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1130 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1132 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1134 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1135 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1136 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1141 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1142 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1144 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1146 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1148 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1152 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1153 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1158 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1159 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1160 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1163 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1165 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1166 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1167 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1168 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1170 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1171 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1172 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1178 if (s->msg_callback)
1179 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1180 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1181 s->msg_callback_arg);
1183 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1184 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1185 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1186 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1187 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1188 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1193 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1197 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1198 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1201 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1202 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1203 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1204 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1206 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1207 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1208 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1209 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1216 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1217 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1222 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1223 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1224 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1227 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1228 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1229 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1230 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1231 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1232 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1233 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1235 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1238 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1241 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1242 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1243 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1245 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1247 if (s->msg_callback)
1248 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1249 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1251 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1252 cb = s->info_callback;
1253 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1254 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1257 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1258 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1261 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1262 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1263 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1264 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1268 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1269 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1270 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1271 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1272 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1273 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1275 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1280 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1281 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1284 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1287 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1288 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1290 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1291 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1292 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1293 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1296 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1304 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1306 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1311 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1313 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1314 * what the record payload has to look like
1316 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1317 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1318 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1323 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1324 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1325 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1330 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1331 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1336 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1340 if (s->msg_callback)
1341 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1342 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1344 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1345 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1352 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1354 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1355 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1356 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1357 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1358 * are not as expected (and because this is
1359 * not really needed for clients except for
1360 * detecting protocol violations): */
1361 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1362 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1364 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1369 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1377 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1378 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1381 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1382 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1383 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1384 * problems in the blocking world
1386 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1387 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1388 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1389 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1400 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1401 * an unexpected message alert.
1403 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1408 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1411 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1413 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1415 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1416 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1417 * happen when type != rr->type
1419 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1424 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1425 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1426 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1427 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1428 * started), we will indulge it.
1430 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1431 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1432 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1433 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1434 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1435 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1436 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1437 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1440 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1443 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1451 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1456 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1462 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1463 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1465 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1467 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1468 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1469 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1471 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1475 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1476 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1480 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1484 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1485 * before we read the finished message
1487 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1488 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1489 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1491 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1492 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1495 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1497 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1502 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1507 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1509 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1510 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1511 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1512 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1513 * protocol_version alerts */
1516 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1517 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1518 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1520 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1521 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1522 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1523 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1524 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1526 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1532 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1535 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1537 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1538 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1540 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1543 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1544 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1547 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1548 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1550 if (s->msg_callback)
1551 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1552 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1554 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1555 cb = s->info_callback;
1556 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1557 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1560 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1561 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);