More tweaks for comments due indent issues
[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58 /* ====================================================================
59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
60  *
61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63  * are met:
64  *
65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
67  *
68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71  *    distribution.
72  *
73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77  *
78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
82  *
83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86  *
87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88  *    acknowledgment:
89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91  *
92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104  * ====================================================================
105  *
106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109  *
110  */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <limits.h>
114 #include <errno.h>
115 #define USE_SOCKETS
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120
121 #ifndef  EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
123 #endif
124
125 #if     defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126         !(      defined(AES_ASM) &&     ( \
127                 defined(__x86_64)       || defined(__x86_64__)  || \
128                 defined(_M_AMD64)       || defined(_M_X64)      || \
129                 defined(__INTEL__)      ) \
130         )
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
133 #endif
134
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
138
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
140         {
141         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142          * packet by another n bytes.
143          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
147          */
148         int i,len,left;
149         long align=0;
150         unsigned char *pkt;
151         SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
152
153         if (n <= 0) return n;
154
155         rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
156         if (rb->buf == NULL)
157                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
158                         return -1;
159
160         left  = rb->left;
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162         align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163         align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
164 #endif
165
166         if (!extend)
167                 {
168                 /* start with empty packet ... */
169                 if (left == 0)
170                         rb->offset = align;
171                 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
172                         {
173                         /* check if next packet length is large
174                          * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175                         pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176                         if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177                             && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
178                                 {
179                                 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180                                  * and its length field is insane, we can
181                                  * only be led to wrong decision about
182                                  * whether memmove will occur or not.
183                                  * Header values has no effect on memmove
184                                  * arguments and therefore no buffer
185                                  * overrun can be triggered. */
186                                 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
187                                 rb->offset = align;
188                                 }
189                         }
190                 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191                 s->packet_length = 0;
192                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
193                 }
194
195         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
198         if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
199                 {
200                 if (left == 0 && extend)
201                         return 0;
202                 if (left > 0 && n > left)
203                         n = left;
204                 }
205
206         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
207         if (left >= n)
208                 {
209                 s->packet_length+=n;
210                 rb->left=left-n;
211                 rb->offset+=n;
212                 return(n);
213                 }
214
215         /* else we need to read more data */
216
217         len = s->packet_length;
218         pkt = rb->buf+align;
219         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
220          * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
221          * 'left' extra ones at the end */
222         if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
223                 {
224                 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
225                 s->packet = pkt;
226                 rb->offset = len + align;
227                 }
228
229         if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
230                 {
231                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
232                 return -1;
233                 }
234
235         if (!s->read_ahead)
236                 /* ignore max parameter */
237                 max = n;
238         else
239                 {
240                 if (max < n)
241                         max = n;
242                 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
243                         max = rb->len - rb->offset;
244                 }
245
246         while (left < n)
247                 {
248                 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
249                  * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
250                  * len+max if possible) */
251
252                 clear_sys_error();
253                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
254                         {
255                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
256                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
257                         }
258                 else
259                         {
260                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
261                         i = -1;
262                         }
263
264                 if (i <= 0)
265                         {
266                         rb->left = left;
267                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
268                                 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
269                                 if (len+left == 0)
270                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
271                         return(i);
272                         }
273                 left+=i;
274                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
275                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
276                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
277                 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
278                         {
279                         if (n > left)
280                                 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
281                         }
282                 }
283
284         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
285         rb->offset += n;
286         rb->left = left - n;
287         s->packet_length += n;
288         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
289         return(n);
290         }
291
292 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
293  * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
294  * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
295  * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
296 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297
298 /*-
299  * Call this to get a new input record.
300  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
301  * or non-blocking IO.
