2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
160 # include <openssl/fips.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
167 # include <openssl/engine.h>
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
172 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_client_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
185 ssl_undefined_function,
186 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
188 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
191 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
192 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
194 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
196 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 cb = s->info_callback;
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
211 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
212 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
215 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
216 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
225 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
227 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
228 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
232 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
233 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
237 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
239 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
249 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
250 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
255 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
257 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
269 /* setup buffing BIO */
270 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
387 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
390 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
395 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
396 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
400 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
401 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
403 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
404 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
409 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
419 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
420 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
421 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
424 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
430 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
434 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
437 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
438 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
441 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
442 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
443 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
444 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
446 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
449 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
451 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
452 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
458 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
459 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
460 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
463 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
467 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
468 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
469 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
471 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
475 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
476 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
478 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
481 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
485 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
486 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
487 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
489 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
490 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
492 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
494 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
496 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
500 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
501 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
510 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
511 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
513 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
516 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
520 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
521 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
522 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
523 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
524 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
526 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
528 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
534 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
537 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
538 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
539 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
540 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
545 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
547 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
552 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
560 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
569 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
572 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
577 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
579 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
580 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
581 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
582 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
589 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
593 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
594 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
595 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
599 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
600 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
604 /* clean a few things up */
605 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
607 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
608 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
613 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
616 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
617 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
618 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
624 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
626 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
630 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
631 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
634 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
647 /* did we do anything */
648 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
650 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
654 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
655 new_state = s->state;
657 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
658 s->state = new_state;
668 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
672 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
675 unsigned char *p, *d;
679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
685 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
686 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
687 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
688 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
689 !sess->session_id_length ||
692 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
693 * "ticket" without a session ID.
695 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
697 (sess->not_resumable)) {
698 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
701 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
702 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
703 int options = s->options;
704 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
705 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
706 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
708 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
712 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
714 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
719 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
721 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
722 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
725 * We only support one version: update method
727 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
728 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
729 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
731 s->client_version = s->version;
733 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
735 p = s->s3->client_random;
738 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
739 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
753 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
754 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
757 /* Do the message type and length last */
758 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
761 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
762 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
763 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
764 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
765 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
766 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
767 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
768 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
771 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
772 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
773 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
774 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
775 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
776 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
777 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
778 * know that is maximum server supports.
779 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
780 * containing version 1.0.
782 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
783 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
784 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
785 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
786 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
787 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
788 * the negotiated version.
791 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
792 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
793 s->client_version = s->version;
795 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
796 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
800 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
801 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
807 i = s->session->session_id_length;
810 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
818 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
820 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
824 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
825 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
826 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
829 /* Ciphers supported */
830 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
835 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
837 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
838 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
841 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
842 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
843 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
849 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
853 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
854 || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
857 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
859 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
860 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
864 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
868 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
873 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
875 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
882 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
883 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
886 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
887 return ssl_do_write(s);
889 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
893 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
895 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
898 unsigned char *p, *d;
899 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
906 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
907 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
912 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
913 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
914 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
919 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
921 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
922 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
923 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
925 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
927 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
934 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
935 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
940 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
941 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
942 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
943 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
944 int options = s->options;
945 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
946 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
947 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
949 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
950 s->version = hversion;
951 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
953 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
954 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
957 s->version = hversion;
958 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
961 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
964 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
966 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
967 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
972 /* load the server hello data */
973 /* load the server random */
974 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
975 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
979 /* get the session-id */
982 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
983 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
989 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
990 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
991 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
992 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
993 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
994 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
995 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
996 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
997 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
998 * server wants to resume.
1000 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1001 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1002 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1003 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1004 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1005 &s->session->master_key_length,
1007 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1008 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1009 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1016 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1018 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
1019 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
1020 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1021 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1022 /* actually a client application bug */
1023 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1025 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1031 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1032 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1033 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1034 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1035 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1037 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1042 s->session->session_id_length = j;
1043 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1046 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1048 /* unknown cipher */
1049 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1054 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1057 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
1058 c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1063 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1065 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1066 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1068 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1069 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1075 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1076 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1077 * set and use it for comparison.
1079 if (s->session->cipher)
1080 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1081 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1082 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
1084 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
1087 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1089 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1093 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1095 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1098 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1100 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1102 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1104 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1106 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1110 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1111 * using compression.