302  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
303  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
304  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
305  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
306  */
307 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
308 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
309         {
310         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
311         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
312         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
313         SSL_SESSION *sess;
314         unsigned char *p;
315         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
316         short version;
317         unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
318         size_t extra;
319         unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
320
321         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
322         sess=s->session;
323
324         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
325                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
326         else
327                 extra=0;
328         if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
329                 {
330                 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
331                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
332                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333                 return -1;
334                 }
335
336 again:
337         /* check if we have the header */
338         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
339                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
340                 {
341                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
342                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
343                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
344
345                 p=s->packet;
346                 if (s->msg_callback)
347                         s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
348
349                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
350                 rr->type= *(p++);
351                 ssl_major= *(p++);
352                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
353                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
354                 n2s(p,rr->length);
355 #if 0
356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
357 #endif
358
359                 /* Lets check version */
360                 if (!s->first_packet)
361                         {
362                         if (version != s->version)
363                                 {
364                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
366                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
367                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
368                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
369                                 goto f_err;
370                                 }
371                         }
372
373                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
374                         {
375                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
376                         goto err;
377                         }
378
379                 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
380                         {
381                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
382                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
383                         goto f_err;
384                         }
385
386                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
387                 }
388
389         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
390
391         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
392                 {
393                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
394                 i=rr->length;
395                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
396                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
397                 /* now n == rr->length,
398                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
399                 }
400
401         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
402
403         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
404          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
405          */
406         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
407
408         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
409          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
410          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
411          * the decryption or by the decompression
412          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
413          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
414
415         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
416          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
417
418         /* check is not needed I believe */
419         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
420                 {
421                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
422                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
423                 goto f_err;
424                 }
425
426         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
427         rr->data=rr->input;
428
429         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
430         /*-
431          * enc_err is:
432          *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
433          *    1: if the padding is valid
434          *    -1: if the padding is invalid 
435          */
436         if (enc_err == 0)
437                 {
438                 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
439                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
440                 goto f_err;
441                 }
442
443 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
444 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
445 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
446 printf("\n");
447 #endif
448
449         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
450         if ((sess != NULL) &&
451             (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
452             (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
453                 {
454                 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
455                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
456                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
457                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
458                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
459
460                 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
461                 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
462
463                 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
464                  * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
465                  * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
466                  * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
467                  */
468                 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
469                     /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
470                     (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
471                      orig_len < mac_size+1))
472                         {
473                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
474                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
475                         goto f_err;
476                         }
477
478                 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
479                         {
480                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
481                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
482                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
483                          * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
484                          * */
485                         mac = mac_tmp;
486                         ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
487                         rr->length -= mac_size;
488                         }
489                 else
490                         {
491                         /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
492                          * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
493                          * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
494                         rr->length -= mac_size;
495                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
496                         }
497
498                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
499                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
500                         enc_err = -1;
501                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
502                         enc_err = -1;
503                 }
504
505         if (enc_err < 0)
506                 {
507                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
508                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
509                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
510                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
511                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
512                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
513                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
514                 goto f_err;
515                 }
516
517         /* r->length is now just compressed */
518         if (s->expand != NULL)
519                 {
520                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
521                         {
522                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
523                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
524                         goto f_err;
525                         }
526                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
527                         {
528                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
529                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
530                         goto f_err;
531                         }
532                 }
533
534         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
535                 {
536                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
537                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
538                 goto f_err;
539                 }
540
541         rr->off=0;
542         /*-
543          * So at this point the following is true
544          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
545          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
546          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
547          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
548          *                         after use :-).
549          */
550
551         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
552         s->packet_length=0;
553
554         /* just read a 0 length packet */
555         if (rr->length == 0)
556                 {
557                 empty_record_count++;
558                 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
559                         {
560                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
561                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
562                         goto f_err;
563                         }
564                 goto again;
565                 }
566
567 #if 0
568 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
569 #endif
570
571         return(1);
572
573 f_err:
574         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
575 err:
576         return(ret);
577         }
578
579 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
580         {
581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
582         int i;
583         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
584
585         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
586         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
587                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
588         if (i < 0)
589                 return(0);
590         else
591                 rr->length=i;
592         rr->data=rr->comp;
593 #endif
594         return(1);
595         }
596
597 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
598         {
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
600         int i;
601         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
602
603         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
604         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
605                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
606                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
607         if (i < 0)
608                 return(0);
609         else
610                 wr->length=i;
611
612         wr->input=wr->data;
613 #endif
614         return(1);
615         }
616
617 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
618  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
619  */
620 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
621         {
622         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
623         int tot;
624         unsigned int n,nw;
625 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
626         unsigned int max_send_fragment;
627 #endif
628         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
629         int i;
630
631         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
632         OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
633         tot=s->s3->wnum;
634         s->s3->wnum=0;
635
636         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
637                 {
638                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
639                 if (i < 0) return(i);
640                 if (i == 0)
641                         {
642                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
643                         return -1;
644                         }
645                 }
646
647         /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write 
648          * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete 
649          * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding 
650          * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
651          * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
652          * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
653          * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
654          * will notice
655          */
656         if (len < tot)
657                 {
658                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
659                 return(-1);
660                 }
661
662         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
663          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
664         if (wb->left != 0)
665                 {
666                 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
667                 if (i<=0)
668                         {
669                         /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
670                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
671                         return i;
672                         }
673                 tot += i;       /* this might be last fragment */
674                 }
675
676 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
677         /*
678          * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
679          * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
680          * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
681          * compromise is considered worthy.
682          */
683         if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
684             len >= 4*(int)(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
685             s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
686             SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
687             EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
688                 {
689                 unsigned char aad[13];
690                 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
691                 int packlen;
692
693                 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
694                 if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
695                         max_send_fragment -= 512;
696
697                 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL)    /* allocate jumbo buffer */
698                         {
699                         ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
700
701                         packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
702                                         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
703                                         max_send_fragment,NULL);
704
705                         if (len>=8*(int)max_send_fragment)      packlen *= 8;
706                         else                            packlen *= 4;
707
708                         wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
709                         wb->len=packlen;
710                         }
711                 else if (tot==len)              /* done? */
712                         {
713                         OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);  /* free jumbo buffer */
714                         wb->buf = NULL;
715                         return tot;
716                         }
717
718                 n=(len-tot);
719                 for (;;)
720                         {
721                         if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
722                                 {
723                                 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);  /* free jumbo buffer */
724                                 wb->buf = NULL;
725                                 break;
726                                 }
727
728                         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
729                                 {
730                                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
731                                 if (i <= 0)
732                                         {
733                                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
734                                         return i;
735                                         }
736                                 }
737
738                         if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
739                                 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
740                         else
741                                 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
742
743                         memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
744                         aad[8]=type;
745                         aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
746                         aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
747                         aad[11]=0;
748                         aad[12]=0;
749                         mb_param.out = NULL;
750                         mb_param.inp = aad;
751                         mb_param.len = nw;
752
753                         packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
754                                         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
755                                         sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
756
757                         if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
758                                 {
759                                 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);  /* free jumbo buffer */
760                                 wb->buf = NULL;
761                                 break;
762                                 }
763
764                         mb_param.out = wb->buf;
765                         mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
766                         mb_param.len = nw;
767
768                         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
769                                         EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
770                                         sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
771                                 return -1;
772
773                         s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
774                         if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
775                                 {
776                                 int j=6;
777                                 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
778                                 }
779
780                         wb->offset = 0;
781                         wb->left = packlen;
782
783                         s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
784                         s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
785                         s->s3->wpend_type= type;
786                         s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
787
788                         i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
789                         if (i<=0)
790                                 {
791                                 if (i<0)
792                                         {
793                                         OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
794                                         wb->buf = NULL;
795                                         }
796                                 s->s3->wnum=tot;
797                                 return i;
798                                 }
799                         if (i==(int)n)
800                                 {
801                                 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);  /* free jumbo buffer */
802                                 wb->buf = NULL;
803                                 return tot+i;
804                                 }
805                         n-=i;
806                         tot+=i;
807                         }
808                 }
809         else
810 #endif
811         if (tot==len)           /* done? */
812                 {
813                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
814                         !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
815                         ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
816
817                 return tot;
818                 }
819
820
821         n=(len-tot);
822         for (;;)
823                 {
824                 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
825                         nw=s->max_send_fragment;
826                 else
827                         nw=n;
828
829                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
830                 if (i <= 0)
831                         {
832                         /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
833                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
834                         return i;
835                         }
836
837                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
838                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
839                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
840                         {
841                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
842                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
843                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
844
845                         if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
846                                 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
847                                 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
848
849                         return tot+i;
850                         }
851
852                 n-=i;
853                 tot+=i;
854                 }
855         }
856
857 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
858                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
859         {
860         unsigned char *p,*plen;
861         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
862         int prefix_len=0;
863         int eivlen;
864         long align=0;
865         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
866         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
867         SSL_SESSION *sess;
868
869
870         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
871          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
872         if (wb->left != 0)
873                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
874
875         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
876         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
877                 {
878                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
879                 if (i <= 0)
880                         return(i);
881                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
882                 }
883
884         if (wb->buf == NULL)
885                 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
886                         return -1;
887
888         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
889                 return 0;
890
891         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
892         sess=s->session;
893
894         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
895                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
896                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
897                 {
898 #if 1
899                 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1;     /* must be AEAD cipher */
900 #else
901                 clear=1;
902 #endif
903                 mac_size=0;
904                 }
905         else
906                 {
907                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
908                 if (mac_size < 0)
909                         goto err;
910                 }
911
912         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
913         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
914                 {
915                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
916                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
917
918                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
919                         {
920                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
921                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
922                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
923                          * together with the actual payload) */
924                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
925                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
926                                 goto err;
927
928                         if (prefix_len >
929                 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
930                                 {
931                                 /* insufficient space */
932                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933                                 goto err;
934                                 }
935                         }
936                 
937                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
938                 }
939
940         if (create_empty_fragment)