1113 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1119 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1122 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1127 else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1132 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1134 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1135 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1137 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1140 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1145 /* TLS extensions */
1146 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1153 /* wrong packet length */
1154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1161 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1163 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1167 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1169 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1170 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1172 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1174 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1176 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1177 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1180 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1183 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1188 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1189 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1190 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1191 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1195 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1200 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1202 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1208 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1209 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1213 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1215 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1218 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1223 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1225 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1230 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1232 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1235 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1244 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1245 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1247 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1248 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1249 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1251 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1253 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1256 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1258 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1262 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1263 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1264 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1266 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1268 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1269 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1271 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1274 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1277 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1279 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1280 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1281 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1285 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1286 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1287 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1288 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1289 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1290 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1291 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1293 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1297 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1301 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1302 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1306 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1311 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1312 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1314 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1316 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1319 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1320 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1322 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1325 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1326 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1327 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1328 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1330 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1331 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1332 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1333 s->session->peer = x;
1335 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1336 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1338 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1339 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1340 s->session->peer = NULL;
1342 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1348 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1350 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1353 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1355 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1359 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1362 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1365 unsigned char *param, *p;
1367 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1368 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1369 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1377 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1378 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1379 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1381 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1384 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1387 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1388 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1390 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1391 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1392 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1393 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1397 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1399 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1401 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1404 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1406 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1411 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1412 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1415 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1416 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1417 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1418 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1419 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1422 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1426 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1427 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1429 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1430 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1431 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1435 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1436 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1437 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1441 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1442 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1443 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1447 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1450 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1453 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1455 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1458 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1459 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1462 if (param_len > n) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1469 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1470 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1471 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1474 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1475 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1479 if (i > n - param_len) {
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1481 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1487 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1488 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1489 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1491 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1492 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1493 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
1494 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1495 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1496 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1497 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1505 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1507 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1509 if (param_len > n) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1515 if (i > n - param_len) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1521 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1527 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1535 if (i > n - param_len) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1541 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1547 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1553 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1556 if (i > n - param_len) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1562 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1568 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1576 if (i > n - param_len) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1582 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1589 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1594 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1595 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1598 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1599 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1603 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1604 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1606 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1607 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1611 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1613 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1614 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1615 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1616 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1620 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1626 if (param_len > n) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1632 if (i > n - param_len) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1638 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1644 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1652 if (i > n - param_len) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1658 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1665 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1666 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1668 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1669 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1674 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1677 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1681 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
1682 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1688 if (param_len > n) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1694 if (i > n - param_len) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1700 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1706 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1714 if (i > n - param_len) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1720 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1726 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1734 if (i > n - param_len) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1740 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1747 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1748 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1750 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1751 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1755 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1756 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1758 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1759 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1762 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1764 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1766 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1767 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1769 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1772 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1775 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
1777 const EC_GROUP *group;
1779 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1785 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1786 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1787 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1791 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1792 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1793 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1796 if (param_len > n) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1801 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1802 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1804 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1809 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1810 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1812 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1816 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1817 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1821 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1825 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1827 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1829 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1830 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1831 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1833 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1839 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1840 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1841 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1846 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1849 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1850 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1851 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1855 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1858 p += encoded_pt_len;
1861 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1862 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1866 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1867 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1869 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1870 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1872 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1873 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1875 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1876 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1878 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1879 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1880 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1882 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1884 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1885 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1887 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1891 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1893 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1895 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1897 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1903 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1910 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1923 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1926 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1928 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1929 /* wrong packet length */
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1934 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1940 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1941 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1942 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1943 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1946 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1948 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1949 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1953 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1955 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1961 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1968 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1969 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1971 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1973 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1974 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1976 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1982 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1983 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1984 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1985 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1986 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1990 /* still data left over */
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1996 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1997 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2002 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2012 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2013 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
2017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2018 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2022 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2025 unsigned long n, nc, l;
2026 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
2027 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2028 const unsigned char *p, *q;
2030 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2032 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2033 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
2034 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
2035 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2040 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2042 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2043 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2045 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2046 * wont be doing client auth.
2048 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2049 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2055 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2056 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2061 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2062 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2063 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2066 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2071 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2073 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2078 /* get the certificate types */
2080 if (s->cert->ctypes) {
2081 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2082 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2084 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2085 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2086 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2087 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2088 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2089 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2091 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2092 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2094 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2097 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2100 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2101 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2103 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2106 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2107 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2108 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2109 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2111 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2114 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2117 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2125 /* get the CA RDNs */
2130 out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
2131 fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
2136 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2137 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2142 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2144 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2145 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2146 goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2154 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2155 /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
2156 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
2159 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2168 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2171 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2185 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2186 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2187 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2188 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2189 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2190 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2196 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2199 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2203 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2205 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2209 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2211 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2213 const unsigned char *p;
2216 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2217 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2218 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2219 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2225 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2231 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2233 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2234 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2235 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2237 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2240 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2242 * Remove the old session from the cache
2244 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2245 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2246 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2249 /* We carry on if this fails */
2250 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2254 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2255 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2260 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2261 s->session = new_sess;
2264 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2266 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2267 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2268 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2273 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2274 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2276 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2277 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2281 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2282 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2284 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2285 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2286 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2287 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2288 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2289 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2290 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2291 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2292 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2294 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2295 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2296 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2297 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2306 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2310 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2313 unsigned long resplen, n;
2314 const unsigned char *p;
2316 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2317 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2318 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2319 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2324 /* need at least status type + length */
2325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2329 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2330 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2336 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2337 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2341 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2342 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2343 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2344 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2345 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2350 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2352 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2354 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2367 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2372 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2377 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2378 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2379 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2380 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2381 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2386 /* should contain no data */
2387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2389 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2397 static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert)
2400 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2401 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2404 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2406 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2407 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2409 if (dh_srvr == NULL)
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2415 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2419 unsigned long alg_k;
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2422 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2426 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2428 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2429 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2430 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2431 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2432 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2433 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2436 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2437 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2439 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2441 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2445 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2447 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2449 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2451 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2458 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2459 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2462 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2463 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2465 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2466 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2471 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2472 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2475 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2476 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2477 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2480 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
2483 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2484 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2486 n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
2487 tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2489 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2491 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2500 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2501 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2506 s->session->master_key_length =
2507 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2509 session->master_key,
2512 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2516 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2517 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2518 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2519 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2520 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2521 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2522 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2523 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2524 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2525 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2526 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2527 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2529 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2532 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2534 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2537 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2539 authp = &authenticator;
2540 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2542 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2543 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2548 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2549 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2550 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2553 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2556 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2562 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2563 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2565 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2566 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2567 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2568 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2569 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2571 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2572 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2573 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2574 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2576 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2577 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2578 * optional authenticator omitted.
2581 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2582 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2583 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2584 p += enc_ticket->length;
2585 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2587 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2588 if (authp && authp->length) {
2589 s2n(authp->length, p);
2590 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2592 n += authp->length + 2;
2598 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2602 tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2603 tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2604 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
2608 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2609 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2610 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2611 * kssl_ctx->length);
2612 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2615 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2616 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2617 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
2619 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2621 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2626 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2628 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2630 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2634 s->session->master_key_length =
2635 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2637 session->master_key,
2641 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
2642 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2646 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2647 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2648 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2650 if (scert == NULL) {
2651 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2657 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
2658 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2660 dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert);
2661 if (dh_srvr == NULL)
2665 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2666 /* Use client certificate key */
2667 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2670 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2671 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2673 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2677 /* generate a new random key */
2678 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2682 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2690 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2691 * clear it out afterwards
2694 n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2695 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2704 /* generate master key from the result */
2705 s->session->master_key_length =
2706 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2708 session->master_key,
2713 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2716 /* send off the data */
2717 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2719 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2728 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2729 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2731 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2734 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2742 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2743 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2744 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2746 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2748 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2749 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2750 * To add such support, one needs to add
2751 * code that checks for appropriate
2752 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2753 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2754 * key on the same curve as the server's
2755 * and the key should be authorized for
2758 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2759 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2762 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2763 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2764 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2765 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2769 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2770 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2772 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2774 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2775 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2776 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2777 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2778 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2787 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2788 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2790 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2802 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2806 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2808 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2809 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2811 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2812 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2813 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2814 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2816 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2819 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2824 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2825 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2833 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2834 * clear it out afterwards
2837 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2838 if (field_size <= 0) {
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2842 n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2849 /* generate master key from the result */
2850 s->session->master_key_length =
2851 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2853 session->master_key,
2856 memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
2858 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2859 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2863 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2867 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2868 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2869 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2872 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2873 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2874 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2875 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2877 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 /* Encode the public key */
2882 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2883 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2884 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2885 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2887 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2888 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2890 /* copy the point */