941                 {
942 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
943                 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
944                  * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
945                  * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
946                  * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
947                 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
948                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
949 #endif
950                 p = wb->buf + align;
951                 wb->offset  = align;
952                 }
953         else if (prefix_len)
954                 {
955                 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
956                 }
957         else
958                 {
959 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
960                 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
961                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
962 #endif
963                 p = wb->buf + align;
964                 wb->offset  = align;
965                 }
966
967         /* write the header */
968
969         *(p++)=type&0xff;
970         wr->type=type;
971
972         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
973         /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
974          * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
975          */
976         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
977                                 && !s->renegotiate
978                                 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
979                 *(p++) = 0x1;
980         else
981                 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
982
983         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
984         plen=p; 
985         p+=2;
986         /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
987         if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
988                 {
989                 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
990                 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
991                         {
992                         eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
993                         if (eivlen <= 1)
994                                 eivlen = 0;
995                         }
996                 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
997                 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
998                         eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
999                 else
1000                         eivlen = 0;
1001                 }
1002         else 
1003                 eivlen = 0;
1004
1005         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1006         wr->data=p + eivlen;
1007         wr->length=(int)len;
1008         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1009
1010         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1011          * wr->data */
1012
1013         /* first we compress */
1014         if (s->compress != NULL)
1015                 {
1016                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1017                         {
1018                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1019                         goto err;
1020                         }
1021                 }
1022         else
1023                 {
1024                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1025                 wr->input=wr->data;
1026                 }
1027
1028         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1029          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
1030          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1031
1032         if (mac_size != 0)
1033                 {
1034                 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1035                         goto err;
1036                 wr->length+=mac_size;
1037                 }
1038
1039         wr->input=p;
1040         wr->data=p;
1041
1042         if (eivlen)
1043                 {
1044         /*      if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1045                         goto err; */
1046                 wr->length += eivlen;
1047                 }
1048
1049         if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err;
1050
1051         /* record length after mac and block padding */
1052         s2n(wr->length,plen);
1053
1054         if (s->msg_callback)
1055                 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1056
1057         /* we should now have
1058          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1059          * wr->length long */
1060         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1061         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1062
1063         if (create_empty_fragment)
1064                 {
1065                 /* we are in a recursive call;
1066                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1067                  */
1068                 return wr->length;
1069                 }
1070
1071         /* now let's set up wb */
1072         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1073
1074         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1075         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1076         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1077         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1078         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1079
1080         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1081         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1082 err:
1083         return -1;
1084         }
1085
1086 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1087 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1088         unsigned int len)
1089         {
1090         int i;
1091         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1092
1093 /* XXXX */
1094         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1095                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1096                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1097                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1098                 {
1099                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1100                 return(-1);
1101                 }
1102
1103         for (;;)
1104                 {
1105                 clear_sys_error();
1106                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1107                         {
1108                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1109                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1110                                 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1111                                 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1112                         }
1113                 else
1114                         {
1115                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1116                         i= -1;
1117                         }
1118                 if (i == wb->left)
1119                         {
1120                         wb->left=0;
1121                         wb->offset+=i;
1122                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1123                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1124                         }
1125                 else if (i <= 0) {
1126                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1127                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1128                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1129                                    point in using a datagram service */
1130                                 wb->left = 0;
1131                         }
1132                         return(i);
1133                 }
1134                 wb->offset+=i;
1135                 wb->left-=i;
1136                 }
1137         }
1138
1139 /*-
1140  * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1141  * 'type' is one of the following:
1142  *
1143  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1144  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1145  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1146  *
1147  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1148  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1149  *
1150  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1151  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1152  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1153  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1154  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1155  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1156  *     Change cipher spec protocol
1157  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1158  *     Alert protocol
1159  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1160  *     Handshake protocol
1161  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1162  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1163  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1164  *     Application data protocol
1165  *             none of our business
1166  */
1167 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1168         {
1169         int al,i,j,ret;
1170         unsigned int n;
1171         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1172         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1173
1174         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1175                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1176                         return(-1);
1177
1178         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1179             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1180                 {
1181                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182                 return -1;
1183                 }
1184
1185         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1186                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1187                 {
1188                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1189                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1190                 unsigned int k;
1191
1192                 /* peek == 0 */
1193                 n = 0;
1194                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1195                         {
1196                         *dst++ = *src++;
1197                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1198                         n++;
1199                         }
1200                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1201                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1202                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1203                 return n;
1204         }
1205
1206         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1207
1208         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1209                 {
1210                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1211                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1212                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1213                 if (i == 0)
1214                         {
1215                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1216                         return(-1);
1217                         }
1218                 }
1219 start:
1220         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1221
1222         /*-
1223          * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
1224          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
1225          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
1226          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. 
1227          */
1228         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1229
1230         /* get new packet if necessary */
1231         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1232                 {
1233                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1234                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1235                 }
1236
1237         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1238
1239         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1240                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1241                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1242                 {
1243                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1244                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1245                 goto f_err;
1246                 }
1247
1248         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1249          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1250         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1251                 {
1252                 rr->length=0;
1253                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1254                 return(0);
1255                 }
1256
1257
1258         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1259                 {
1260                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1261                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1262                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1263                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1264                         {
1265                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1266                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1267                         goto f_err;
1268                         }
1269
1270                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1271
1272                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1273                         n = rr->length;
1274                 else
1275                         n = (unsigned int)len;
1276
1277                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1278                 if (!peek)
1279                         {
1280                         rr->length-=n;
1281                         rr->off+=n;
1282                         if (rr->length == 0)
1283                                 {
1284                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1285                                 rr->off=0;
1286                                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1287                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1288                                 }
1289                         }
1290                 return(n);
1291                 }
1292
1293
1294         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1295          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1296
1297         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1298          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1299          */
1300                 {
1301                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1302                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1303                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1304
1305                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1306                         {
1307                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1308                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1309                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1310                         }
1311                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1312                         {
1313                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1314                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1315                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1316                         }
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1318                 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1319                         {
1320                         tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1321
1322                         /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1323                         rr->length = 0;
1324                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1325                         BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1326                         BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1327                         return(-1);
1328                         }
1329 #endif
1330
1331                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1332                         {
1333                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1334                         if (rr->length < n)
1335                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1336
1337                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1338                         while (n-- > 0)
1339                                 {
1340                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1341                                 rr->length--;
1342                                 }
1343
1344                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1345                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1346                         }
1347                 }
1348
1349         /*-
1350          * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1351          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1352          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 
1353          */
1354
1355         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1356         if ((!s->server) &&
1357                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1358                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1359                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1360                 {
1361                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1362
1363                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1364                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1365                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1366                         {
1367                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1368                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1369                         goto f_err;
1370                         }
1371
1372                 if (s->msg_callback)
1373                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1374
1375                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1376                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1377                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1378                         {
1379                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1380                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1381                                 {
1382                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1383                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1384                                 if (i == 0)
1385                                         {
1386                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1387                                         return(-1);
1388                                         }
1389
1390                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1391                                         {
1392                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1393                                                 {
1394                                                 BIO *bio;
1395                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1396                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1397                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1398                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1399                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1400                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1401                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1402                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1403                                                 return(-1);
1404                                                 }
1405                                         }
1406                                 }
1407                         }
1408                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1409                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1410                 goto start;
1411                 }
1412         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1413          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1414          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1415          */
1416         if (s->server &&
1417                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1418                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1419                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1420                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1421                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1422                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1423                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1424                 
1425                 {
1426                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1427                 rr->length = 0;
1428                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1429                 goto start;
1430                 }
1431         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1432                 {
1433                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1434                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1435
1436                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1437
1438                 if (s->msg_callback)
1439                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1440
1441                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1442                         cb=s->info_callback;
1443                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1444                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1445
1446                 if (cb != NULL)
1447                         {
1448                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1449                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1450                         }
1451
1452                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1453                         {
1454                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1455                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1456                                 {
1457                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1458                                 return(0);
1459                                 }
1460                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1461                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1462                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1463                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1464                          * expects it to succeed.