2891 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2892 /* increment n to account for length field */
2896 /* Free allocated memory */
2897 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2898 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2899 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2900 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2901 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2902 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2904 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2905 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2906 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2907 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2910 unsigned int md_len;
2912 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2913 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2917 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2921 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2925 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2928 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2932 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2933 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2935 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2937 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2938 * certificate key for key exchange
2941 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2943 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2944 /* Generate session key */
2945 if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
2946 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2950 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2952 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2953 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2954 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2956 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2963 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2966 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2967 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2968 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2969 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2971 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2973 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2974 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2975 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2976 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2982 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2984 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2986 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2988 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2994 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2996 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2999 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
3002 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
3003 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3004 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3005 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
3006 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
3007 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3009 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3010 s->session->master_key_length =
3011 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3013 session->master_key,
3016 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
3019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3020 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3021 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
3022 /* send off the data */
3023 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
3025 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3032 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
3033 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3034 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3035 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3037 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3041 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3042 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3043 s->session->master_key)) <
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3052 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3054 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
3055 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
3058 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
3059 size_t identity_len;
3060 unsigned char *t = NULL;
3061 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
3062 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
3066 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3068 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
3072 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
3073 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
3074 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
3076 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
3077 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3081 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3083 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
3086 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
3087 identity_len = strlen(identity);
3088 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3093 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
3094 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
3096 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
3098 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
3102 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
3103 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
3104 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
3105 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
3106 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
3107 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3109 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3113 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
3114 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
3115 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
3116 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3118 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3122 s->session->master_key_length =
3123 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3125 session->master_key,
3128 s2n(identity_len, p);
3129 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
3130 n = 2 + identity_len;
3133 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3134 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
3136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3147 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
3148 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3151 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3152 return ssl_do_write(s);
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3155 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3156 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3157 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3158 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3159 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3162 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3166 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3169 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3171 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3177 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3179 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3180 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3181 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3182 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3183 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3184 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3185 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3186 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3187 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3190 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3195 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3196 * digest and cached handshake records.
3198 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3201 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3202 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3203 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3212 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3213 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3214 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3220 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3224 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3225 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3226 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3227 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3228 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3237 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3238 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3239 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3240 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3241 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3250 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3251 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3252 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3253 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3254 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3262 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3263 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3264 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3266 size_t sigsize = 64;
3267 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3268 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3269 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3273 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3274 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3282 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
3283 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3285 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3286 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3287 return ssl_do_write(s);
3289 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3290 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3296 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3297 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3298 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3300 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3302 unsigned long alg_k;
3303 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3305 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3306 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3309 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3310 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3312 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3313 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3315 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3316 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3317 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3318 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3319 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3320 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3321 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3322 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3323 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3326 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3328 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3329 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3330 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3334 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3339 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3342 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3345 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3346 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3347 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3348 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3350 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3355 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3360 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3363 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3366 /* We need to get a client cert */
3367 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3369 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3370 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3373 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3378 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3379 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3380 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3381 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3383 } else if (i == 1) {
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3386 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3392 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3393 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3396 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3397 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3398 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3401 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3405 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3406 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3409 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3411 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3412 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3413 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3415 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3416 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3420 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3421 return ssl_do_write(s);
3424 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3426 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3430 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3440 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3441 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3443 /* we don't have a certificate */
3444 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3447 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3453 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3456 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3459 /* This is the passed certificate */
3461 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3463 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3464 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3471 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3475 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3480 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3481 pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
3482 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3483 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3485 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3486 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3488 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3492 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3494 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3499 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3500 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3502 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3507 if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
3508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3511 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3512 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3514 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3518 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3519 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3521 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3526 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3528 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
3529 dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
3531 DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc);
3532 if (dh_srvr == NULL)
3534 dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p);
3538 if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
3539 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
3544 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
3546 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
3547 pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3549 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3551 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3552 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3554 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3560 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3562 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3563 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3565 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3572 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3578 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3585 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3586 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3587 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3588 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3589 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3590 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3591 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3593 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3597 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3598 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3601 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3602 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3604 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3605 * so permit appropriate message length.
3606 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3607 * and not its length.
3609 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3612 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3613 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3618 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3620 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3623 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3624 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3633 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3634 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3636 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3639 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3640 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3641 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3642 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3644 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3645 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3646 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3647 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3648 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3649 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3650 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3654 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3656 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
3657 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
3659 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3663 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3664 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3665 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3666 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3671 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3672 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);