1465                          *
1466                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1467                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1468                          */
1469                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1470                                 {
1471                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1472                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1473                                 goto f_err;
1474                                 }
1475 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1476                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1477                                 return(0);
1478 #endif
1479                         }
1480                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1481                         {
1482                         char tmp[16];
1483
1484                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1485                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1486                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1487                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1488                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1489                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1490                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1491                         return(0);
1492                         }
1493                 else
1494                         {
1495                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1496                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1497                         goto f_err;
1498                         }
1499
1500                 goto start;
1501                 }
1502
1503         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1504                 {
1505                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1506                 rr->length=0;
1507                 return(0);
1508                 }
1509
1510         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1511                 {
1512                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1513                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1514                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1515                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1516                         {
1517                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1518                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1519                         goto f_err;
1520                         }
1521
1522                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1523                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1524                         {
1525                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1526                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1527                         goto f_err;
1528                         }
1529
1530                 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1531                         {
1532                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1533                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1534                         goto f_err;
1535                         }
1536
1537                 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1538
1539                 rr->length=0;
1540
1541                 if (s->msg_callback)
1542                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1543
1544                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1545                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1546                         goto err;
1547                 else
1548                         goto start;
1549                 }
1550
1551         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1552         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1553                 {
1554                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1555                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1556                         {
1557 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1558        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1559        * protocol violations): */
1560                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1561                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1562                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1563 #else
1564                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1565 #endif
1566                         s->renegotiate=1;
1567                         s->new_session=1;
1568                         }
1569                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1570                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1571                 if (i == 0)
1572                         {
1573                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1574                         return(-1);
1575                         }
1576
1577                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1578                         {
1579                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1580                                 {
1581                                 BIO *bio;
1582                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1583                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1584                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1585                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1586                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1587                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1588                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1589                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1590                                 return(-1);
1591                                 }
1592                         }
1593                 goto start;
1594                 }
1595
1596         switch (rr->type)
1597                 {
1598         default:
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1600                 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1601                  * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1602                  */
1603                 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1604                         {
1605                         rr->length = 0;
1606                         goto start;
1607                         }
1608 #endif
1609                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1610                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1611                 goto f_err;
1612         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1613         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1614         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1615                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1616                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1617                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1618                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1619                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620                 goto f_err;
1621         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1622                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1623                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1624                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1625                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1626                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1627                  * we will indulge it.
1628                  */
1629                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1630                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1631                         ((
1632                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1633                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1634                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1635                                 ) || (
1636                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1637                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1638                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1639                                         )
1640                                 ))
1641                         {
1642                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1643                         return(-1);
1644                         }
1645                 else
1646                         {
1647                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1648                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1649                         goto f_err;
1650                         }
1651                 }
1652         /* not reached */
1653
1654 f_err:
1655         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1656 err:
1657         return(-1);
1658         }
1659
1660 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1661         {
1662         int i;
1663         const char *sender;
1664         int slen;
1665
1666         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1667                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1668         else
1669                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1670
1671         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1672                 {
1673                 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1674                         {
1675                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1676                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1677                         return (0);
1678                         }
1679
1680                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1681                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1682                 }
1683
1684         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1685                 return(0);
1686
1687         /* we have to record the message digest at
1688          * this point so we can get it before we read
1689          * the finished message */
1690         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1691                 {
1692                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1693                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1694                 }
1695         else
1696                 {
1697                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1698                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1699                 }
1700
1701         i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1702                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1703         if (i == 0)
1704                 {
1705                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1706                 return 0;
1707                 }
1708         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1709
1710         return(1);
1711         }
1712
1713 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1714         {
1715         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1716         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1717         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1718                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1719         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1720         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1721         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1722                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1723
1724         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1725         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1726         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1727         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1728                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1729         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1730          * some time in the future */
1731         return -1;
1732         }
1733
1734 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1735         {
1736         int i,j;
1737         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1738
1739         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1740         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1741         if (i <= 0)
1742                 {
1743                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1744                 }
1745         else
1746                 {
1747                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1748                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1749                  * we will not worry too much. */
1750                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1751                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1752
1753                 if (s->msg_callback)
1754                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1755
1756                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1757                         cb=s->info_callback;
1758                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1759                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1760
1761                 if (cb != NULL)
1762                         {
1763                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1764                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1765                         }
1766                 }
1767         return(i);
1768         }